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Abstract 
The subject matter of this thesis is the 1974-75 reorganisation 
of the French state broadcasting services which abolished the ORTF 
and the consequences of this reform for the relationship between the 
Government and broadcasting during the early years of the Giscardian 
presidency. 
The originality of the thesis lies in the fact that this 
reorganisation is placed in an explicitly political context, 
the election of the first non-Gaullist President of the Fifth 
Republic and the ensuing conflict between the Gaullist and Giscardian 
components of the governing coalition. The thesis also makes a 
significant contribution to the limited amount of academic literature 
on French broadcasting in general. 
Placed within the framework of the debate about the role 
of broadcasting in liberal democracies, the thesis examines the 
applicability of two antithetical models, the "fourth estate" 
and "state control" models, to the French broadcasting system 
since 1974. 
Neither is found to be satisfactory. Our detailed study of 
government-broadcasting relations since the reform demonstrates 
that the political executive, and within the executive particularly 
the President of the Republic, has at its disposal a variety of 
means through which to control those aspects of broadcasting in 
which it has an interest,, ranging from determing the legal frame- 
work of the state monopoly to appointing political sympathisers to 
key decision-making posts. Neither the broadcasting staff, 
the management or the boards of governors of the separate companies 
set up by the 1974 reform has the freedom of manoeuvre necessary 
for broadcasting in France to be regarded as a "fourth estate. " 
On the other hand, the "state control" model is too vague and 
monolithic, unable to allow for change except of a totally radical 
kind. On the basis of a wide variety of published and unpublished 
material and interviews with members of broadcasting management, 
staff, journalists, politicians and civil servants, this thesis shows 
that government-broadcasting relations in France have altered greatly 
in form and to a limited extent in substance since 1974. For example, 
the direct, overt controlswhich were so much of a feature of de Gaulle's 
presidency have given way to a reliance on indirect controls, 
particularly via partisan appointments within the broadcasting 
companies. This is especially the case with control over news 
output which has been largely internalised within the radio and 
television companies. 
I 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s the traditional public service broadcasting 
organisations of western Europe came under strong attack from a 
variety of quarters. In Great Britain, for example, the long-standing 
duopoly of the BBC and IBA was temporarily threatened by a recommendation 
of the Annan committee to allocate the fourth television channel to a 
new Open Broadcasting Authority. 
1 
A minority of the committee also 
recommended that the BBC be split up into two separate organisations, 
one of which would be concerned with television production and programming 
and the other with the provision of radio services. 
2 By the end of the 
decade the BBC's dependence on revenue from the licence fee set by the 
Government was posing the corporation grave financial problems. Not 
only were certain services cut back, but the BBC's relationship with the 
Government was called into question along with the very concept of a 
public service broadcasting system. 
3 
In Italy too the situation became particularly confused after a 
constitutional court decision in July 1976 that the state broadcasting 
monopoly, previously entrusted to the Italian broadcasting corporation, 
the RAI, was legally enforceable at the national level only. This 
decision resulted in the creation of a multitude of private television 
companies and radio stations, operating in conditions of unrestrained 
competition at the local and regional levels. 
4 
1. Report of the committee on the future of broadcasting, London, HMSO, 
command no. 753,1977, pp. 229-2 1. 
2. Ibid, pp. 108-117. 
3. See for example the article by John Howkins, "The crisis in public 
service broadcasting", Intermedia, vol. 8 no. 3, May 1980- 
4. R. Foenza, The radio phenomenon in Italy, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 
CCC/DC (70-93, February 1977. 
-15- 
In West Germany attempts were being made in the late 1970s to 
establish a commercial television channel. 
5 
In Ireland commercial 
pirate radio stations were set up in flagrant breach of the state 
monopoly, while Belgium, Sweden and Denmark among others were engaged 
in reorganising their own broadcasting services. 
6 
Writing in 1975 
Anthony Smith remarked that "one can now perhaps discern the beginning 
of the end of the age of the broadcasting monoliths. "7 
The reasons for this state of crisis in western European broadcasting 
may have differed from country to country. Yet what is striking is the 
extent to which well-known national broadcasting institutions such as 
the BBC and the RAI were exposed to severe criticism. Nor was France 
immune from this malaise in national broadcasting organisations. Indeed, 
in 197+-75 the ORTF, the custodian of the State's broadcasting monopoly, 
was abolished by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing following his victory 
in the 1974 presidential elections. The unitary structure of the ORTF 
was replaced by seven broadcasting companies, organisationally independent 
of each other. Each company was responsible for a particular function 
in the broadcasting process: transmission, production, radio programmes, 
television programmes and regional programmes. 
The subject matter of this thesis is the reorganisation of the 
French state broadcasting services in 1974-75 and the consequences 
of this reform for the relationship between the Government and broad- 
casting during the early years of the Giscardian presidency. 
5. Le Monde, May 30 1980. 
See also A. Williams, Broadcasting and democracy in West Germany, 
London, Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976. 
6. Intermedia, vol. 6 no. 2, April 1978. 
7. A. Smith, The shadow in the cave, London, Quartet, 1976 (second edition), 
p. 6. 
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There are several reasons why the 1974-75 broadcasting reform 
merits close study. Moreover, an examination of these reasons 
serves to place this thesis in the context of important changes 
taking place in the French political system. 
The reorganisation of the state broadcasting services was the 
first major substantive reform undertaken by the new President of the 
Republic on his accession to the presidential office. Elected by a 
very small majority of the voters on a platform of reformist change, 
the new President quickly introduced a series of reforms, particularly 
in the social field, to mark the start of the Giscardian regime. 
By mid-1976, however, the President's reformist zeal had waned 
quite dramatically. The poor performance of the parties of the 
governing right-wing coalition in the 1976 cantonal elections; 
the growing tension between the President and his Prime Minister, 
Jacques Chirac, which culminated in the latter's resignation from the 
premiership in August 1976; the lack of a reliable, stable and sufficiently 
large parliamentary base to support reform proposals; and, finally, 
the 
President's preoccupation with foreign policy - all contributed to a 
noticeable decline in reformist measures as the presidency established 
itself. 
8 
The capital gains tax reform, emasculated beyond recognition in the 
Gaullist dominated National Assembly in the spring of 1976, arguably marked 
the end of the reformist period of the Giscardian presidency. It is 
possible to view the reorganisation of the state broadcasting services, 
8. Domestic reforms usually require legislation, whereas in foreign 
policy the President's freedom of manoeuvre is more extensive. 
1 -17- 
therefore, as not only the first major reform of the new presidency but 
also one of the most important to be implemented. 
9 
A second reason for studying the 1974-75 broadcasting reform is that 
with Giscard d'Estaing's election to the presidency France, for the first 
time in the Fifth Republic, had a non-Gaullist President. The 1974 
reorganisation of state broadcasting was one of the first policy decisions 
not only of a new President, but more importantly of a President of a 
different political stance from his two Gaullist predecessors. Since 
Giscard d'Estaing's antipathy towards certain aspects of the Gaullist 
regime was well-known, it was clear that his election to the principal 
political office would in all probability exacerbate tension within the 
governing coalition and prove a source of considerable disquiet for a 
large section of the Gaullist party. In this context the abolition of 
the ORTF, a powerful symbol of the Gaullist state, marked the beginning 
of a new phase in the politics of the Fifth Republic. 
Furthermore, the Government's broadcasting bill and the ensuing 
debate in the National Assembly exemplified what was to become a salient 
feature of Giscard d'Estaing's presidency: the lack of a presidential 
power base in Parliament. The new President's dependence on Gaullist 
party support had a considerable influence on the content of the reform 
bill and the nature of the reorganisation. While at this early stage of 
the presidency Giscard d'Estaing could rely on Chirac to deliver the votes 
of the Gaullist parliamentary party, nonetheless the potential for conflict 
between the President of the Republic and the Gaullists in Parliament was 
evident even in these first few weeks of the new regime. This conflict 
was to become increasingly overt from 1976 onwards as Chirac adopted a 
highly critical attitude towards the Giscardian presidency. 
9. The other main reform of this period was the abortion law reform carried out in the autumn of 197]. 
1 -18- 
The reorganisation of the state broadcasting services illustrates 
this institutional and political conflict between a Giscardian President 
and a National Assembly in which the Gaullists remained the single 
largest group in the majority. While the compromise nature of the 
reform reflects in part Giscard d'Estaing's dependence on Gaullist 
parliamentary support, appointments to key managerial and editorial 
posts, particularly since 1976, and political coverage in news 
bulletins demonstrate the President's desire to marginalise the 
influence of Chirac and his supporters in the Gaullist party. 
A third reason for studying the 1974-75 reform of broadcasting 
is that it marked yet another attempt to provided a stable organisational 
framework for state broadcasting in France. The reform was the third 
major piece of legislation on the structure of the state broadcasting 
services in ten years. Established by statute in 1964, reformed by 
statute in 1972, the ORTF was finally abolished by statute in 1974. 
Moreover, other important reforms had been carried out during this 
period without recourse to a new broadcasting statute. These included 
the introduction of commercial advertising at the ORTF in 1968 and the 
reorganisation of the ORTF news departments undertaken in the wake of the 
1968 events at the instigation of the Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas. 
The sheer quantity and variety of the reforms introduced during the 
Fifth Republic prior to 1974 highlight the constant difficulties the 
French government has faced in establishing an acceptable structure for 
state broadcasting. In attempting to provide such a structure the 1974 
reform retained the twin concepts which have underpinned the organisation 
of the broadcasting media in France since the second world war: a public 
service system within the framework of the state monopoly. However, in 
I 
-19- 
abolishing the unitary structure of the ORTF and replacing it with 
separate companies, the reform marked a break with the tradition of 
a functionally centralised broadcasting institution. Moreover, by 
instituting a system of competition among the separate programme 
companies the reorganisation introduced a degree of economic liberalism 
into what had traditionally been a centralised, dirigiste structure. 
Finally, the 1974-75 reform is worthy of study because the 
relationship between politics and broadcasting in France has been 
a contentious issue since at least the outbreak of world war two. 
While the state monopoly has been traditionally accepted by all sides 
of the political spectrum with few exceptions, the way in which this 
monopoly has been used, not to say misused, by the Government in a crude 
partisan fashion has ensured the French broadcasting services of the 
unenviable reputation of being one of the most overtly controlled in 
western Europe. 
10 According to ministerial spokesmen the 1974 statute 
was designed to grant the broadcasting companies an unprecedented degree 
of independence from the Government. One objective of this thesis is to 
test the validity of this claim. 
In the light of the political importance of the 197+ broadcasting 
reform and indeed of government-broadcasting relations in France generally, 
the amount of academic literature on the subject is surprisingly and 
disappointingly limited. Partial accounts by members of the broadcasting 
management or staff are not uncommon, but even the best of these tend to 
treat only particular aspects of the subject, usually highly unsystematical] 
10. Up until recently the state monopoly was accepted as the most 
desirable framework for the organisation of broadcasting by the 
Socialist and Communist parties, the broadcasting unions, the 
majority of the Gaullist party and some Giscardians. - Only a few Gaullists and some Giscardians, backed by business interests, 
favoured the introduction of a commercial television channel. 
-20- I 
ll 
In any case they mainly predate the 1974 reform. 
There is also a strong tradition of legalistic approaches to the 
subject, typefied by Charles Debbasch's massive volume on the 1964 
ORTF statute. 
12 The most recent example of this approach is the study 
by Jacques Chevallier entitled La radio-television francaise entre 
deux rýformes. This work examines the 1972 ORTF statute and the 1974 
broadcasting statute from a jurisprudential viewpoint. 
13 However, 
Chevallier tends to underestimate the importance of the political 
context of the 197+ reform. Moreover, as his study was published 
in 1975 it inevitably takes a very short-term perspective on the 
significance of the reorganisation. Nor does it contain any material 
on the consequences of the reform with regard to such important matters 
as news coverage and the development of pirate radio stations. 
Observation studies by media sociologists, of which there have 
been several recent examples in this country, would appear to be much 
less common in France. 
14 
Nor, surprisingly, have French political 
scientists directed their analytic skills to the question of government- 
broadcasting relations in their own country, though journalists have 
been less reluctant. 
15 
11. See for example R. Louis, L'ORTF un combat, Paris, Seuil, 1968; 
J. Thibau, Une television pour tous les franc, Paris, Seuil, 
1970 and La t61evision, le pouvoir et 1'argent, Paris, Calmaril Levy, 
1973; A. Conte, Hommes libres, Paris, Plon, 1973; A. Astoux, Ondes de 
choc, Paris, Plon, 1978; and J. Fremontier, Vive la television, 
messieurs, Paris, Editions du Rocher, 1975. 
12. C. Debbasch, Trait4 du droit de la radiodiffusion: radio et television, 
Paris, Librairie generate de droit et de jurisprudence, 1967. 
13. J. Chevallier, La radio-t4levision francaise entre deux reformes, 
Paris, Librairie gen rale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975. 
14. See for example T. Burns, The BBC: public institution and private 
world, London, Macmillan, 1977; P. Schlesinger, Putting 'reality' 
together, London, Constable, 1978; and M. Tracey, The production of 
political television, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 
15. For example of works on broadcasting by journalists see J. Diwo, 
Si vous avez manque le debut, Paris, Albin Michel, 1976; C. Vieux, 
La týlecratie, Paris, Tema, 1976; and J. Rocchi, La television malade 
du pouvoir, Paris, Editions sociales, 1975. 
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The major text in English on broadcasting in France is a study by 
Ruth Thomas entitled Broadcasting and Democracy in France. 
16 
Published 
in 1976 this work concentrates on government-broadcasting relations 
prior to the 1974 reform in a semi-historical semi-thematic framework. 
As the author is not a political scientist, her work lacks the analytic 
and conceptual rigour of that discipline. In any case the book provides 
only the very broadest outlines of the 1974 reorganisation and nothing 
at all on the consequences of the reform. 
This thesis, therefore, seeks to fill an obvious gap in the 
academic literature. First, it places the 197+ broadcasting reform in 
a political context: the changeover from a Gaullist to a Giscardian 
regime. This change in the balance of power within the ruling right-wing 
coalition is exemplified by this thesis on the reorganisation of the 
state broadcasting services. Secondly, by concentrating on the 197+ 
reform and certain of its consequences the thesis makes what we hope 
is a significant contribution to updating the limited amount of literature 
on the politics of French broadcasting. 
This thesis is not a history of the ORTF. Nor does it seek to cover 
all aspects of the 1974 reform. We are interested here in the political 
features of the reform and in particular the effects of the reorganisation 
on the relationship between the Government and the state broadcasting 
services. We have confined our research to metropolitan France, with 
the result that the thesis contains no material on the organisation of 
broadcasting in the French overseas departments and territories. Moreover, 
within metropolitan France we have concentrated for obvious reasons on the 
state broadcasting services. While in the final chapter we examine the role 
16. R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in'France, London, Crosby 
Lockwood Staples, 1976. 
and development of certain broadcasting media outside the state 
broadcasting companies, such as the peripheral radio stations and 
pirate radio, this is done with the general intention of placing 
the state broadcasting services within the context of the French 
broadcasting media. More particularly, we have included these other 
broadcasting media to highlight certain problems which the state 
companies, particularly Radio France and FR3, have had to face in 
recent years and to analyse the response of the Government and 
these companies to these external challenges. 
The framework within which this thesis is placed is that of 
democratic theory as applied to the role of the mass media and in 
particular to the relations between the State and broadcasting 
in liberal democracies. Other theoretical frameworks could have 
been usefully employed. For example, our research might well have 
been conducted within the tradition of inquiry known as organisation 
theory. 17 In particular it might have proved interesting to use the 
break-up of the ORTF as a case-study to examine the general thesis 
of Michel Crozier's Le ph6nomene bureaucratique regarding French 
attitudes towards hierarchical relationships in organisations and 
society. 
18 
17. On organisation theory see A. Etzioni, A comparative analysis of 
complex organisations, New York, Free Press, 1961; A. Etzioni, 
Complex organisations: a sociological reader, New Jersey, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966; A. Etzioni (ed. ), Readings on modern 
organisations, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1969; M. Albrow, 
Bureaucracy, London, Macmillan, 1970; and J. C. March and H. Simon, 
Organisations, New York, Wiley, 1958. 
18. M. Crozier, Le ph4nomene bureaucratigue, Paris, Seuil, 1963. 
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However, we decided not to use organisation theory as the framework 
for our research since this might have led to a disproportionate emphasis 
being placed on the internal organisational relationships within the 
broadcasting companies. The risk would then be that the external 
environment, and in particular the relationship between the broadcasting 
companies and the Government, would be given less attention than we consider 
it merits. Indeed because we are concerned with the political context 
of the reform, it is this external environment which principally concerns 
us in this thesis. 
Partly for similar reasons decision-making theory was not employed 
as the research framework. 
19 This is not to say that a decision-making 
analysis would not add much of interest and relevance to the subject 
matter of our research. For example, an analysis of the process by 
which the 1974 reform was drafted, the different forces involved in the 
drafting procedure, the groups whose interests had to be taken into 
account and the compromises and concessions made during the parliamentary 
debates would contribute a great deal to our knowledge of the 1974 
reform. 
Nevertheless, we have chosen not to adopt such a decision-making 
approach for two reasons. First, and this is a practical objection, 
much of the information which would be most relevant to such an analysis 
is simply not available to the outside observer, even with the help of 
interviews. More importantly, however, a decision-making approach runs 
the risk of policy decisions being considered in isolation with undue 
19. See J. A. Robinson and R. Majak, "The theory of decision-making", 
in J. C. Charlesworth (ed. ), Contemporary Political Analysis, 
London, Macmillan, 1967; and H. Lasswell, The decision process: 
seven categories of functional analysis, College Park, University of 
Maryland, 1956. 
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emphasis being placed on particular decisions of the policy-making 
process and insufficient attention being paid to policy content and 
the consequences of its implementation. 
20 
Yet the content of the 
Government's broadcasting policy as contained in the 1974 reorganisation 
and the consequences of that reform for state-broadcasting relations 
are very much our concern in this thesis. 
By placing the thesis within that tradition of inquiry which 
is concerned with the role of the mass media in democratic theory, 
we can evaluate the 1974 broadcasting reform in terms of the same 
concepts used by those involved in the political communications process: 
independence, autonomy, impartiality and control. This framework is also 
that most frequently employed, albeit implicitly, by commentators on 
French politics when writing about the broadcasting services. 
In our assessment of the 1974 broadcasting reform we could have 
conducted our research on a cross-national comparative basis, seeking 
to illuminate, for example, the similarities and differences in the 
British and French responses to the question of state-broadcasting relations. 
On the other hand, given the numerous attempts to reorganise broadcasting 
in France and the change of regime in 1974, we decided that a longitudinal 
comparison covering roughly the period of the Fifth Republic would in 
itself be sufficient to highlight the main features of continuity and change 
in state-broadcasting relations in France. Therefore, while the emphasis 
is on the period since the 1974 reorganisation, our research necessarily 
involved comparison with government-broadcasting relations at the time of 
the ORTF. 
20. For similar objections see R. Duclaud-Williams, The Politics-Of 
Housing in Britain and France, London, Heinemann, 1978, p. 5. 
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With regard to the methodology of our research two main sources 
of information were utilised. The first comprised published 
material, both primary and secondary. This included studies of 
broadcasting in France and elsewhere, official documents, minutes 
of committee meetings, annual or occasional reports by interested 
parties such as the broadcasting unions, parliamentarians, parliamentary 
committees, the Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel and the Quality Committee, 
unpublished academic theses and dissertations, trade union journals, and 
newspaper and magazine articles. 
The second source of material consisted of a series of over 
eighty interviews with members of broadcasting management, representatives 
of the broadcasting unions, journalists, civil servants and parliamentarians 
among others. These interviews were conducted during two separate stays 
in France: the first from October 1976 to June 1977 and the second from 
June to September 1979. In some cases the same persons were interviewed 
during both periods. These interviews were open-ended with no formal 
questionnaire being submitted to interviewees. Given the different roles 
of those interviewed, the interviews were formulated with the objective 
of eliciting the maximum amount of relevant information from each interviewee. 
The interviews were principally used to clarify or exemplify certain 
points which had already emerged from the published source material. 
This is reflected in the text. They are not representative in any statistical 
sense, nor were they ever intended to be so. Each, however, reflects a 
personal view of some aspect of French broadcasting and their inclusion 
in the main body of the text is justified on that basis. 
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We ought perhaps to justify the extension of the time-span 
covered by our research. Originally it was intended that the thesis 
would cover the period up to and including the legislative elections 
of March 1978. Indeed most of the material included in the thesis 
falls between the initial dates, 1971+-1978. However, we decided 
to bring certain sections up to date when major developments 
occurred during writing. Our task was of course facilitated by the 
fact that there was no change of government, and hence no restructuring 
of the broadcasting services, in 1978. This extension of our analysis 
past 1978 has proved particularly useful in the section on anti-strike 
provisions in chapter 7, the section on special ad hoc parliamentary 
committees in chapter 8 and the sections on local radio and satellite 
broadcasting in chapter 12. 
In conclusion, it will be useful to present an outline of the 
structure of the thesis. It is divided into four sections, of which 
sections two and three form the core of our analysis. Section one 
looks in general terms at the relationship between politics and broad- 
casting. Chapter 1 places the research within the relevant academic 
literature, while chapter 2 concentrates on the relationship between 
the Government and the state broadcasting services in France prior 
to the 1974 reform. Section two on the break-up of the ORTF consists 
of four chapters: chapter 3 on the origins of the reform, chapter 4 
on the liquidation of the ORTF, chapter 5on appointments in the new 
broadcasting companies and chapter 6 on the reallocation of ORTF staff 
among the new companies. Section three looks at particular features 
of the new broadcasting system. Chapter 7 is devoted to the 
organisation and behaviour of the broadcasting unions, while chapter 8 
examines the role of Parliament as a possible counter-balance to the 
predominance of the political executive. The role of the executive 
in two 
-, 
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areas of control is studied in detail: control of finance (chapter 9) 
and control of news programming (chapter 10). Chapter 11 deals with 
criticisms of the programme output of the new companies and proposals 
to amend the reform. Section four is concerned with challenges 
to the State's broadcasting monopoly. Chapter 12 examines these 
challenges and the Government's response to them. 
Naturally these sections do not form watertight compartments. 
However, we would strongly defend the organisation of our research 
material as presented in this thesis. There is a thematic logic in 
the division as it stands, with section two concentrating on certain 
immediate aspects of the reorganisation and section three dealing with 
more long-term features of the reform. 
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Section 1 
Politics and broadcasting 
7 
CHAPTER 1 
The politics of broadcasting 
Broadcasting is now a major feature of life in all developed 
industrialised countries, with almost every household possessing 
both radio and television. 
1 Large sections of the population in 
these countries spend an important part of their leisure time either 
listening to radio or watching television. 
2 Moreover, both of these 
1. See tables 2. iv and 2. v for statistics relating to France. 
In Great Britain 95% of households possessed a television set 
by 1970. About 10% of households had two or more television 
sets by the late 1970s, while over 50% had two or more radio sets. 
C. Seymour-Ure, The political impact of mass media, London, 
Constable, 1974, p. 209, and the Report of the committee on the 
future of broadcasting, London, HMSO, command 6753,1977, p. 23. 
In West Germany there are approximately 20 million television 
sets, one for every three inhabitants. There are also about 
22 million radio sets according to official figures. 
M. Jenke, Telecommunication development in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, CCC/DC (76) 83-E, 
1976, and West German Press and Information Office, Facts about 
Germany, London, 1979, p. 295. 
Italy had around 12 million television licence holders in 1975, 
which meant that officially 75% of Italian households possessed a 
television set. 
F. L. Cavazza, "Italy: from party occupation to party partition", 
in A. Smith (ed. ), Television and Political Life, London, Macmillan 
1979. 
Similar figures reflecting saturation point in radio and television 
ownership could be produced for every developed industrialised 
country. 
2. In France in the early 1970s people who possessed a television 
set spent on average 18 hours a week watching television. 
Presse Actualit4, no. 100, April 1975. 
This figure was confirmed by an opinion poll conducted by the 
broadcasting audience research service in 1977. 
Tele-7-jours, no. 871, February 28-March 4+ 1977. 
Well over half the French population watch television daily. 
For a sociological and regional analysis of viewing figures see 
Ministare de la Culture et de 1'Environnement, Service des etudes 
et de la recherche, Les pratigues culturelles des francais, Paris, 
1974. 
Again, similar figures could undoubtedly be produced for all other 
developed industrialised countries. 
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broadcasting media constitute among other things important sources 
of information about politics. 
3 
In fact, during politically sensitive 
periods such as elections the broadcasting media in developed countries 
represent the principal sources of political information ahead of the 
press, party leaflets or campaign meetings. 
4 
3. For example, around half of the French population over the age of 
15 watch the main evening television news programme on either TF1 
or A2. See tables 5. ii and 5-iii. 
For figures showing the importance of the information function 
of broadcasting in other western European countries see: 
M. Tracey, The production of political television, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 7 (Great Britain ; L. J. Edinger, Politics 
in West Germany, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1977 (second edition), 
p. 135 (West Germany); G. Almond and S. Verba, The civic culture, 
Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1965, P"56 (Great Britain, West Germany, 
Italy, as well as the United States and Mexico). 
4. In France this was shown during the 1974 presidential and, to a 
lesser extent, the 1978 legislative election campaigns. 
In reply to the question "Which are the media most useful in helping 
you to know how to vote? ", the replies were as follows. 
1974 1978 
Television 63 47 
Radio 10 32 
Press 13 39 
Conversations 8 18 
Meetings k 4 
Leaflets 1 5 
Posters 1 5 
Opinion polls - 6 
None/don't know - 22 
Multiple replies were allowed in 1978 but not in 19714. 
See J. G. Blumler, R. Cayrol and G. Thoveron, La television fait-elle 
1'election?, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1978, (Great Britain, France and Belgium). 
R. Cayrol, "Les mass media dans la campagne electorale de mars 1978", 
in H. Penniman (ed. ), France at the Polls II, Washington, American 
Enterprise Institute, 1979. 
This article also contains a sociological breakdown of the electorate'; 
use of the media during the 1978 legislative elections. 
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In the light of this penetration of the broadcasting media 
as sources of political information in deve'oped countries, the nature 
of the links between politics and broadcasting has naturally given 
rise to much idle speculation and an impressive quantity of academic 
research. The aim of this chapter is to place this thesis within the 
body of academic literature which has examined the relationships 
between politics and broadcasting. While the findings of our research 
are mainly and unashamedly empirical, we have nonetheless sought to bear 
in mind the contribution of the thesis to the relevant academic literature. 
We hope, therefore, that this thesis on the politics of broadcasting 
in France since 197+ will have a wider application than to just one 
political system over a specific time period. 
There are a variety of entry points into a study of the role 
of broadcasting in the political communications process. The first 
section of this chapter examines briefly the contribution of each 
of the major different traditions of inquiry in the general field of 
politics and broadcasting. The second section concentrates in more 
detail on the role attributed to the broadcasting media in democratic 
theory. Two antithetical views of the relationship between the State 
and broadcasting in liberal democracy will be studied: the pluralist 
"fourth estate" model and the elitist "state control" model. 
5 
5. There is a vast literature on the pluralist-elitist debate within 
democratic theory. See among others G. Parry, Political Elites, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1969; D. Ricci, Community Power and 
T)Cnocratic Theory, New York, Random House, 1971; S. Lukes, Power: 
a radical view, London, Macmillan, 1974; R. A. Dahl, Who governs?, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961; C. Wright Mills, The 
Power Elite, London, Oxford University Press, 1956; P. Bachrach 
and M. S. Baratz, "The two faces of power", American Political 
Science Review, no. 56,1962; and R. Miliband, The State in 
Capitalist Society, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. 
-- 
Broadcasting in the political communications process 
The paradigm of the political communications process which 
we shall consider in this section is that made famous by Harold 
Lasswell: Who says What in Which Channel to Whom with What Effect? 
6 
As Colin Seymour-Ure remarks, corresponding to each question is a 
field of analysis: control, content, media, audience and effect. 
7 
Lasswell's formula allows one, therefore, to concentrate on different 
aspects of the political communications process at will, focusing 
on either the communicator, the message, the medium, the audience 
or the effects of the message. 
6. H. D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in 
Society", in L. Bryson (ed. ), The communication of ideas, New York, 
Harper, 1948. 
One might have used instead Deutsch's cybernetics model. K. Deutsch, 
The nerves of government, New York, Free Press, 1966 (second edition). 
Deutsch's aim is 
"to use the concepts and methods of the science of cybernetics 
to provide explanations for not simply the survival but the 
growth of political systems, and to predict the consequences 
of changes that affect the structures of systems. ... 
A cybernetic model directs the analyst to specific aspects 
of any system. He is led, for example, to analyse the amount 
of variety of information; the structure of the information 
network ...; the structure of sybsystems; the feedback system; 
the organisation of the system's 'memory' mechanisms; and the 
rules which determine the behaviour of the system. " 
M. R. Davies and V. A. Lewis, Models of Political Systems, London, 
Macmillan, 1971, pp. 71 and 76. 
See also, W. J. M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science, Harmonds- 
worth, Penguin, 1967, pp. 117-119. 
However, as Seymour-Ure remarks, although 
"one method ... is to describe a model of the political 
system entirely using communication concepts, (as) has been 
done by Karl Deutsch in The nerves of government, ... 
it is 
doubtful whether his model could be applied to an actual 
system. " C. Seymour-Ure, op. cit., p. 16. 
7. C. Seymour-Ure, op. cit., p. 142. 
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Research on the mass media, and in particular broadcasting, 
has concentrated unequally on these different aspects, treating 
them usually as "discrete specialist departments. "8 The literature 
has been dominated, perhaps to a stultifying extent, by research 
on the final aspect of the political communications process: the effects 
of the broadcast message (effects analysis). 
9 
Moreover, within this 
body of research on effects the emphasis has been disproportionately 
placed on the short-term responses of the audience to specific 
stimuli. As Denis McQuail writes, 
"Studies of media effectiveness have tended to focus 
on short-term, measurable effects and on the marginal effects 
of any change in the pattern or amount of mass media provisions. "10 
Moreover, 
"Studies based on measurements of individuals have also 
been favoured compared with studies of structures and institutional 
patterns which may be markedly affected by the mass media, but for 
which tools of measurement were unavailable. " 11 
Recently there have been attempts to move away from this narrow focus 
of inquiry by directing attention towards the long-term effects of the 
media as well as the short-term effects of the message. In addition, 
effects analysis now concentrates not only on the audience but also 
on the communicator, social and political elites, institutions and 
the political system itself since the broadcasting media and the message 
also affect their political and social role through, among other things, 
feedback from the audience. 
12 
8. J. Curran, M. Gurevitch and J. Wollacott (eds. ); Mass Communication 
and Society. London, Arnold, 1977, p. 2. 
9. It would take a book merely to list the variety of works on effects 
analysis. One of the major works is J. T. Klapper, The effects of 
mass conmaunication, New York, Free Press, 19E0. 
See also, D. McQuail, Towards a Sociology of Mass Communications, 
London, Collier-Macmillan, 1969, chapter 3 "The empirical tradition 
in the sociology of mass communications", pp. 36-57, especially p. 45 
which lists some of the more notable works. 
10. D. McQuail, op cit., p. 47. 
11. Ibid, p. 53. 
12. C. Seymour-Ure, 2p. cit., is an example of the wider approach 
to effects analysis. 
34- 
The most familiar strand of effects research for political 
scientists has concentrated on evaluating the influence of 
broadcasting output on the viewers prior to elections. A vast 
amount of research has been done in this particular area both in 
the United States and western Europe with the result that no 
election study now seems complete without the ritual chapter on the 
role of the mass media during the campaign. 
13 
13. Studies of elections and referenda in France are conducted 
by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and published 
by Armand Colin, Paris. 
Note also H. Penniman (ed. ), France at the Polls, Washington, 
American Enterprise Institute, 1975, especially the chapter 
by Alfred Grosser entitled "The role of the press, radio and 
television in French political life, " and the chapter by Monica 
Chariot entitled "The language of television campaigning. " 
See also J. G. Blumler, R. Cayrol and G. Thoveron, op. cit. and 
R. Cayrol, op. cit. 
On elections in Britain see J. Trenaman and D. McQuail, Television 
and the political image, London, Methuen, 1961; J. Blumler and 
D. McQuail, Television in Politics: its uses and influence, London 
Faber and Faber, 1969; and, of course, the Nuffield election studies. 
See also, C. Seymour-Ure, op. cit., pp. 202-239. 
For a pioneer study of influences on voting behaviour taken 
from the 19+0 American presidential campaign see P. F. Lazarsfeld, 
B. Berelson and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice, New York, Duell, 
Sloan and Pearce, 1944. 
For a summary of the main conclusions to be drawn from the studies 
of the role of broadcasting in election campaigns up to 1970, 
see E. Katz, '131atforms and Windows: Broadcasting's role in election 
campaigns", published in D. McQuail (ed. ), Sociology of Mass 
Communications, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, pp"353-371. 
See also P. Golding, The Mass Media, London, Longman, 1974, pp"79-83. 
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Another tradition of inquiry within the field of effects 
analysis has examined the role of the broadcasting media in the 
process by which members of a political system become socialised 
to the norms, values and beliefs of that system. 
14 This branch of 
research has shown that along with the family, peer groups, the 
educational system and the church among others, the mass media 
in developed political systems represent one of the main socialising 
agents. 
15 While research into the effects of broadcasting output 
on the electorate during election campaigns takes a short-term 
perspective, political socialisation research adopts a more long-term 
approach which seeks to evaluate the role of the mass media not just 
in influencing a particular political decision but in forming the 
political persona of the members of a political system and thus 
influencing that system's political culture. 
While effects research has traditionally been the most popular 
area of inquiry in studies of the political communication process, other 
aspects have not been totally ignored. For example, rather than 
concentrating on the effects of the broadcast message, some researchers 
14. On the topic of political socialisation in general see H. Hyman, 
Political Socialisation, New York, Free Press, 1959; R. Dawson 
and K. Prewitt, Political Socialisation, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co., 1969; -and G. Almond and S. Verba, op. cit. 
See also P. Golding, op. cit., pp. 85-98. 
On the mass media and political socialisation in France see 
H. Ehrmann, Politics in France, Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 
1971 (second edition), particularly chapter 5, "Political 
socialisation through the mass media", pp. 125-138. 
Note also the impressionistic comment by L. Wylie in his Village 
in the Vaucluse, London, Harvard University Press, 1974 (third edition), 
chapter 18 "Peyrane ten years later" (1959): 
"Television seems to have atomised still further the social 
contacts of the people of Peyrane, which were already badly 
fragmented in 1950. However, the Peyranais who watch television 
instead of Playing boules with their neighbours and gossiping about village affairs no doubt feel as though they have more in common with Frenchmen in general who are also watching the 
swimming meet in Paris. This is only one example of many 
influences which act upon the people of Peyrane to increase their sense of integration with the rest of France today. " fr ILA) 
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have preferred to devote their attention to the message itself. 
This tradition of inquiry may range from simple content analysis 
through agenda-structuring studies right up to extremely detailed 
interrelated analyses of the content, form, presentation and language 
of the message by semiologists. 
15 
The most recent and sophisticated analysis of broadcast content 
in Great Britain was undertaken by the Glasgow University Media Group 
who analysed the content of news bulletins on all three television 
16 
channels for a period of five months. 
"... we presented a mass of evidence culled from a large 
sample of recorded news bulletirP to illustrate the basic 
agenda-setting function of the news. We demonstrated that the 
bulletins of competing services did not really compete as to the 
stories they were reporting, or the style in which they reported 
them. We showed a predictability in the ordering of news items 
and the limited range of presentational devices available to the 
broadcaster. 
We further demonstrated that regularities in the area of 
industrial reporting lead to a consistent failure to cover the 
area thoroughly ... 
It is not that the news programmes leave the audience 
bewildered. On the contrary, the agenda-setting function works 
to limit the range and density of information just so that it 
can be comprehended within a narrow consensus. " 17 
However, content analyses of such a detailed nature remain relatively 
rare as an area of inquiry for practical as well as methodological 
reasons. 
15. On content analysis see M. Duverger, Introduction to the Social 
Sciences, London, Allen and Unwin, 1961, pp-105-124. This section 
also includes a bibliography on content analysis, pp. 123-121+. 
On semiotics see R. Barthes, "Rhetoric of the Image", in Image, 
Music. Text, London, Fontana, 1977, and U. Eco, A theory of semiotics, 
London, Macmillan, 1977. 
16. Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News (vol. 1). London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1976. 
17. Glasgow University Media Group, More Bad News, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1980, PP. 400 and 07. 
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Another field of broadcasting research has focused on the first 
part of Lasswell's paradigm: the communicator. This tradition of 
inquiry has concentrated on such topics as the sociological background 
and recruitment of the communicators, the norms and values of the 
professional broadcasters, the organisational ethos of the broadcasting 
institution and the production process, particularly with regard to 
political television. 
18 
Frequently this approach depends on direct 
observation of the television production process and interviews with 
the broadcasters. Two recent examples of the genre in Great Britain 
are Michael Tracey's The Production of Political Television and Philip 
Schlesinger's Putting' reality' together. 
19 The former is 
"a study of production within political television, an 
attempt to understand and explicate the fashioning of political 
images within the confines of the television organisation. " 20 
Schlesinger's book, in similar vein, 
"examines the practices and ideology which lie behind the 
making of the news by Britain's most prominent broadcasting 
organisation" 21 
18. For a rare observation study of French television see R. Cayrol, 
"L'ORTF face aux Elections de mars 1973", paper presented to the 
European Consortium for Political Research, Strasbourg, 1974. 
On British broadcasting see T. Burns, The BBC: Public Institution 
and Private World, London, Macmillan, 1977; P. Elliot, The making 
of a television series: a case study in the sociology of culture, 
London, Constable, 1972; J. G. Blumler, "Producers' attitudes 
towards television coverage of an election campaign: a case study", 
in J. Tunstall (ed. ), Media Sociology, London, Constable, 1970. 
19. M. Tracey, The Production of Political Television, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977. 
P. Schlesinger, Putting 'reality' together, London, Constable, 1978. 
20. M. Tracey, op. cit., p. 3. 
21. P. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 11. 
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This thesis also is principally concerned with the first part of 
Lasswell's paradigm. In particular we are interested in a specific 
aspect of the role of the broadcasters in the political communications 
process: their relationship with the major actor in the political system, 
the Government. This thesis, therefore, concentrates less on the internal 
organisational context in which the broadcasters function and more on 
the external political environment. Of course, in practice the dividing 
line between the two is by no means clear. Nonetheless, our starting 
point is always the external political environment and only secondarily 
the internal organisational context. Because of this emphasis, we 
have chosen to place our research within that body of literature which 
is devoted to an examination of the relationship between the State and 
broadcasting in democratic theory. 
The role of broadcasting in democratic theory 
The debate regarding the nature of state-broadcasting relations 
in liberal democratic regimes forms part of a much wider controversy 
about the distribution of power which lies at the very heart of democratic 
theory. Essentially this controversy is between those who argue that 
power in liberal democracy is diffused among different and competing 
elites, none of which is dominant, and those who contend that it is 
concentrated in the hands of a homogeneous ruling class or ruling elite. 
The former group are generally known as pluralists and the latter as 
elitists. 
22 
22. See footnote 5. 
The following section relies heavily on chapter 2 of M. Tracey, 
op. cit. 
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The pluralist view 
The functions of broadcasting from a pluralist perspective are 
perhaps most clearly set out in the charters of the broadcasting 
institutions of western Europe. 
23 Specifically assigned public 
service obligations, radio and television in western European 
democracies have as one of their main functions to inform the 
electorate of the policies and arguments of the competing political 
elites so that in turn these elites may be held accountable to the 
electorate. 
To perform these functions effectively the broadcasting media 
must be independent of the political elites and in particular of the 
Government. In an ideal-type pluralist democracy there would be a 
variety of broadcasting outlets representing views across the whole 
spectrum of political debate with only minimal state intervention 
to protect this "free broadcasting market" from monopoly domination. 
Any group of citizens would be allowed to establish their own radio 
or television station to express their political grievances or act 
as a forum for political debate. 
However, broadcasting in western European states, unlike the press, 
has never been organised on anything remotely resembling these lines. 
On the contrary, in most western European political systems, including 
Great Britain, France and Italy, broadcasting has been organised, at 
least initially, within a totally antithetical framework: the state 
monopoly. This state broadcasting monopoly has then usually been 
entrusted to a single, large-scale national institution such as the 
BBC, the RTF or the RAI. 
23. Broadcasting in the United States has of course been organised 
along different lines from its counterpart in western Europe. 
As this thesis is concerned with France, we have chosen to emphasise 
the western European dimension. 
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The main reason usually given for this organisation of broadcasting 
as a state monopoly was a technical one, namely the shortage of wavelengths. 
Given the finite scarcity of this technical resource it fell to the State 
to establish the framework within which broadcasting would operate, since 
a free market response on a national level was technically undesirable. 
"In the early 1920s America's wavelengths had become 
impossibly cluttered by a radiophonic anarchy in which radio 
operators almost overnight were allowed to grab wavelengths 
like early settlers staking claims on land, and squabbling over 
the boundaries. Thousands of stations sprang up trying to 
blast one another off the air. The news of this chaos spread 
across the Atlantic and fostered in Britain the creation of a 
highly disciplined system; Mr. F. J. Brown of the British Post 
Office visited the United States in the very early months of 
1922 when the BBC was scarcely conceived, and his report was 
a decisive influence. A new kind of state monopoly was born. " 24 
Other factors working in favour of the state monopoly included the 
special importance of broadcasting as a means of conveying information 
to a large public, broadcasting's capacity to cross political frontiers 
and the presumed social power of broadcasting. 
25 
Because of this organisation of broadcasting within the framework 
of the state monopoly, plurality of expression could not be guaranteed 
by a multiplicity of outlets. At first sight, therefore, the existence 
of a single broadcasting institution benefiting from monopoly status 
conflicted with the norms of the pluralist model of democracy. To resolve 
this dilemma pluralist expression had somehow to be guaranteed within 
a single organisation so that the information and accountability functions 
of radio and television could be said to be effectively carried out. 
24. A. Smith, The shadow in the cave, London, Quartet, 1976 (second 
edition), p. 59. 
25. F. Terrou and L. Solal, Legislation for Press, Film and Radio, 
New York, Arno Press, 1972, pp. 129-130. 
Ii 
For pluralist theorists this difficulty was overcome by establishing 
as many filters as possible between the State and the political elites 
on the one hand and the broadcasting institution on the other. In addition, i 
guidelines were laid down regarding the dissemination of political 
information. In these respects the archetypal pluralist model of 
broadcasting in western Europe was, and still is, the BBC. 
26 
Financed from licence revenue, administered by a board of governors 
whose tasks are to represent the public interest within the corporation 
and act as a screen between it and the Government, the BBC represents 
for pluralist theorists of democracy in western Europe the "fourth 
estate" model of state-broadcasting relations. According to this view 
of the BBC's role the corporation is independent of the Government and 
the political parties and pressure groups. As a necessary corollary 
of this independence and also because of the BBC's privileged status 
as a political communicator, the political output of the corporation 
has to conform to certain norms. Thus, in return for its independent 
status the BBC has to be impartial, objective and balanced in its 
political coverage. The independence and impartiality of the BBC 
are inextricably interlinked. 
"The state leaves, indeed requires, the broadcasters 
to be independent because/on condition that this independence 
is exercised in a certain way: impartially. 
The state does not grant autonomy to the broadcasters 
to behave as they please: it grants autonomy only on the condition 
that broadcasters treat the controversial and problematic matters 
germane to their own sphere, and to the controversial sphere of the 
political system, which supports and creates the state, with a 
'due impartiality'. " 27 
26. A. Smith, on. cit. schapter 2 section 1, 
"The BBC as Archetype. " 
27. S. Hall, "Broadcasting, Politics and the State: the Independencel 
Impartiality couplet", Paper presented to the IAMCR conference, 
W, cester, 1976, p. 6. 
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This pluralist model of state-broadcasting relations as 
applied to western European political systems may be viewed 
as both descriptive and prescriptive. Pluralists theorists 
would argue, for example, that the above is a model of both 
how the BBC functions in practice and how it ought to function 
in theory. A major proponent of this pluralist model as applied 
to broadcasting in Great Britain is Jay Blumler, a leading writer 
on the British mass media. 
Blumler has written a considerable amount on British broad- 
casting. From his publications it is possible to build up a picture 
of his view of state-broadcasting relations in Britain, which regards 
the broadcasters as essentially independent of the political elites 
and in particular of the Government. For example, in answer to the 
self-posed question whether broadcasting journalists should function 
as a mouthpiece for the State, the neutral purveyor of someone else's 
information, a source of non-partisan comment and criticism or as an 
overtly partisan editorialiser, Blumler argues that British television 
moved "from the more subdued second function, which predominated in the 
1950s, towards an enthusiastic application of the third in the 1960s. "28 
In his discussion of the broadcasting media's coverage of the 
February 1974 election campaign Blumler writes of the relatively 
free hand which producers had with regard to output. 
"Some part of the explanation for this must lie in the 
public service model of organisation that Britain has sustained 
in the broadcasting field for many years. This has ensured that 
financial constraints do not stifle innovatory impulses at source, 
and has helped to keep alive the principle that communication shoulc 
serve citizenship. " 29 
28. J. G. Blumler, "The political effects of television", in J. D. 
Halloran, The effects of television London, Panther, 1970, p. 72. 
29. J. G. Blumler, "Mass media roles and reactions in the February 
election", in H. Penniman (ed. ), Britain at the polls, Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1974, pp. 161-162. kh- 
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Finally, with reference to the power of the mass media to resist 
political control, Blumler writes: 
"... the normative root of media power can be crucial 
at times of conflict. This springs from the respect that 
is accorded in competitive democracies to such tenets of liberal 
philosophy as freedom of expression and the need for specialised 
organs to safeguard citizens against possible abuses of political 
authority. This tends to legitimate the independent role of 
media organisations in the political field and to shelter them 
from overt attempts blatantly to bring them under political 
control. " 30 
It was this fourth estate model of state-broadcasting relations 
which was used by French government spokesmen in 1974 to prescribe 
the relationship between the Government and the new state broadcasting 
companies established by the 1974 statute. The provisions of the 
statute, the terminology of the companies'cahiers des charges and 
numerous statements by ministerial spokesmen reproduced the concepts 
integral to the fourth estate model: public service, independence, 
autonomy, balance, impartiality and objectivity. 
31 A principal 
objective of this thesis is an examination of the extent to which 
government-broadcasting relations since 1974 correspond to the norms 
of the fourth estate model. 
The elitist view 
In marked contrast to pluralist theorists of democracy, elitist 
theorists usually regard the mass media in general and broadcasting 
in particular as fulfilling an important fuction in the process by 
30. M. Gurevitch and J. G. Blumler, "Linkages between the mass media 
and politics: a model for the analysis of political communication 
systems", paper presented at the European Consortium for Political 
Research, Strasbourg, 1974, pp. 9-10. 
31. See chapters on the Liquidation of the ORTF and News programmes. 
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which power is concentrated in the hands of a ruling class or 
ruling elite. Rejecting the pluralist argument that broadcasting 
in liberal democracy is independent of the State and can thus perform 
both information and watchdog functions, elitist theorists regard 
the broadcasting media as subordinate to the State and the output 
of the broadcasting services as furthering the interests of the ruling 
class or ruling elite. 
There are varieties of emphasis within this broad elitist 
camp. Tracey, for example, argues that there are two main themes. 
"One, that the restraints on, or 'structuring'-of, the 
production process derive from other social institutions or 
social groups, for example, the State, institutional elites, 
social classes, etc. 
The other theme ... derives from the more 
'sophisticated' 
pastures of media research and points to the structuring of the 
programme-making process by particular routines and ideologies 
that derive from the occupational setting of the organisation 
and from the general structure of ideas within society ... 
" 32 
However, this difference of emphasis is underpinned by the shared 
view that, in the words of Althusser, the broadcasting media in 
capitalist regimes function as "ideological state apparatuses. " 33 
32. M. Tracey, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
33. L Althusser, Lenin and philosophy and other essays, London, New 
Left Books, 1977 (second edition), pp. 131-1 I. 
Writers on British broadcasting who are situated within this 
broad elitist camp include S. Hood, "The Politics of Television", 
in D. McQuail (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 406-431+; P. Schlesinger, op. cit. 
J. Westergaard, "Power, class and the media", in J. Curran, 
M. Gurevitch and J. Woollacott, op. cit., pp. 95-115; M. Tracey, 
op. cit.; Glasgow University Media Group, op. cit.; and G. Murdock 
and P. Golding, "Capitalism, communication and class relations", 
in J. Curran, M. Gurevitch and J. Woollacott, op. cit. 
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One of the leading spokesmen for this elitist camp is Ralph 
Miliband, who in The State in Capitalist Society writes: 
"In most ways ... the assumed impartiality and objectivity (of the broadcasting media) is quite artificial. For it mainly 
operates in regard to political formations which while divided 
on many issues are nevertheless part ofa basic, underlying 
consensus ... 
(There exists, therefore) an ideological bias ... 
There is nothing particularly surprising about the character 
and role of the mass media in advanced capitalist society. 
Given the economic and political context in which they function, 
they cannot fail to be predominantly agencies for the dissemination 
of ideas and values which affirm rather than challenge existing 
patterns of power and privilege, and thus to be weapons in the 
arsenal of class domination. " 34 
The view expressed by several commentators that prior to the 
1974 reform the state broadcasting servies in France were controlled 
by the Government neatly fits in with this elitist view of the role 
of the mass media in liberal democracy. 
35 
However, the advocacy of 
34. R. Miliband, op. cit., pp. 200 and 211. 
35. See, for example, J. Hayward, The One and Indivisible French 
Republic, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973, pp"1 3-1 , "Since the second world war, and especially since the advent of 
the fifth republic, ... the radio and television services have been increasingly subordinated to the state, being converted into 
the government's docile propaganda instrument. "; J. Ardagh, The 
New France, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1973 (second edition), ppd. 07- 
008, "... if French television today is far less excitingly 
creative than French cinema, and less varied and dynamic than TV 
in Britain, the causes lie in its political subservience to the 
Government. "; L. G. Noonan, France: the Politics of'Continuity in 
Change, Illinois, Dryden Press, 1970, p. 1)+8, " ... the reform 
of 1964 (gave) the impression of having reduced greatly the 
control of the government over the ORTF ... In the meanwhile 
the 
service continues to act as a creature of the government. "; 
R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy, in France, London, Crosby 
Lockwood Staples, 1976, p. 1, "... French broadcasting can early 
be seen developing those traits which appear so clearly in later 
years. On the one hand, government control, more extensive and 
more political than is usual in Western Europe;... "; and W. D. Redferi 
"The Media in France", West European Politics, vol. 1 no. 3, October 
1978, p. 167, "... the national networks have) been brought under 
the governmental thumb, ... " 
b- 
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this state control model does not necessarily form part of an 
acceptance of the whole elitist argument regarding the distribution 
of power in French society. 
The fact that both pluralist and elitist commentators on French 
politics tended to agree about the main features of state-broadcasting 
relations before 1974 is in our opinion quite revealing, since it shows 
that one's substantive conclusions are not necessarily predetermined 
either by one's ideological 36 Y predisposition or research methodology. 
We would argue strongly that our conclusions in this thesis were not 
predetermined by the methodology of the research, which could in the 
face of different evidence equally well have produced different results. 
We did not assume a specific type of relationship between the Government 
and the state broadcasting services in France, but rather sought to 
examine that relationship empirically. 
In turn, this empirical study has shed some light on the nature 
of the argument between the pluralist and elitist commentators on 
state-broadcasting relations in liberal democratic political systems. 
To say the least our research casts serious doubt on the applicability 
of the fourth estate model to government-broadcasting relations in 
France since the 1971+ reform. The norms of independence and autonomy 
on the one hand and impartiality and balance on the other do not at all 
describe the reality of the relationship. 
36. Elitist commentators would regard the Government's control 
of broadcasting as evidence of their more general theory about 
the distribution of power in liberal democratic regimes. 
Pluralist commentators' would regard the same relationship as 
a deviant case, "the exception which proves the rule. " 
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However, for a variety of reasons the alternative model of 
state control does not seem to us to be particularly satisfactory 
either, since it tends to underestimate certain distinctions which 
we would regard as important. The state control model is monolithic 
and static since it covers in an all-encompassing fashion a wide 
variety of state-broadcasting relationships with differing areas 
and degrees of state control in each. 
For example, Miliband writes: 
"In France both radio and television were quite deliberately 
turned into Gaullist institutions, to be used to the advantage 
of the general, his government and the party which supported 
them. . 
In strict political terms, this is a very different situation 
from that which has prevailed in a country like Britain, where 
the Labour leaders have been assured since the war of some kind 
of parity with their Conservative opponents. 
In large ideological terms, however, the contrast has been rather 
less dramatic; ... 
As between all shades of the consensus on the one hand and 
all shades of counter-ideology on the other, radio and television 
in all capitalist countries have ensured that the former had by 
far the best of the argument. " 37 
In the context of Miliband's thesis this might well be the case. 
However, in our opinion the political differences are frequently as 
important and revealing as what Miliband regards as the large ideological 
similarities. This is particularly true when one is focusing one's 
attention on a single political system. Thus, in the context of French 
politics the changeover from a Gaullist to a Giscardian regime as 
reflected in the reorganisation of the state broadcasting services 
has altered the relationship between the French state and its broadcasting 
services. 
38 
37. R. Miliband, pp. cit., p. 201. 
38. For an interesting perspective on the importance of the change 
from a Gaullist to a Giscardian regime see P. Birnbaum, *Les sonnets 
de l'Etat, Paris, Seuil, 1977, pp, 151-183. 
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In assessing the applicability of the state control model to 
the relationship between the Government and the state broadcasting 
companies since 1974, we have sought therefore to make the model 
more explicit. This involves examining empirically, first, 
different areas of control; secondly, the degree of control in each 
area; and, thirdly, the source of control. In this way we hope that 
the static and monolithic state. control model may be improved by the 
adoption of a more dynamic approach. 
This thesis illustrates the shortcomings of the state control 
model. For example, one conclusion of our research is that the type 
of direct, overt control exercised over news programming during 
the presidency of General de Gaulle is no longer a feature of 
government-broadcasting relations in France. Thus, we would argue 
that the 197+ reorganisation has had important consequences for the 
form of government-broadcasting relations and, to a limited extent, 
on its substance. 
The essential point we are making is that a focus on the two 
antithetical models of fourth estate and state control grossly 
oversimplifies reality by glossing over distinctions which are quite 
significant. Even-if one confines one's study to liberal democracies 
alone, government-broadcasting relations are not susceptible to such 
a crude twofold classification. Rather we would prefer to see 
government broadcasting relations viewed as on a continuum with 
the more subordinate systems at one end and the more autonomous 
at the other. This would still allow one to group certain systems 
in a specific category if one so desired, but, first, it would allow 
one also to focus on the differences within and between categories 
and, secondly, the categorisation would be done on the basis of 
empirical enquiry rather than merely reflecting one's ideological 
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predilections. 
This approach is that proposed by Blumler and Gurevitch who 
write that: 
it... media systems may be classified as more or less 
subordinate to, or autonomous from, the political institutions of 
society; ... such structural differences give rise to a differential 
processing of political material and manner of presenting political 
ideas, issues and events to the public ... 
" 39 
In this thesis, therefore, we have sought to employ the framework 
proposed by Blumler and Gurevitch as amended by Kees Brants and 
Walther Kok. 
4o 
Blumler and Gurevitch outline a framework "consisting of four 
dimensions by reference to which the political communication 
"4l arrangements of different states could be profiled. ... These 
dimensions are, first, degree of state control over mass media 
organisations; secondly, degree of mass media partisanship; thirdly, 
degree of media-political elite integration; and, finally, the nature 
of the legitimising creed of media institutions. 
42 
The first dimension is concerned with those areas where government 
intervention can exist and where the resulting degree of state control 
can be assessed. Blumler and Gurevitch point to three areas in 
particular: control of appointments; control of media finance; and 
control over media content. The second dimension focuses on the degree 
of partisan commitment exhibited by mass media outlets. The third 
dimension concentrates on the degree of integration between media elites 
39. J. G. Blumler and M. Gurevitch, "Towards a comparative framework 
for political communication research", in H. Chaffee (ed. ), 
Political Communication, vol. 4, Sage annual review of communication 
research, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1975. 
40. K. Brants and W. Kok, "Political communication and agenda-building". 
paper presented to the IPSA world congress, Edinburgh, 1976. 
41. J. G. Blumler and M. Gurevitch, op. cit., p. 8. 
42. Ibid. 
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and political elites, emphasising the degree of political affinity 
and social-cultural proximity that obtains between these two sets 
of structurally differentiated elites. Aspects of this affinity 
between the two elites include similar social and cultural backgrounds 
leading to similar interests and values; an overlap of personnel; 
and informal interaction between members of the two sets of elites. 
The final dimension, the nature of the legitimising creed of media 
institutions, concerns the organisational and professional ethos 
of the media institution which may act as a check against tendencies 
to subordinate media performance to politicians'-goals. 
Brants and Kok have simplified and improved upon Blumler and 
Gurevitch's above framework. Their starting point is the relationship 
between the mass media and the State or government, political parties, 
other organised interests in society and the public in respect of 
the following six aspects: first, control of appointments of the 
media elite; secondly, control of media finance; thirdly, control 
of (form and) content; fourthly, control of technological possibilities; 
fifthly, norms and opinions about the role of the mass media and within 
the media themselves concerning their political role; finally, the 
degree of integration between media elites and other elites. 
43 
Using this adapted framework we have sought to examine empirically 
the external political context in which the French state broadcasting 
companies have functioned during the early years of the Giscardian 
presidency. 
44 
43. K. Brants and W. Kok, op. cit., pp. 8_9. 
44. Control of appointments of the media elite and degree of integration 
between media elites and the political elite is covered in the 
chapter on Appointments; control of media finance is dealt with in the chapter on Finance; control of content is the subject of 
the chapter on News programmes; control of technological possibilities is discussed in the chapter on the State monopoly; finally, 
the 
norms and opinions of the media personnel are considered in the chapters on the Reallocation of ORTF staff, the Broadcasting Unions and News programmes. 
-51- 
Conclusion 
With the help of Lasswell's formula, we have examined in this 
chapter the main areas of research into the political communications 
process. Concentrating on France since the 1971 broadcasting 
reorganisation, our own research covers one aspect of this process, 
the relationship between the Government and the state broadcasting 
services. Two antithetical models are usually employed to describe 
government-broadcasting relations in liberal democracies: the fourth 
estate and state control models. In this chapter we have raised 
doubts about the usefulness of this extreme polarisation, since neither 
model seems suitable for our enquiry. The fourth estate model is 
totally inapplicable, while the state control model is for our purposes 
too static and all-embracing. Neither adequately reflects the complex 
reality of state-broadcasting relations in France since the 1974 
reform. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Politics and broadcasting in France before the 
1974 reform 
The political importance that broadcasting has assumed in France 
evidently owes much to the specific nature of the French historical 
experience. The wartime occupation of France, thepolarised nature of 
the French political system, the essential characteristics of the French 
press system and not least the skilful use of radio and television by 
General de Gaulle, all helped to shape the relationship between the 
Government and the broadcasting services during the Fifth Republic, 
at the very time that television was becoming a truly mass medium in 
France. 
The first part of this chapter-concentrates on those historical 
and political features which ensured-that broadcasting became an 
important and controversial=area -0f-policy-making-in-Prance= In the 
second part we -shall- go-on to -trace -briefly the 
history-of the-relationship 
between the Governmentand the state-broadcasting services from the end 
of the second world war to the death of President Pompidou in April'-1974. 
Given, -as Vincent Wright-remarks, -'that-the biggest decision-maker. in-- - 
any political-system is the past"', this historical introduction -is -vital 
if a proper evaluation is-to be made of the origins and-consequences-of 
the 1974 broadcasting reform. 
The first and second parts of this chapter are closely linked with 
each other. Indeed the main argument of this chapter is that because of 
1. V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France, London, Hutchinson, 
1978, PP. 229-230. 
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certain historical and political factors broadcasting in France, from 
world war two up to the 1974 reform, was organised with the primary objecti% 
of furthering the interests of whichever government was in power. With the 
increased stability of governments after 1958 and the concomitant develop- 
ment of television, this partisan politicisation of broadcasting became 
a notable feature of the political system of the Fifth Republic. 
Wartime occupation 
It would be impossible to overestimate the role played by radio 
during the second world war in influencing the subsequent organisation 
and development of broadcasting in France. The potential of radio as 
a propaganda weapon came to light with the advent of the war and was 
exploited by all sides in the conflict. From 1940 to 1944 France was 
the scene of a verbal battle over the air involving pro-Nazi, pro-Vichy 
and pro-de Gaulle radio stations. 
2 It was during this period that de 
Gaulle acquired those broadcasting skills which he was later to employ 
with such remarkable effect during his presidency. As Anthony Smith 
writes of this period: 
"It was in Britain, in the studios of the BBC, that a new 
system of French broadcasting was born. Brigadier de Gaulle 
made his historic broadcasts to the people of Occupied France 
from British soil. It is uncertain whether many people heard 
him, certainly in the early months when millions were fleeing 
from their homes and the Germans had attempted to confiscate 
every single radio receiver in the northern part of France. 
Nonetheless the political personality of de Gaulle, which was 
decades later to be the foundation stone of the broadcasting 
structure, was created at that moment by the transmitters of 
the BBC. It was at that time that he first realised, more 
powerfully and more skilfully than any other world leader, the 
political potential of broadcasting and its particular applicability 
to the chaotic conditions of the French nation. " 3. 
2. For the political role of broadcasting during the Vichy regime, see P. 
Amaury, Les deux premieres e eriences d'un ministere de 1'information 
en France, Paris, Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 19699 pp. 409-422. 
3. A. Smith, The Shadow in the Cave, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1973 (-ist edition), p. 157. 
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De Gaulle's first radio speech from London on June 18 1940 has been 
described as "an extraordinary intervention"4 and as "the act which 
established his prestige beyond dispute". 
5 In recognition of this fact 
and as a sign of the importance the Gaullists attached to their wartime 
origins, for a long time during the Fifth Republic one of the major 
symbols of Gaullism was the four beats of "London calling". 
6 
The role played by the radio during the war not only allowed 
de Gaulle to familiarise himself with the necessary techniques to 
become a formidable broadcasting performer. The success of the Free 
French station was a decisive factor in the formation of Gaullist views 
on broadcasting, since it was decided during this wartime period that 
the radio services would be nationalised following the liberation.? The 
private radio stations which had been allowed to broadcast up until the 
outbreak of hostilities were'not to re-appear on French territory after 
the war. In fact, after some vacillation the Vichy laws on broadcasting 
were reinstalled by the liberation government in 1945. The main 
provisions of this legislation were the confirmation of broadcasting 
as a state monopoly and public service, placed under the responsibility 
of a Minister of Information. The liberation government thus legitimised 
the framework within which broadcasting in France was to develop and 
attain maturity: a public service within a state monopoly. 
8 
4. A. Werth, De Gaulle, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967 (2nd edition), 
p. lo3. 
5. M. Anderson, Government in France, Oxford, Pergamon, 1970, P-44- 
6. J. Chariot, The Gaullist Phenomenon, London, Allen and Unwin, 1971, 
p. 92. 
7. H. Coston, Dictionnaire de la Politi ue Fran aise Paris, La 
La Librairie Francaise, 19 7, p. 901. 
8. B. Voyenne, L'information en France, London, McGraw-Hill, 1972, p. 126. 
See also R. Thomas, Broadcastin and democracy in France, London, 
Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976, -Pp. 2-5. 
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Political polarisation 
While the changed nature of political communication has increased 
the political importance of broadcasting as a means of mass information, 
the high degree of political pluralism in France has meant that broad- 
casting has been a constant subject of political controversy. The 
political system of the Third Republic, with its democratic base 
in the provinces rather than Paris, its numerous small self-contained 
constituencies and its weak party organisation, has disappeared. While 
in the Fourth Republic the means of mass communication were slow to 
adapt to the growing "nationalisation" of political issues, in the 
Fifth Republic the balance has been redressed with a vengeance. While 
in the traditional system of political intercourse the local personalities 
predominated, now it is the national political figures, such as the 
President of the Republic and party leaders, who attract most publicity. 
Since 1958 television has provided politicians with a readily available 
means of nationwide coverage and has altered radically the style of 
political communication. 
9 
During the Fourth Republic the Socialists, Radicals, Christian 
Democrats and moder4s all sought to colonise broadcasting. However 
the instability of Fourth Republic governments tempered the effects 
of these attempts, even when the Algerian crisis came to threaten 
the survival of the regime. Gaullist politicians were not slow to 
avail themselves of television in their bid to implant the new regime 
in 1958, with the Algerian troubles which dominated the political agenda 
of the first four years of the Fifth Republic providing the background 
9. P. M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise, London, Longman, 1964, p. 60. 
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to the Gaullist government's takeover of broadcasting. However, the 
Gaullists, as their predecessors in power had done during the Fourth 
Republic, were unwilling to allow access to television to their 
political opponents. The high degree of polarisation in the political 
system, reflecting cross-cutting cleavages in French society, partly 
accounts for this refusal. Not only did France have a multi-party 
system, but prior to 1965 the opposition parties were highly critical 
of certain principles of the 1958 Constitution and most notably the 
1962 constitutional amendment by which the President of the Republic 
was to be elected by direct universal suffrage. As no consensus existed 
among the parties on the basic principles upon which the Fifth Republic 
was founded, no practice developed in France of the give-and-take which 
characterises the approach of British political parties to the allocation 
of broadcasting time. On the contrary, an antithetical tradition, already 
in evidence before the institution of the Fifth Republic, became 
established by which control of radio and television came to be regarded 
as a legitimate spoil of electoral victory. 
Press system 
The political significance of broadcasting since the war has been 
especially enhanced by certain characteristics of the French press 
system. The wartime division of the country into an occupied and an 
unoccupied zone increased the importance of the regional as opposed to 
the Parisian press. 
10 
As a result, the most popular newspapers are 
still the regional dailies. The Paris newspapers, which are the only 
10. S. Hood, The Mass Media, London, Macmillan, 1972, p. 52. See also 
W. Redfern, "The Press", in J. E. Flower, France Today, London, 
Methuen, 1977 (3rd edition). 
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ones to achieve nationwide cirulation, have with some notable exceptions 
such as Le Monde fared badly in competition with the provincial press. 
Since the war the number of daily newpaper titles has sharply de- 
clined, while at the same time the total circulation of those still in 
print has stagnated despite an increase in the population and "the 
relative democratisation of higher education. " 
11 The readership of daily 
newspapers in France is lower than that of most other developed countries 
including Great Britain and West Germany. Partly attributable to the 
growth of radio and more especially television, this relative decline 
of the press from its post-war peak has in turn further increased the 
importance of the broadcasting media. Indeed it is. ironic that the 
section of the press with the biggest circulation in France is that of 
the television magazines such as Tele-7-Jours and Telerama. 
12 
According to Alfred Grosser the two most important press phenomena 
of the postwar period in France are what he calls "departification" 
and consolidation. 
13 Under the first heading it is clear that since 
the end of the second world war various political party newspapers have 
disappeared: the MRP daily, L'Aube, folded in 1951, while the 
Socialist daily, Le Populaire, eventually gave up the ghost in 1966 
after years of decline. The Gaullist party daily, La Nation, dis- 
appeared in 1974, 
"... after Giscard's government team cut off its secret subsidy 
because of the paper's criticism of the "ungaullist" behaviour 
of the new president. " 14 
11. R. Cayrol, "Les mass media dans la campagne electorale de mars 1978" 
paper to appear in H. Penniman (ed. ), France at the polls II9 
Washington, AEI, 1979. 
12. In 1976, for example, the highest selling daily in France was 
Guest-France with a circulation of about 650,000 compared with a 
circulation of over 2,000,000 for the weekly television magazine 
Tele-7-Jours. 
13. A. Grosser "The role of the press, radio, and television in French 
political life", in H. Penniman (ed. ), France at the Polls, 
Washington, AEI, 1975, p. 209. 
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Though it had a derisory circulation, La Nation was politically 
important because its editorials had been given prominent coverage 
in radio and television news programmes during de Gaulle's presidency. 
Finally, L'Humanite, the Communist party daily, has managed to maintain 
its precarious existence despite a sharp decline in its circulation 
since the post-war peak. 
I 'Depart ificat ion" does not, however, mean depoliticisation. The 
national daily, Le Monde, a paper full of political news and comment 
on France and abroad, has substantially increased its circulation 
since the war. The decline of the party political dailies has been 
partly compensated by the appearance of new non-party political 
weeklies such as L'Express, Le Nouvel Observateur and Le Point, all 
of which have creditable circulation figures. 
15 In 1977, just one 
year prior to the crucial 1978 legislative elections, a new national 
daily was launched by the management of Le Nouvel Observateur. This 
new daily, Le Matin de Paris, later renamed Le Matin, is strongly 
sympathetic towards the French Socialist party. 
The other phenomenon referred to by Grosser, that of consolidation, 
is. particularly evident in the provincial press with many nominally 
independent newpapers -belonging to large press groups. One con- 
sequence of this consolisation is that in many of the French regions 
a press monopoly has been established with one newspaper dominating the 
market. For example, in Brittany Ouest-France has no competitor 
worthy of the name in a circulation area which covers ten French 
departments, while on the Mediterranean coastline Le Provencal 
15. L'Express, favourable to the Giscardian wing of the majorit4, had a circulation of over 500,000 in 1977; Le Nouvel Observateur, 
which generally favours the Socialist party, had a circulation of 
around 350,000 in the same year; Le Point, more pro- than anti- 
maorite, had a circulation of around 250,000 in 1977. R. Cayrol, 
on. cit., pp. 15-16. 
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benefits from a similar monopoly position. 
16 Regions such as the 
north-east where competition among regional dailies does exist, 
La Voix du Nord competing against both Nord Eclair and Nord Mat in, 
are now the exception to the general rule of market dominance in each 
region by one daily newpaper. 
The essential features of the French press system which emerge 
from this brief outline are, first, that overall the French press has 
been on the decline since the high point of the liberation, and, 
secondly, that since the war for a variety of reasons the regional 
press has been much stronger than its national counterpart. It is 
in this context that the state broadcasting services have come to 
fulfil a vital role as truly national media as well as constituting for 
many the major source of news and political comment. 
17 
During de Gaulle's presidency Alain Peyrefitte, the most important 
Minister of Information in the Fifth Republic, sought to justify the 
pro-government-stance of the regional news programmes on the state 
broadcasting services by pointing out its balancing effect in areas 
where the press was controlled by the opposition. -Such an area was 
the south-west where La Depeche du Midi retained its Radical origins 
and actively opposed the Gaullist regime. Moreover, according to 
Malcolm Anderson: 
"the absence of a serious large-circulation newspaper 
or weekly supporting the Government convinced the Gaullist 
leadership early in the Fifth Republic that it was faced by 
a predominantly hostile press. " 18 
Whether the Gaullist leadership really did believe this to be the 
16. J. -L. Servan Schreiber, "Le Monopole de la Presse de Province", 
paper presented to the conference "Cinq monopoles de 1'information, 
Paris, November 1976. 
17. For circulation figures of the French press, see tables 2. i, 2. ii 
and 2. iii. 
18. M. Anderson, op. cit., p. 175. 
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case or not, the fact remains that Peyrefitte sought to justify the 
one-sided presentation of news by the regional television stations 
as a reaction to the perceived anti-Gaullism of the regional press. 
19 
The consequence was that broadcasting particularly in the early years 
of the Fifth Republic, as we shall see later in this chapter, was closely 
controlled by the Gaullist government who believed it to be an important 
political weapon to be used to their advantage. 
De Gaulle's use of the broadcasting media 
De Gaulle's personal understanding of broadcasting as a political 
tool also influenced the political development of radio and television 
during his presidency. The success of his wartime broadcasts led de 
Gaulle to invest radio, and later television, with a special power to 
influence the French people, a power which he was determined to exploit 
to the full. From the very start of his political career, therefore, de 
Gaulle was aware of the political importance of broadcasting and he 
maintained this sense of awareness throughout his presidency. 
For example, control of broadcasting was naturally of paramount 
importance during periods-of-political crisis. During the Algerian 
troubles de Gaulle asserted his authority via the broadcasting media 
on two important occasions. First, during the week of the Algiers 
barricades in January 1960 de Gaulle appeared on television in army 
uniform to condemn the insurgents and to call for the strictest 
discipline from the army. 
20 Again, during the Algerian putsch of the 
four army generals in April 1961 de Gaulle spoke out on the radio to 
19. A. Saldich, Politics and Television in France during the De Gaulle 
years, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Paris, 1971, p. 29, 
interview with A. Peyrefitte. 
20. Speech of January 29 1960. See P. Viansson-Ponte Histoire de la , Retýublioue Gaullienne, (vol. 1), Paris, Fayard, 1970, pp. 266-267. 
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condemn the uprising and order the soldiers to use every means possible 
to ensure the failure of the rebellion. In his book De Gaulle Alexander 
Werth describes the effect of this broadcast in these terms: 
"It was later said that this broadcast produced in Algeria 
what was called "a transistor victory" for de Gaulle. The 
hundreds of thousands of French conscript soldiers there had, 
through their transistor radios, listened to this broadcast, 
and the effect had been overwhelming; they were determined 
to resist the "foursome". Countless officers who had wavered, 
decided against embarking on an adventure which might end very 
badly for them. It was obvious to them that de Gaulle was a man 
who would stand no nonsense. " 21 
De Gaulle's frequent interventions on television in election and 
referendum campaigns were considered, by the Gaullists and their 
opponents, to be crucial in rallying support to the Gaullist camp. In 
the 1961 referendum campaign on Algerian self-determination, -for example, 
de Gaulle opened the campaign, made-two broadcasts in the week before 
the poll and had almost as much time on the air as all the parties 
together. 
22 
The finest examples of de Gaulle's use-of the broadcasting media 
were the presidential press conferences which received saturation 
coverage on radio and television. Since many of the -major policy 
decisions of the President were announced at these conferences, these 
occasions would have been significant from the point of content alone. 
What made them such impressive events, however, was de Gaulle's style. 
Presidential policy decisions were revealed on television not only to the 
viewers but also to government ministers who up until the start of the 
conference were often unaware of what policy initiatives de Gaulle was 
going to announce. The President used an element of suspense to dramatise 
his utterances for maximum impact. By dint of careful stage management 
21. A. Werth, op. cit., p. 269. 
22. P. M. Williams, French Politicians and Elections 1951-1969, London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 118. 
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de Gaulle not only enhanced the prestige and dignity of the 
presidential office and its incumbent, but also demonstrated the 
force of broadcasting as a political instrument. 
23 
De Gaulle spared no pains to ensure that he performed well on 
television. He took 
"all the trouble to write out his text, to learn it off by 
heart ..., to make the most of his mannerisms which, in the end 
move rather than irritate people. He rehearses his TV speeches 
in front of a mirror and with the help of a tape-recorder. He 
even took lessons in diction from an eminent actor of the Comedie 
Francaise, and knows all the right cadences, and is aware of the 
gestures and intonations to avoid. " 24 
Using the broadcasting--media to bypass intermediary bodies such as 
Parliament and the political parties, de Gaulle capitalised on the growth 
of television and his mastery of this medium in no uncertain fashion. 
It is worth-stressing in this context that the beginning of. the 
growth of television in France coincided almost exactly with the 
foundation of the Fifth Republic. Though government interference in 
the news output -of the state broadcasting services had originated 
during the war and had re-emerged-in the latter years of the Fourth 
Republic, it was only with the establishment of-the Fifth Republic 
that the dimensions of this practice assumed such political importance. 
The foundation of the Gaullist regime, the advent of the transistor 
radio and the start of the expansion of the television market in France 
were more or less contemporaneous events. Thus, while before 1958 
television was confined to a select few, after this date sales steadily 
increased from around one million in 1959 to saturation point of about 
23. M. Anderson, op. cit., p. 49. For the texts of the presidential 
press conferences, see J. C. Maitrot and J. D. Sicault, Les 
conferences de presse du General de Gaulle, Paris, PUP, 1969. 
24. A. Werth, op. cit., p. 361. 
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fifteen million in the mid 1970s. 
25 From 1958 onwards de Gaulle and 
his ministers exploited the new medium to the full, thus giving rise to 
a description of the new Gaullist regime as a "telecracy". 
26 
A combination of the above factors is sufficient to explain not 
only why broadcasting has assumed political significance in France, but 
also why it has given rise to such bitter controversy. The problem of 
how to ensure that the democratically elected government does not control 
in a partisan fashion the state broadcasting services which are 
supposedly at the service of the whole nation was from the beginning 
never satisfactorily resolved. The failure to resolve this problem is 
evidenced in the following brief examination of the relationship between 
the Government and the state broadcasting services from the end of the 
second world war to the presidential election of 1974. 
Government and broadcasting: the Fourth Republic: 1946-1958 
During the Fourth Republic government control of broadcasting 
worked especially to the detriment of the Communists and the Gaullists, 
including the General himself. --Both Communists-and Gaullists suffered 
from a lack of radio time in which to air their views, while the 
Communists were also the victims of anti-Communist propaganda broad- 
casts such as La Vie en Rouge and Paix et Liberte. 
27 Most of the govern- 
ments of the Fourth Republic justified this censorship by pointing to 
"the lack of objectivity" of those who were kept off the air. 
25. See tables 2. iv and 2. v. 
26. The term "telecracy" was used as the title for a book on the 
politics of French broadcasting during the Fifth Republic. c. f. 
C. Durieux, La Telecratie, Paris, Tema, 1976. 
27. J. Montaldo, Dossier ORTF 1944-74: Tous Cou ables Paris, Albin Michel, 1974, pp. 29,3,49, passim. 
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Under Guy Mollet's Socialist government, which included in its 
ministerial ranks Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Arthur 
Conte, measures were taken at the time of the Algerian troubles to 
suppress anti-government views in news broadcasts. During the Fifth 
Republic Gaullist ministers, criticised by the opposition for their 
exploitation of the broadcasting services, frequently retorted by 
referring to the censorship of which they had been the victims during 
the Fourth Republic and to the doctoring of the news during Mollet's 
premiership. 
The lack of a statute to regulate government-broadcasting 
relations did nothing to ameliorate the situation. Of sixteen bills 
drawn up on the subject of the state broadcasting services during the 
Fourth Republic, none was passed or even went to the vote. 
28 In the 
absence of any regulatory legislation the temptation on the part of 
government ministers to control news programming was easily given in to 
when the Fourth Republic ran into trouble over the Algerian question. 
Government and broadcasting: De Gaulle's presidency: 1958-1969. 
On coming to power in 1958 the Gaullists began to install their 
own men in the key posts of the Radiodiffusion-television francaise (RTF). 
In July Jacques Soustelle was appointed Minister of Information, a post he 
had already occupied in 1945. Within a month of his appointment Soustelle 
had 
". .. changed the holders of a dozen key posts in the RTF (director general, president of the higher council, director 
of news, editor of television news, director of the politics 
desk, general secretary, etc. ), appointing at all these levels, 
except one, Gaullist loyalists ... " 29 
28. P. M. Williams, The French Parliament 1958 -1967, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 91. See also R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 5-10. 
29. P. Viansson-Ponte, op. i-_, (vol. 1), p. 70. 
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Thus, Christian Chavanon, a Gaullist conseiller d'Etat, was appointed 
director general of the RTF, while Louis Terrenoire, a former general 
secretary of the Gaullist RPF, was given the post of director of news. 
30 
By 1959, therefore, the key decision-making posts of the RTF were almost 
without exception occupied by Gaullist sympathisers. 
The consequences of this Gaullist domination of the state broad- 
casting organisation were quickly in evidence, particularly during 
election and referendum campaigns. Gaullist politicians were given a 
vastly disproportionate amount of time in which to outline their 
policies, while opposition spokesmen were either denied the opportunity 
of replying or their replies were deliberately distorted by skilful 
editing. In 1958, for example, --during the referendum campaign for the 
new constitution, de Gaulle's "yes" campaign was enthusiastically 
reported and Soustelle was allowed most of a news programme in which to 
refute the arguments of the opposition. 
31 Commenting on the use of the 
state broadcasting services during the 1958--campaign, Pierre Viansson- 
Ponte writes: 
"Never since the Second Empire, with the possible-exception 
of the 1877 elections, had one witnessed in France under a 
Republican constitution such an unleashing of propaganda: - 
Never had the-hold over the RTF, the deliberate-distortion of 
radio and television news, attained such a degree. Never had 
simple equity in an electoral contest been so flagrantly pushed 
aside. ... " 32 
Likewise in the 1962 referendum campaign on the election of the President 
of the Republic by direct universal suffrage and in the legislative 
30. J. Montaldo, op. cit., p. 121. 
31. P. M. Williams, French Politicians and Elections, 1951-1969, 
London, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 98- 
32. P. Viansson-Ponte, op. cit. (vol. 1), p. 71. See also A. Werth, 
op. cit., pp. 247-248. 
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election one month later, "radio and television were thoroughly 
exploited" and "the supreme governmental weapon was, as always, de 
Gaulle's own broadcast. ""33 
In 1964 a bill was introduced in Parliament by the Government, 
setting out a framework for the organisation of the state broadcasting 
services. The statute of June 27 1964, which reproduced the provisions 
of the Government's bill, was the major legislative text on broadcasting 
during the eleven years of de Gaulle's presidency. Under the terms of the 
new statute the state broadcasting services were to be renamed the 
Office de Radiodiffusion-Television Frangaise (ORTF), a name which was 
quickly to become one of the symbols of the authoritarian face of -the 
Gaullist regime. The statute itself contained only nine clauses and was 
concerned solely with the general lines of the reform. The ORTF, like 
its predecessor the RTF, would be managed by a director general appointed 
by the Government and responsible for the everyday management.. of the 
Office. 
34 In addition, and this was an innovation, provision was now 
made for the creation of-a board of governors, half -of whom would 
be 
appointed directly by the Government, to watch over amongst other things 
the objectivity and accuracy of news programmes. The lines of control 
between the broadcasting services and the Ministry-of Information were 
to be relaxed. 
35 The statute was quickly, supplemented by five decrees 
signed on July 22 which dealt with the organisation of the board of 
governors, the ORTF's finances, the staff statute, the journalists' 
statute and the composition of the Office's programme committee. 
36 
33. P. M. Williams, French Politicians and Elections, 1951-1969, London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 139. See also M. Anderson, op. 
cit. p. 184. 
34. L'Office is frequently used by French commentators as a synonym for the 
ORTF. 
35". Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Law no. 64-261 of June 27 1964. 
36. Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Decrees no. 64-736,64-737,64-738 64-739 and b4-740 of July 22 1964. 
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The avowed intention of the Government was that the 1964 statute 
signified a step towards greater autonomy for the state broadcasting 
organisation. Peyrefitte, the Minister of Information responsible for 
preparing the Government's bill, stated in the National Assembly that 
"the fundamental defect which we intend to remedy by the 
present statute is the permanent confusion which has taken 
root in the minds of the public between RTF and the Government. "37 
This did not, however, prevent Peyrefitte from appointing several members 
of his cabinet to key positions in the ORTF. 
38 Nor did it stop the one- 
sided presentation of news and government policy on the Office's news 
programmes. 
The 1965 presidential election showed, however, that this strict 
control-of broadcasting through appointments and direct supervision 
of news content could be counter-productive. By the law of November 
6 1962 
the allocation of broadcasting time among the candidates in the official 
campaign period (but only within the official period) was to--be supervised 
by a special ad hoc committee appointed by the Government for the purpose. 
Thus, for the few weeks of the official campaign opposition candidates, 
notably Mitterrand and Jean Lecanuet, appeared on television to present 
their case. Long accustomed to the bombardment of Gaullist propaganda, 
the electorate was for the first time exposed to critics of the regime who 
used their screen time to put forward anti-Gaullist policies. -The effect 
was shattering. 
"Television which for seven years had tirelessly offered 
the same faces, the same pictures, the same satisfied and 
soporific statements, seemed suddenly shaken by a fit of 
madness. Unknown faces appeared on the screen to tell 
37 Alain Peyrefitte's speech in Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires 
Assemblee Nationale, May 27 1964, p. 1377. 
38. See chapter on Appointments. 
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Millions of stupefied Frenchmen that everything was not for 
the best, that de Gaulle was not always right, that the 
Government was not the best one possible. People felt 
shocked as if the ORTF had fallen into the hands of dangerous 
rebels. " 39 
While prior to the first ballot de Gaulle had scarcely used his allocation 
of television time, the necessity of a second ballot convinced him that 
he could not remain above the electoral battle in the face of his critics. 
The political importance of television was thus further enhanced and was 
measured in opinion polls which showed de Gaulle losing more ground among 
viewers than among non-viewers, especially to Lecanuet before the first 
ballot . 
40 
The disappointing election result lead to a limited relaxation 
of the Government's control over broadcasting. New current affairs 
programmes such as Face a Face, - Zoom and Camera III were introduced 
in which opposition politicians, including Communists, were featured. 
Nevertheless, while current affairs programmes strove to be more politically 
balanced, news programmes, watched-by a much larger audience, continued 
to be closely controlled by the Minister of Information by means of 
ministerial directives and direct intervention. Self-censorship by 
journalists and producers also remained in evidence. 
41 
The events of May 1968 highlighted the nature of the relation- 
ship between the Government and the ORTF during de Gaulle's presidency. 
At first the Government refused to let the ORTF broadcast any account of 
39" P. Viansson-Ponte, op. cit., (vol. 2), pp. 183-184. 
40. Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, L'election 
presidentielle des 5 et 19 decembre 1965, Paris, Armand doling 1970. 
41. J. Ardagh, The New France, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1973, (2nd edition), 
p. 611. J. Thibau, Une television pour tous les fran ais Paris, 
Seuil, 1970, pp. 273-282. 
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the riots, even though the press and the peripheral radio stations were 
giving them full coverage. At the end of May, first the general staff and 
then the journalists came out on strike in protest against the Government's 
directives regarding the reporting of the events and more generally the 
way in which the Government had manipulated the state broadcasting services 
for ten years. The strikers demanded a new ORTF statute to guarantee the 
autonomy of the broadcasting services, freedom from ministerial pressures 
and an impartial news service. More specifically, they insisted that 
the ORTF board of governors should no longer contain a 
, 
de facto 
government majority, that the director general should be elected by the 
board of governors and not appointed by the Government and that a "committee 
of wise men" independent of the board of governors be aet up to ensure 
objectivity in news content. 
42 
Obviously the Government could not accept these demands. The general 
aims of the strikers were in theory already guaranteed by the 1964 
statute, while the more specific claims demonstrated that only those 
provisions of the statute had been applied which reinforced the 
Government's hold over broadcasting. Taking advantage of the climate 
of reaction which followed the May events, the Government proceeded to 
quell the strike. 
The measures taken by the Government after May 1968 were particularly 
savage. While on the one hand some minor conciliatory moves were made, 
such as an increase in the staff representation on the board of governors 
42. The best account of the events at the ORTF in 1968 is 
R. Louis, L'ORTF un combat, Paris, Seuil, 1968. See also 
C. Fred4ric, Liberer 1'ORTF, Paris, Seuil, 1968; J. -P. 
Hanel and A. Planel, La crise de l'ORTF, Paris, Pauvert, 1968 
and A. Astoux, Ondes de Choc, Paris, Plon, 1978. 
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(which nonetheless still remained in the hands of the Government), more 
significant steps were taken to punish the strikers. In August more than 
sixty radio and television journalists were dismissed and thirty others 
were 'exiled" from Paris to offices in the French regions or abroad; eight 
of the eleven members of the strike committee were sacked and other prominent 
strikers effectively demoted; current affairs programmes were axed to 
be replaced by others less outspoken. L'Annee Politioue summed up the 
consequences of the strike as follows: 
"A strike of five weeks at the ORTF. Results obtained: a 
rise in salaries, a comite d'entreprise, commissions paritaires, 
two or three more votes on the board of governors, ... Not a 
negligeable result. But it was not to obtain this that the 
strike-took-place. What did the strikers want? The independence 
of the Office guaranteed by the (1964) statute but not put 
into effect and to ensure this independence precise guarantees. 
The Government's answer to these unusual demands was a categorical 
no. After a facade-of-negotiations, everything was restored 
to order at the time of the June elections. " 43 
In short, having made some formal concessions the Government proceeded 
to reassert its authority over the ORTF. 
The backlash to the strike at the ORTF in 1968 proved, if further 
proof were necessary, that the 1964 statute had failed to remedy the 
"fundamental defect" to which Peyrefitte had referred: the permanent 
confusion between the state broadcasting services and the Government. 
In April 1968, four years after the passing of the ORTF statute and only 
a few weeks before the ORTF strike, a Senate report concluded: 
"the depoliticisation promised by the Government was to say 
the least scarcely evident and the instructions of the authorities, 
far from diminishing, appeared rather to be increasing. ... The 
43. L'Annee Politigue, 1968, p. 370. See pp. 369-372 for a concise 
summary of the events at the ORTF in May-June 1968. 
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political personalities close to the Government benefited 
from favourable treatment: they were systematically shown 
to advantage. " 44 
To sum up the period of de Gaulle's presidency one can scarcely do 
better than repeat the oft-quoted phrase first used by Pierre 
Viansson-Ponte in his history of the period: 
"... television (is) the absolute weapon of the regime. " 45 
The Chaban-Delmas experiment: 1969-1972 
From the beginning of his presidency in June 1969 Pompidou 
assumed responsibility for policy making in most fields with the 
notable exception of broadcasting which was the most important area 
the President-was content -to- leave to-his Prime Minister. 
It was 
only after May 1972 that broadcasting became included in the 
presidential -sector of policy making. Since the views of 
Pompidou and 
Chaban-Delmas on the role of the ORTF were quite different, this change 
of policy making sector was symptomatic of a substantive change in 
broadcasting-policy. 
That the relationship-between the Government and the state 
broadcasting services became an issue during the presidential election 
campaign of May 1969 was largely due to Alain Poher, the interim 
President of the Republic after de Gaulle's resignation and a candidate 
44. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1967-1968, no. 118, Rapport 
fait en conclusion des travaux de la commission de controle creee 
en vertu de la resolution adoptee par le Senat le 14 decembre 
1967 et chargee d'examiner les problemes poses par 1'accomplisse- 
ment des missions propres ä 1'Office de radiodiffusion-television 
francaise par Andre Diligent depose le 13 avril 1968, p. 260. 
(The Diligent report, 1968. ) 
45. P. Viansson-Ponte, op. cit., (vol. 1), p. 151. 
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for the vacant presidency. On numerous occasions Poher attacked 
the ORTF's lack of objectivity in its presentation of the campaign 
and put forward plans for a reform of the 1964 statute. These 
proposals, similar in detail to the demands of the 1968 strikers, 
favoured greater autonomy for the Office from government interference 
and, in particular, the abolition of the Ministry of Information, the 
symbol of Gaullist control of the broadcasting media. 
46 
In reply to these proposals Pompidou was obliged to outline his 
own views on the ORTF. He too supported a more liberal statute which 
would guarantee the state broadcasting services "real autonomy. "47 
Echoing the declarations of his rival for the presidential office, 
Pompidou advocated the abolition of the Ministry of Information as 
well as the establishment of competition between the two ORTF channels. 
There was no question, however, of any commercialisation of broadcast- 
ing or-indeed-of any-modification of-the state monopoly. 
48 
Pompidou showed himself very conscious of the national vocation 
of the ORTF and its distinctiveness from other means of mass com- 
munication such as the press. Thus, any liberalisation of state 
broadcasting could not be allowed to detract from the quintessential 
role of the Office as "the voice-of France. " During-the election 
campaign Pompidou asserted: 
"... because we have a national radio and television service 
... they are in a sense the official voice of France, and there 
is a certain tone to be maintained which must be the tone of 
France. " 49 
It was in fact this view of the ORTF as the mouthpiece of the State 
46. Le Monde, May 27 1969. 
47. L'Express, no. 936, June 9-15 1969. 
48. Le Monde, June 5 1969- 
49. Le Monde, May 17 1969 
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which was more representative of the new President's thinking on 
the subject of broadcasting than his advocacy of any liberal measures. 
Pompidou eventually disavowed the reform proposals which he had put 
forward during the campaign with the main aim of not being outbid by 
Poher. 
After the formation of the new government in June 1969, 
responsibility for broadcasting policy was assumed by the office of 
the Prime Minister, and particularly by Chaban-Delmas himself and one 
of his advisers, Roger Vaurs. In the Government's declaration of 
general policy before the National Assembly on September 16 1969 
Chaban-Delmas launched his project to transform France's "stagnant 
society. " Included in his proposals to construct "the New Society" 
was a reorganisation of the ORTF. This reform included greater 
financial autonomy for the Office, more competition between the 
ORTF's television channels and the allocation of screen time to 
political groups-and socio-professional organisations. 
50 
The most controversial measure sought to-hive off-the news 
departments on each of the two channels to form independent units 
whose directors would enjoy a hitherto unparalleled degree of autonomy. 
The directors of these news departments would be able to choose journ- 
alists for their respective teams without any-interference either from 
the Government or the channel directors. As a guarantee of their 
independence they would not be required to submit their material in 
advance for higher approval, thereby reducing the need for self- 
censorship. Moreover, the news directors were to be appointed for 
a fixed period of three years and could be dismissed only in the 
event of serious professional misconduct. 
50. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
September 17 1969, pp. 2252-2253. 
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The director subsequently placed in charge of the news 
department on the second channel was a dedicated Gaullist, 
Jacqueline Baudrier. For the more widely viewed first channel 
the Prime Minister chose a television journalist known for his 
independent, not to say left-wing, views, Pierre Desgraupes. 
Desgraupes had been among those who had signed a communique protest- 
ing against government interference in the television coverage of the 
May 1968 events and had taken part in the subsequent strike by ORTF 
staff. 
Welcomed by many commentators and broadcasting staff as the sign 
of a fresh approach to news broadcasting, the appointment of Desgraupes 
gave rise to vehement criticism inside the ranks of the Gaullist 
party, and even inside the Government where it was rumoured that the 
Minister of Defence, Michel Debre, had threatened to resign from his 
post. 
51 Chaban-Delmas, however, refused to bow to this pressure as 
this would have entailed a volte-face on the policy formulated--by- 
him and outlined to the Assembly in September. During this period of 
dissension inside the Gaullist ranks President Pompidou refused-to 
intervene in what he obviously regarded as a prime ministerial matter. 
52 
Nonetheless it was obvious that Pompidou did not fully associate 
himself with his Prime Minister's policy on the ORTF. In a president- 
ial press conference in July 1970 he asserted that the Ministry of 
Information had been abolished on the initiative of his Prime Minister. 
More conclusively, in a television broadcast in December 1969 Pompidou 
referred to the recent reorganisation of the ORTF in the following 
51. Report on World Affairs, vol 50,1969, p. 269. 
52. L'Express, no. 951, September 29 - October 5 1969. 
53. L'Annee Politiaue, 1970, p. 430. 
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critical terms: 
"... I accepted the reform of the ORTF. But I intend to 
see that freedom of speech is not abused and that our national 
radio and television service is truly impartial and worthy of 
our country. " 54 
Pompidou thus emphasised that he had "accepted" rather than initiated 
government policy on broadcasting. Some controversy was caused by 
the ambiguous second sentence in which the President specified that 
the broadcasting services should be "truly impartial. " The implication 
was that he did not judge them to be so already, and that, in 
particular, he objected to the way in which events were being presented 
by the news department of channel one. In this speech the President 
appeared to be claiming the right to intervene directly in the 
administration of the ORTF, a right he was to exercise after May 1972. 
The President's criticisms of his Prime Minister's broadcasting 
reform, and indeed of his New Society project in general55, echoed 
those of a large body of Gaullist deputies who harked back to their 
virtual monopoly of the broadcasting services during de Gaulle's 
presidency. 
56 As early as January 1970, for example, Robert Poujade, 
general secretary of the Gaullist party, sent out to party officials 
and deputies a letter in which he invited them to denounce any broad- 
cast which appeared to them to call into question the work of the 
Fifth Republic. Poujade promised to convey their protests to the 
Prime Minister who was now constantly under attack from inside his 
own party over his broadcasting reform. 
57 
In February 1971 Poujade's successor as general secretary, Rene 
54. Le Monde, December 17 1969. 
55" See J. Chaban-Delmas, L'Ardeur, Paris, Stock, 1975, especially 
chapter 31 in which Chaban-Delmas recounts the unfavourable re- 
action of Pompidou to the appointment of Desgraupes, pp. 376-377. 
56. Prominent among these critics were Jacques-Philippe Vendroux, 
Charles Pasqua, Pierre Bas and Christian de la Malene. 
57" For the full text of this letter, see P. Avril, UDR et gaullistes, Paris, PUF, 1971, p. 28. 
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Tomasini, went even further in his criticism of Chaban's ORTF reform. 
Tomasini, who had been the candidate supported by Pompidou for the 
post of general secretary of the Gaullist party, made an outspoken 
denunciation of the news programmes on channel one, claiming that 
they were'bnder the control of the enemies of freedom. "58 In 
addition, he affirmed that while in other areas the policies executed 
by the Prime Minister had had positive results, "in broadcasting 
matters he has been led astray. ""59 
What was apparent in this speech and in the controversy it gave 
rise to in the press and the Gaullist party was that it was the 
Prime Minister personally and not the President of the Republic, far 
less the director general of the ORTF, who was held responsible for 
the "lack of objectivity and honesty" of the ORTF. In fact Tomasini 
in acting as the spokesman for many Gaullist deputies was at great 
pains to point out the loyalty of his supporters to the President. 
Moreover, Pompidou noticeably failed to reprimand Tomasini for his 
outburst or to give his Prime Minister any support in the affair. 
60 
The period 1969-1972 marked in the eyes of many commentators a 
step in the directnn of a less overtly governmental broadcasting service 
when compared with the previous eleven years of de Gaulle's presidency6l 
As a consequence of the 1969 reform, the news programmes on channel 
one were openly critical of government policy in social and economic 
affairs and opposition leaders appeared almost as often on television 
58. Le Monde, February 17 1971. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Le Monde, February 25 1971. 
61. See for example, J. Ardagh, op. cit., pp. 612-613 and J. Thibau 
La television le pouvoir et 1'argent , Ps, Calmannvy, 1973, PP"17" 46. For an excellent summary of this period see G. Martinet, 
Le systeme Pompidou, Paris, Seuil, 1973, pp. 120-131. 
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as government spokesmen. The two news departments, which formed 
independent units outside the normal hierarchical structure of the 
ORTF, were far less subject'to ministerial interference than before. 
6- 
However, it should be remembered that the 1969 reform did not, and - 
given that it was in operation only three years could net, fundament- 
ally alter the underlying attitudes which certain sectors of the 
political elite, most notably within the Gaullist party, adopted 
towards government-broadcasting relations. Thus, the 1969 liberalis- 
ation depended largely on the personal convictions of ChabanDelmas 
and his immediate entourage. Desgraupes in particular owed his appoint- 
cent to Chaban-Delmas personally and as a result his fate became in- 
extricably linked with that of the Prime Minister. When Chaban-Delmas 
was dismissed from the premiership by Pompidou in July 1972, Desgraupes 
left the ORTF soon after., one of the first victims of the abandonment 
of the 1969 reform. 
63 
Broadcasting and the presidential sector: the 1972 ORTF statute 
Despite the President's notable lack of enthusiasm for the 1969 
reform of the ORTF, it was not until mid-1972 that Pompidou brought 
broadcasting into the presidential sector of policy-making, which now 
became all-embracing. In this he was helped by the publication at 
the beginning of May of two parliamentary reports on the ORTF which 
brought the issue of broadcasting once again into the political spot- 
light. 
62. Interview with Pierre Desgraupes, September 10 1979. 
63. D. Bombardier, la voix de la France, Paris, Robert laffont, - 
1975, Pp. 88-91. 
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A Senate mission of inquiry, with Andre Diligent as its 
rapporteur, had been set up in December 1971 to investigate the 
scandal of covert advertising at the ORTF. 
64 
'Its report revealed 
that a number of television producers had been accepting bribes from 
private companies to advertise their products during normal transmission 
time. In addition, the public had been duped into buying products in 
support of various charities, while in fact the manufacturers of the 
products were benefiting more than the charities concerned. 
A National Assembly committee of inquiry set up in the same month 
confirmed the findings of the Senate report and concluded that the 
covert advertising scandal was merely "... the epiphenomenon of the 
profound malaise which prevails at the Office. "65 This report, whose 
ravporteur was Joel Le Tac (Gaullist), had a wider brief than that of 
its senatorial rival. It condemned not only the underhand advertising 
but also the bad management, the. wastage of resources and the bureau- 
cracy and corruption which characterised the administration of the 
ORTF. On the other hand, the . 
1e Tac report welcomed the 1969 reform 
of the ORTF news service and praised the work of the separate news 
departments in the following terms: 
"It seems that at present the two directors of the news 
departments have proved that they are journalists who ... 
carry out their task of informing the viewers in an honest 
way. The creation of these two departments is therefore at 
64. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1971-1972, no 165, Rapport 
d'information pr6sent6 au nom de la mission commune d'information 
... chargee d'examiner la r6gularite de la gestion 
de 1'ORTF et 
des relations que cet organisme entretient avec diverses entre- 
prises nationales, Etablissements publics, societes d'economie 
mixte ou autres, notamment dann le domaine de la publicite, par 
Andre Diligent, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 25 avril 
1972. The Diligent report, 1972. ) 
65. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1971-1972, no. 2291, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission de contrBle de -la gestion de 
1'Office de radio diffusion-t elevision francaise, par Joel Le Tac, 
annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 28 avril 1972. (The Le Tac report, 1972. ) 
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this level an undoubted success. " 66 
Both parliamentary reports were critical of certain aspects of 
the ORTF's organisation. Since broadcasting policy had been the 
personal responsibility of Chaban-Delmas since 1969, the criticisms 
of the ORTF contained in the reports amounted, intentionally or not, 
to an indictment of the policy the Prime Minister had initiated on 
coming to office. 
67 
Though Chaban-Delmas promised the Gaullist 
deputies that those implicated in the covert advertising scandal would 
be brought to justice, the adverse publicity surrounding the publication 
of the reports provided Pompidou with the pretext to-introduce a new 
reform of the ORTF and to bring broadcasting into the presidential 
sector of policy making. 
The first indication that broadcasting had moved into the 
presidential sector was the appointment of Philippe Malaud to the 
task of preparing a new statute for the ORTF. An Independent 
Republican deputy, Malaud was known to be a supporter of the President's 
views on broadcasting. 
68 
Infamous for his hardline views, Malaud 
had previously denounced the "left-wing elements" at work on the first 
channel and thus showed himself opposed to the policy of Chaban-Delmas. 
69 
It was on the personal recommendation of Pompidou that Malaud was 
authorised to take charge of the reorganisation of the Office, 
70 
and 
it was to the President and not the Prime Minister that Malaud later 
presented his proposals. As a result, Chaban-Dehnas found himself 
outmanoeuvred and confronted with a fait accompli. 
66. Le Tac report, 1972, p. 230. 
67. For a more detailed account of the importance of special parliament- 
ary reports see the chapter on Parliamentary Control. 
68. V Express, no. 1092, June 12-18 1972. 
69. IIExpress, no. 1088, May 15-21 1972. See also P. Malaud, La revolut- 
ion liberale, Paris, Masson, 1976, pp. "13-32. 
70. Le Monde, ray 14-15 1972. 
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The 1972 ORTF statute confirmed the state broadcasting monopoly 
and the ORTF's status as a public establishment of an industrial 
and commercial character. The Office would continue to be administered 
by a board of governors, half of whose members would be appointed 
by the Government. Provision was now made for a right of reply, 
though not for political groups, and for an extension of the minimum 
service during strikes. 
71 One of the major objectives of the new 
act was that the ORTF's structure became more decentralised with 
each unit (channel one, channel two, radio, etc. ) being accorded 
a greater degree of responsibility for the running of its own 
services. In fact, however, this decentralisation of the ORTF had 
stillnot been put into operation two years later when the Office 
was finally abolished. 
72 
Three aspects of the 1972 statute in particular indicated that 
the policy formulated by--Vaurs and Chaban-Delmas in 1969 was to be 
discontinued. First, the directors of the news departments lost the 
autonomy which had been accorded them in 1969. Previously responsible 
solely to the board of governors, which meant in fact a-high degree 
of independence, the news directors now -became subject to the authority 
of the channel heads. This reintegration of the news departments 
within their respective channels was a complete about-turn on the 
policy initiated by Chaban-Delmas three years previously. Subsequent 
to this reorganisation being put into effect Desgraupes resigned 
as news director on channel one, while some members of his staff 
were sacked and the rest were transferred to the much less widely 
71. See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
72. Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Law no. 72-553 of July 3 
1972. (1972 ORTF statute). 
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viewed second channel. 
73 
Secondly, the fusion of the posts of director general and 
chairman of the board of governors in the one post of President 
Directeur G4n4ral (PDG) was expressly designed to centralise respons- 
ibility at the top of the ORTF and remove any potential countervailing 
force. 
74 The PDG was to be appointed by the Government for a "fixed 
period of three years. "75 The obvious risk was that as the post 
of PDG was within the patronage of the President, the person appointed 
would become a rubber stamp for policy decisions taken at the Elysee. 
Finally, the reconstitution of the Ministry of Information 
after the formation of the new government in July 1972 reflected the 
change in policy. As a reward for his efforts in helping to draw up 
, 
the new statute the new ministry was given to Malaud whom Pompidou 
felt he could trust to reflect his own views on broadcasting. 
It is not difficult to understand why Pompidou was so keen to 
bring broadcasting-into his own policy-making sector-and to-reverse 
the policy initiated by Chaban-Delmas. The organisational defects 
listed in the two parliamentary reports and the-surrounding public 
scandal regarding charges of corruption at the Office afforded a 
useful pretext for the reform of the ORTF. However, the-major reasons 
behind the change in direction were more overtly political. 
A major factor was the relative failure of the referendum 
on Europe which had taken place at the end of April and which Pompidou 
73. Le Monde, June 14 1972. 
74. One might note in passing the contradiction within the statute 
between its decentralising objectives and the creation of the 
post of PDG of the ORTF. 
75.1972 ORTF statute, article 9. 
kh- 
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had made his personal concern. Both a manoeuvre to embarrass the 
Left which was split on the Common Market issue and a means of 
boosting his own popularity, the referendum had backfired on the 
President due to a very high rate of abstention at the polls. 
Pompidou attributed the mediocre success of the "yes" vote to the 
inadequate presentation of the campaign by the ORTF. In particular 
he was incensed at the scarcely concealed preference for abstention 
which many of the television journalists had shown. 
76 
Moreover, with the approach of the 1973 legislative elections 
the President realised that a well-orchestrated campaign would be 
required to combat the common programme of the Socialists and Communists 
whose electoral alliance had just been announced. It was in the 
obvious interest of Gaullist deputies, many of whom were in grave 
danger of losing their seats, that the news programmes of the ORTF 
should publicise the Government's actions in a more favourable-light 
than had been the case since 1969. Obviously Chaban-Delmas could not 
be expected to agree with this change of policy on the status of the 
ORTF's news departments. It was therefore left to the President to 
bring the ORTF under his own supervision. 
This change of broadcasting from the prime ministerial to the 
presidential sector of policy making reflected a more general assertion 
of the primacy of the presidential office. After the failure of his 
referendum on Europe Pompidou's standing with the Gaullist deputies 
was at a low ebb. Chaban-Delmas, on the other hand, was apparently 
recovering from the adverse publicity he had received following the 
76. Le Monde, July 19 1972. 
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publication of his tax returns in the satirical weekly le Canard 
Enchaine. 77 In May the Prime Minister decided without any prior 
consultation with the President to seek a vote of confidence in the 
National Assembly. His objectives in seeking such a vote were to 
strengthen his position inside the Gaullist party, to confirm his 
hold of the premiership and to protect himself from the rancour of 
the President who blamed him for the insufficient preparation of the 
electorate by the ORTF during the referendum campaign. Pompidou, 
however, dissociated himself in advance from this initiative and, 
despite the massive vote of confidence accorded Chaban-Delmas, decided 
that he was free to dismiss him barely a manth later. 
78 Thus 
Chaban-Delmas had failed in his bid to play off the National Assembly 
and particularly the Gaullist party against the President. When 
Pompidou asked for his resignation following the practice of the 
Fifth Republic if not the letter of the Constitution, Chaban-Delmas 
had no alternative-but-to-accede-to--this request. 
The "resignation" of the Prime Minister represented- the- final 
breakdown in relations between Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas, -which 
had 
been increasingly strained due to Pompidou's lack of enthusiasm for 
Chaban's'S1ew Society" project. In adopting this stance Pompidou 
had been strongly-encouraged by his advisers Pierre Juillet, - 
Marie-France Garaud and Jean-Louis Guillaud, who were all opposed 
to Chaban-Delmas and wanted his dismissa09 It is in this context 
77. It was revealed in January 1972 that Chaban-Delmas had paid no 
income tax for some years while he was President of the National 
Assembly. Although this was quite legal, his standing with the 
public had been impaired. Le Monde, January 21 1972. 
78. The vote in the Assembly was 368 for and only 96 against. Journal 
Officiel, Dýbats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, May 25 1972. 
79. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979. 
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of presidential-prime ministerial relations that the 1972 ORTF 
statute can be interpreted as one sign of the growing presidential- 
isation of the regime which took place in the summer of 1972.80 
At the ORTF the appointment of Arthur Conte as the first PDG 
of the Office delivered the coup de race to the broadcasting policy 
put into operation by Chaban-Delmas. Conte had been one of the 
Gaullist party critics of the broadcasting policy of the former 
Prime Minister, condemning on one occasion at the 1971 Gaullist 
party conference in Strasbourg the news programmes of channel one as 
tending to weaken the authority of the State. 
81 
In an interview with 
the author Conte described the incident as follows: 
"I spoke out at the Strasbourg congress criticising the 
news reporting on channel one because during the presentation 
of a particular topic,. I forget now what it was exactly, it 
seemed to me that the journalists were being too communistic. 
... I criticised Chaban-Dehnas because he was at the table 
beside me. I did not criticise the director general of the 
ORTF because it was the Prime Minister and not the director 
general of the ORTF who was responsible. " 82 
The new PDG had impressed the President by his television appearances 
during the recent referendum campaign and it was on Pompidou's personal 
recommendation that Conte was appointed. 
Conte's appointment thus fitted in with the trend whereby positions 
of responsibility inside and outside the Government were being given 
80. Other signs of the presidentialisation of the regime included 
Pompidou's choice of Prime Minister to replace Chaban-Delmas. 
Pierre. Messmer failed to impress as even a potential challenger to 
the primacy of the Head of State over the next two years of 
Pompidou's presidency. Moreover, Pompidou's most trusted political 
supporters were well represented in the allocation of ministerial 
posts in the new government: Robert Poujade (Minister of the 
Environment), Jacques Chirac (Minister of Agriculture), Yvon 
Bourges (Minister of Commerce) and Jean-Philippe Lecat (government 
spokesman). Le Monde, July 21 1972 and 1'Express, no. 1097, July 
17-23 1972. 
81. L'Express, no. 1097, July 17-23 1972. 
82. Interview with Arthur Conte, June 19 1979. 
I 
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to persons whose loyalties were to the President personally rather 
than to the Gaullist party. A former SF10 deputy in his native 
department of Pyren4es Orientales, Conte had changed sides to 
represent his constituency as a Gaullist from 1968 onwards. A 
strong defender of French Algeria in the early sixties, Conte had 
been a strong critic of the Gaullist regime and so his commitment to 
the Gaullist movement was neither deep-seated nor long-standing. 
83 
It was difficult to believe that the choice of a Gaullist 
deputy and more importantly personal acquaintance of the President 
as head of the ORTF could in any way enhance the independence of 
the state broadcasting services vis-ä-vis the Government. The 
declaration of the new PDG that his objective was to ensure a 
"loyal" news coverage did nothing to assuage the criticisms which 
greeted the integration of the news departments within the structures 
of their respective channels. 
Though Conte's immediate task, to prepare the ground for a 
right-wing victory in the 1973 legislative elections, was successfully 
carried out, relations between Conte and the Elysee steadily worsened 
during 1972-73, despite the fact that Conte had been a personal 
appointment of the President. Partly this was due to Conte's delay 
in drawing up a detailed plan to implement the decentralisation of 
the ORTF outlined in the 1972 statute. More importantly, it was 
due to Conte's desire to use the ORTF as his own power base, his 
own personal fief. The importance Conte attached to his appointment 
can be judged by the fact that he considered the post of PDG of the 
83. P. Viansson-Ponte, op. cit. (vol. 1), p. 461. 
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ORTF to be the most important political position after that of 
President of the Republic. 
84 
Apparently assured of his own position at the ORTF for a fixed 
three year term at least, Conte was unwilling to share responsibility 
for the running of his new empire with either the Minister of 
Information or the Elysee. Thus the tandem placed by Pompidou to 
supervise the running of the ORTF, Malaud as Minister of Information 
and Conte as PDG of the Office, started to pull in different directions. 
While the policy difference between the two men came to a head over 
the issue of ministerial interference, what was to-become known 
as the Conte affair was as much due to the clash of personalities 
between the two men concerned. 
Limits to the independence of the PDG: the Conte affair: October 1973 
Mutual hostility between Conte and Malaud had beenbuilding. uP 
throughout 1973 and finally erupted in October. Conte complained to 
Pompidou about ministerial interference in his management of the 
Office and offered his resignation if his authority over the ORTF 
were not confirmed. Pompidou at first assured Conte of his complete 
confidence in the latter's administration and asked him to withdraw his 
proffered resignation. Yet barely ten days later, after Conte had 
tactlessly denounced in public the political pressures to which the 
Office had been subjected, Pompidou performed a sudden about-turn and 
sacked Conte from his post. 
85 
84. Interview with Arthur Conte, June 19 1979 
85. For a chronological account of the events leading up to Conte's 
dismissal see A. Conte, Hommes libres, Paris, Plon, 1973, PP- 
300-326 and Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1973-1974, no. 39, 
Rapport general fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1974, Tome III, annexe no. 43, 
ORTF, rapporteur special: Andre Diligent, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 21 novembre 1973, pp. 21-40. 
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Conte's dismissal after only fifteen months in office demon- 
strated the practical limits of the autonomy granted the PDG of the 
ORTF by the 1972 statute. It also belied the declarations of govern- 
ment spokesmen that the 1972 statute guaranteed the PDG a minimum 
three year term of office. Conte's mistake was to alienate 
simultaneously those who had been responsible for his appointment 
and those who had opposed it. As a result, he was left unprotected 
when faced with a direct challenge to his authority. His public 
dispute with Malaud angered Pompidou while his attempt to use the 
ORTF as an independent power base annoyed the President's personal 
advisers. 
86 
The fact that he was a personal appointment of the 
President and not a party man scarcely commended him to the main body 
of Gaullist deputies who were disturbed at the-increasingly presidential 
orientation of the regime. Using as a pretext the financial deficit 
in the Office's budget for 1973, the Gaullist deputies-were in the 
main critical of Conte's running -of- _the 
Office. In particularg they 
objected to the way in which recent political events had been presented 
on television: the work-in at the Lip watch factory, the coup in Chile 
against the Allende government and the Middle East conflict in which 
France had a major interest as an arms-dealer. 
87 
The only man who could protect Conte, the President himself, 
was already gravely ill and incapable of sticking to any decision 
he came to. As a result, when Conte found himself under attack 
from Malaud, the presidential entourage and an important section of 
Gaullist deputies, he had no support on which to rely, particularly 
once he had made the dispute with the Minister of Information public 
86. Interview with Arthur Conte, January 28 1977. 
87. Le Monde, October 17 1973 
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knowledge. The ORTF staff, while condemning the manner of the 
dismissal, could scarcely be expected to organise in defence of a 
presidential appointment and even if they had done so it is difficult 
to see what they could have achieved. As a power base the ORTF was 
too fragile and at the first major concerted attack its PDG was 
compelled to retire from the scene, a victim of his own overreaching 
ambition and political miscalculation. 
Conte was replaced as PDG of the ORTF by Marceau Long, a top 
civil servant who could be relied on to keep a low profile and to 
execute government policy regarding the decentralisation of the 
Office. At the same time Malaud was replaced at the Ministry of 
Information by Jean-Philippe Lecat, a more conciliatory figure than 
his predecessor. Long described his appointment in the following terms: 
"I received a phone call by ministerial telephone from the 
Prime Minister. I had previously -worked as-general 
secretary 
in the ministry of the -Armed Forces under Messmer. -Messmer 
offered me the job of the PDG of the ORTF, an offer which 
Pompidou approved of. According to Messmer the ORTF needed 
a manager (gestionnaire) and he was keen to appoint someone 
quickly so that the affair could be completed as soon--as 
possible. I did not feel any particular enthusiasm in 
being offered the job, but given my training as a high civil 
servant I could not very well refuse it. Therefore, I accepted 
it with some foreboding. " 88 
Prior to his appointment Long admitted that he had no knowledge of 
the ORTF from the inside nor of broadcasting matters in general. 
Since he was neither a party politician, nor a broadcasting pro- 
fessional, one may readily infer from Long's appointment that the 
Government was seeking to calm things down at the ORTF after the 
Conte scandal and rely on Long's administrative experience to remedy 
the organisational defects of the Office. 
88. Interview with Marceau Long, July 10 1979. 
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Long's first tasks were to bring the ORTF out of the red 
and more importantly prepare a plan for the decentralisation of 
the Office in line with the 1972 statute. However, his attempt 
to bring this latter project to fruition was called to a halt by 
the death of Pompidou in April 1974 and the subsequent election 
of Giscard d'Estaing as President of the Republic. The problem 
of the ORTF quickly became one of the prime concerns of the new 
President with the result that the reform proposals drawn up by 
Long were pushed aside almost as soon as they had been prepared. 
Giscard d'Estaing decided to implement a more radical reorganisation 
of the state broadcasting services which, embodied in his first major 
piece of legislation, heralded the end of the ORTF's stormy ten year 
existence. 
Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were, 'first, to-explain-why 
the relationship between government and broadcasting in France 
assumed such political importance and, secondly, -to outline briefly 
the nature of this relationship from the end of the second world 
war up to the death of President Pompidou-in 1974.89 -What has 
emerged is that because of certain- historical and political factors 
(the wartime occupation, political polarisation, the press system- - 
89. The author is well aware that this chapter is only a brief out- 
line of government-broadcasting relations prior to the 1974 
reform. More detailed aspects of this relationship will be dealt 
with under the relevant chapter heading in the chapters which 
follow. For more information on the period up to the 1974 reform 
see among others: R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, 
London, Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976; C. Durieux, La Tel6cratie, 
Paris, Tema-editions, 1976; J. Thibau, Une television pour tous 
les Frangais, Paris, Seuil, 1970, and La tel vision, le pouvoir 
et l'argent, Paris, Calmann Levy, 1973; D. Bombardier, La voix 
de la France, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1975; J. Montaldo, Dossier 
ORTF 19 7 Tous coupables, Paris, Albin Michel, 1974; and J. 
Ardagh, The New France (second edition), Harmondsworth, Pelican, 
1973. 
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and de Gaulle's use of radio and television), broadcasting in 
France was never allowed to develop an independent role vis-a-vis 
the Government. 
From 1958 onwards, as the sale of television sets started to 
take off in France, the new Gaullist government appointed faithful 
sympathisers to the key broadcasting posts and at the same time 
established a system of direct ministerial supervision of news 
programmes. Even what some commentators regarded as a period of 
relative liberalisation during the premiership of Chaban-Delmas was 
over-dependent on the Prime Minister's personal espousal of a non- 
interventionist policy with regard to news programming and on his 
ability to stay in office. When the conflict between Chaban-Delmas 
and Pompidou came to a head, it was the Prime Minister who in the 
tradition of the Fifth Republic had to resign from his post. The 
appointment of Conte as PDG of the ORTF in 1972 and the end-of the 
Desgraupes experiment-reflected Pompidou's desire-to put into 
practice his view of the ORTF as "the voice of France. " When Conte 
sought to establish his independence from the President he was 
dismissed in a manner which highlighted the de facto limits on the 
autonomy of the head of the ORTF. 
According to the new-Giscardian government the 1974 broadcasting 
reform was intended to be a radical move away from this tradition of 
close government control of the state broadcasting services. In 
abolishing the ORTF, the first non-Gaullist President of the Fifth 
Republic was dismantling one of the major edifices of the Gaullist 
state (1'Etat UDR), thereby heralding the beginning of the end of 
the Gaullist domination of ministerial, administrative and para- 
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administrative posts which had lasted since 1958. In the following 
chapter we shall examine the causes of this reorganisation of the state 
broadcasting services and the drafting of the Government's reform bill. 
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3 CHAPTER 
Origins of the 1974 reform 
The origins of the 1974 reform of the state broadcasting services 
in France may be placed in two broad contexts which, though analytically 
distinct, frequently overlap in practice. One context comprises the 
administrative and financial history of the ORTF in the early 1970s, 
while the other is made up of changes taking place in the nature of 
the French political system at the time. This analytic distinction 
is a useful one, particularly since commentators on the 1974 statute 
have in general tended to concentrate almost entirely on the internal 
organisational context of the reform and to underestimate if not 
ignore the importance of the wider external political context. 
' 
While the administrative and financial history of the ORTF may be 
sufficient to explain why some sort of reform of the state'broadcasting 
services was desirable and even necessary, an examination of changes 
in the political system is vital for an understanding of the scope of 
the reform. In this chapter we shall argue that while the ORTF would 
have undergone internal reorganisation in early 1974, without the 
election of a new President of the Republic it would not have been 
abolished. It is principally by studying changes in the political 
system following Giscard d'Estaing's presidential victory that one can 
appreciate why on the one hand the reform was so wide-sweeping (dis- 
solution of the ORTF) and on the other hand why it did not go further 
(creation of a commercial channel). The first part of this chapter 
1. See for example: J. Chevallier, Ia radio-television frangaise 
entre deux reformes, Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1975, Part one, especially pp. 1+8-76 and 106-109; 
C. Courvoisier, "La radiodiffusion-television francaise apres 
1'Office", L'Actualite Juridigue, vol 31 no. 6, June 1975; and 
J. Morand and G. Palter, "Efficacite de gestion et liberte 
d'expression ä la radiodiffusion-television frangaise", Revue 
du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, 1976. 
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examines the administrative context of the 1974 reform, while the 
second part looks at the wider political context, in particular the 
power relationship between the newly elected President of the 
Republic and the Gaullist dominated National Assembly. 
Administrative centralisation 
If one looks at the administrative history of the ORTF up until 
1974 it is not difficult to see why discard d'Estaing thought it both 
necessary and opportune to introduce a reform of the state broadcasting 
services so soon after his victory in the presidential election. Certain 
organisational defects of the Office had once again--come into prominence, 
including most notably a very centralised decision-making procedure 
whereby even matters of relatively minor importance were sent up to 
the PDG for his attention. - . This procedure, described by 
I1alaud in 
August 1973 as one of "bureaucratic centralism", was aggravated by 
poor lines of communication between management and staff to the detriment 
of any atmosphere of cooperation. 
2 As a result of this chronic - 
centralisation the ORTF gave the impression of constant-corporate 
entropy. 
It cannot be simply asserted however, that the ORTF was just too 
big to be run efficiently; - The BBC, -for example, was and still-is a 
larger organisation in terms of staff numbers and variety of services 
than was the ORTF. 
3 Yet the Annan report published in 1977 was only 
2. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1973-1974, no. 39, Rapport 
g n6ral fait au nom de la commission des finances o.. sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1974, Tome III9 annexe no. 43. ORTF, 
rapporteur special: Andre Diligent, annexe au proces-verbal de 
la seance du 21 novembre 1973, p. 25. 
3. ORTF........... 13,386 employees. 
BBC ........... 23,753 employees. 
Presse Actualite, no. 96, December 1974 
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mildly critical of the BBC's organisation. In fact, referring to 
the break-up of the ORTF a majority of the committee specifically 
rejected the splitting of the BB: into two separate organisations, one 
for radio and the other for television. 
4 
Moreover, within France it- 
self public companies larger than the ORTF, such as Renault, EDF and 
the SNCF, did not pose nearly such intractable problems of management 
as did the ORTF. Senator Jean Cluzel asserted in his 1974 budgetary 
report that the organisational problems facing the ORTF were due not 
so much to its sheer size, but to the fact that the Office had not 
adapted its management methods to the changes which had taken place 
in French broadcasting over the previous ten years: the creation of 
a second and then a third television channel, the introduction of 
colour television, increasing competition for the state radio services 
from the peripheral radios and the increase in-the number of-staff-to 
deal with the expansion of-services. 
5 It was -this problem-of the --- 
inability or unwillingness of the Office to adapt to changing circum- - 
stances which came to-a head in 1973-74. 
However, -=the problem of-centralisation within the ORTF was not 
anew one. - On assuming responsibility for broadcasting policy-in-1969 
Chaban-Delma established an independent committee under the chairman- 
ship of -former minister Lucien Paye with the task of-"studying the - 
modifications to be -made to -the ORTF statute, -with the -aim of -- 
facilitating the adaptation of the Office to its functions. "6 In its 
report published in June 1970 the Paye committee recommended a thorough 
decentralisation of the ORTF without going so far as to call for the 
4+. Reort of the Committee on the Fluture of Broadcasting, Command 6753, 
1ndong 0,1977, PP"1 -u The Annan report). 
5. Journal Officiel. Documents Senat. 1971+-1975, no. 99, Rapport general 
fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de 
finances pour 1975, Tome III, annexe no. 44, Radiodiffusion et tele- 
vision, rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, annexe au proces-verbal de la 
seance du 21 novembre 
197'+, pp. 13-18. 
6. ga port de la commission d'etude du Statut de 1FORTF, 
70Paris, 
Ia 
documentation francaise, 1970, p. 3. (fa Le report. 19. ) 
i 
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break-up of the Office. The committee proposed the creation of six 
separate companies under the overall control of a central holding 
company. The six companies would comprise a radio company, two 
television channels, a regional radio and television company, a 
production company and a transmission company.? The functions of the 
holding company would be 
"... to supervise the management of the subsidiary companies, 
to coordinate their activities, to share out the ORTF budget 
among them, to decide priorities in equipment, as well as to 
assume certain common tasks (staff policy) and to run directly 
certain common services (collection of the licence revenue ... 
)r'8 
The 1972 ORTF statute reproduced with certain alterations these 
recommendations of the Paye report. Eight separate functional units 
(re ies) were to be created comprising the radio, -television channel one, 
television channel two, regional radio and television (channel three), 
the transmission services and three separate production units (vi d9o 
fixe, video mobile and films). 
9 A central---structure was to-be main- 
tained to be responsible for overall budgetary--and- staff -policy: --- 
Paradoxically the 1972 reform also merged the previously separate 
offices of chairman of the board of governors and director general into 
the single post of President Directeur General, thereby centralising 
authority at the head of-the ORTF. 
10 During 1972 and 1973 Conte with 
the support of the broadcasting -trade unions refused to -implement -the 
decentralising proposals of the 1972 reform preferring to-maintain a 
centralised structure with himself at the top of the pyramid. 
On replacing Conte as PDG of the ORTF Long immediately proceeded 
7. Ibid, p. 208. 
8" Ibid, pp. 221-222. 
9., Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, Law no. 72-553 of July 3 1972, 
article and arr¬te of July 21 1972, articles 1,2 and 3- 
10. Pave report, 1970, p. 217. 
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to draw up his own proposals for the implementation of the 1972 reform. 
These proposals were made public in February 1974, only a few months 
before the ORTF was finally abolished. The structure of the ORTF 
was to be reorganised in line with the major recommendation of the 
Paye report within the limitations set by the 1972 statute. Six 
public corporations (etablissements publics) were to be set up to include 
each of the following: the radio services, television d3annel one, 
television channel two, regional radio and television (channel three), 
"heavy production"" and, finally, external services. 
12 Each of the 
television channels would have its own "light" production services 
directly attached to it. A central organism would be retained with the 
task of supervising the prgramming of the television channels by means 
of cahiers des charges. 
13 
It would also have control of the ORTF's 
budget, the transmission services, -staff policy, the ORTF's-overseas 
stations and its commercial. services. There was to be no harmonisation 
between the two- major-television channels, -but="ruthless competition" 
was to be discouraged by means of_the cahiers-des-charges. 
14ýThe 
proposed--functional -decentralisation, - therefore, did not -go--so -far as 
to abolish a powerful central-- body and as a result the unitary structure 
" of the ORTF was to be maintained. 
15 
In an interview with the author_Marceau Long spoke -about -the 
importance of his project. 
"The main problem with the ORTF in late 1973 was not the 
financial problem, but rather the fact that since the publication 
of the Paye report in 1970 none of the heads of the ORTF had made 
any attempt to put into effect a serious policy of decentralisation. 
11. "Heavy production" consists of dramas, series, variety shows, etc. 
12. The ORTF's foreign broadcast service was called La Direction des 
Affaires Ext6rieures et de la Cooperation (DADC). 
13. A charter setting out obligations with regard to programming. See 
chapter on the Liquidation of the ORTF. 
14. The directorship of harmonisation set up in 1972 to coordinate the 
programming of channels one and two was thus abandoned. 
15. Nouvelles de 1'ORTF, supplement to number 68, February 27 1974. 7ORTF management publication. ) 
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The Paye report had been very badly accepted by the broadcasting 
unions. Partly because of this opposition from the unions, who 
themselves were very centralised and wanted the ORTF to remain so 
the Paye report was not applied during the period from 1970 to 
1973. In other words a number of occasions were lost during 
this period to decentralise the ORTF. This was especially true 
of the launching of channel three. When channel three was 
established (January 1973) the ORTF ought to have been de- 
centralised at the same time. Instead channel three was im- 
mediately integrated within the structure of the Office. "16 
Approved by the ORTF board of governors with only two staff rep- 
resentatives voting against, the Long project was accepted by the Govern- 
ment and the relevant government decrees were already drawn up when the 
news of President Pompidou's death was announced. With the election of 
Giscard d'Estaing to the presidency the Long project was overtaken by 
events, with the very existenceof the ORTF_and. not just its internal 
reform becoming the-first major subject of political-controversy of 
the new regime. - 
The ORTF's financial record and the Chinaud report 
Coupled with the long-standing defect of administrative cent- 
ralisation-was--the ORTF's--precarious-financial position. During 
1973 
the Office had gone into deficit. Used by the Government in October 
as a pretext for the dismissal-of-Conte, this deficit also helped 
critics of the ORTF justify -a radical reform of the state=broadcasting 
services. 
It should be noted that the ORTF's financial record prior to 
1973 had been excellent. Relying overwhelmingly from income from the 
licence, supplemented since 1968 by advertising revenue, the ORTF was 
a self-financing organisation, receiving only a very small subsidy from 
the Government for its external broadcasts. From its budget the ORTF 
16. Interview with Marceau Long, July 10 1979. 
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covered both its capital investment and operational costs and even 
made frequent annual profits. However, in 1973 a combination of circum- 
stances, only some of which can be attributed to the ORTF directly, 
sufficed to push the Office into the red. 
Certainly the ORTF was not entirely blameless for this state 
of affairs. As the Chinaud report on the ORTF's financial administra- 
tion pointed out, production costs were allowed to soar far in excess 
of the original estimates, certain production units were under-employed 
and delays in production frequently led to increased costs. 
17 The 
ORTF's investment policy was criticised for its lack of rigour; there 
was a lack of forward planning and of a coherent staffing policy, while 
the sale of ORTF programmes to foreign broadcasting services was con- 
sidered derisorily -low. 
18 
In an attempt to establish control of its costing system -the- ORTF 
had in the early seventies introduced a computerised accounting system. 
While in theory this-new system ought to-have resulted in-a more 
rational use of resources, in practice it proved far too sophisticated 
for the ORTF staff who-had not been given enough time to master its 
complexities. There were too many subdivisions of costs with- the-result 
that even a small overstepping of estimated costs in each subdivision 
led to a considerable increase in overall costs. In short, far from 
establishing an efficient control over the ORTF's expenditure, the 
computerised accounting system actually contributed to the Office's 
growing financial problems. 
19 
17. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1973-1974, no. 1072, 
Rapport fait au norm de la commission de controle de la gestion 
financiere de l'Office de radiodiffusion et tel6vision francaise, 
rapporteur - Roger Chinaud, annexe au proces-verbal de la stance 
du 20 juin 1974. (Chinaud report, 1974. ) 
18. Ibid, pp"15-37,39-48,103-116 and 132-150. 
19. I_ d, pp"91-101. 
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The introduction of channel three, which came into service 
on December 31 1972, had also imposed a considerable strain on 
the ORTF's finances. In 1973 the Office spent 264 million francs, 
over 11% of its total budget, on transmitters, programmes and 
production equipment for the third channel, a budgetary outlay it 
could scarcely afford. The extra revenue which the Office obtained 
after 1972 due to the increase in the licence-fee and the rise in the 
number of licence holders was almost totally absorbed by the expenditure 
of channel three alone. With the benefit of hindsight the Chinaud 
report severely criticised the establishment of the third channel at 
the ORTF, which now became the only broadcasting institution in the 
world to run three-separate television channels. 
20 
Lacking effective control of its expenditure, the_ORTF was also - 
suffering -from a -levelling out of its income. Since the sale of black 
and white sets had to all intents and purposes reached saturation- point, 
any increase -in revenue--from the licence was- dependent on the- change- 
over by viewers to-colour sets and on the Government raising-the cost 
of the licence for black and white and introducing a higher licence fee 
for colour. Unfortunately, the-changeover to colour sets by the 
viwers had been less widespread than forecast, the increase in the cost 
of the licence-had not-kept pace with the- rise in--costs -during-the early 
1970s and a separate higher licence-fee for- -colour -Bets was 
not introduced 
until July 1974. Revenue from advertising, --the other major source of 
income for the ORTF, was pegged by law at a maximum 25% of the ORTF's 
total income and was therefore dependent on the amount of revenue 
obtained through the licence. As a result, the Office's total income 
was not sufficient to meet its expenditure at a time of spiralling costs. 
20. lb id, pp. 87-89. 
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There can be no doubt that the ORTF was partly responsible 
for its financial plight in 1973. However, the Government also 
must shoulder a considerable share of the responsibility. From 1970 
onwards the ORTF had been "subject to the same taxation system as private 
enterprise" with the result that VAT had to be paid on all revenue in- 
cluding the income from the licence. 
21 The ORTF, therefore, did not 
benefit from the total amount of licence revenue collected, with the net 
loss in 1973 being calculated at 54 million francs. 
22 
In 1971 the ORTF had entered into a contractual agreement (contrat 
de programme) with the Government whereby the Office's income would be 
automatically raised each year. The objective of this contract was to 
guarantee the ORTF financial stability and. a_greater degree of independ- 
ence from the Government. In practice, however, the annual increase was 
restricted to 3-5% over-the previous year's income, -which proved far too 
optimistic a target in the light of the rate of inflation over the next 
three years. Consequently, -=far from guaranteeing-the ORTF a-regular- 
stable_income,:: the contractual agreement- severely. weakened the ORTF's 
financial-equilibrium. 
23 
In addition, the ORTF was not-reimbursed-for-the revenue lost 
through licence. fee_exemptions_. which were__granted_unilaterally_by_the 
Government-on political grounds. - In 1973 25% of those who-paid-only 
the radio licence were-exempted-from payment-while-5% of television owners 
were exempted from-paying the television licence. The total cost of these 
21. R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, London, Crosby 
Lockwood Staples, 1976, j p. 72. 
22. Chinaud report, 1974, p. 164. 
23. J. Chevallier. op. cit., p. 62. 
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exemptions to the ORTF in 1973 amounted to 116 million francs, 
24 
Finally, the Government was guilty of grossly inadequate payment 
for programmes produced and broadcast by the ORTF at the Government's . 
request. The ORTF produced programmes for various government departments, 
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories and the Ministry of 
Culture among others. These ministries consistently failed to reimburse 
the ORTF the real cost of these programmes and so were partly responsible 
for the ORTF's financial plight at the end of 1973.25 For example, be- 
tween 1971 and 1974 the contribution of the Hinistry of Foreign Affairs 
to the budget of the ORTF's external services rose from 51.3 million 
francs to -. 
55.4 million francs, --while 
the total budget of the external 
services rose from 103.7 to 142.2 million francs. ---Thus while in-1971 
the ministry contributed 49.5% of the-total income . of_the- external 
services, in 1974 it gave only 39%. 
26 
The O F's overall deficit in 1973 amounted to 75 million francs. 
27 
More alarmingly; - at the-end of-that year it-was--forecast-that- the deficit. 
in 1974 would be around 1.50 million francs, -6% of the Office's total 
24. Journal -Offici-el, -Documents Senate 1.973-1974, no. 39, Rapport_ggn4ral 
fait au nom--de la-commission des finances- ... -sur -le-projet--de loi de finances pour 1974, Tome III, annexe no. 43, ORTF, rapporteur - 
special: --Andre Diligent , -annexe -au-pro ces-verbal -de -1a seance-du 21 novembre-1973, pp. 18-19. 
It was forecast that in 1974 exemptions from payment of the licence 
would cost the ORTF 134 million francs. 
25. Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 49-54. 
26. Journal Officiel. Documents Senat, 1973-1974, no. 39 Rapport general fait au nom do la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi 
de 
finances pour 1974, Tome III, annexe no. 43. ORTF, rapporteur special Andre Diligent, annexe au proces-verbal de is. seance du 21 novembre 1973, P" 65- 
27 Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1974-1975,30, no. 1230, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1975, Annexe no. 4$, ORTF, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 11 octobre 1974, 
p. 4. 
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income. 28 As we have seen, however, the deficit in 1973 was not solely 
due to financial maladministration within the ORTF. The Government too 
must accept some of the blame for imposing financial burdens on the 
Office without full compensation. In any case the gravity of the ORTF'& 
financial position in 1973-74 was certainly overstated. 
"There was a hole in the ORTF's budget, a financial problem partly 
due to bad management. ... 
(But) the financial problem was not the 
main problem. At the end of 1973 the ORTF had a very small deficit 
compared with the total budget of the Office. The financial problem 
was much exaggerated. " 29 
After song's appointment the ORTF's financial position improved to 
buch an extent that the Office made a small profit of 34 million francs 
during 1971+. 
30 This improvement in the ORTF's finances was not due to 
any increase in the Government's contribution -for -the services it 
imposed 
on the Office. Certainly the cost of the licence was increased -in 
July 
1971+ from 130 to 140 -francs, -only half the increase -Long 
had asked for, 
and a separate licence for colour was introduced at a cost of-210-francs. 
By themselves, however, these measures would have been inadequate as=a - 
remedy--to -the -ORTF's financial problems. -- It was, - therefore, - 
left to=the- 
new PDG to . put_ 
the ORTF's_finances in_order. 
_: 
This he. accomplished_by-- 
means of severe-cutbacks in-operating-costs-and in-capital-investment. 
31 
28. Regards sur 1'actualite, Paris, -la-documentation. frangaise, -no. 3, 
July 197 4,, p. 18. 
29. Interview with }larceau Long, July 10 1979. 
30. See also "L'An 1 de la Radio-Television Frangaise", Regards sur 
1'actualite, Paris, La documentation frangaise, no. 189 February 1976, 
p. 27" 
31, For a detailed breakdown of the savings made by long during 1974+ 
see Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1974-1975, no. 99, Rapport 
gene T fait au nom de la commission des finances ... our le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1975, Tome III, annexe no. 1+4, Radiodiffusion et tel4vision, rapporteur special-Jean Cluzel, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 21 novembre 197k, pp. 19-34. 
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Paradoxically, the ORTF was abolished partly on the grounds of financial 
maladministration at the very time that the Office was showing a profit. 
32 
The financial difficulties of the ORTF were highlighted at the end 
of June 1974 by the publication of the findings of a special National 
Assembly committee of inquiry: the Chinaud report. Set up in 
December 1973 to investigate the financial management of the ORTF, 
the committee produced a report which was critical of many aspects 
of the Office's internal administration, while the Government's 
share of the responsibility for the ORTF's financial plight was also 
condemned. The timing of the publication of the report was crucial 
since the future organisation of the state broadcasting services was 
already being discussed by the new Giscardian government. The Chinaud 
report, therefore, became a weapon to. be used by the new Government 
and by-the supporters of commercial television against--the ORTF, -- 
while those parts of the report which-emphasised-the. -Government's 
role in the ORTF's-finances-were not unnaturally scarcely-mentioned 
by government spokesmen. __ - 
The main recommendation -of the -Chinaud--report, was- that- the- ORTF 
be retained with amore-decentralised administrative--structure-along - 
the lines of the -1972 statute 
33---The 
Office was -to=continue-to-- be 
financed principally from licence revenue so as to. guarantee_its 
"financial-independence. '! 
34 
-Critics of the ORTF, -. however, regarded 
the report as presenting a powerful case for the creation of a com- 
mercial television channel. Moreover, it was well-known that both the 
committee's rapporteur, Roger Chinaud, president of the Independent 
32. It. is fair to say, however, that the savings made by Long during 1974 
could not have been indefinitely extended without having an adverse 
effect on the quality and range of the ORTF's services. They were 
short-term measures to deal with a specific financial problem. 
33" Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 173-175. 
34. Ira, p. 161. 
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Republican group of deputies in the National Assembly, and its chairman, 
Robert-Andre Vivien, a leading Gaullist deputy, were both personally in 
favour of the establishment of a commercial channel. 
Given the importance the report assumed in preparing the ground for 
the break-up of the ORTF, it is interesting to note some leading reactions 
to its publication. Marceau Long, PDG of the ORTF at the time, commented: 
"The Chinaud report was very violent towards the ORTF. In fact 
the report was excessive. The ORTF had some defects, but no worse 
than a lot of other bodies. The ORTF was a scalp for Chinaud. " 35 
Jack Ratite, Communist party deputy and secretary of the Chinaud committee, 
also criticised the report in the following terms: 
"The objective of the committee was to discredit the ORTF. - I 
voted against the committee's report and produced a 5-6 page 
document giving. my reasons for voting against. The committee 
refused to publish this document. -.. -. 
The Chinaud committee -" 
wanted to throw-out the baby with-the-bath water. " 36 
Finally, Joel Le Tac, --Gaullist-deputy and rapporteur special of the 
National Assembly Finance Committee's annual budgetary report on broad- 
casting, attacked-the--conclusions of the committee on several grounds: 
"The Chinaud committee was completely useless. ---It- merely re- 
produced-the- findings of my 1972 report. - The parliamentary-admini- 
strators were the same and naturally they wanted to do the least - 
possible. ---In-any case-not-all. that-much_had_happened-since, l972. 
Another- criticism-"I" have of the Chinaud--committee is that it' was 
criticising Conte's management-at a time when he had already-left 
the Office. The management of-the-Office--had been. greatly=improved - 
under-Long. Therefore, -the report was -already out- of date when -it 
was published and as such its-conclusions-were unfair to the ORTF. 
Vivien and Chinaud were mounting an-anti-ORTF operation. Both 
are in favour of commercial television. It was obvious from the 
beginning, given the personalities in charge of the committee that 
the ORTF would be badly judged. The Chinaud committee was a pro- 
commercial manoeuvre at a time when Pompidou's health was obviously 
failing and people were thinking of the presidential elections to 
come. " 37 
35. -Interview with 
Harceau Long, July 10 1979. 
36. Interview with Jack Ralite, July 10 1979. 
37. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979. 
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Strikes at the ORTF and the public reaction 
A long section of the Chinaud report was devoted to staff problems 
at the ORTF with a detailed annex listing the number and length of 
strikes at the Office during the early 19705.38 Overmanning at the 
ORTF, the strong corpratist trade unions and the propensity to strike 
action were all condemned by the committee. More immediately, a strike 
by sections of technical and administrative staff in spring 1974 appeared 
to justify the criticisms contained in the report. 
39 In itself the strike 
scarcely presented a challenge to the continued existence of the ORTF and 
programmes were relatively little disturbed. However, given extensive 
coverage by certain sections of the French press and exploited by 
commercial television lobbyists as symptomatic of-the-abuse of power by the 
broadcasting unions1. the -strike contributed to the siege-like situation 
of the ORTF at 'a time when the Office -had -still not-recovered from--the 
politico-financial-crisis-of 1973-74. _In-other 
words the-strike was-- 
probably -the -trigger factor which -precipitated- 
the- break-upi the ORTF: - 
In any case it--scarcely=required the-publication of a parliamentary 
report to -focus -the-public's attention on the administrative-difficulties 
of the ORTF. -Conte's dismissal-in-October 1973, the surrounding ------- 
publicity on the ORTF'. s -financial crisis, the -strikes- 
during -the : early 
months of 1974 and the -forthcoming 
increase in the -cost -of the 
licence 
combined to ensure that-the viewers were well disposed to greet 
38. Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 118-131 and(Chinaud revort_, 1974, ) 
annexes, pp. 147-161. 
39. For the background to this strike and its development, see La Croix, 
June 16 1974, Le Monde, June 20 and 21 1974 and Combat, June 27 
1974. 
h- 
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enthusiastically any reform of broadcasting which promised them a more 
reliable and cheaper service. An opinion poll conducted in June 1974, 
at the very height of the ORTF crisis, predictably reflected this 
public discontent. Not surprisingly, given the timing of the poll, 68% 
of those interviewed agreed with the principle of a commercial television 
channel to compete against the state broadcasting services. 
40 
The new presidenc 
A series of interrelating factors concerned with the recent administrat- 
ive and financial history of the ORTF were, therefore, instrumental in 
bringing about a reorganisation of the state broadcasting services 
in mid-1974. In addition, more overtly political factors strongly in- 
fluenced both the decision to reform broadcasting at this time and the 
type of reform chosen.. 
The new President elected in May 1974, had based the major part of 
his election campaign--on the theme of change, promising -the -ýrench_- 
electorate that they would be surprised "by the scope and speed of the 
changes.! 141 The haste in which the reform proposals on broadcasting- 
were drawn upand then steamrollered through-Parliament in a"special 
legislative session can be attributed to Giscard d'Estaing's-desire-to 
prove to the electorate that his espousal of a policy-of-reform-was not 
simply empty rhetoric. In fulfilment- of his electoral pledge, -the 
President wanted to settle the broadcasting issue with an impressive 
flourish so that the new companies could be in operation by the start of 
1975. 
In this context the reform of the state broadcasting services was only 
40. France-Soir-IFOP poll published in France Soir, June 22 1974. 
41 Z_ 
M_=+ May 19-20 1974. 
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one of several measures intended to aid the implantation of the new 
regime, and mark the end of the "UDR state. " Giscard d'Estaing was 
acutely conscious of the fact that he had been elected with fewer than 
500,000 votes more than his left-wing opponent, Mitterrand, a margin 
of less than 1%. Since at this time the Union of the Left showed no 
signs of the split which was to take place in the autumn 
42, 
the President 
decided to ease the pressure on the new government and bring public 
opinion behind the regime by a series of reforms. While the changes 
put into effect were not all popular with the general public, they did 
succeed in confusing the left-wing opposition and the trade unions, who 
remained irritated but quiescent until the autumn when the Government's 
economic measures began to bite. 
Though all the measures taken were designed_to_. aid- the_implantation- 
of the new regime, they were not all of equal importance. Certain 
innovations were superficial, concerned with settingthe style of the 
new presidency and -as---such -frequently- criticised _as: -rather=-pointless--- -- 
"gimmicks'!. - These included -the chänges in-protocol-at the-official 
inauguration ceremony at the end of May, the jazzed-up Marset. laise 
and the transfer of the July 14 -military parade--from the Champs-Elysees 
to the Bastille. -Other measures-were of-more substance-and 
tended to - 
be lumped together--under the . 
heading of "liberal. reforms!!. - --These 
included such diverse measures as the suppression of telephone -tappings, 
the lowering of the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen, the 
liberalising of the laws on contraception, improvements in the penal 
system and promised reforms on the controversial issues of abortion and 
42. For a detailed account of the split in the Union of the Left which 
took place in the autumn of 1974, see I. Campbell, The End of the 
Mitterrand Experiment, Department of Politics, University of Warwick, 
Working Paper no. 5, August 1975. 
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divorce. These policy decisions were designed to give Giscard d'Estaing 
a liberal, humanitarian image, to keep the President in the public eye 
and to remove the spotlight from the more fundamental economic and social 
problems which faced the Government. It was in the context of these 
liberal measures that the broadcasting reform was dubiously placed by 
government spokesmen. 
43 
The 1974 reform was the first concrete manifestation of the new 
President's desire to stress the change of regime. The fact that the 
reorganisation of the state broadcasting services was the first major 
piece of legislation during the new presidency emphasises the importance 
of broadcasting as a political weapon for disseminating news and 
structuring the political agenda. In addition, the reform acquires 
a special significance because of the particular status of radio and 
television as means of mass communication, since it is largely through 
these media that government decisions in all other policy areas are 
explained and defended. In other words, the reorganisation of the 
state broadcasting services at the start of Giscard d'Estaing's 
presidency not only revealed the President's views on the organisation 
of broadcasting and the benefits of a competitive system, but was 
also important because the presentation of policy decisions in other 
areas such as health, education and agriculture, would be affected 
by 
the reform of the ORTF. This double importance of the 1974 broadcasting 
reform was further enhanced by the fact that in stark contrast to many 
other policy areas the consequences of a reorganisation of broadcasting 
become evident very quickly, particularly in the politically sensitive 
field of news programming. 
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Giscard d'Estaing should 
43. Andre Rossi in Le Monde, July 23 1974. 
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decide to mark the beginning of his presidential term of office 
with a reform of the state broadcasting services. In so doing the 
new President was maintaining a tradition whose origins can be 
traced back to the foundation of the Fifth Republic and before, 
whereby major changes of government have often been accompanied 
by changes in the structure of the state broadcasting services 
and the appointment of political sympathisers to the key posts. 
Thus de Gaulle's accession to power in 1958 was quickly followed by 
the 1959 broadcasting ordinance and a flood of Gaullist appointments 
to the key posts, which heralded the start of Gaullist domination of 
the state broadcasting services. After Pompidou's election to the 
presidency in 1969 an internal reform of the ORTF was carried out at 
the instigationof the new Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas. - Similarly, 
the dismissal- of-Chaban-Delmas -in-1972 and- the concomitant--growth-of- 
presidential power was accompanied-by-a new statute for the ORTF and 
the appointment of-a man personally loyal to-the President`to-the_ 
post of PDG_of the_ORTF. While-the 1974 Giscardian-broadcasting 
reform was-a-symbol-af-the change of regime, -it-was-also part of a 
tradition which incoming governments had upheld-since before the - 
foundation-of-the Fifth Republic. 
A reorganisation of_the_state broadcasting. services in 1974 can: - 
be explained, therefore with reference toboth organisational and- 
political factors. --Furthermore, it is argued-here that-_the-nature 
of the reform can be fully understood only by examining changes in 
the political system following Giscard dT. Estaing'6 presidential election 
victory and particularly the balance of forces within the governing 
coalition. The abolition of the ORTF and the establishment of a 
competitive broadcasting system with public service goals and within 
the framework of the state monopoly was a compromise solution between 
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the supporters of the establishment of a commercial television 
channel and the defenders of the state monopoly embodied in the 
ORTF. 
Commercial television lobby 
Since the foundation of the ORTF in 1964 various abortive attempts 
had been made to introduce a commercial television channel to compete 
against the state services. 
44 
The introduction of brand advertising 
on the ORTF channels in 1968 was intended not only to supplement 
the Office's income without increasing the cost of the licence, but 
also was an attempt to buy off the commercial television lobby by 
going part-of the way to satisfy its demands. -However, since 
the 
amount of-advertising revenue the Office -wa. sallowed-to obtain was 
limited by the Government, the- introduction of brand -advertising at 
the ORTF did not wholly satisfy the supporters -of-a- commercial tele- 
vision channel-who--continued-to-lobby -for-the creation-of--an -alter- 
native to the ORTF. =iPrior-to-1974-none -of-these projects-had ever 
come to fruition, largely-dne tothe opposition . o1 
themainstream -of 
the Gaullist party who regarded--a--state monopoly broadcasting - 
service as a fundamental principle-of-Gaullism-particularly as - 
they could control-it to their own political-advantage. --_-=- 
Traditionally the party which was most in favour of commercial 
television was Giscard d'Estaing's own party, the Independent 
Republicans. During the parliamentary debate on the 1972 ORTF 
bill Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, the brother of the new President, had 
44. on the commercial lobby, see R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 118-125. 
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introduced an amendment in favour of the creation of an independent 
channel on the lines of the IBA in Great Britain. In his speech 
Olivier Giscard d'Estaing defended his amendment on the grounds 
that such a channel would provide greater freedom of choice for 
the viewer, while in any case the state monopoly was already 
obsolescent with the advent of cable television, videocassettes 
and broadcasting satellites. 
45 
Opposed by the Socialists, Communists 
and most of the Gaullists, this amendment was defeated in the National 
Assembly without a public vote being taken. 
In 1972 also, Michel Poniatowski, one of the leading members of 
the Independent Republican party, expounded his party's view on the 
question of-the state monopoly in the following terms: 
"One of-the fundamental -principles Lwhich our political 
movement professes is--precisely that of leaving each-individual, 
in every domain and as much as possible, freedom of choice. 
Undoubtedly this objective will be obtained one day only by 
the creation of private television channels which would free. 
the ORTF -from- its- restrictions as is already -the. case with - 
radio (In--competition-with-the-peripheral-stations). "--46 
The election of Giscard'd'Estaing to the presidency in 1974 was, 
therefore, followed by an intensive campaign in favour of the establish- 
ment of_a. commercial-television channel since the Giscardians were 
well known to favoursuch a-policy. 
47 
In fact even before Pompidou's 
death proponents of a commercial channel-were seeking to--exploit-the 
crisis at the ORTF to their own advantage. The setting up of the 
Chinaud committee was one such manoeuvre. Another was the drawing up 
45. Journal Officiel, Debats Assemblee Nationale, June 17 1972, 
pp. 79-2580. See also H. Mercillon (ed. ), ORTF l'agonie du 
mono Paris, Plon, 1974, pp. 80-98 and le Figaro, June 24 1974. 
46.14. Poniatowski, Cartes sur table, Paris, Fayard, 1972, p. 113- 
47. The Giscardian club Perspectives et realites also declared itself 
in favour of the establishment of a commercial channel. Le Mondel 
June 22 1973" 
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of a private members' bill (proposition de loi) in the National 
Assembly in March 1974 in favour of a commercial channel by Jean 
Boyer, an Independent Republican deputy. Largely ignored at the 
time, the bill was given more publicity following Giscard d'Estaing's 
election as the ORTF crisis developed and the very existence of the 
Office was called into question. 
48 
The Boyer bill criticised the financial management of the ORTF 
and condemned the high cost of the licence and the limits placed on 
the amount of brand advertising which could be shown on the ORTF 
channels. To remedy these defects the Boyer bill proposed that 
independent radio and television stations should be established and 
grouped together to facilitate control of their income-in-an Office 
de radiotelevision commerciale (ORTC). _. -. There would be no limits on 
the amount-of advertising these commercial broadcasting companies would 
be allowed to transmit. - 
With regard to technical-matters the-commercial 
companies-would be -placed-- under the-supervision (tutelle) of-the-ORTF. 
Boyer underlined the beneficial effects of. this. competitive- system 
on programme quality and foresaw the reduction and long-term abolition 
of the licence as a means -of-broadcasting finance. -The-revenue 
from 
advertising would be used-to help compensate the-press-for any loss 
in income from advertising it - suffered, _while_the_ORTF_bio 
ld also 
receive financial-compensation. . 
It was apparent, -given-Boyer's 
self-confessed support of a commercial broadcasting system on the 
American model, that the ORTF was being preserved solely to provide 
the technical infrastructure for the commercial companies, since 
48. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationalaa 1973-1974, no. 999, 
proposition de loi tendant ä la suppression de la redevance pour 
usage de postes de radiodiffusion et de t4levision par la cr4'ation 
de chaines independantes de radio et de tel4vision, March 6 1974. 
See also Le Figaro, June 24 1974. 
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the initial capital cost of constructing a separate transmission 
network would have been prohibitive. 
49 
Another project put forward 
around this time favoured the use of the spare television channel in 
the French network by the company Images et Son-Eurore 1. the parent 
company of the peripheral radio station Europe 1. 
The project which was most widely publicised at the time the 
new broadcasting reform was being drawn up was, however, le projet 
Baudouin, named after the initiator of the proposal Denis Baudouin. 
Baudouin proposed the hiving off of one of the state television 
channels50 to be run by the Societe Financiere de Radiodiffusion 
(Sofirad) of which Baudouin was the President Directeur Gen6ral. 
Sofirad is a holding company set up during the second world war with 
the State as its main shareholder. Through_its_boar_d of governors, 
ten of whom including the chairman are appointed by the Government, 
the State controls the financial operations of the peripheral radio 
stations with the-exception--of Radio Tele Iuxembourg_and-Rad; o-Andorre5l 
Baudouin defended his project on the grounds that the streamlining 
of the ORTF would have'a beneficial effect on-its financial position, 
since-it would-no longer--have to--run three television channels. - 
More- 
over, Baudouin-also argued that bysetting up a channel in:: -competition 
with the ORTF the Office would be encouraged to manage its affairs- 
more efficiently-- The State would retain-the transmission monopoly 
and would retain overall control of the new channel's finances as 
well as responsibility for key appointments. If it was considered 
49. Le Figaro, June 24 1974. 
50. Channel three was generally considered to be the likeliest candidate. 
Interview with Denis Baudouin, January 25 1977 and Le Monde, June 
13 1974. 
51. For more information on of' and the peripheral radio stations 
see the chapter on the State Monopoly. 
-U5- 
necessary a cahier des charges could be imposed on the new channel 
to ensure the respect of the public service goals of French broad- 
casting. 
52 The Baudouin project thus combined the advantages of 
reducing the size of the ORTF while at the same time guaranteeing 
that the Government would continue to possess important means of 
control over the new channel through Sofir . 
Giscard d'Estaing's views on broadcasting 
At the time of Giscard d'Estaingls accession to the presidency, 
therefore, there was no shortage of proposals for the creation of some 
sort of competitor for the OF, commercial or semi-commercial. How- 
ever, the new President's own views on broadcasting policy were by 
no means clear. Despite the -publicity surrounding the 
ORTRI 
-the 
broadcasting issue-did not assume-nearly the same degree of importance 
during the 1974 presidential -election campaign as, 
it badLdone during 
the 1969-contest between-Pompidou and Poher. - -Moreover., - though-_as- -- 
Minister of-Finance discard-, d'Estaing -had -been closely concerned with 
the financial-administration -of -the 
0RT153, he had. never publicly out- 
lined his views on the organisation of the state broadcasting services 
and their relations with the-Government-. - He was -thought* -to--be -in - 
favour of the- establishment- of _a commercial- 
television -channel -since 
the bulk of the Independent Republican-party, -his-right-hand 
man, 
Poniatowski, and his brother, Olivier, had all in the recent past come 
out in favour of this option. On the other hand, there is some verbal 
52. Interview with Denis Baudouin, January 25 1977 and Le Canard 
Enchaine, July 3 1974. Also, Le Nouvel Observateur, n 
July 1-7 1974. 
53. A. Astoux, Ondes de choc, Paris, Plon, 1978, p. 22. 
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evidence that for political reasons Giscard d'Estaing was personally 
in favour of retaining the state monopoly to conciliate the strong 
pressure group of the regional press which was opposed to commercial 
television for fear of losing a large amount of its advertising 
revenue. 
54 
During the campaign itself Giscard d'Estaing's views on the ORTF 
emerged in dribs and drabs. Frequently he was content to express 
himself in very abstract terms, exemplified by his profession of 
support for a "wider access to information. "55 However, he did 
explicitly reject his predecessor's view that the ORTF was the voice 
of France: 
"The ORTF is a public body. It exercises--a-function of 
information, but - and this is my profound-conviction - France 
is something too valuable and too important to-be identified 
with anything else-. The voice of -France, --it can 
be -heard 
in 
the presidential election and not-through an instrument or-a 
sector of-information. ... I do not think that the ORTF 
has 
the task of being the voice of--France. -- -The voice -of -France--- 
is the President of -the Republic -or the Frenck people. _'56 
The fullest exposition of Giscard d'Estaing's-views on-broadcasting 
came not--from him=but -from an interview with-his advisers-published - 
in Le Figaro prior to the first ballot. - Even here, -however, --the 
replies were either rather vague or at worst totally vacuous, None- 
theless, with the -benefit of_ hindsight- it- 3s possible- to_ see -a hint of 
Giscard d'Estaing's opposition to the-unitary- structure of the"ORTF 
if not necessarily to the principle of the state monopoly: 
54. Interviews with Marceau Long, July 10 1979 and Antoine de Tarle, 
September 8 1979. See also the chapter on the State Monopoly. 
55. Le Monde, May 3 1974. 
56. Interview on Europe 1, May 13 1974. 
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of *00 perhaps we should be considering a more fundamental 
difficulty, which results from the convergence on a single body 
like the ORTF of all the paths of news and broadcasting culture. "57 
In short, after his election Giscard d'Estaing was able to maintain 
a convincingly flexible stance on the broadcasting issue, since, apart 
from his rejection of the view that the ORTF was the voice of France, 
he had made no specific pronouncement on the future role and organ- 
isation of the state broadcasting services. Yet his espousal of the 
liberal ethic of competition in economic policy was well-known and it 
was but a short step from this to a belief in the benefits of a 
competitive broadcasting system. Once this step had been taken it 
was then rationalised after the event in a passage in the President's 
slim, pretentious, and monumentally tedious-volume_on French democracy: 
"Pluralism also in the`-broadcasting media. The break-up of the 
former ORTF into several-national companies, _completely--independent 
of each other, contributes to the preservation of our liberties. 
The rule of independence and of-competition must be developed-in 
all its aspects, including the-objective of the cultural- 
quality-of the programmes. '-1-58 
The Gaullist-factor- 
Given the financial-and-administrative crisis of. _ 
the ORTF, the 
pressure exerted by the different strands of the commercial-lobby 
and Giscard d'Estaingts=liberal belief-in the=merits-of- -ree enter----- 
prise-and competition; -it-may- at-first sight seem surprising-that- - 
the option of a commercial channel and the halfway house solution of 
a Sofirad channel were both rejected by the President when the 
57. Le Figaro, May 4 1974. 
58. V. Giscard d'Estaing, Democratie Francaise, Paris, Fayard, 1976, 
P. 99. 
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reform of the ORTF came under discussion. However, this would 
be to underestimate the strength of the defenders of the state 
broadcasting monopoly. The ambivalent nature of the presidential 
majority in the National Assembly, and especially Giscard d'Estaing's 
dependence on the support of Gaullist deputies for the passing of 
the Government's proposed legislation in Parliament, had an important 
influence on the substance of the President's broadcasting reform. 
Giscard d'Estaing's presidential victory had resulted in significant 
changes in the triadic relationship between the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister and the majoritg in Parliament. The 
President's ambition had long been to create a centre party which 
would-take over from the Gaullists the role of parliamentary support 
for the Government, and so throughout 1972 and 1973 Giscard. d'Estaing 
had been seeking --to win over the support of the centre parties for 
his assault on the presidency. After his election the majoritigl -was 
extended to include the centrist reformers of Jcan Lecanuet -and 
Jean-Jacques- Servan--Schreiber. -_ While -this widening of--the-base - 
of the ma orite accorded with Giscard's-objective--of pushing-=the- 
Gaullists out -towards -the- isolation -of the extreme right, -it--also 
made Giscard d'Estaing's parliamentary base less cohesive than 
Pompidou's as well as alienating a large body of Gaullist deputies. 
In addition, the--election -of the- first -non-Gaullist. 
President= .. - 
of the Fifth Republic meant that Giscard d'Estaing could not count 
on the unconditional loyalty of the Gaullist party in Parliament. 
Since Giscard d'Estaing's desire to govern France from the centre 
was not shared by the Socialist party leader, Mitterrand, who 
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preferred to ally his party's electoral fortunes with those of 
the Communist party, Giscard d'Estaing was compelled faute de mieux 
to rely on the large body of Gaullist deputies whose support he 
would have much rather been in a position to do without. As a 
result, the President would be running a risk if he sought to 
adopt a policy which undermined or appeared to undermine the basic 
principles of Gaullist doctrine. While after Chirac's resignation 
from the premiership in August 1976 Giscard d'Estaing was prepared 
to defy the Gaullists to bring the Government down by a vote of 
censure on issues such as the bill sanctioning direct elections 
to the European Parliament (1977) and the 1980 budget provisions 
(1979), up until the change of Prime Minister Giscard d'Estaing was 
more likely to compromise with the Gaullists, as he did with-the 
1974 broadcasting- reform, - even at the risk of his proposals being - 
savaged in the Assembly, as they were during the debates: Qn -- 
capital -gains 
tax reform in 1976. 
_ 
The most notable exception--to 
this preference--for-compromise when-Chirac -was -still--Prime-Minister 
was the abortion bill which passed through the --Assembly- despite- 
the opposition of many Gaullists because the Socialists and 
Communists rallied to support Giscard--dtEstaing's reform: -- 
Giscard- d'Estaing's -task in retaining the support-of the Gaullist 
deputies was facilitated at the start of his presidency by the 
decline in the power of-the Gaullist barons such as Chaban-Delmas 
and the concomitant rise of Chirac within the UDR. During the 
presidential campaign Chirac had given his full hearted support 
to Giscard d'Estaing's candidacy before the first ballot and had per- 
suaded forty-three Gaullist deputies to do likewise. In so doing 
he had made a vital contribution to Giscard d'Estaing's victory, 
though at the risk of incurring the wrath of the mainstream of the 
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Gaullist party which had officially backed the candidacy of Chaban- 
Delmas. In the months immediately following the presidential 
election Chirac was principally concerned with re-establishing 
his position inside the Gaullist party, capturing the post of 
general secretary in December 1974.59 As a result of the growing 
importance of the Prime Minister inside the Gaullist party during 
1974, Giscard d'Estaing was able in the early months of his presidency 
to work through Chirac to obtain the required support of the Gaullist 
deputies. On the broadcasting issue, as in other policy areas up until 
the cantonal elections of spring 1976, Chirac acted as the link be- 
tween the President of the Republic and the Gaullist party in 
Parliament. 
In sharp contrast to-many Independent-Republicans, the-great 
majority of Gaullist deputies-strongly defended the maintenance--of 
the state broadcasting monopoly. Therefore, the bill presented--in 
the National Assembly in-: Late July was- indicative-of --Giscard d'£staiig's 
desire for a compromise solution to keep his parliamentary majority in- 
tact and to-retain the required support-of the Gaullist deputies. 
Partly-to appease-the-mainstream-of the Gaullist-.. party=in Parliament 
the state monopoly-of transmission and programming--was--reaffirmed. - 
Andre Rossi, who along-with, Chirac was--responsible for introducing 
the bill on behalf--of- the Government---in the Assembly, --was adamant 
that the Government had-rejected the-option-of the creation of a 
commercial channel: 
"Commercialisation is absolutely impossible without the intro- 
duction of a new law. " 60 
59" Monde, -December 16-1974. -Chirac! s attempt to assert his 
authority over the Gaullist party reached its height in late 
1976 after his resignation from the premiership when he was 
elected leader of the renamed Gaullist movement, le Rassemblement 
pour la Republique. (RPR). 
60. Journal Officiel, Debats Assemblee Nationale, July 24 1974, p"3650d 
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It is not difficult to understand why the Government was so 
anxious to profess its faith in the state monopoly. The press, even 
that section which was sympathetic to the Giscardian regime, was against 
any proposal to set up a commercial or semi-commercial channel for 
fear that this would deprive it of a large share of its advertising 
revenue at a time when its circulation was generally stagnating or on 
the decline. 
61 
The broadcasting trade unions were also virulently opposed 
to any move to change the monopoly status of the state broadcasting 
services. Moreover, the Socialist-Communist Union of the Left had 
frequently reiterated its determination to resist any attempt to abolish 
the monopoly. 
The determining iactor., 
_however_, was 
the large group of UDR deputies 
62 
pledged to-defend what. they. regarded.. as a fundamental principle of Gaullism.. 
The broadcasting reform bill was-the first opportunity the Gaullist 
party had-of asserting its position as the dominant group-within the 
majorite. In complete-. disarray-after-the presidential -election-result 
and largely--written off by-the press as a declining political--force, the 
UDR took advantage-nf-the -reorganisation of the state broadcasting=- 
services to -present. -a-relatively united front-behind-Chirac-and-to-demon- 
strate to Giscard-d'Estaing-his-reliance on their support. It was--esti- 
mated that of the 181-Gaullist-deputies in the Assembly over-100--would 
vote against any proposal to abandon the monopoly. Under these circum- 
stances Giscard d'Estaing was unwilling to run the risk of a combination 
of left-wing and Gaullist votes defeating the Government's broadcasting 
bill and throwing the regime into an early crisis 
63 
61. See section on the press system. 
62. It is astonishing in this context that Chevallier should view the 
Gaullist party's decision to defend the state broadcasting monopoly 
. as'rather surprising. 
" The official policy of the Gaullists had 
never been anything other than the defence of the state monopoly. 
See J. Chevallier, op. cit., p. 108-109. 
63.. See table 3. i. giving composition of the National Assembly in July 
1974. 
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Of course the President could have either pre-empted any Gaullist 
opposition to the bill in the Assembly or used the occasion of the bill's 
defeat to dissolve the Assembly and call for new legislative elections 
in an attempt to secure the election of a parliamentary majority less 
based on the Gaullist party and more loyal to him personally. However, 
the country was only just recovering from two months of campaigning, the 
summer holidays had already begun and given the popularity of the Union 
of the Left at this time any recourse to the electorate could have back- 
fired disastrously. In any case, during the presidential campaign Giscard 
d'Estaing had stressed that if elected he would not call new legislative 
elections. 
64 
Consequently, on this issue the President was prepared to 
conciliate, settle for the break-up of the ORTF, introduce a system of 
regulated competition within the framework of the state monopoly and 
rely on Chirac- to rally the Gaullist deputies-in support of the reform. 
Though the monopoly was retained, supporters of the introduction 
of a commercial television channel were not displeased with-the - -- 
provisions -of- the_--Government's bill. - Despite, --or- perhaps- 
because--of, 
the tenacity with which government spokesmen defended the pledge to 
preserve the-monopoly, the bill was regarded -by 
those in favour -of a 
commercial channel, and also those against, as marking. a-first step 
to- 
wards-the abolition of . the monopoly. --. 
The break-up- of the ORTF's - 
unitary structure-would facilitate the-hiving off-of. one- or-more- of 
the television channels to be run either---by Sofirad-or. in the- long term 
by private interests. The supporters of commercial television in the 
National Assembly, particularly the Independent Republicans intent on 
showing their loyalty to the new President, had little incentive, 
there- 
fore, to vote against or attempt to amend the defence of the monopoly 
contained in'the bill. Consequently, while two amendments were presented 
64. Lý Kess, no. 1348, May 9-15 1977. 
ý123- 
during the debate in the Assembly, one in favour of the creation of 
a commercial channel and the other proposing that the new transmission 
company should relay the programmes of the peripheral television stations 
throughout France, both were rejected without a public vote being taken65 
In large part due to Giscard d'Estaing's dependence on Gaullist support 
in Parliament, the state broadcasting monopoly had been granted a reprieve 
The Government's broadcasting bill. 
Elected to the presidency on May 19 1974, Giscard d'Estaing pushed 
ahead with the reform of the state broadcasting services as quickly as 
possible with the result that the new statute was published at the 
beginning of August. In the space of just over two months, therefore, the 
new government had discussed the policy options available, drawn up its 
bill and pushed it -through both chambers -imf -Parliament -in a special - 
legislative-session. 
66 
U 
Three -different reform projects were discussed-in 
the- Council of 
Hinisters: -the Long plan- which-proposed--decentralisation-within=the 
unitary- structure. rof_the ORTF and_'the retention of a central-coordinating 
body; the-Baudouin project, -which-favoured-the transfer-of one ORTF 
channel=- to be run - by -Sofirad; -and=_the reform as-it-was, --adopted-by the 
Government, -which-proposed -the abolition of the ORTF- and -the- creation - 
of independent state companies. Each of these three projects was 
defended-by important personalities-in-the governmental discussions 
which preceded the drafting of the bill: Marceau Long, PDG of the 
ORTF was the principal spokesman for his plan. Denis Baudouin, PDG 
65. Amendment no. 10 presented by Pierre-Bernard Couste and amendment 
no. 23 presented by Pierre Buron. Journal Officiel, Debats Assemblee 
Nationale,, July 25 1974, pp. 3739-3'7_41 and 37 37 9 respectively. 
66. See timetable of the drafting and passage of the bill, table 3. ii. 
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of Sofirad, defended his own proposal. Head of the Government's information 
service (La W1egation Ggnerale a l'Information), Baudouin had worked 
for Giscard d'Estaing during the presidential election campaign. His 
project received support from his deputy in the Government's information 
service, Henri Pigeat, and inside the Government from the Minister of the 
Interior, Poniatowski. 
67 
The main spokesman for the project which was finally adopted by the 
Government and made public at the end of the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on July 3 was Yves Cannac, deputy general secretary of the Elysee 
and therefore one of "the President's men". 
68 
Cannac's proposal was 
approved by Giscard d'Estaing and then accepted by Chirac and the other 
ministers. Rossi, the Government's official spokesman, who was to be 
responsible- along -with- Long- for -the -implementation of the 1974 statute, 
participated very little in the debates, on the reform prior to-the decision 
taken on July 3- 
69 
Moreover, --once Cannac's proposal had been approved 
by- 
k 
Giscard d'Estaing, 'the discussions on-which project to adopt immediately- 
ceased since -nobody--wished-to-enter-into an--overt and fruitless-conflict- - 
with the President at-the very start of his term of office. - 
In the-first few weeks after Giscard d'Estaing's election Long thought 
that his project might still be accepted by the incoming President, albeit -- 
with certain-modifications to further its decentralising features and reduce 
7° 
the powers-of-the central body. However, by the end of June the-Lang plan 
had lost credibility as a solution to the ORTF's crisis for administrative 
67. Pigeat was later appointed deputy director general of Agence France 
Presse. 
68. The phrase is from V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France 
London, Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 63- 7. 
69. Interview with Marceau Long, July 10; 1979 and with Jean-Loup Arnaud, 
July 3 1979- 
70. Minutes of the meeting of the ORTF comite central d'entreprise held 
on July 19 1974. See C. Floch, La reorganisation d'une entreprise 
ubli ue et les relations du travail: le cas de la radiodiffusion et 
tAlevision fran aise, unpublished DES m moire, University of Paris 11 
rc , pp" -0 
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and, more importantly, political reasons. Within the context of the 
organisational problems of the ORTF the plan still retained many of the 
inconveniences of the existing institution in the eyes of the new 
President: a centralised decision-making structure with an apparently 
forceful PDG at the top and a strong trade union organisation. The 
new President and his advisers feared that if the ORTF were not broken 
up the former centralising tendencies would re-emerge despite the 
decentralised structure outlined in the Long project. 
Within the wider political context the ORTF was considered following 
the Conte episode as a potential political power base for its PDG. The 
Long plan was not a sufficiently radical break with the past and as 
such it did not live up to Giscard d'Estaing's electoral promise of 
change. As the first major reform of the new presidency the reorgan- 
isation of the state broadcasting . services 
had to -make an impact with 
the electorate. Since the ORTF was associated in the minds of the 
electorate with the Gaullist regime and . with one of its more un- 
attractive features-at--that; there-was good-reason to mark the - 
start of the new regime with its abolition. -This move, however, did 
not meet with the approval- of -the PDG--of the Office: --" 
"The ORTF had- problems-in-1973-74, but they -could-have- been 
treated- different-IT in a different-atmosphere: --But-in=197+ -- 
after the presidential election. -there=was felt a need -for-change. - The ORTF served as the pretext for Giscard's policy of change. 
The Long plan- could have become- vfficial ORTF policy, -..: if it 
had not- -been 
for the pressures -of 
time after the presidential - 
election. It could -at -least 
have been implemented as a transitory 
phase on an experimental basis for a year or so to see if it would 
have worked. " 71 
The Baudouin project, on the other hand, ran up against the 
obstacles of Giscard d'Estaing's dependence on the Gaullist party in 
71. Interview with Marceau Long, July 10 1979. 
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Parliament and the opposition of the press to a television channel financed 
from commercial advertising. However attractive as an administrative 
reform in streamlining the ORTF and thus responding to many of the recent 
criticisms directed against the Office, most notably in the Chinaud report, 
politically the Baudouin project was a non-starter. Therefore, Cannac's 
proposal was approved by Giscard d'Estaing and ratified in the Council of 
}: inisters. The Government's bill was drawn up by Rossi, Long, Cannac and 
Jacques Friedmann, a political adviser in Chirac's cabinet, and was pub- 
lished only a few days before the start of the debate in Parliament on 
July 23. 
The debates in the National Assembly and Senate combined took less 
than n-a -week from the first session in the Assembly to the final votes on 
the text of_the -commission mixte -paritaire. 
72 Parliamentarians of all 
parties criticised the lack of time available for debate- and the : indecent 
haste with which-the Government's proposals-had been drawn up: 
73 Rossi, - 
however, defended -the-decision to'-hold a--special legislative-session on the 
grounds -that- 
delay -would -have. meant -the postponement-of . -the- creation--of 
the 
72. For an analysis--of-the--legislative -process in- the Fifth . 
Republic see 
P. M. Williams, - The French Parliament. 1958-1967, - Ibndozi; Allen and 
Unwin, 
1968, -and La procedure 1 gislative en France, 
_ _Documents 
d! etudes,. Droit 
constitutionnel et institutions politiques, no. 12, Paris, Ia document- 
ation-francaise, -1970. - 
73. See- among -others -the -speeches-of Georges-Fillioud 
(Socialist) and- 
Jacques =Chambaz -(Communist); -the inability of Rossi to give detailed 
answers to many of the questions-asked him; the speech-of-Michel" 
Miroudot, rapporteur of the Senate Cultural-Affairs Committee; ' and the 
criticisms made by Joel Le Tac (Gaullist), rapporteur special of the 
National Assembly Finance Committee annual budgetary report on broad- 
casting-Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assembl6e Nationale, 
July 24 1974, P-365.5 and July 25 19? , p. 3703; Journal 
Officiel, 
De bats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1974 p. 914; and Journal Officiel 
Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1978-1979, no-570 Rapport fait au nom 
de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 
3.979, annexe no. 129 Culture et communication: Radiotelevision, 
rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance 
du 5 octobre 1978, p. 21. See table 3-ii for the timetable of 
the drafting of the reform bill and its passage through Parliament. 
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new companies until January 1976. According to the Government it 
was more desirable that the problem should be tackled and resolved 
quickly. In any case various reforms of the ORTF had been under 
discussion since 1968 and recommendations had been put forward in 
no less than five major reports. 
74 For the Government action not words 
was the order of the day. 
The compressed timetable not only made Parliament's task of fully 
debating the proposed reform very difficult. It also meant that only 
the general outlines of the reorganisation were discussed in the various 
ministerial committees held prior to the submission of the bill to 
Parliament. As a result, many of the difficulties raised by the reform 
had not been foreseen by the Government and this became all too apparent 
during the parliamentary debates. The Government's bill provided only 
the framework of the reorganisation. The details were to be filled in 
later through government decrees and in the companies' cahiers des 
charges which themselves were drawn up by the Government75`This led 
to the frequent complaint in Parliament that the Government was asking 
for a blank cheque which it could later fill in as it wished? 
6 
Further 
more several bodies which might have-expected to be consulted were 
conspicuously ignored for lack of time. These included-the consultative 
74. Diligent report (Senate) 1968; Paye report (Independent) 1970; 
Diligent report (Senate) 1972; Le Tac report (National Assembly) 
1972; and Chinaud report (National Assembly) 1974. See the 
bibliography for full references. 
75. The decrees were to cover such topics as the appointment of the chair. 
men of the new companies, the functions and composition of the dif- 
ferent boards of governors, the reallocation of ORTF staff and the 
division of ORTF programme stocks, buildings and equipment among 
the new companies. See chapters on the Liquidation of the ORTF, 
Appointments and Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
76 '*See for example, the speech of Georges Fillioud (Socialist) in 
Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assemblge Nationale, 
July 24 19? 49 pp. 3 54-3 57. 
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parliamentary delegation77 on the ORTF, the Haut Conseil de 1lAudiovicuel; 
0 
and the board of governors of the OP. TF, all of which had been consulted 
about the Long plan. 
"There was no consultation of the ORTF board of governors prior 
to the drafting of the Government's bill. (After Giscard d'Estaing's 
election victory) the problem had become a governmental rather than 
an administrative matter and so the board of governors was by-passed 
and the question decided at governmental level. " 79 
Yet despite the fact that the Government's bill was hurried through 
Parliament with only one reading in each chamber, various amendments were 
incorporated into the Government's text to clarify, expand or modify the 
provisionsof the bill. Recognising the deficiencies of its own text, the 
Government was sometimes favourable to these amendments. For example, a 
series of amendments -was introduced in both the National Assemity and the 
Senate to expand the article on the cahiers des charges of the new com- 
panies by theImposition of -more specific-programing-obligatioflS. 
° 
Moreover, Rossi even introduced amendments to the Government's bill on 
behalf-of the Government itself. -81 Even some amendments -which, were. opposed 
by the=Government were passed in Parliament and were included in the 1974 
broadcasting-statute. 
82 
These included-in-- particular=the--establishment 
77. For functions and composition- of- -the _pa: rliamentary -delegation -on 
broadcasting see chapter on--Parliamentary control. 
78. For functions -and -composition--of-the Haut Conseil de l'Aiidib"visuel 
see chapter on the Liquidätiön of the ORTF 
79. Interview with Marceau Long, July_l01979" --- 
80. Journal Officiel, Debats-Parlementaires Assemblee=Nationale, -July 25 -- 
1974, -pp. 3776-3781, and-Journal--Officiel'Debats Parlementairea Senat, 
July 28-1974, -pp. 995-998. Article 15 of the 197broadcasting statute. 
81. For example, amendment no. 154 on the granting of "financial autonomy" 
to the transmission company (article 5 of the 1974 broadcasting 
statute); amendment no. 151 on the method of choosing the parliament- 
ary representatives on the boards of governors of the programme 
companies (article 11 of the 1974 broadcasting-statute); and amend- 
ment no. 156 on the procedure of staff reallocation (article 31 of 
the 1974 broadcasting statute). 
82. For example the management of the ORTF orchestras was to become the 
responsibility of Radio France (article 7 of the 1974 broadcasting 
statute). For more details of these parliamentary amendments see 
chapter on Parliamentary control. . 
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of the Institut relational de 1'Audiovisuel83; the creation of consult- 
ative regional broadcasting committees84; the harmonisation of programme 
schedules among the three television companies85; and the strengthening 
of parliamentary control. 
86 
Nonetheless, while some of these modifications 
to the Government's bill were not without importance, the text which was 
finally adopted in both chambers of Parliament and which then became the 
statute of August 7 1974 did not differ in its major provisions from the 
Government's original bill. 
87 
Conclusion 
The 1974 reorganisation of the state broadcasting services was 
justified by government spokesmen-principally on administrative grounds. 
Moreover, academic commentators-in France have tended to stress-the- 
internal organizational origins df the reform. However--we have argued in 
this chapter that while-the recent-administrative and financial-history- 
of the ORTF gave the new-government-a-perfect-opportunity to introduce a 
reform-of state broadcasting, the reorganisation-is best understood within 
a political ratherzthan purely--administrative-context. -In -fact, we 
have 
contended that the causes -of the reform -cannot be -fully appreciated -without 
taking-into account the external-political environment and-in -particular 
changes in the regime following the election-of the first non-Gaullist 
President of the Fifth Republic. 
83. Article 3 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
84. Article 10 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
85. Article 9 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
86. Articles 4 and 19 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. See chapter 
on Parliamentary control. 
87. The text was adopted in the Senate on Sunday July 28 1974 by 178 voteE 
to 88 and in the National Assembly on the same day by 289 votes to 
186. See Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires Senat, July 29 1974, 
p. 1059 and Journal Officiel, D bats Parlementaires Assemblee Nation- 
ale, July 29 1974, pp. 3943-39444 for the full lists of those voting 
for and against the final bill. 
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The type of reform introduced, a competitive system within the 
framework of the state monopoly, can be viewed as a compromise measure 
indicative of the new power relationship between the newly elected 
President and his predominantly Gaullist parliamentary support. While 
Giscard d'Estaing would have preferred a parliamentary majority less 
dependent on the Gaullists, a large section of the Gaullist party 
had never forgiven him for his ambivalent support of de Gaulle in the 
mid-sixties and particularly for his support of a "no" vote in the 1969 
referendum which resulted in de Gaulle's resignation from the presidency. 
Thus, both sides regarded each other with a certain degree of hostility, 
while at the same time both recognised that they were for the time being 
at least in a state of mutual dependence. The state broadcasting monopoly 
was retained partly to placate the Gaullists, while -the creation of 
organisationally independent-companies would facilitate the future hiving 
off of one or more companies to commercial or semi-commercial interests. 
Drafted very quickly, -the - Government Is bill was pushed 
through 
Parliament-in a special--legislative session. After the bill had become 
law the immediate task of the Government was to proceed with the liquid- 
ation--of the ORTF so that the new broadcasting companies could 
begin their 
transmissions-as--planned in-January 1975. The vagueness of the new 
statute on many points of substance-and the truncated timetable--by 
which - the Government wished to--abide meant that the-period 
from the 
beginning of September 1974-to January 1975 was one-of-frenetic activity, 
punctuated by a whole series of government decrees to fill out the details 
of the reorganisation. Several working parties and ad hoc committees 
were set up to supervise various aspects of the reform. The management 
of the new companies drew up their plans for their -first programmes and 
selected their key personnel, frequently with government assistance. The 
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broadcasting trade unions sought first to oppose the reform itself and 
then to mitigate its most undesirable consequences. The ORTF staff 
had to be reallocated to the new companies. 
Details of the break-up of the ORTF and the establishment of the 
new companies are analysed in the following three chapters which deal 
respectively with the major provisions of the 1974 statute and the 
liquidation of the Office, the appointment of the management and boards 
of governors of the new companies and the reallocation of ORTF staff 
among the successors of the moribund ORTF. 
I, 
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CHAPTER 4 
Liquidation of the ORTF 
While the publication of the statute of August 7 1974 marked the 
end of the legislative process to abolish the ORTF, it was only the 
beginning of the administrative stage of the reorganisation. In the 
space of just over four months, the Government hoped, the new broadcast- 
ing companies would come into existence with the minimum of fuss. Yet 
obviously the transition from the ORTF to the new structure involved a 
huge amount of administration. 
This chapter examines certain aspects of this period of transition. 
In the first part of the chapter we concentrate on the main provisions 
of the 1974 statute, -the objectives of the reform and reactions to it 
from interested parties, and on various immediate problems caused by the 
break-up of the ORTF. In part two we look at the role of the Government 
in this liquidating process. Leparate. sections are devoted to the part 
played by the Ministry of Information, the drafting of 'the companies' 
cahiers des charges and the broadcasting companies' first budget in 1975. 
In addition, there is included a section on the organisation and func- 
tions of the Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel. 
Two main themes run throughout this chapter. The first concerns 
the adverse consequences caused- by the break-up of the ORTF and the many 
problems which had not been foreseen by the Government when it decided 
to undertake the reform. The second theme shows the important super- 
visory role played by the responsible minister and his staff in this 
transitional period. While we contend in this thesis that power 
has shifted from the Ministry of Information to the Elysee during the 
course of the Fifth Republic, nonetheless during the changeover period 
Rossi and his entourage carried out the important task of implementing 
the wide-ranging provisions of the 1974 statute. 
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The statute of August 7 1974 
The statute of August 7 19741 provided for the abolition of the 
ORTF which had been in existence almost exactly ten years. 
2 It was to 
be replaced by a new broadcasting structure consisting of seven companies 
organisationally independent of each other: a transmission company, 
Tel4diffusion de France (TDF)3, a production company, Societe Francaise 
de Production (SFP) 
4, 
an archive and research institute, Institut 
National de 1'Audiovisuel (INA)S, a national radio company, Radio France 
6 
and three television companies, Television Francaise 1 (TFl), Antenne 2 
(A2) and France Regions 3 (FR3)7. FR3 was to be responsible for both 
regional radio and television. 
8 
The state monopoly of transmission and 
programming was maintained in accordance with the provisions of the 1972 
ORTF statute. 
9 Article 1 of the new legislation reaffirmed the public 
service goals of the state broadcasting-services as set out in the' 
first article of the 1972 statute: information, culture, education, 
entertainment and the values of civilisation. To these was added in- 
1974 the function of communication. 
l0 
Along with the abolition of the ORTF went the disappearance of the 
unitary structure of the 'state-broadcasting services. The 197+ statute 
can therefore be viewed both as a logical extension of the decentralis- 
ation set out in the 1972 ORTF statute -but-not -put--into -effect . 
in the 
Journal Officiel, Lois et. DLcrets, _. 
Loi no. 74-696-du -7_aoüt-1974 
relative ä la radiodiffusion et a la t4levision. (1974 broadcasting 
statute). See appendix 1. 
2. Ibid, article 2. 
3. Ibid, article 5- 
4. I bid, article 13. 
5. Ibid, article 3. 
6. Ibid, article 7. 
7. Ibid, article 8. 
8. Ibid, article 10. 
9. Ibid, article 34, which reaffirmed the provisions of articles 2 
and 3 of the 1972 ORTF statute. 
10. Ibid, article 1. 
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intervening period and as a radical break with the monolithic structure 
within which the state broadcasting services had functioned since the 
second world war. The major innovation of the 1974 reform was not 
so much the abolition of the ORTF as the deliberate absence in the 
new organisation of any central body to coordinate the operations of 
the separate companies. 
While President Giscard d'Estaing asserted that the reform was 
inspired by the recommendations of the Paye report of 1970911 this 
statement ignored the fact that the Paye report had come down against 
the fragmentation of the state broadcasting services and had explicitly 
recommended the maintenance of a central organ at the top of the de- 
centralised structure to act as a coordinating body in matters of 
finance and staff policy. 
12 The 1974 reform, therefore, went much further 
along the path of decentralisation than had been envisaged by either 
the Paye report (1970), the Le-Tac report (1972), -the ORTF statute (1972), 
the Long plan (1974) or the Chinaud report (1974). The bureaucratic 
structure of the ORTF was dismantled-in a reorganisation which pushed 
decentralisation to its logical conclusion, the absence of a centre. 
Though organisationally independent of each other, -the companies 
obviously have to rely on each other for the provision of certain 
services. For example, the two major national television companies, 
TF1 and A2, depend on the transmission company, TDF, for the transmission 
of their programmes; -- on the archive and research institute, 
INA, 
-for 
staff training facilities; and on the production company SFP, for 
the production of major programmes such as drama series. 
13 In the 
absence of a central body, relations between companies were to be 
11. Lem Monde, July 27 1974. 
12. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
13. The television companies TF1 and A2 are forbidden by their cahiers 
des charges to indulge in "heavy" production, i. e. the production of 
high budget programmes such as dramas and series. Article 131 of 
TFl's cahier des charges and article 130 of A2's. 
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regulated either by the Government through the device of the cahiers 
des charges or conducted on a bilateral commercial basis. 
14 For 
example, since TDF is the custodian of the State's transmission monopoly, 
the programme companies (TF1, A2, FR3 and Radio France) have to pay TDF 
for the use of its transmission networks. This amount is fixed by the 
Government and included in the annual modifications to the companies' 
cahiers des charges. On the other hand, since the SFP does not possess 
a monopoly over television production, which was abandoned by the ORTF in 
1964, relations between the television companies and the production 
company were in theory to be governed only by the laws of the market. 
As a short term measure to allow the SFP to find its commercial feet, 
however, the television companies were compelled by the Government to 
- purchase on an annual sliding scale -a proportion-of-the SFP's-production. 
In fact, because of the SFP's precarious -financial position, -relations 
between the production company and the television companies have never 
been allowed to-develop-on a purely commercial basis, -much 
to the dis- 
like of the two major national television channels, TF1 and A2.15 
Relations among the four separate -programme companies-were to be 
governed by the liberal ethos of competition, particularly-in-the--case 
of TF1 and A2. The system of complementary programme scheduling which 
had characterised the output- of--the. ORTF's-two_elevision channels-up 
until 1969 and between 1972 and 1974 was-explicitly rejected by-govern- 
ment spokesmen-during the-debates-on the reform in Parliament. 
16 In 
the new structure TF1 and A2 were to compete for viewers as two independ- 
ent companies, with only their cahiers des charges imposing any con- 
14. See section on the cahiers des charges of the broadcasting companies. 
15. See chapter on Finance. 
16. See, for example, Rossi's speech criticising the Diligent amendment 
on complementary programme scheduling in Journal Officiel Debats 
Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, pp. 9_7T-__979- 
on complementarity and competition in programme scheduling at the 
ORTF see J. Thibau, La television le pouvoir et 1'ar ent, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1973, especially pp. - 0. 
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straints on this competition. An amendment proposed by Andre Diligent 
and adopted by the Senate in favour of complementary programme schedules 
emerged much weakened in the text of the commission mixte Pari aire. 
17 
Consequently, in the 1974 statute there is provision only for periodic 
meetings of the chairmen of the television companies to ensure the 
harmonisation of programme schedules, though even this was more than 
the Government wanted. 
18 In any case this rather minimal concession to 
the defenders of complementarity has had little impact since the passing 
of the act, as many of the critics of the Giscardian broadcasting reform 
have not been slow to point out. 
19 
Objectives of the 1974 reorganisation and reactions to the reform 
The Government's objectives in breaking-up the ORTF and creating 
seven separate broadcasting--companies-can be-quite simply-summarised. - _ 
First, -and most immediately, the Government hoped that the new companies 
would not be subject-to the-same sort of financial-and administrative 
problems which had dogged the recent history of the ORTF. The creation of 
smaller organisational-units, it- was argued, --would -help personalise-re- 
sponsibility in decision-making-and facilitate financial accountability. 
Secondly, the system of competition instituted among the three-television 
companies would, according to the Government, result--in--a better-quality--- 
service-for the viewer. The Giscardian belief in the-benefits of the 
free market--were thus to be applied to the state programme companies- 
with the only constraint the'provisions contained in the companies' 
cahiers des charges. Finally, once the system was in operation the 
managements of the different companies would be entirely responsible 
for the running of their affairs. The 1974 reform was, in the eyes 
of ministerial spokesmen, designed to put an end to the symbiotic 
relationship of government and broadcasting which had been a permanent 
17- See chapter on Parliamentary control. 
18.1974 broadcasting statute, article 9. 
19. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
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feature of the Fifth Republic. Competition between autonomous responsible 
companies within a state monopoly public service sums up. the Government's 
view of the reform. 
Not surprisingly the Government's view of the reorganisation of 
state broadcasting was not shared by the left-wing opposition parties. 
Socialist and Communist party spokesmen in Parliament criticised the 
reform as the first step in the establishment of a commercial broadcast- 
ing system, whereas they wished to defend the public service ethos of 
broadcasting through the maintenance of the state monopoly. 
21 In their 
opinion the financial crisis at the ORTF had been stage managed by the 
Government to prepare the way for the break-up of the Office. In direct 
contrast to the Government the opposition parties believed that the 
system of competition among the three television companies would lead to 
a poorer quality service for the viewers as the channels fougbt1to 
capture the same mass audience by reverting to the lowest common denom- 
inator in taste. Finally, they argued, of itself the reform would not 
put an end to the long-standing practice -of ministerial interference 
in the sensitive area of news broadcasting. On the contrary, the 
" dismantling of the Office into separate companies would facilitate 
control on the lines of the classic political maxim of "divide and rule. " 
These criticisms were. echoed by the main broadcasting trade unions 
20. For a statement of the Government9s, objectives see the speech 
by 
Jacques Chirac introducing the bill in the National Assembly. 
Journal Officiel D4bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, July 
2 . 
197 49 pp. 339. Also J. Morand and G. Valter, "Efficacit4 
de gestion et libert4 d'expression a la radiodiffusion-t4lvision 
frangaise", Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, 
vol. 92 no. 1,1976. pp. 7-9. 
21. See speeches by J. Chevenement (Socialist) in Journal Officiel, 
Wbats Parlementaires Assemble Nationale, July 2.5 1974 pp. 3708-37136 
G. lamousse Socialist in Journal Officiel Wbats Parlementaires 
ate, July 27 1974, pp. 937-938; J. Chambaz Communist in Journal 
Officiel D4bats P le et Tres embVe , July 25 1974, pp. -? ; and C Lagatu (Communist) in Journal Officiel 
D6bats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1974, pp. 931-9'5Z. 
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who also viewed the reform as an attack directed against them. 
22 For 
example, the Syndicat Unifie de Radio et de Television (CFDT) regarded 
the reorganisation not only as reinforcing the Government's control over 
news output and introducing private interests into the state broad- 
casting services, but also as a "settling of accounts with the broad- 
casting staff. "23 The Syndicat National de Radio et de Television (CGT) 
also voiced the opinion that the reform was "an unprecedented aggression 
against the staff of a national enterprise" and that "never in the 
previous thirty years had the authorities gone so far in their attempts 
to dominate news and cultural output" by the broadcasting media. 
24 A 
member of the National Committee of the main journalists' union at the 
ORTF, the Syndicat National des Journalistes (autonomous), saw the reform 
as having three main objectives: to accentuate the hold of the Government 
at all levels of broadcasting; to introduce private-capital into broad- 
casting; and to smash-the-Office staff and-the trade union organisatiöns25 
Fears of a future commercialisation of state broadcasting were 
not confined to the left-wing- parties or the broadcasting trade unions. 
They were also voiced by diverse personalities of the maiorite including 
Joel Le Tac, rapporteur special of the-National Assembly. -finance com- 
mittee's annual-budgetary report--on broadcasting 
26, 
-Michel- Debre27' - 
Michel Jobert28 and Albin Chalandon. 
29 In addition, a committee of 
22. For more information-on the -views -of-the broadcasting-unions--on-the 
1974 reform see-chapters on the - 
Reallocation of_ORTF_stafi and on 
the Broadcasting unions. 
23. import de la Vd4ration--des Travailleurs de 1'Information, de 
l'Audiovisuel et de 1'Action Culturelle ä la r4flexion globale de la 
confed4ration dans le domaine des moyens de communication de masse, 
CDT document, March 1977, P. 21. 
24. Le Quotidien de Paris, July 25 1974. 
25. J. Barbot, "Les demolisseurs du service public", Revue politique et 
parlementaire, no. 853,, November/December 1974. 
26. Lem, July 5 1974. 
27. Le Monde, July 11 1974. 
28. Le Monde, July 23 1974. 
29. Le Figaro, July 25 1974. 
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eminent jurists including Robert Badinter and Maurice Duverger regarded 
the reorganisation as preparing the way for the commercialisation of 
broadcasting with only the transmission company remaining in the hands 
of the State. 
30 
Despite vigorous denials by Rossi and others, various aspects of the 
reform gave credibility to the view that the new organisation represented 
a convenient jumping-off point for the future commercialisation of part 
of the state broadcasting services: the absence of any central feder- 
ating body, the system of competition among the television companies, 
the contractual relationships among the various companies and the 
different administrative statuses of the seven organisationally independ- 
ent entities. 
31 The public, however, seemed uninterested in this exchange 
of views. - Thus in an opinion poll taken between July 15 and 22, at the 
height of the debate -on the proposed reorganisation, fewer than half ---- 
those asked could provide- the major guidelines of the reform. 
32 
Liquidation of the Office 
To help manage -the changeover from the ORTF to -the new 
broadcasting 
structure a liquidating department (service de liquidation) was set up 
on January-1 1975. The functions of the liquidating--department included 
the drafting of the ORTF's balance sheet for 1974, the collection and 
payment of the Office's debts, the management: of--an, _outstanding-ORTF 
property and equipment not yet transferred to the new companies and 
the payment of redundancy money to staff not taken on by the new 
30. Le Monde, July 25 1974. 
31 See appendix 4. ii. 
32. Results of the poll were published in Le Quotidien de Paris, 
July 25 1974. 
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companies. 
33 Jean-Francois Vincent, assistant director of the 
radio services at the ORTF, was appointed head of the liquidation 
department with a small staff made up of civil servants, former ORTF 
staff and some employees of the new companies temporarily seconded to 
the liquidation department. 
34 The department was to cease its operations 
on June 30 1976 at the latest, eighteen months after the changeover from 
the ORTF to the new structure. Those tasks which had still not been 
completed by that date were to become the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
It would seem that the allocation of ORTF programme stock and 
equipment was settled with little dissension. 
35 Programmes which had 
already been broadcast by the ORTF became the property of INA which 
had been given the responsibility-of preserving the programme archives- 
of the ORTF and of the new-programme companies. Programmes--which-had 
been produced but had not yet been broadcast were divided up among the 
new companies. 
36 Radio-France received-the'rädio programmes originally 
destined for the ORTF's radio services as well as those produced . 
for the 
Office's external services. _FR3 was allocated 
the radio and television 
programmes due to be broadcast - on the ORTF's regional-network arid-in 
the DOM-TOM. TF1 and A2 shared between them the programmes due to be 
shown on-the ORTF's channels-one-and two. 
33.1974 broadcasting statute, articles 33 and 34. See also decree 
no. 74-948 of November 14 1974 and decree no. -74-1109 of 
December 
26 1974. 
34. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arrete of December 19 1974. 
35. The official procedure for the allocation of ORTF property and 
programmes among the new companies was laid down in Journal Officiel 
Lois et d4caets, decree no. 74-1110 of December 26 197 and decree 
no. 797 of November 14 1974. 
36. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arrete of July 12 1976. 
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The allocation of ORTF buildings among the new companies 
posed greater problems. To ensure that the new companies would 
be as organisationally independent of each other as possible the 
Government wanted each company to have separate administrative 
headquarters. This led to a scramble for ORTF property and a 
search for new accommodation as well, with each company seeking to 
derive maximum benefit from the reorganisation. 
The bizarre consequences of this process are best exemplified by 
the fate of the best known ORTF building, the Office's broadcasting 
headquarters on the banks of the Seine: la maison de 1'ORTF. 
Completed in 1963 this huge building was intended to bring together 
under one roof the previously-scattered-. services of the state-broad- 
casting organisation, -though-in. -fact this-objective-was never-achieved 
with the result that even the unified ORTF had-over a_dozen. properties 
scattered throughout-the Paris region. alone. -Following the break-up 
of the ORTF the-building was allocated-to Radio France as its new 
headquarters. - However; --though-the building had proved too small for 
the ORTF, it-"was conversely-far-too large for-the-radio company alone. 
As a result, Radio France has been compelled since 1975 to rent out 
office space which it does not use itself. 
In early-1975-this problem was temporarilyovercome because-the 
television companies-continued to use-the-. former_ORTF_headquarters for 
their administrative staff. However, both TF1 and A2 moved to new 
headquarters by the beginning of 1976, the former to the base of the 
Montparnasse tower block and the latter to a refurbished building near 
the Cognacq-Jay television studios. This left at the maison de la Radio, 
as it was now called, the radio company, the audience research services 
common to the new companies, and certain departments of the. regional 
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programme company FR3. The remaining office space, almost half the 
total, was rented out by Radio France to the Ministry of Youth, Sports 
and Leisure. 
37 After the 1978 legislative elections certain services 
of the Ministry of Industry also took up residence in Radio France's 
headquarters! 
38 
Ownership of the television studios in the rue Cognacq-Jay was 
divided up among TF1 (40%), A2 (4O%) and TDF (20%), with both of the 
major television companies having their news departments and studios 
in this one building. Since 1975 A2, which found its new accommodation 
in the rue de Montessuy rather cramped, has been planning to move to 
a new larger site at Neuilly-sur-Seine in the Paris suburbs. The 
original intention was to move into the new headquarters by September 
1979, but this date has had to be postponed indefinitely due to lack 
of money. 
39 Thus A2, which in this respect came off relatively badly 
from the break-up of the Office, will for the foreseeable future have 
to remain in its present unsatisfactory accommodation. 
As a direct result of the 1974 broadcasting reform, therefore, 
the most prestigious ORTF building is now-partially occupied by govern- 
ment ministries which have no connection with the policy field of broad- 
casting. Moreover, while the maison de la Radio is too large for Radio 
France, other companies, most notably A2, have had to look for alternat- 
ive accommodation with unsatisfactory results. The Government's desire 
that the new companies should each have a separate headquarters was 
certainly in keeping with the logic of the 1974 reform. It fitted . 
in with the objective of containing disputes wherever possible within 
37. Le Figaro, February 25 1975. 
38. Le Monde, April 13 1978. 
39" 1R3 also considered for a time moving its headquarters to the 
new complex at les Halles, but the project was abandoned as being 
too costly. 
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the bounds of one company rather than allowing them to affect the 
totality of the state broadcasting services. HoweveiZ, the con- 
sequences of this policy have undoubtedly been undesirable for 
some of the companies involved in both the short and long terms. 
In the short term the reorganisation involved the removal of staff, 
office equipment, files and other material from one building to 
another in a different part of Paris. 
40 
In the long term the reform 
left some companies with unsatisfactory accommodation and without the 
means to obtain better. 
The allocation of ORTF buildings was not, however, the only 
unsatisfactory aspect of the reorganisation of the state broadcasting 
services which came to light at the end of 1974. While all sections 
of the-ORT F_were_naturally_affected_by=the -reform, . 
they, were not- all- 
equally -affect ed: '-- Two sections-which-were particularly- badly hit -- 
were the external services -of- the ORTF and the Office's orchestras. 
The ORTF's-sxternal. services, la Direction des Affaires - --- 
Ext4rieures--etde la-Coopgration-(DAEC)--w¬Te-partly financed by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs which also had overall control of their 
programme policy. In 1973 the external services broadcast in 18 
different languages, had a budget of 132 million francs and employed 
a staff- of 900-which -included over- 200-journalists. 
41 
Even before----- 
the break-up of- the-ORTF-the-Government had decided to -cut back on the 
range of foreign broadcasts produced by the external services. Thus 
in January 1974, in the final months of Pompidou's presidency, a 
comitg interministeriel agreed to abolish the short wave foreign 
language programmes broadcast to Eastern Europe and to concentrate on 
40. For a concise description of the chaos which the change of build- 
ings involved, see L'Unit4, no. 140, January 10-16 1975- 
41. ORTF 73, Paris, Presses Pocket, 1973, P" 313" 
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broadcasts to Africa and the Middle East- 
42 
However, the break- 
up of the ORTF seriously exacerbated the threatened 'position of the 
external services. 
After the reorganisation Radio France was given responsibility 
for the production of programmes broadcast to foreign countries and, 
in keeping with the division of labour outlined in the statute, TDF 
assumed control of their transmission. Since the budget of Radio 
France did not match up to the company's estimated needs and as the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation were unwilling and/or 
unable to reimburse the full cost of the external broadcasts, there 
was a savage cutback in the service provided. In January 1975 14 
of the 18 -language_sections-of-the_external services were disbanded 
with only the French, German, English-and Spanish -sections: remaining. -- 
This compared unfavourably with the 40 language sections of the-BBC - 
or the 30 language sections of the German broadcasting-services. 
43 
In the -league-table -of- short -wave-broadcasts-France-fell to 28th 
position in the world, behind Albania and even Monaco. The number 
of staff employed in. -the. external -services was=severely reduced-and 
many journalists--employed in this sector, including exiles-from 
Eastern European countries, were not reallocated to one of the new 
companies at the end of 1974. In 197 nationale. 
the successor-to -the ORTF's-external services, --employed -only -11+5 staff 
including-76 journalists. 
44 
It was not until 1977 that the range of foreign broadcasts 
was extended after the submission of a critical report to the 
42. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1974-75, no. 100, Avis 
pr sent au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1975, tome IV 
Information -Radiodiffusion-TLlevision, Rapporteur special - 
Henri Caillavet, November 21 1974, pp"35-39" 
43. Le Monde, March 6-7 1977, 
44. Radio France handbook, first edition 1976, pp. 99-116. 
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Government by Jean d'Arcy, an influential member of the Haut 
Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel. Broadcasts to Portugal and to Eastern 
Europe were resumed in early 1977, largely due to a Senate budgetary 
amendment which allocated 5 million francs of the licence revenue 
for this purpose. 
45 
By the beginning of 1979 Radio-France-Internation- 
ale was broadcasting 171 hours daily to the African continent, 5 hours 
to the American continent and 15 hours daily to central and Eastern 
Europe. 
46 
Nonetheless, though improvements have been made since 
the disastrous first months following the break-up of the ORTF, 
the external services output of Radio-France-Internationale still does 
not match up to that of its predecessor at the ORTF. The external 
services, forgotten in the Government's original bill in 1974, have 
only partially recovered from the effects of the reform. 
Another major victim of the -break-up, =in the short term at 
least, were the ORTF orchestras. The Office managed-three=national 
orchestras, -four regional orchestras, other assorted musical groups 
and four choirs. 
47- 
The fate of- these musical formations was--totally =-- - 
ignored in the Government's original bill presented to the National 
Assembly-at-the =end-of-July. It was only in-Ahe_Senate_that -an_. _- 
amendment-was --adopted which gave responsibility-for-the maintenance-- 
and development of the national and regional orchestras to the 
national- radio -company---Radio -. France.. -Accepted-by-the-commission---- 
mixte paritaire-despite governmental-opposition; this amendment-was 
included in article 7 of the 1974 statute. 
48 
45. Journal Officiel Documents Senat, 1976-1977, no. 65, Rapport 
- gen ral fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1977, Tome 111, annexe no. 46, 
Radiodiffusion et television, rapporteur sp4cial: Jean Cluzel, 
annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 23 novembre 1976, pp. 93- 
101 and 128. 
46. Radio France handbook, second edition 1978, pp. 97-100. 
47. ORTF 73, Paris, Presses Pocket, pp. 206-207. 
48. See chapter on Parliamentary control. 
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Welcome as it was, this amendment was of itself scarcely 
equal to the problems facing the ORTF orchestras at the end of 
1974. The orchestras had been particularly badly affected by 
the statutory clause which made retirement compulsory at the age 
of 60 and had lost approximately 20% of their musicians. 
49 
Moreover, 
Radio France's budget was insufficient to cover the cost of maintain- 
ing the orchestras, particularly as they were in any case in no fit 
condition to give public concerts. To save Radio France money the 
regional orchestras were attached directly to the Ministry of Culture 
after 1976, but only after their upkeep had cost the radio company 
13 million francs in 1975.50 As with the external services it was not 
until two to three years after the reorganisation that the orchestras 
attached to Radio France began to attain a level of performance 
comparable with that given by the ORTF orchestras prior to the reform. 
The Ministry of Information 
One of the major objectives of the 1974 reorganisation of the 
state broadcasting services was to sever the umbilical cord which had 
linked the ORTF to the Government. The ORTF had up until 1969 been 
squeezed in a vice between two government ministries. On the one 
hand, the Ministry of Finance had exercised a high degree of control 
not only over the total size of the Office's budget but also over the 
way in which it was spent, interfering in the minor details of 
programme expenditure and staffing policy. Simultaneously the 
Ministry of Information concentrated among other things on the ORTF's 
news output, with the Office's news programmes being censored and 
sometimes even composed by the minister himself with the assistance of 
his cabinet and top ORTF management. A certain relaxation was 
49. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
50. L'Express, no. 1220, November 25 - December 1 1974. 
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noticeable during the premiership of Chaban-Delmas (June 1969- 
July 1972) when the Ministry of Information was abolished and broad- 
casting became the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister. 
News output became the responsibility of the broadcasting journalists 
within the ORTF and the Government's financial controls were slightly 
relaxed. However, when in 1972 Chaban-Delmas was forced to resign 
from the premiership, a new ORTF statute was passed in Parliament, the 
Ministry of Information was reconstituted and the reforms made under 
Chaban-Delmas were discontinued. 
51 
As we have seen, during the 1974 presidential election campaign 
Giscard d'Estaing explicitly rejected the idea of a Ministry of 
Information 
2 
Consequently, by-the-terms of the 1974 broadcasting 
statute the Government's-supervisory=role in the new broadcasting 
structure- is -relatively- limited - The Prime -Minister or a minister -- 
appointed by him for this purpose ensures that the state broad- 
casting=monopoly is protected- and=that-the- companies -observe-their- - 
public service obligations in general and the regulations contained 
in their_cahiers des charges- in particular. 
53_ A government 
- minister was 
to-be-responsible for the drafting-of the companies' 
cahiers des charges54 and the Government was to appoint the 
chairmen -ofthe-new companies and 
fix-the-cost of the broadcasting 
licence. 
55 While the Government obviously had an active role t-o-play 
in the transition period-from- the -ORTF to -the=-new-, structure, =once --- - 
the new companies were operational the Government was supposed largely 
51. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 1974 
reform. 
52. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
53" 1974 broadcasting statute, article 14. 
54. Ibid, article 15. 
55" Ibid, articles 5 and 11. The Government's powers as laid down in 
the 1974 statute resemble very closely those set out in article 5 
of the 1972 ORTF statute. 
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to retire from the scene and allow the system to function on its 
own within the constraints imposed by the cahiers des charges 
and the companies' financial resources. 
During the changeover period at the end of 1974 the Government 
played a vital role in ensuring the implementation of the reform. 
The minister directly responsible for this task was Rossi, who was 
assisted by Cannac at the Elys4e, Friedmann at Matignon, and his 
own personal cabinet. In accordance with the new President's 
electoral pledge Rossi did not have the title of Minister of Informatioi 
Instead his official nomenclature was that of government spokesman. 
Whatever his official title, however, Rossi was the government 
minister given-the-task of-executing the-1974 reform. 
Rossi had-at his disposal a small group of persons, _either 
members of his--cabinet--or--temporarily assigned-to-his-ministerial 
department, to assist him in this task. - Ofthese the most important-- 
was undoubtedly the director of Rossi's cabinet, Antione de Clermont- 
Tonnerrebtha was responsible for coordinating=the implementation 
of the reform. Clermont-Tonnerre-was to-maintain-his-relationship-- 
with the state broadcasting services throughout Giscard d'Estaing's 
presidency, stepping from-a supervisory role in ministerial cabinets 
(1974-1978) to the top post in the ailing production company 
(1979)"56 
56. A_graduate of_ENA, _Clermont-Tonnerre 
had been a member of differ- 
ent ministerial cabinets before becoming director of Rossi's in 
1974. In 1976, when the broadcasting tutelage . 
(tutelle) be- 
came the responsibility of the Prime Minister in the first Raymond 
Barre government, Clermont-Tonnerre was appointed to Barre's 
cabinet and placed in charge of broadcasting matters. In April 
1978 when the tutelage passed to the newly created Ministry of 
Culture and Communication, Clermont-Tonnerre remained in Barre's 
cabinet as adviser on questions of culture and communication. 
Prior to his appointment as head of the production company with 
the task of establishing it on a sound financial footing, Clermont. 
Tonnerre was also a member of Sofirad's board of governors. 
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Under Clermont-Tonnerre a small group of people were responsible 
for supervising different aspects of the reform. For example, 
Bertrand Cousin was responsible for the judicial aspects of the' 
break-up of the ORTF and for drafting the new companies' cahiers 
des charges, before he moved to occupy a top post at FR3.57 Jean- 
Loup Arnaud dealt with the financial aspects of the reform, particularly 
the drawing up of the companies' first budget. In 1978 he too was 
given a post at FR3.58 Paul L'Ollivier, an administrator at the 
ORTF, was in charge of questions relating to the reallocation of the 
ORTF staff, before being given a post at Radio France. 
59 As these 
few cases show, the practice whereby persons move back and forth 
between posts in the state administration and in the state broad- 
casting-services has=-not been-significantly affected-by-the 1974 reform. 
During the -implementation -of=the- 1974 reform-, 
Rossi was-also- 
assisted by staff-of the-Service -Juridigue=et Technique de 
1'Inform- 
ation. 'Formally- attached _to -the-office--of- the 
Prime Minister, =the - 
SJTI is concerned with matters relating to the press and the broad- 
casting media. It prepares legislation=-and ministeri&Y-decrees in 
this field and supervises their application. - 
With specific --- regard 
to broadcasting the SJTI has the task of preparing the groundwork 
for the exercise of those functions given the Prime-Minister in the 
1974 statute, particularly article 14. It also prepares the way for 
ministerial decisions regarding-the-protection of-the_state=monopoly. - 
57. Bertrand Cousin, a graduate of ENA and conseiller d'Etat, held the 
position of conseiller technique in Rossi's cabinet. He then 
became director of Contamine's cabinet at FR3 and then general 
secretary of the company. In December 1979 he returned to the 
state administration but retained his connection with broad- 
casting, being appointed head of the Service Juridique et Tech- 
nique de 1'information. 
58. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 3 1979. 
59. Interview with Paul L'Ollivier, July 13 1979. 
L 
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The SJTI has the further task of ensuring that the broadcasting 
companies abide by the regulations contained in their cahiers des 
charges. 
60 
In short, the SJTI is the administrative body which 
performs the daily supervisory tasks allotted to the Prime Minister 
(or a minister appointed by him for this purpose) by the 1974 
broadcasting statute. 
It would be a mistake to imagine that the minister responsible 
for the supervision of the state broadcasting services has at his 
command a vast body of civil servants to assist him in his task. 
The SJTI has a staff of about 50, of whom only half deal with 
broadcasting questions and the other half with matters relating 
to the press. -Therefore, --not--only is there now no Minister of 
Information in France, but there is no Ministry of Information either. 
Indeed --the Tministry- only_ever: did-exist as a-skeleton-administrative - 
service: 
61 
The SJTI's-supervisory- role -is, -there 
fore-, -very limited. 
However, it is not non-exist ence-It'Was- the SJTI which was the 
coordinating body on the company management side in the negotiations 
for the drawing up of collective staff agreement -conventions- 
collectives) in late 1975.62 It was also the SJTI which drew up 
the bill introduced by two deputies of the governing coalition in 
1979 to extend the-minimum--service -provisions-in-the event of 
strike-activity-in the - broadcasting -companies. 
6 
In the absence of a Minister of Information the Government's 
60. Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Decree no. 75-127 of March 7 
1975- 
61. F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France, London, 
p. 73-7 , and 1969 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19 ist edition), pp-73-7T, 
_ 
(2nd edition) pp. 77-78. 
62. See chapter on the Broadcasting unions. 
63. Ibid. Both the above examples of the activity of the SJTI were 
provided by M. Mougey, a member of the SJTI's staff, in an inter- 
view with the author, September 17 1979. 
L 
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formal supervisory role in the broadcasting field has since 1974 
been the successive responsibility of different government ministers. 
From May 1974 to August 1976 the task was carried out by Rossi, 
government spokesman and as such also responsible for explaining 
government policy to the press. Following the government reshuffle 
which accompanied the appointment of Barre to the premiership in 
August 1976, responsibility for broadcasting was given to two 
ministries, the office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Culture. The role of the latter ministry, however, was particularly 
small, since it had only a general watchdog function with regard to 
programme quality and the companies' observance of their cahiers des 
charges. 
64 
After the surprisingly confortable victory of the governing right- 
wing coalition in the 1978 legislative elections, responsibility for 
the supervision of broadcasting-was-given to-a newly -constituted-=--- 
Ministry-of Culture and-Communication in the hands-of a former Minister 
of-Information-during-the Pompidou presidency, Jean-Philippe Lecat. 
The new minister, who had been Giscard d'Estaing's press secretary 
. at the Elysee from August 1976 to April 1978, emphasised-that-the- 
creation of a new ministry did not mean the re-establishment of a 
Ministry of Information under another name. 
65 
Instead he confirmed 
that his role would be that laid down in article 14-of the 1974 statute. 
To assist him -in this role he would have at his-disposal the services 
64. LeMonde, -September 5-6 and 11 1976. 
65. Le Monde, April 22 1978. A graduate of ENA, Lecat became 
Minister of Information in October 1973 after the resolution of 
the Conte-Malaud affair. In August 1976 he was appointed Elys4e 
spokesman and head of the presidential press services, before 
becoming Minister of Culture and Communication in April 1978. 
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of the SJTI. He would also chair the meetings of the Haut Conseil 
de l'Audiovisuel. 
The fact that responsibility for supervising broadcasting policy 
has been given to different ministries since 1974 does not signify 
any change in the relationship between the Government and the state 
broadcasting services in. the period since the reform. Apart from 
the Minister's personal cabinet there is nobody at the Ministry of 
Culture and Communication. who is concerned with broadcasting problems, 
with the result that the new minister, like his predecessors, continues 
to rely on the services of the SJTI. 
However, there has been an important change in the relationship 
between- the-Government and-the state broadcasting : services during-the-- 
course of-the Fifth Republic. From 1964 to-1969 it was-the-Minister 
of Information who both formally and in fact= supervised--and-controlled 
the Government's-policy-on- broadcasting: -- It_-was-Peyrefitte Who=drew --- 
up the 1964 statute, placed members of his cabinet in key posts at 
the ORTF_and exercised_aclose daily __control_of_the 
ORTF. 's-news--output. 
His successors-as-Minister-of-Information during de Gaulle's presidency 
carried on this strong interventionist role. 
In 1969 responsibility---for broadcasting moved -from the -Minister_ 
of Information : to-. the-Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, --who-was--personally 
responsible for the formulation and execution of governmental policy 
on broadcasting up until his resignation in 1972. While the Ministry 
of Information was re-established during the last two years of Pompidou't 
presidency, the source of effective control of broadcasting was moving 
away from this ministry towards the office of the President. Thus it 
was Pompidou who was personally responsible for the appointment of 
Conte as PDG of the ORTF in 1972. 
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The 1974 reform confirmed this trend towards presidential 
control of the broadcasting sector. While by the terms of the 1974 
statute it is the Prime Minister or a minister appointed by him (since 
1978 the Minister of Culture and Communication) who is responsible 
for the supervision of governmental policy on broadcasting, in fact 
the effective source of control is now the Presidency of the Republic. 
The 1974 reform was drawn up by the President in company with members 
of his immediate entourage and other specialist advisers. 
66 
Moreover, 
it is increasingly the President who is responsible for the key 
appointments to the state broadcasting services and related media. 
67 
Formal supervision may still be the responsibility of the relevant 
minister, but effective control in matters such as top appointments 
now emanates-from -the . Elysee.. z--- 
Le Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel 
Though the Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel was not established 
by the 1974 statute, a short section is devoted to it -in-thisthapter - 
because along with_the---SJTI the Haut-Conseil de l'Audiövisüel--con- - 
stitutes a source of policy-advice to the minister with responsibility 
for broadcasting. Formally set up by the 1972 ORTF statute, the 
Haut -Conseil-de-l'Audiovisuel was established in March 1973 with-- 
the principal task of acting as-an advisory body to-the Government-_- 
in the twin fields of broadcasting and telecommunications. 
68 
66. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
67. See chapter on Appointments. 
68. The Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel was set up by article 16 of 
the 1972 ORTF statute and its organisation and functions were 
laid down in decree no. 73-325 of March 21 1973. Its first 
meeting was held on July 5 1973- Its existence was maintained 
by article 34 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
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The membership of the HCA is composed of six parliamentarians 
(four deputies and two senators chosen by their respective assembles) 
and thirty four "highly qualified persons" chosen for their cultural, 
technical, judicial, professional or trade union backgrounds and all 
appointed by the Government. 
69 
Since November 1976 the chairmen of 
the broadcasting companies, with the exception of the production 
company, also sit on the Council. The general secretary of the HCA 
since October 1976 has been Gdrard Montassier, Giscard's son-in-law 
and unsuccessful UDF candidate in the 1979 cantonal elections in the 
Charentes. 7° The HCA has a very small permanent staff consisting 
of the general secretary, an assistant and a secretary. It has 
extremely limited financial resources. 
Meeting in full session at least twice a year under-the- .- 
chairmanship of the government-minister with responsibility for-- -- 
broadcasting, the_HCA_acts as a think tank'for the-Gövernment-in-the - 
broadcasting field. -The_main -bulk _of . 
the -Council's -work, however; __ - 
is not. done in these infrequent plenary sessions but by small working 
parties--which, - acting -usually-at--the Government'_s request; --cancentrate__ 
on particular aspects-of--broadcasting policy. 
71 
For example, the Council has devoted much of its attention to 
the thorny problem of the future -development. of_the state broadcasting 
monopoly. In fact the creation of the HCA was made at the-time of-- 
the advent of cable television in France when the need was felt 
by the Government to have a separate body to monitor the cable 
television experiments. 
72 The Council has prepared various reports 
69. For fuller details of the membership of the RCA see R. Thomas, 
Broadcasting and Democracy in France, London, Crosby Lockwood 
Staples, 1976, pp. 99-101. 
70. See chapter on Appointments. 
71. The HCA may decide to discuss a topic on its own initiative, but 
in fact it rarely does so. 
72. For more information on-cable television and other challenges to 
the state broadcasting monopoly see chapter on the State Monopoly. 
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for the Government on the question of the monopoly, dealing with 
such topics as local radio and, most recently, the development of 
direct satellite broadcasting. It also played a consultative role 
in the drafting of the supplementary legislation in 1978 to reinforce 
the state broadcasting monopoly. 
73 
Other topics on which the Council has set up working parties have 
included the drafting of the broadcasting companies' cahiers des 
charges, the right of reply to persons who have been unjustifiably 
maligned during a radio or television programme, the role of 
educational broadcasting, an ethical code for broadcasting (la 
d4ontologie audiovisuelle), clandestine advertising, the licence-fee 
system and copyright legislation.? 
" 
Usually the Council's decisions 
on these matters are-not made public, - though-the report on -anethical 
code for broadcasters--aas published. =The Councils- other major r- -_ 
public contribution is- its annual -report--on the broadcasting 
companies' respect<-af=the-provisions -nontainesl n-their cahiers-. des_- 
charges. 
The -Council exercises no direct control over- the operations 
of 
the state broadcasting companies. It is appointed largely by the 
Government, gives policy advice to the Government and generally works 
within the terms of reference set by the responsible government 
minister. This is not to -say -that-theECAis-merely- 
the_politiba-l. ____ 
tool of the minister. The Council's reports are frequently highly 
critical of government policy. 
76 Nor is it to call into question the 
73". Ibid. 
74. Interview with Mme. Fourneret, assistant to the general secretary of 
the HCA, July 20 1979. 
75. Rapport sur certain aspects de la d9ontolo ie audiovisuelle, Paris 
La documentation francaise, 1978. 
76. For example, the Council's annual reports on the broadcasting com- 
panies' respect of the provisions contained in their cahiers des 
charges have been critical of various crucial aspects of the 1974 
reform. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
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high professional quality of its members. 
77 Nonetheless, the HCA 
is not, as Ruth Thomas would have us believe, "an independent body. "? 
8 
As one interviewee remarked: "The Council is not there to make 
difficulties for the Government. "? 
9 Nor as far as one can judge, 
has it been a particularly influential body with regard to the major 
aspects of the Government's broadcasting policy. 
80 
The cahiers des charges of the broadcasting companies 
One. of the major tasks facing the Government in the autumn 
of 1974 was the drafting of the broadcasting companies' cahiers 
des charges. 
81 
Though much more detailed in its provisions than 
its predecessors of 1964 and 1972, the 1974 broadcasting statute 
still left unanswered many questions regarding-the running--of the 
new companies. These lacunae were partly filled by a whole series 
of governmental -decrees published in the= final months ., of 
1974. =The- - --- 
single ost--important document on-the--funct Toning-of- the- new- broadcast- - 
ing companies was, however, each company's cahier des charges. 
With 
-the--except 
ion, of-the= production company--each of- the broad-_.. 
cast ingcompanies-has-its--own-cahier-des-charges . 
82 
The function 
77. Members include Jean-d'Arcy, former director of television in 
the 1950s, 'Pierre Schaeffer, former head of the-ORTF's research 
service, *Francis Balle, mass media sociologist, and Philippe'Grum- 
bach, -director-of-the - news--staff-at-3. ' Express - 
78. 
_R. 
Thomas, op. cit., P. -99. 
One sign of independence would be 
automatic-publication-of all-Council reports. -- 
79. Interview with Mme. Fourneret, July 20 1979. 
80. Jean d'Arcy considered that the HCA had been largely ineffective, 
while Pierre Schaeffer remarked that the Government wanted the 
Council to do as little as possible. Interviews with Jean d'Arcy, 
December 3 1976, and Pierre Schaeffer, July 2 1979. 
81. The cahiers des charges are in effect detailed charters. The French 
term has been retained in this section because the obligations laid 
down in the cahiers des charges are more specific than those usually 
found in a broadcasting charter of the BBC type. 
82. The SFP has no cahier des charges. becaüse of its special 
administrative status. - 
-157- 
of these documents is twofold: to set out the general goals of 
broadcasting as a public service and to enumerate a series of 
specific obligations which the companies have to observe to maintain 
the public service nature of French broadcasting. Through the 
device of the cahiers des charges the Government can impose obligat- 
ions on the broadcasting companies in matter of programming without 
having to intervene in the daily decision-making process. 
The basis of the cahiers des charges was laid down in article 15 
of the 1974 statute. This article, which because of a series of 
parliamentary amendments was a much fuller clause than in the Govern- 
ment's original bill, laid down the general framework for the cahiers 
des charges 
83-_The 
cahiers-des charges were to fix the goals of the 
broadcasting companies with regard to the maintenance of the public 
service, notably-with reference to-the-development---of-the-transmission 
networks and the-minimum-amount-of programmes. - In-addition, =-each 
cahier des charges was to determine the programme companies' 
obligations--with regard--to--news -and-eultural-programmes- and-arlso 
in 
the field of external services. The prögramme-companies were to 
favour "creativity" in programming, were to accord a minimum viewing 
time for-political-parties-and--representative professional organis- 
ations-and wereto be-göverned-by strict rules regarding-the-amount 
of television-advertising time to-be allowed--to-each advertiser-. -- 
The content of the cahiers des charges themselves was the subject 
of consultations between Rossi and his staff on the one hand and on the 
85 
other the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting, the Haut Conseil 
83. See Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
July 25 1974, pp. 3776-3781, for the content of the parliamentary 
amendments. 
84. Article 15 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
85. Parliamentary amendment no. 80 proposed by Joel Le Tac and accept- 
ed by the Government. Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires 
Assemblee Nationale, July 25 19749 pp. 3777-3778" 
-158- 
de 1'AudiovisuelI 
86 
nd representatives of the management of the ORTF 
and of the new broadcasting companies. 
$? 
The initiative, however, 
was firmly in the hands of the minister and his staff. For example, 
the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting complained that it had 
been-consulted only when the documents were already at the stage 
of the final draft. 
88 
While the new company chairmen were consulted, 
the final decision lay in the hands of the minister. Contentious 
issues, therefore, were resolved at ministerial level either by Rossi, 
Friedmann or Cannac. Issues resolved at this level included the con- 
flict between Radio France and FR3 for the control of the regional 
radio network and the difference of opinion between the Ministry of 
Culture and the programme companies on the quota of cultural programmes 
to be included in the cahiers pies -charges. 
89 
-Moreover, --the -cahiers__ - 
des charges-were- not-contracts-freely-entered =into by-the brdadcasting- 
copanies. _. The- -companies -could not--reject- . their cahiers 
des -charges ----- 
even if they wished- to. do so. 
go 
The cahiers des charges were drawn up in late 1974 by Cousin, a 
member of Rossi's cabinet. He described the process as follows: 
"There was no model on which to base the content of the 
cahiers des charges. They are unique in the world. We started 
with the statute and the ORTF's public service goals. ... There 
were meetings between Rossi's -staff, - the 
Prime -Minister_'s_ cabinet 
and the President's advisers-. - The heads "of- the new companies--'----- 
were consulted once the framework of the cahiers-des charges - 
had been established. Certain government ministries-wanted- 
specific regulations- binding--on- the new companies. There was also 
86. Consultation with the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel was not in- 
cluded in the formal provisions. of the statute. The Government 
decided to consult the HCA on its own initiative. 
87. Interview with Marceau Long, July 10 1979. 
88. J. Chevallier, La radio-television francaise entre deux reformes 
Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975, p. 250. 
89. Interview with Bertrand Cousin, July 11 1979. 
90.. A2 threatened to refuse its cahier des charges in early 1975 in 
protest against its budget allocation for that year which it re- 
garded as being too small. Le Monde, January 4 and 23 1975" 
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pressure from corporatist interests. For example, the 
broadcasting unions and the actors' unions pushed for 
the inclusion of clauses to fix minimum quotas of French 
produced programmes. The cinema industry applied pressure 
to ensure the adoption of measures designed to limit the number 
of films shown by the programme companies and to control the 
times at which they were shown. Also, the publishers of the 
television magazines like Tole- -ours and T414-poche pushed 
for the adoption of article 28 which compels the companies 
to give 3 weeks' notice of their programme schedules. " 91 
Partly because of the existence of these and similar pressures the 
cahiers des charges were not published in their final version until 
April 1975, four months after the new companies had begun their 
transmission, though according to Cousin the companies knew the content 
of their cahiers des charges in their more or less definitive version 
in January. 
The preamble -off the -cahiers-des-charges;, which is the same for -al. l 
four programme companies, is-a very-general statement-of the public -- 
service goals of the state broadcasting-services. 
92 The four-programme 
companies-are to--ensure-by the-. -diversity-and quality of their-programmes 
that as many people as possible are introduc-ed-to all forms-of culture. 
They are to-provoke-the exchange 6f--ideas necessary for the-functioning 
of democratic -institut-ions-and=to =relay and-- increase=-the efforts- made - 
in the educational field. In addition, they have to strive for quality 
in both entertainment-and news programmes. - 
These rather-vacuous -ideals-are-given-some --flesh 
in the main body 
of the text which imposes specific obligations regarding the programm- 
ing of the companies. For example, the programme companies were bound 
91. Interview with Bertrand Cousin, July 11 1979- 
92. The cahiers des charges of the broadcasting companies (excluding 
the SFP are obviously not identical in every detail given the 
different functions the separate companies have to perform. 
However, the guidelines are similar for all the companies. What 
follows in the main body of the text is a sample of some of the 
contents of the cahiers des charges of the two major television 
companies, TF1 and A2. 
16a- 
to ensure balance and objectivity in news programming. This 
involved compliance with specific provisions. For example, while 
the programme companies had to broadcast a programme if the Govern- 
ment so requested them, these programmes would be announced as 
emanating from this source. The companies also had to comply with 
particular regulations governing the coverage of parliamentary 
proceedings, -electoral broadcasting, party political programmes and 
regional news bulletins. 
93 
The cahiers des charges also laid down-certain obligations with 
regard to general programming. For-example, --the-programme-companies 
-----were, to -strive to ensure that 60% of-their- programmes were o French 
origin. - The total number of -feature- films which the companies were 
allowed to screen annually-was set out in-the cahiers-des charges. 
In addition, both TFl and A2 had to broadcast a specified number of 
. __ plays-and-ballets in-cooperation with the"Ministry of 
Culture as well 
as a specified number of concerts by French orchestras. ' 
The total amount of advertising time allowed per day on TFl 
and A2,18 minutes per day on average, was also included in their 
cahiers des charges. The amount of advertising which any single 
advertiser could place with either of the two major television 
companies could not exceed 8% of the respective company's total income 
from commercial advertising. Advertising was to be confined to specia 
slots and was not permitted to interrupt a programme. 
95 
93. Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, arr8t4s du 25 avril 1975 fixanr 
les cahiers des charges des soci tos nationales de t41 vision et 
de radiodiffusion, TF1 and A2, articles 3,4,5,6 and 11-22. 
94. Ibid, articles 23-35. 
95 Ibid, articles 65-81 (TF1) and 64-80 (A2). 
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Within the companies the application of the provisions contained 
in the cahiers des charges is supervised by the board of governors. 
Externally this supervision is carried out by the Service d'Observatioz 
des Programmes, which is a part of the SJTI. It is the SOP which 
ensures that the companies respect the quotas included in their cahierf 
des charges and which passes on any infringements of these quotas to 
the-attention-of_the-minister with responsibility for broadcasting. 
The Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel also-publishes an annual report on 
the companies' respect of their cahiers des charges. 
The -crucial- question regarding -the-_cahiers des charges is whether 
-they-are an-unjustifiable =restrict ion_on-the autonomy- of -the- broad- 
casting companies-or-a necessary safeguard to-prdtect thepublic 
service ideals of Fre-nch_bröadcasting. Chevallier subscribes to the 
former opinion, arguing that 
"the weight of the cahiers des charges is symptomatic 
of the 
- 
desire of the authorities--to=acquire--direct-control 
over programme content -... " 96 
Morand and Valter, on the other hand, disagree with Chevallier, 
arguing that: 
"the constraints imposed by the authorities on the autonomy 
and liberty of expression of the companies are not very 
rigorous. " 97 
Five years after the establishment of the new companies, it would 
appear that Morand and Valter are nearer the truth. The cahiers 
des charges do indeed restrict the autonomy of the companies, 
but far less than other aspects of the reorganisation such as the 
96. J. Chevallier, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 
97. J. Morand and G. Valter, "Efficacite de gestion et libert4 
d'expression ä la radiodiffusion-television francaise", 
Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique, 1976. 
f 
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system of appointments or the budgetary procedure. In any case 
many of the provisions contained in the cahiers des 'charges are- 
quite justified as a counter balance to the possible adverse effects 
of unrestrained competition among the separate companies. In fact, 
the main criticism which can be directed against the cahiers des charge 
is not that they have restricted the companies too much, but rather 
that they--have-largely failed in their protective function of 
preserving the-public service nature of French broadcasting. 
98 
The 1974-75 budget 
One of the major problems which faced the new companies in 1975 
was the size of their budgetary allocation for their first year of 
operation. . 
The. complex-financial. procedure . 
designed: -to, -take, account 
of the. audience. ratings- and- programme. quality- of Ahe__programme=-companie 
could obviously-nQt be-applied-at-the start- of their- first-year in 
operation. 
99 Instead it was left to Rossi and his staff, in particular 
Jean-Loup Arnaud, to decide the amount of licence revenue to be given 
to each company. This was carried out on the basis of the figures 
drawn up in 1974 for the corresponding sectors of the ORTF. 
100 The 
1975 broadcasting budget was in several respects, therefore, a budget 
of transition. 
Because of the speed with which the reorganisation of the state 
broadcasting services was to be accomplished and the resultant chaos, 
the budgetary proposals for 1975 presented to the National Assembly 
98. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
99.1974 broadcasting statute, articles 6 and 18-24. See also chapter 
on Finance. 
100. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 13'1979. 
L 
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finance committee in October 1974 contained no details about the 
projected income or expenditure of the new companies. 
101 Indeed 
Arnaud argued that the lack of information available to Parliament in 
early autumn was not merely accidental. 
"Rossi gave instructions not to give the parliamentarians 
concerned, such as Le Tac and Caillavet, all the real figures, 
but only to give them the outlines of the 1975 budget. Rossi 
feared that the budget might pose problems. The figures. given 
to Parliament, therefore, were slightly sugared (un peu tdulcores). 
Now that there were parliamentarians on the boards of governors 
we had to be careful. " 102 
This state of affairs led the National Assembly finance committee's 
rapporteur sp4cial on broadcasting, Le Tac, to complain that he was 
being asked to present a report on a budget the contents of which he 
was quite ignorant. In the light of this absence of information 
and with the other problems caused by-the abolition of the ORTF in 
mind, Le Tac went so far as-to ask thät_-tiie: January 1975 deadline 
be postponed so that the transitioncould proceed more smoothly. 
103 
The Government, =however, -could hardly have been expected -to accede 
to this request. 
In any case. more - information was-forthcoming during 
November--and 
December 1974, enabling a comparison between the ORTF's budget for 
1974 and the projected -budget for the new companies 
in 1975. These 
figures=-showed--that- the -est-imated- income of the new companies- in_1975 
would-exceed -that-- of--the ORTE in its-last- year of operation _by_ 
282 
101. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblde Nationale, 197+-1975, no. 123Q 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour'1975, annexe- no. 48, 
ORTF, rapporteur special - Joel Le Tact annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 11 october 1974, p. 3. 
102. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 13 1979- 
103- Journal 0fficiel. Documents Assemb] e Nationale, 1974-1975, no. 
1230, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1975, annexe - no. 48, ORTF 
rapporteur special - Joel Le Tact annexe au proces-verbal de la 
seance du 11 october 1974, p. 3. 
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million francs, an increase of just over 12%. 
104 Nonetheless, the 
projected 1975 budget was open to criticism on several counts. 
First, the cost of collecting the licence revenue was estimated 
at 148 million francs in 1975 compared with 111 million francs in 
1974, an increase of 34%. While the cost of collecting the licence 
revenue had in 1974 represented 6.6% of the total collected, in 1975 
it was estimated that the cost of collection would represent 7.3%. 
Thus the transfer of the task of licence revenue collection from the 
ORTF to the Ministry of Finance, far from leading to significant 
savings as the Chinaud committee had forecast, resulted in an increase 
in the cost of collection. 
105 As a result, there was less money 
than forecast available for the broadcasting companies. 
Secondly, while the Government agreed that the State should 
reimburse the broadcasting companies for the revenue lost because 
certain persons were exempted from paying the licence, the amount 
was calculated by the Government at only 95 million francs. This 
figure was considered by both the National Assembly and Senate 
finance committees to underestimate the real cost of these exemptions, 
104.1974 1975 
Licence revenue allocated to state broad- 
casting excluding cost of collection 1,573 1,773 
Advertising revenue 569 640 
Other income 171 182 
Total income ................................ 2,313 2,595 (totals in thousands of francs) 
Source: Journal Officiel Documents Senat, 1974-1975, no. 99 
Rapport gn ral fait au nom de la commission des finances 
... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1975, tome III 
annexe no. 44 Radiodiffusion et tel4vision, rapporteur 
sp4cial - Jean Cluzel, annexe au prods-verbal de la 
seance du 21 novembre 1974, p. 40. 
105. Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 165-166. 
-165, - 1 
which they calculated to be around 130 million francs. 
106 While 
Rossi himself agreed that the figure of 130 million francs was 
probably the more accurate, the Government's original estimate was 
adhered to throughout 1975.107 
However, in fairness it should be noted that even this amount 
represented 95 million francs more than had been paid in 1974 to 
the ORTF which had had to bear the cost itself of licence fee 
exemptions decided by the Government. Moreover, the principle of 
such reimbursements had been explicitly rejected by the Chinaud 
report. 
108 Therefore, while the reimbursement of licence fee 
exemptions in 1975 was not as large as it should have been, it 
was a substantial improvement on the previous practice. 
The most virulent criticism voiced against the ; proposed 1975 
budget was that the total amount of revenue-from all sources to . 
be allocated - among the new companies-eras-insufficient-to-cover-their 
projected--expenditure. - In-other words, according to the companies 
and the-parliamentary=rapporteurs-speciaux-the. -figure=of-2,595 - 
million-francs-in-revenue fell far short of the companies' estimated 
financial-requirements. 
The four programme companies, for example, had-calculated-that --" 
their minimum financial needs amounted to 2,965 million francs. 
106. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 197 1975, no- 
1230, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1975, annexe no. 48, ORTF, rapporteur 
special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au procbs-verbal de la seance du 
11 octobre 1974, p. 12. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Sgnat, 1974-1975, no. 99, Rapport gen- 
dral fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1975, Tome III, annexe no. 44, Radiodiffus- 
ion et tel4vision, rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, annexe au 
proces-verbal de la seance du 21 novembre 1974, pp. 40-41. 
107. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1975-1976, no. 62, Rapport gener- 
al fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet de 
loi de finances pour 1976, Tome III, annexe no. 46, Radiodiffusion 
et television, rapporteur spdcial: Jean Cluzel, annexe au procZ! s- 
verbal de la seance du 20 novembre 1975, p. 33. 
108. Chinaud report, 1974, p. 167. -Mom 
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Moreover, since the programme companies had underestimated the amounts 
asked of them for services rendered by the transmission company (658 
million francs instead of 532) and by the archive and research instit- 
ute (111 million francs instead of 54), the gap between the programme 
companies' estimates and those of the Government in respect of revenue 
for 1975 was more than 550 million francs. The difference in the two 
sets of estimates is made clear in the following table: 
log 
197 broadcasting budget: revenue 
(in millions of francs 
Original government estimates Company estimates 
TF1 608 810 
A2 640 739 
1R3 732 839 
Radio France 433 569 
In the above table the companies' estimates were based on the 
projected budget for the equivalent sectors-of the ORTE for 1975" 
Even if-to the government figures were added -the -revenue-the- companies- 
could hope to-make-from-commercial--sales and--payments from government 
ministries for--programmes broadcast--at their request, the difference 
between-the two sets of estimates was still enormous: over 160 
million francs in the-case--of-TF1, -- 90 million-francs 
in the case of 
A2, over 100 million francs in the -case-of-FR3-and-90million-francs 
log. La-Croix, January_71975- 
According to Rossi the company estimates of their financial re- 
quirements-were the following: TFl - 698 million francs, A2 - 
637 
million francs, FR3_- 876 million francs and Radio France - 570 
million--francs. -- 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1974-1975, no. 
1230, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet de loi de finances pour 1975, annexe no. 48, ORTF, 
rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la 
seance du 11 octobre 1974, p. 33. 
Figures from different sources are unfortunately not always com- 
parable. However, whatever the differences may be between 
individual figures, there can be no doubt that a serious difference 
of opinion existed between Rossi on the one hand and the companies 
on the other with regard to their financial needs for 1975. 
a67. - 
in the case of Radio France. 
110 
I 
The Government's prime role in producing this alarming situation 
was apparent. The cost of the licence had been increased in July 
1974 to 140 francs instead of the 150 francs asked for by the last 
PDG of the ORTF. As a result, the new companies effectively lost 
around 170 million francs in revenue from both the licence and 
commercial advertising. Moreover, revenue from the licence was still 
subject to VAT despite a contrary recommendation made by the Chinaud 
report. 
ill The Chinaud committee had estimated that the imposition of 
VAT on the licence fee resulted in a net loss to the state broadcasting 
services of over 50 million francs zer annum. 
The break-up-of the unitary structure of the ORTF had itself led 
to short-term costs and =the -companies-feared that it might inV6lve 
long-term costs as well-since certain-services which had been central- 
ised at the ORTF would- have to be reconstituted in each of the new 
companies. In addition, since the rise in prices during 1974 had 
been greater than forecast, the estimites were already out of date 
and it was though that another 150 million francs would be required 
just to take account of the rate of inflation. 
In reply to -these points-Rossi asserted. =that--to-the -projected. ------ 
revenueof-the companies-of 21-59.5-million francs-should-be-added-100- 
million- francs owed to the ORTF by --its --creditors in excess of the -- 
money owed by the Office in payment of its debts. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the new companies had received substantial programme 
stocks from the defunct ORTF amounting to 1,700 hours of programmes 
110. Le Monde, January 22 1975. Jullian himself estimated that the 
shortfall in the case of A2 amounted to 70 million francs. 
Le Monde, December 22-23 1974. 
111. Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 163-165. 
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valued at 320 million francs. In addition, the Government announced 
in late 1974 that-the new companies could make certain savings, notably 
by not extending the length of viewing time, which would bring the 
difference between the Government's estimates and those of the 
companies to under 200 million francs instead of the original figure 
of over 450 million francs. 
112 
Nonetheless, the plight of the new companies was all too 
apparent. The two major television companies, TF1 and A2, would 
have been in a more advantageous position if they had been allowed 
to produce more programmes by themselves or if they had been permitted 
to place -orders-with-private production companies as and when 
they 
wished: --However, --because-of-the enforced-relationship. 
between the 
programme companies on the one hand and the transmission-company, 
the production company and the. -archive-and research institute on the 
other, the programme companies were mpelled by- h it ca1t rs`des 
charges. to__make _use_ of- : 
the services -of the other three companies 
and to-pay , them- accordingly.. -... . 
During 1975 the production--company-was--guaranteed-90% of its 
costs to be met by the television companies, which were thus compelled 
against their--own commercial interests to subsidise the production 
company and-prevent its going --bankrupt. ---The production company 
took 
advantage of this de facto monopoly position to increase its prices 
by 35%. 
113 During 1975 the amount paid by the four programme companies 
112. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblge Nationale, 1974-1975, no. 
1230, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur. le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1975, annexe no. 48, ORTF, rapport- 
eur sp&cial: Joel Le Tac, annexe au prods-verbal de la seance du 
11 octobre 1974, p. 12. 
113. L'Express, no. 1220, November 25-December 1 1974. 
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for the services of the other three companies was as%follows: 
114 
Mandatory expenditure (in millions of francs) 
Paid by: Paid to: 
TDF SFP INA 
TF1 151 242 17 
A2 210 209 14 
Y23 134 19 17 
RF 120 - 9 
In the case of TFl and A2 well over half of their projected 
income was to be paid out in the form of mandatory expenditure to 
TDF, INA and the SFP, though this did not even ensure the financial 
stability of these three companies during 1975. The Government 
controlled-the -total amount-to--be devoted--to-: the-state broadcasting- 
services, -as well as--each-company's individual-allocation. - Consequent- 
ly, while there was--A -high measure-of 
disagreement-among the . separate 
companies over the-amount each=-should pay to-the-others-1-the fundament-- 
al source of-the-problem was the inadequacy of resources devoted to 
the state broadcasting services in toto by the Government. 
During 1975 the complaints made by the broadcasting companies 
in late 1974 were largely-substantiated. -its a result, 
the Government 
was obliged to step in to paper over the cracks which the hastily 
constructed-edifice was nay--revealing. In the spring of 1975 the 
Government intervened to increase the total amount of financial 
resources available to the new broadcasting companies from 2,595 
million francs to 2,701 million francs. 
114. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1975-1976, no. 
19169 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet de loi de finances pour 1976, annexe no. 48, Radio- 
diffusion et t4ldvision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe 
au procýs-verbal de la seance du 10 octobre 1975, p. 18. 
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This increase was the result of various minor policy decisions. 
First, the amount of revenue that TF1 and A2 were allowed to receive 
from commercial advertising was raised from the original figure of 
640 to 690 million francs. The Government succeeded in increasing 
the total by 50 million francs by reinterpreting the provisions 
of the 1974 broadcasting statute so that the cost of collecting the 
licence revenue was now included in the total amount of revenue on 
which the permitted 25% quota was based. 
115 TF1 was now allowed 
to receive 410 million francs instead of 400 and A2 280 million francs 
instead of 240.116 
Secondly, the amount of income from sources other than the 
licence and-commercial-advertising, such as payment-by government 
- ministries for programmes- broadcast--at-their request, -was increased - 
from 182 to 198 million francs. The Ministry of Culture agreed to 
take over the management-of three of: --the -former ORTF-orehestras 
from-Radio-France, though only from-1976-onwards. Finally, the new 
companies were allowed to borrow a total of 4+0 million francs to 
help cover their expenditure-costs. 
117 
These steps among others enabled the companies to survive the 
early months of their first year of operation without a major financial 
crisis. However, the fact that within such a short space of time after 
115. Under the terms--of-article 22 of the 1974 broadcasting statute- 
revenue from commercial advertising could not exceed 25% of the 
total income of all the companies put together, excluding the 
production company. Since 1975 the cost of collecting the 
licence revenue has been included in this total on which the 
permitted maximum of advertising revenue is based. 
116. In fact, neither of the two companies attained this higher figure, 
with TF1 falling short by 10 million francs and A2 by 30 million 
francs. Le Monde, March 14-15 1976. 
117. Journal Officiel, Documents S4nat, 1975-1976, no. 62, Rapport 
gn ral fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1976, Tome III, annexe no. 46, Radio- 
diffusion et tel6vision, rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, annexe 
au proces-verbal de la s6ance du 20 novembre 1975, pp. 29-36. 
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the break-up of the ORTF the Government was obliged to take these 
supplementary measures at all was evidence that the fears expressed 
at the end of 1974 regarding the companies' budgetary allocations 
were well founded, as Arnaud himself freely admitted. 
118 
In any case even the increase in resources did not obviate the 
need for substantial savings on the part of the programme companies 
during 1975. Critics, including the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel 
and the Quality Committee pointed to the increase in the number of 
cheap programmes such as foreign series and films and the frequency 
of repeats. 
119 
A cut in the projected extension of viewing time was 
also made by the programme companies. Radio France, for example, 
had to abandon certain new-programming projects--and the-purchase of 
new equipment- To -'supplementits_ 
income A2-proposed to-hire-out-its 
equipmentand-screen-time-to private industrial=cui; yanies-which might 
wish to make use of the services of a television chännel in the 
morning when normally the screen was blank. The idea was that the 
companies would use-their screen--time to diffuse--Information to 
their management and staff in-Paris and the provinces. However, the 
scheme was vetoed by the Government who decided that it would be in 
contradiction with-the public service character of-the television-- 
company as defined in its cahier des charges. 
120 Thus, it was 
thanks mainly to cutbacks in projected expenditure coupled with 
certain adjustments in government policy, that by the end of their 
first year of operation the new companies, with the exception of the 
118. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 13 1979- 
3.19. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
120. See L' ress, March 10 1975. 
A similar proposal was put forward in 1979 by Jean Frydman but 
was rejected by the Conseil d'Etat as it infringed the state 
broadcasting monopoly. See Le Nouvel Observateur, April 30 1979 
and Le Matin, August 4 1979. 
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production company, had established themselves on a reasonably 
sound financial footing. 
lb 
Nonetheless, the precarious financial position of the broad- 
casting companies throughout 1975, and particularly in the early 
months, revealed the importance of the Government's power to fix 
the cost of the licence and, in so doing, to control the total 
amount of financial resources allocated to the state broadcasting 
services. The only source of income not subject to control by 
the Government was that gained through sales of programmes to 
foreign television companies and other commercial spin-offs. This 
represented only a tiny fraction of the companies' total income. Nor 
was this financial-control-confined to-the changeover period from 
the ORTF to--the new-structure. As we shall see in a later chapter, 
the Government's-power to--fix-the cost-of-the -licence-- is -only -one of---- 
a set of financial controls linking -the. -broadcast 
ing_companies to the 
Government. 121 
Conclusion - 
The objective of this chapter was to describe and analyse certain 
aspects-of the-liquidation-of-the-ORTF which took-place-in--the autumn 
of 1974. Two main points have emerged from this analysis. ---'The first 
concerns the adverse consequences which resulted from the break-up 
of the ORTF, notably the chaos of the transitional period. Marcel 
Jullian summed up his impressions of this chaos in the following 
manner: 
"I know scarcely any company which was going to be granted 
an important budget and which comprised nearly eight hundred 
staff set up in conditions as bewildering (ahurissantes) as 
121. See chapter on Finance. 
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those which surrounded our launching. The establishment 
(of A2) resembled that of the provisional government of 
Bordeaux more than of a national television company. " 122 
Nor were the consequences of the liquidation of the Office purely 
short term. For example, certain sectors of the ORTF such as the 
external services were particularly badly affected by the reorganisat- 
ion and have never recovered the position they enjoyed at the ORTF. 
Moreover, the liquidation of the Office had still not been finally 
completed more than three years after the reform had been put into 
effect. Thus, in its 1978 report the Cour des Comptes commented: 
"... three years after this important reform, the liquidation, 
the cost of which cannot be exactly known, is not yet complete, 
and the new companies have been unable to draw up a financial 
statement of their assets-and liabilities at-the start of-their 
operations ... " 123 
The second--point--to-emerge-is-the-role-played In this transition- - 
al period and - since 
by the minister --. with responsibility for broad- 
ca, _Since 
1975_ this-_role has been limited to -tire supervision- 
policy formulated elsewhere, most notably at the Elysge. - During-late 
1974 this supervisory role-was. nonetheless-quite -important. - Though- 
not responsible for -drafting the reform, Rossi -and his entourage-were- 
responsible for its implementation. - 
In. this chapter-we=have concent- 
rated -particularly on two aspects of this role, namely--the drafting 
of the companies' cahiers-des charges and the-allocation--of their 
budgets for 1975. In the following chapter we shall examine another 
crucial aspect of the Government's role in this changeover period: 
the appointment of top managerial and editorial personnel in the new 
companies. 
122. M. Jullian, Ulit de vagabondage, Paris, Grasset, 1978, p. 127. 
123. Cour des Comptes, Rapport au President de la Republique suivi 
des r4ponses des administrations, Paris, Journaux Officiels, 
1978, document no. 5025, p. 25. 
CHAPTER 5 
Appointments 
Political appointments to the key decision-making posts in the state 
broadcasting services represent a long-standing practice whose origins 
can be traced back before the foundation of the Fifth Republic. The 
object of this chapter is to describe and analyse the nature and extent 
of government intervention in the appointments process to the major posts 
in the state broadcasting companies set up after the dismantling of the 
ORTF. After a brief historical introduction on political appointments 
at the ORTF, we shall examine the appointments made in the autumn of 
1974 at the time of the reorganisation and also subsequent appointments 
made in the first five years of the new companies' existence. Two 
sections will be devoted to managerial appointments and another to the 
politically contentious area of news appointments. Another section will 
consider the question of whether there exists a pattern of Giscardian 
appointments in the French broadcasting media. Finally, we shall look 
at the composition and functions of the boards of governors of the 
separate broadcasting companies. 
Three main themes emerge from this study of broadcasting appointments. 
First, the key managerial and editorial posts in the state broadcasting 
services have remained highly politicised, particularly in the news 
departments. Secondly, for both professional and political reasons the 
appointments made in 1974 marked less of a break with the past than 
one might have reasonably expected given the incoming Government's pro- 
fessed commitment to change. Finally, while in 1974 appointments to 
the key broadcasting posts reflected the balance of forces in the 
governing coalition, after Chirac's resignation from the premiership 
in August 1976 Gaullist sympathisers of the Chiracian tendency were 
gradually ousted and replaced by persons of a more Giscardian outlook. 
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Appointments at the ORTF 
Historically one of the most important powers which the French 
government has exercised in the field of broadcasting has been the 
power of appointment. Used by the Socialists and Christian Democrats 
among others during the Fourth Republic to install political sympathisers 
in the key decision-making posts of the RTF, the power of appointment 
was then used by the Gaullists at the start of the Fifth Republic to 
colonise the state broadcasting services at a time when television was 
only just starting to reach a mass audience in France. 
l 
This colonisation became particularly intense after the passing 
of the 1964 statute which marked the establishment of the ORTF. The 
Minister of Information at the time, Peyrefitte, who had been personally 
responsible for the drafting of the new broadcasting statute, placed 
several members of his ministerial cabinet in positions of responsibility 
at the ORTF and was generally responsible for all important appointments. 
The "Peyrefitte clan", as this group of appointments came to be called, 
was merely one example of the Gaullist domination of ministerial, 
administrative and para-administrative posts in the so-called Gaullist 
state. 
2 
1. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 1974 
reform. 
2. Members of the "Peyrefitte clan" included Jean-Jacques de Bresson, 
director of Peyrefitte's cabinet at the Ministry of Information and 
then director general of the ORTF (1968-1972); Claude Contamine, 
director of Peyrefitte's cabinet (1962-1964), head of television 
(1964-1967) and deputy director general of the ORTF and director 
of the ORTF's external services (1973-1974); Jacques Thibau, 
deputy director of Peyrefitte's cabinet and then deputy head of 
television (1965-1968); Georges Riou, technical adviser in 
Peyrefitte's cabinet and head of the ORTF's general administration 
(1964-1969); Claude Lemoine, a member of Peyrefitte's cabinet until 
1966 and appointed head of the ORTF's public relations in 1968; 
Bernard Gouley, member of Peyrefitte's cabinet (1962-1964) and 
then placed in charge of the ORTF's regional network (1964-1970), 
a post later occupied by Lemoine; Jean Castarede, charge de mission 
in Peyrefitte's cabinet (1962-1965) and then director of de Bresson's 
cabinet at the ORTF from 1970 to 1972. Andre Astoux, though not a 
member of Peyrefitte's cabinet, was appointed by Peyrefitte as 
deputy director general of the ORTF in 1964. 
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The reform introduced by Chaban-Delmas in 1969 as part of his 
New Society project did little to modify this practice of political 
appointments, There were two reasons why this was the case. First, 
the 1969 reform did not affect the whole of the ORTF. It was restricted 
to the news departments of the two television channels with the result 
that the other decision-making posts, including that of director general 
of the Office, were not touched by the reform. Secondly, even though 
the reform of the ORTF's news services was intended to cut the umbilical 
cord linking the Government on the one hand with the ORTF on the other, 
before the reorganised news departments could begin functioning new 
directors of news had to be chosen. Since the top management of 
the ORTF was unaffected by the 1969 reorganisation and as the reform 
was the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister, the appointment 
of the new directors of news could not be entrusted to the ORTF manage- 
ment but had to-come from -the- Prime Minister himself. The4irector 
of news on channel one, Desgraupes, was rightly viewed as the personal 
appointment of Chaban Delmas and-his-hold over his-post came--to depend 
on the latter's tenure of the premiership. As we have seen, when 
Chaban-Delmas was dismissed from the premiership in July 1972, Desgraupes 
lost his post immediately afterwards with the winding-up of the Chaban- 
Delmas experiment. 
3 
2. Some of the above have also occupied key posts in the new broad- 
(cont. ) casting-companies: Contamine--was-appointed President_Directeur 
General of FR3 (l975-_______ ); Riou became financial and administrat- 
ive director of TF1 in 1975 and was promoted to the post of deputy 
director general in 1978; Lemoine retained the post he had held 
since 1972 as head of the regional network; and Gouley, after two 
and a half years in charge of public relations at TDF, was 
appointed head of the regional station Paris-Normandie-Centre 
in October 1977. 
For more information on the Peyrefitte appointments see 
J. Montaldo, Tous coupables, Paris, Albin Michel, 1974, pp. 144-155; 
C. Durieux, La Tel cratie, Paris, Tema, 1976, pp. 47-52; and 
A. Astoux, Ondes de choc, Paris, Plon, 1978, pp. 15-25" 
3, See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 
1974 reform. 
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The appointment of Conte as President Directeur General of the 
ORTF in July 1972 was the personal choice of President Pompidou who 
wished to assert his authority over the ORTF by bringing it into the 
presidential sector of policy-making. However, as we have seen, this 
attempt proved abortive because Conte sought to use the ORTF as an 
independent political power base, thereby cutting himself off from the 
presidential fold. 
Up until the 1974 reform therefore, and it hardly seems necessary 
to labour the point, the system of political appointments to the key 
broadcasting posts was well entrenched. From 1964 to 1969 and again 
from 1972 to 1974 those appointed were meant to act as the transmission 
belts for-the smooth execution of government policy within the state 
broadcasting services. Even between 1969 and 1972, when Chaban-Delmas's 
policy was intended to grant a high degree of independence to the ORTF 
news departments, the source of the appointment of the directors of 
news remained political. It was-this system of--political appointments, 
particularly-in-the -field of news, -that according 
to--government-spokes- 
men the-1974--reorganization was intended-to stop. 
The heads of the new broadcasting companies . 
From the above-short historical introduction it is clear that the 
term "political-appointment"-requires some form of definition. - Other- 
wise the term can be stretched to cover a variety of cases which are 
in fact of a quite different order. As used in this chapter the term 
"political appointment "involves four distinct though interrelated facets: 
the legal right of appointment granted to the Government, the legal right 
of dismissal, the source of the appointment in practice and most import- 
antly the practice of appointment with regard to the political loyalties 
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of those appointed with the aim of ensuring a politically sympathetic 
management. It is only if this last criterion is satisfied that we 
shall use the term "partisan political appointment. " For example, 
the choice of Conte'as President Directeur Gengral of the ORTF in 1972 
was undoubtedly a partisan political appointment. On the other hand, 
the choice of Desgraupes in 1969 as head of news on channel one 
appears not to have been a partisan political appointment because 
he was not expected afterwards to serve the interests of the Government. 
By the terms of the 1974 legislation the Government's legal right 
of appointment in the broadcasting companies is quite limited. In 
the case of the transmission company the Government has the right to 
appoint the chairman of the board o1 governors, bRif the members- of- the 
board, and the director general. 
4 
In the-case--of the four programme 
companies. -the Government -appoints the chairman of the board of governors, 
who in fact also -usuallyperforms the function of director general of 
the company, 
-and 
two of-the-six governors including the chairman. 
5- 
As for the production company the'hppointment of the chairman and, 
if there is one, of the director general are-submitted for the - 
approval of the Prime Minister or a minister appointed by him for 
this purpose. "6 Finally, with regard to the archive and research 
institute the Government-has-the right to -appoint the chairman of the 
governing board, ten of -the-twenty -twogovernors and, on the proposal 
of the chairman, the director general.? 
4.1974 broadcasting statute, article 5. 
5. Ibid, article 11. 
6. Ibid, article 13. 
7. Journal Officiel Lois et D4crets, decree no. 74-946 of November 14 
197T. - 97 , articles 3,11 and 13. 
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Apart from these appointments the Government has no legal 
right to appoint persons to other posts in the broadcasting companies. 
For example, the chairmen of the four programme companies are theoretic- 
ally responsible for the choice of their own managerial staff. 
8 
In 
practice, however, as we shall see in the following section, the 
Government intervened, particularly in the case of the newcomer to 
broadcasting, Marcel Jullian, to impose alongside the chairman persons 
on whom it considered it could rely to maintain the stability of the 
company. 
The 1974 broadcasting statute guaranteed the chairmen of the new 
companies (with the exception of the production company where no 
such provision is specifically mentioned in the statute)-a minimum 
three year term in office. Paradoxically-while the 1964 ORTF statute 
had not guaranteed the director general-a fixed term of--office, in 
fact between 1964 and 1972 there were only two appointments to this 
post. 
9 On the other hand though -the-1972- ORTF. statute guaranteed- 
the-PrSsident -Directeur General-a-three year--term- of-office, --neither- 
of the last two PDGs had-occupied=the-post for anywhere near the 
statutory minimum term. 
10= The-three 
-year-- security _of_ 
tenure-introduced 
in the 1972 ORTF statute was reproduced in the 1974 legislation as 
evidence of the Government's intention to grant the new-companies-a 
large measure-of autonomy. 
8.1974 broadcasting statute, article 11. 
9. Jacques Bernard Dupont (1964-1968) and Jean-Jacques de Bresson (1968-1972). 
10. Conte was spectacularly dismissed by Pompidou barely fifteen months 
after being appointed, while Long who succeeded Conte in October 
1973 remained at the head of the ORTF until its break-up in 
January 1975. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France 
before the 1974 reform. 
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In fact all the chairmen of the new companies appointed in late 
1974 did fulfil their three year term in marked contrast to their 
immediate predecessors at the ORTF. However, at the end of this 
period in December 1977 the Government demonstrated that its power to 
terminate or renew the appointment was by no means an insignificant 
sanction, since not only can the threat of non-renewal of contract have 
a restraining influence on the conduct of a chairman in office, but if 
employed against a holder of the post it can also provide a salutory 
lesson for future incumbents. At TF1 Jean Cazeneuve was replaced 
by his director general, Jean-Louis Guillaud, who had in fact been 
responsible for the running of the company during the previous three 
years. Guillaud's promotion was made in recognition of-his efforts in 
keeping TF1 stable and in the knowledge that in the-crucial period 
prior to-the 1978 legislative elections he-could be relied-On to 
keep a firm control of TF1. - 
The-appointment--of-Maurice Ulrich in December 1977-to-succeed 
Jullian-at-the head-of-A2 was a change of a completely different nature. 
A2 had- set-out to -be 
_the_most 
_imaginative _of 
the three television 
companies, the most open to new ideas and personalities. For example, 
it was A2-who-tried to-persuade Jean-Paul--Sartre--to-give-a-series of 
programmes on French-history. In many ways A2 in 1975 exemplified- 
the hopes -and aspirations -of-the new -Giscardian -regime with--its -- - 
professed beliefs in change. The reality of the first three, years had 
proved, however, to be extremely disappointing. Along with the other 
television companies A2 had been severely criticised by President 
Giscard d'Estaing in 1976 for its lack of creative programming. 
ll In 
addition it had suffered from a series of minor scandals and rumours, 
U. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
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ranging from unfulfilled promises about new programmes to the threat 
of being hived off to commercial interests. The apparent instability 
of the company made it an easy target for parliamentary criticism, 
including the familiar Gaullist complaint that the company's news 
coverage was too sympathetic to the left-wing opposition. 
Unlike Cazeneuve at TF1, Jullian had in 1975 personally taken 
on the task of running the company. The result of the criticism 
directed against A2 was the evaporation of the Government's confidence 
in Jullian's ability to manage the company and consequently the non- 
renewal of his contract. Since Jullian was the programme company 
chairman who best personified the electoral promise of change, the 
non-renewal- of -his contract-in=December 1977 marked a major failure 
for the Giscardiari broadcasting reform. 
Since the Government had the legal right to appoint the chairmen 
of the new-broadcasting companies, t- goes -without saying 
that the 
source -of-these appointments 
in practice was governmental. To be more 
precise, the choice of the seven chairmen of the new companies was made 
in the autumn of 1974 by Giscard d'Estaing personally with the advice 
among others of his deputy general secretary Cannac. 
12 
Finally, and most - 
importantly, the. appointment -of -the : chairmen 
of the separate companies-took into-account--the political-sympathies 
of those appointed. In the context of French politics it is axiomatic 
that the heads of the state broadcasting services cannot come from the 
ranks of the opposition. The 1974 reform proved no exception to this 
iron law. 
13 The political criteria which were most relevant in late 
12. For the circumstances of Jullian's appointment see M. Jullian, 
Delit de Vagabondage, Paris, Grasset, 1978, pp. 28-35. Interview 
with Marcel Jullian, September 19,1979- 
13- There is no reason to suspect that if the Union of the Left had come 
to power in 1978 this practice would have been discontinued. 
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1974 were, first, that individually the new heads should be sympathetic 
to the Giscardian regime and, secondly, that collectively they should 
reflect the heterogeneity of the new President's parliamentary majority 
and particularly his dependence on Gaullist party support. 
14 
The appointment of Jullian (A2) and of Jean-Charles Edeline (SFP) 
reflected Giscard d'Estaing's commitment to change which had been the 
major plank of his presidential election campaign. 
15 Claude Contamine 
(FR3) and Jacqueline Baudrier (Radio France) were on the other hand, 
Gaullist sympathisers. 
16 Pierre Emmanuel, the head of the archive 
and research institute, was also a Gaullistl7 Cazeneuve (TF1) is more 
difficult to place in this balance of political forces, but in any case 
he was merely a figurehead at TF1 and left the running of the company to 
his director general, Guillaud, another-well known Gaullist. sympathiser. 
18 
14. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. Political balance 
at the top of the broadcasting services is a recognised feature of 
both the West German and the Italian state broadcasting organisations. 
See A. Smith, The Shadow in the Cave, London, Quartet, 1976, p. 68 
and R. -Faenza,. The Radio Phenomenon in Italy, Council of 
Europe, 
Ccc/DC (76) 93-E, 1977, p. l. 
15. Jullian was-a--well-known literary figure-and-an intellectual-from 
the world of culture. -- Edeline had been responsible 
for the 
denationalisation-of-the state -cinema -company -and- had turned At into 
a profitable concern. He personified the liberal Giscardian ideology 
of belief in free-enterprise. 
16. Contamine-had been- a -member of Michel Debre's_ministerial cabinet 
from 1959 to 1962 befo-re joining Peyrefitte's cabinet., Baudrier had 
distinguished herself during the 1968 strike at ht e_C TF_by-main- 
taining a news service -despite strong opposition 
from-the-majority 
of her news staff. 
17. Emmanual was appointed to the political council (conseil politique) 
of the RPR in November 1979. Le Monde, November 11-12,1979" 
18. Former research director at the Centre national de la recherche 
scientifique (CNRS), Cazeneuve was a former governor of the ORTF 
and chairman of the Office's programme committee. A well-known 
sociologist and writer on the mass media, Cazeneuve was appointed 
permanent French representative at the Council of Europe in Stras- 
bourg after leaving TF1 at the end of 1977. Guillaud had 
entered the RTF in 1963 after a career in journalism, establishing 
his Gaullist political credentials as editor of television news 
between 1963 and 1968. Refusing to participate in the journalists' 
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The political sympathies of the chairmen of the new broadcasting 
companies played a primordial role in their appointment. The second 
factor to be taken into account was their professional expertise. 
Contamine and Baudrier had both held top managerial posts at the 
ORTF. 
19 Cazeneuve and the new chairman of TDF, Jean Autin, had both 
been members of the ORTF's board of governors. Finally, while none 
of the other three company chairmen had had previous experience in 
broadcasting management, they had all proved their ability in adjacent 
fields. 
20 Thus four out of the seven company chairmen had worked in 
some administrative capacity at the ORTF. This was in marked contrast 
to the practice at the ORTF where none of the Office's four director 
generals had had previous administrative experience in broadcasting 
before their appointment. 
18. (Cont. ) strike at -the ORTF-in 1968, he had instead become a leading 
memberof a civic action committee_p_ledged to defend-the 
Republic and _to_work -for. _the -removal 
from their posts of those 
journalists-who had-supported the strike. As a -reward for 
his loyal efforts he was promoted to the post of deputy head 
of television news in August 1968 at the time of the purging 
of the -ORTF 
journalists 
-and- was then appointed 
head--of tele- 
vision-news in -January--1969, a-post-he held-until)-the reform 
of the. -DRTF-news-departments-in -Sept 
ember-1969_by Chaban- 
Delman. A member of -President-Pompidou' s-general secretariat 
from 1969_to-1972, -Guillaud-was -responsible-for coordinating 
the preparatory-studies-prior to the establishment of the 
ORTF's third channel. ---The successful completion 
of this 
task led-to -his--appointment in 1972 as director of channel 
three, -a post he held- until the-break-up of the ORTF. ' 
19. -Contamine-had -been -head -of-television -_at_the-URTF-from-1964 
to 1967. 
Returning-to the 
-ORTF-in 
1972, he occupied-#he--posts_-Df-deputy--- 
director-general--and- director-of -the"-external=services. ----- Baudrier had--entered the RTF-as B journalist-in 1948. She had been 
appointed editor of radio news in-1963 and then deputy director of 
radio in charge of news in-1968. --In-. 
October-1969 -she worked 
in 
television for the first time as director of the news dgpartment of 
channel two. After the passing of the 1972 statute she was promoted 
to the post of director of channel one until the break-up of the 
ORTF in 1974. 
After Guillaud's appointment as chairman of TFl in December 1977, 
three of the four programme companies (TF1, FR3 and Radio France) 
were all run by people who had had long managerial experience at 
the ORTF. 
20. Edeline had been head of the cinema chain Union Generale Cinemato- 
. graphigue from 1971 to 1974. 
Jullian had been head of various publishing companies including 
Plon and Julliard, as well as having produced several television 
programmes. 
Emmanuel had worked for the French radio service from 1948 to 1958 and was a prominent author and cultural figure. 
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The change in emphasis towards the appointment at the head of 
the new companies of people with professional broadcasting experience 
was accompanied by a move away from the practice of choosing top civil 
servants to occupy the top post in the state broadcasting services. At 
the time of the ORTF and before, the post of director general had usually 
been held by a top civil servant. Partly this was due to the historical 
origins of French broadcasting, whereby the radio service had been 
attached to the Ministry of Posts and thus formed part of the French 
administration. While the legal status of the broadcasting services 
had been altered in 1959, the tradition of appointing top civil 
21 
servants to the post of director general had continued. However, of 
the seven- broadcasting -companies- set--up in 1974-7,5 only two were headed 
by former civil servants. 
22 
_=__- 
If this move away from appointing-former-civil-servants-to-the-top 
broadcasting -posts was ' intended'by_the_Government_as_an_integral_aspect 
of the 1974 reorganisation, however, then it_. basmanifestly_failed-to_ 
live up to expectations. Even in 1974 while-only-one-programme-company--- 
was headed -by a 
former -top civil servant -(Contamine --at 
FR3), -the other 
three programme companies all had -at 
least one. former__top_civil-servant- 
u. Three of the four heads of the_ ORTF between--1964 and-1971+ had-been 
top civil servants: --Dupont -_(1964=29-68), 
- de Bresson- (1968-1972) 
and Long_(1973-1974). Only Conte--(1972-1973) came from a political 
rather than an administrative background. 
22. Contamine (FR3) was a graduate of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, 
while Autin (TDF) was a graduate of the Ecole Nationale de la France 
d'outre-mer. 
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in a key managerial post. 
23 Even more revealingly, by the end 
of 1979 five out of the seven broadcasting companies had as their 
chairmen former top civil servants. 
24 
The chairmen of the broadcasting companies chosen in late 
1974 were almost without exception partisan political appointments. 
By the terms of the 1974 statute the Government had the legal 
right of appointment to the top post in each company and the 
right of dismissal after a period of three years. The source 
of these appointments in practice was presidential since Giscard 
d'Estaing personally supervised the appointments to these posts. 
Furthermore, the appointments were made with-the political 
23. These included: Xavier-Iarere, -director-of A2; 
Noel. 
-Sanviti, director_oL the administrative and -- financial-services of-FR3; Gabriel de Broglie, --- director of the administrative and financial-- 
services of Radio France; and Georges Riou, director 
of the administrative and--financial--services-of-TF1. 
Larere, Sanviti and de Broglie were all graduates 
of ENA, --while-Riou had been an administrator in 
various government services. 
24. FR3 and TDF were still headed by Contamine and Autin 
respectively. Jullian-was=replaced. _as chairman of-7A2-- in December 1977 by-Ulrich, who had graduated from the 
Ecole Nationale de la -France=d'autre-mer and-had-been-the - ---- --head-of the -cabinet-of two--Ministers-of--Foreign Affairs, ---- 
Jean Sauvagnargues and Louis de Guiringaud. Edeline was. 
replaced at the head of the SFP at the beginning of 1979 
by Antoine de Clermont-Tonnerre, a member of Rossi's 
cabinet in 1974 and responsible for supervising the 
implementation of the 1974 broadcasting reform. 
Emmanuel was replaced at the head of INA by de Broglie in 
May 1979" 
If one remembers that Guillaud who replaced Cazeneuve at the 
head of TF1 in December 1977 had been a member of Pompidou's 
cabinet, by 1979 Baudrier was the only company chairman who 
had not held a politico-administrative post prior to appointment 
at the head of a broadcasting company. 
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sympathies of those appointed very much in mind. At 
the head of the programme companies only Jullian was an 
unknown political quantity and he barely survived the 
guaranteed three year term. 
25 The 1974 reorganisation 
of broadcasting did little, therefore, at the level of the 
company chairmen to modify the system of partisan political 
appointments which had been in evidence since the foundation 
of the Fifth Republic and before. 
Nor was the reform a radical break with the past in terms 
of the professional background of those appointed. Four out 
of the seven company chairmen appointed in 1974 had been 
associated in one form or another with the discredited ORTF. By 
1979 this figure-had increased to five out-of seven. __Moreover,.. __ 
the shift . away--from the --appointment- of former-- top -civil servants------ 
to the töp-broadcastingposts which was apparent An-1974 had-- 
by 1979 been abandoned. 
The appointment of key managerial staff in the new companies 
While at TDF the- Government -was- legally---entitled == -- 
to appoint_both the chairman of. the board of_governors_ 
and the director general of the company, - in the four 
programme companies the newly appointed company chairmen were 
25. Cazeneuve, the chairman of TF1, was also a political unknown. 
However, unlike Jullian at A2, Cazeneuve allowed Guillaud as 
director general to assume responsibility for the everyday 
running of the company. 
-187- 
given statutory freedom to appoint the other members of the management. 
By the terms of article 11 of the 1974 broadcasting statute the Government 
had no legal right of appointment to these posts, nor did it claim any 
such power in practice. In fact, however, the much vaunted autonomy 
of the chairmen was belied by the advice and pressure exerted on them 
from ministerial sources including Rossi's cabinet, the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of the Interior. 
For example, at FR3 Contamine chose his own team which was then 
submitted to Rossi for his approval. 
26 At Radio France Baudrier "was 
advised to take Gabriel de Broglie" as director of the administrative 
and financial services. 
27 At TF1 Guillaud's appointment as director 
general was made at the-behest of the--Prime Minister, Chirac. 
28 
Guillaud's practical managerial experience at the ORTF, not to mention 
his solid Gaullist credentials, was regarded-as-the necessary complement 
to the rather academic background of the company chairman, Cazeneuve. 
Similarly at A2 Xavier Iarere's appointment as director showed the 
Government's- intent-to- preserve-managerial--continuity- -with--the . 
4efunct 
ORTF. 29 In contrast to Jullian, barere was a proven administrator in-- 
both the political and broadcasting fields. As Jullian-admitted himself, 
Iarere-was appointed-at-the request-of the Government. 
26. Interviews with-Harceau Long, --July- 10_1979 and--Ber-trand--Cousin, July 11 1979. 
27. Interview with Marceau Long, July-10 1979. 
28. Le Canard Enchafng, August 21 1974. 
29. A graduate of ENA, Iarere had been an adviser in two government 
departments before entering the ORTF in 1964 as technical adviser 
to the director general. From 1968 to 1969 he had been head of the 
director general's cabinet, before being placed in charge of the 
coordination of the two television channels (1970-1972). Head of 
the production services from 1972 to 1973, his last post before the 
break-up of the ORTF had been as head of the television programme 
purchases department. 
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"I was told by Rossi the three people I had to take as my 
directors. Baudrier and Contamine knew the ORTF. I didn't. 
Prior to January 1975 I did not know personally the people chosen 
as my directors. For me the experience was an adventure. Therefore, 
I accepted all the restrictions without really thinking about them. 
I accepted the three directors too quickly. But the names of the 
directors of all the programme companies were to be announced to 
the press simultaneously. Therefore, I could not really have 
delayed. Larere, Jammot and Marque were suggested to me by the 
Government. ... " 30. 
At both TF1 and A2, therefore, the official second in command in the 
company's hierarchy was a man politically acceptable to the Government, 
with politico-administrative experience in ministerial cabinets and 
managerial experience at the ORTF. 
Once the chairman and his immediate subordinate had been selected 
there appears to be little evidence of -ministerial- intervention in the 
appointments - process, _with the . notable exception of 
the top posts in the 
news departments. Partly-this was attributable to the Government's 
confidence in the company chairman and his director or director general 
to fill the lower managerial posts with people who were not politically - 
antipathetic . 
to 
-the-new_ regime: -It-was- also-due--to-the -decreased - 
political sensitivity of these secondary appointments. The lower 
down 
the company- hierarchy- one goes, --the. less important political criteria 
become, with more emphasis being placed on technical competence reinforced 
by personal acquaintance. In the other managerial hosts-apart-from-those 
of the chairman-and director/director-general, --therefore, --the 
important- 
considerations-were the- appointee'sprofessional experience at 
the ORTF 
and the personal contacts he had managed to build up there. 
At TF1, for example, Georges Riou was appointed director of the 
administrative and financial services. A member of the "Peyrefitte clan", 
Riou had since 1964 been employed in managerial posts at the ORTF. He was 
30. Interview with Marcel Jullian, September 19 1979" See also M. Jullian, 
op. cit"" Pp. 129-134. 
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therefore well-known to Guillaud and it was on his recommendation that 
Riou was brought to TF1.31 TFl's organisational structure was based on 
a tripartite vertical division of responsibilities: programming - Guillaud, 
administration - Riou and news - Henri Marque, with Guillaud in overall 
charge. 
32 
The internal organisation of A2 was more flexible. Jullian refused 
to create a separate post of director general as Cazeneuve had done at 
TF1. Rarere was given charge of the company's financial administration. 
As far as programming was concerned Jullian preferred to appoint a 
personal adviser and to establish a programme committee which would be 
responsible for the company's programme scheduling. Jacques Chancel 
was chosen by Jullian_to be his personal adviser. A well-known radio 
and television-producer at the ORTF; Chancel was a personal friend of 
Jullian-and had already worked with him at the Julliard-publishing 
company. 
33 The programme - committee also contained a-personal friend -of 
Jullian, Charles Baudinat, together with producers-from the ORTF 
including-Armand Jammot, Claude -Barma--and- Pierre Tchernia. 
34 - 
One of- the most- striking features of the -appointments 
to the- 
managerial posts in the new companies was the overwhelming-reliance on 
31. A former member of Peyrefitte's cabinet, -Riou was director of 
the 
ORTF's general-administration41_9_64_-I_9)_6§) -and later director-of- - 
financial control-(1972-1974). 
32. Le Monde, January 7 1976. 
33" Chancel had been a producer at the ORTF since 1968 and was well- 
known to the public for his radio programme Radiosco ie arid his 
television show le Grand Echiquier. During the 197 presidential 
election campaign Chancel had conducted a long radio interview 
with Giscard d'Estaing. He had been director of the series Idee 
fixe at the Julliard publishing company of which Jullian was the head. 
34. Baudinat had been co-author with Jullian of the television series 
Les Fargeot. Prior to his appointment as head of A2 Jullian dined 
at Baudinat's house and from his account of their conversation it 
is evident that the two men were friends. M. Jullian, op. cit., 
pp. 57-59. 
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persons who had had long working experience at the discredited 
ORTF. On the one hand this is scarcely surprising since it would 
have been impossible to carry on a regular broadcasting service without 
retaining many of the ex-ORTF's programming and administrative staff. 
Administrators with experience in the state broadcasting services 
were retained because their jobs were not in politically sensitive areas 
and because in any case the new Giscardian regime did not have the 
personnel to replace them. On the other hand, the lack of change in 
managerial personnel hardly seemed in keeping with the new President's 
electoral promise of reform. With only a few exceptions, those who 
were given managerial posts in the new companies had held similar posts 
at the ORTF, while of those who had held managerial posts at the ORTF, 
a large proportion were given similar posts in the new companies. 
35 
35. Most ORTF managerial--staff-were given-posts-in the new companies. 
(For TF1 and--A2 see the text). --At FR3, for-example, -Maurice Cazeneuve, former director of channel two-at the_ORTF_(1968-1971)- 
and television producer, was appointed director_, of_-FR3's national - television network. 
- 
Rene Ran, --former deputy director of-broadcasting- 
for-the overseas departments and territories and later director of 
the television-department-of-the-ORTFta-external--services, was---- 
appointed-head of broadcasting for the overseas departments and 
territories. - Noel Sanviti4 a member of. the--PDG's-advisory staff (1972-197k), 
_was appointed 
director of the-administrative--and finan- 
cial services of FR3. - -Finally, Claude Lemoine, head of regional 
broadcasting under-Guillaud at channel-three-(1972-197k), retained 
the same post at FR3 after the break-up of the ORTF. 
At Radio France, 
-Pierre Wiehn retained the post 
he had occupied 
since 1972-ab-director-of France Inter. - Yves Jäigu, - programme-. -s- = --- 
adviser for-documentaries-on channel-one (1972-1974)-, ' moved-with- 
Baudrier-to-Radio fiance-where-he-became--director-of-France-Culture. 
Finally, =Gabriel de Broglie, =head of the legal-department and 
general secretary of the administrative services at the ORTF 
(1972-1974), was appointed director of the administrative and 
financial services of Radio France. 
Apart from appointments in the news departments, the only person 
of note not given an appointment in the new broadcasting companies 
was Pierre Sabbagh, director of channel two at the ORTF. 
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The further down the hierarchy in each of the new broadcasting 
companies, the more important became the role played by personal 
acquaintance and career experience at the ORTF. During the last few 
months of 1974 the new company chairmen and their directors were 
competing against each other to bring people they had known at the 
ORTF to work for their company. Teams were quickly formed, with some- 
times a section moving en bloc from the ORTF to one of the new programme 
companies. A member of A2's programme planning staff described the 
procedure as follows: 
"Having occupied various posts at the ORTF I knew Larbre, 
Chancel and others, and they all knew me. At the time of the 
break-up of the ORTF the top people looked for those they 
knew personally to take up posts in their companies. ... In 
the programmes department-at A2 I had to build up a staff under 
me from scratch because the trained staff went to TFl-with 
Guillaud and Zbinden. --This meant that TF1-started out with an 
advantage over us. ... " 36 - 
Specialist staff -were particularly in demand, -and both Guillaud and 
barere took advantage of their long experience at the-ORTF to- bring 
ßpecialists_-tö TFl and A2.37" 
CazeneuveIs replacement by Guilläud andTJu3lian's by Uirlch=at--the 
head of TF1 and A2 respectively in December 1977 did not radically alter 
the allocation of managerial posts made in late 1974. Though some 
alterations were made-. -in 
function-and status, there-were very few. - 
36. Interview. with Mme. _Mirette_ 
Savelli, May 17--1977---. Former-head of 
the ORTF's programme planning sector, Jacques Zbinden had been made 
responsible for-programme planning at TF1 by Guillaud in 1975. 
37. Guillaud, for example, brought Claude Desire, a programme adviser on 
channel two, to be head of TRl's fiction section. Guillaud also 
brought several of his staff from channel three to work at TF1, 
including programme advisers Mme. Eliane Victor and Arnaud Tenzýze. 
barere brought Jean Rouilly to be general secretary of production at 
A2. He also brought Henri Perez, who had worked under him in the 
production section of the ORTF, to be managing director under him at 
A2. Other appointments made on Iarere's recommendation included 
those of Jacques Rousseau, former administrative head of channel one, 
to the post of head of financial and commercial affairs and Mme. 
Jacqueline Furbeyre, former head of the legal affairs department at 
the ORTF, to the post of head of the personnel and legal department. 
Perez in turn brought Maurice Geoffroy, former head of technical services on channel two, to be head of the technical services at A2. 
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changes in top personne1.38 
38. At TF1 Guillaud was appointed chairman of the board. of governors 
and director general after being director general for the previous 
three years. Riou, director of the administrative and financial 
services (1975-1977), was promoted to the post of deputy director 
general. Jean Leclerc, former administrative head of channel two 
at the ORTF, whom Guillaud had brought to TF1 in 1975, was appointed 
director of production at TF1 in January 1978. Certain structural 
changes were made in the organisation of the company, but the key 
personnel remained the same, most of them Guillaud's personal appoint- 
ees. These included Mme. Monique Trnka, general secretary for pro- 
grammes, Francis Mercury, head of the documentary department, Jean- 
Michel Hepp, head of the variety department, Teneze, head of the 
theatre and music department, Mme. Victor, in charge of TF1's 
afternoon programmes and programmes for the young, Zbinden, head 
of the purchases department, and D4sire, joint head of the company's 
fiction department. Guillaud summed up his view of his associates 
at his first press conference as company head: 
"My team is the same since the time of channel three (at the 
ORTF), ... You cannot do this sort of work with people you 
haven't confidence in. " Le Monde, January 19 1978. 
At A2 Larere was reappointed director general of the company, a post 
he had held since his promotion in January 1977. Chancel lost his 
post as personal adviser to the company head when Jullian left, 
but remained a member of the new programme committee. Jammot lost 
his post as directeur des spectacles, which had been created in 
June 1976 and was now abolished. He too, however, was appointed 
to the new programme committee. Paul Peyre, former assistant 
director for programme coordination at the ORTF and then director 
of external affairs at A2, was appointed general secretary in 
charge of coordinating the work of A21s-, production units. 
At FR3 Lemoine, director of the regional network, was promoted to 
the post of director general, second in command to Contamine. 
Bertrand Cousin, graduate of ENA and director of Contamine's cabinet 
at FR3 from 1975, was appointed general secretary of the company. 
Both Han and Sanviti retained their posts as deputy director, head 
of broadcasting for the overseas departments and territories, and 
director of the administrative and financial services respectively. 
Maurice Cazeneuve, director of FRS's national television network 
from 1975, left this post to resume his former profession as a 
television producer. 
At Radio France de Broglie, director of the administrative and 
financial services, was promoted to the post of director general 
under Baudrier before moving in the summer of 1979 to be chairman 
of INA. Wiehn and Jaigu remained directors of France-Inter and 
France-Culture respectively. Jean Izard, formerly head of the 
personnel department under de Broglie at the ORTE and then 
assistant director responsible for general administration under 
de Broglie at Radio France, was appointed director of administrative, 
professional and social affairs in January 1978. 
At TDF Autin retained his post as head of the company, while 
Maurice Remy was also reappointed director general of the company 
for a further three years. 
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The extent to which managerial personnel at the ORTF were 
given similar posts in the new broadcasting companies in 1974-75 
is one of the most important points to emerge from this section. 
Once the very few posts at the top of the different companies' 
hierarchies had been allocated with due regard to the balance of 
political forces within the Government's parliamentary majority, 
the secondary posts were filled largely on the basis of professional 
criteria without the need for external intervention by government 
ministers. Political acceptability and professional experience 
fused together at this level of appointments, reinforced by the 
important role played by personal acquaintance. 
News appointments ._ 
0 
The most politically sensitive sector within any broadcasting 
organisation--is the-news department. The appointments process to 
the key posts in the--news departments of the four-programme 
companies affords, therefore, 
-an excellent 
criterion trwhich to 
judge the validity of the Government ts-proclaimed-commitment-to 
the principle of the independence-of-the-broadcasting-companies from 
external interference. As in the field of general managerial 
appointments -the -company -chairmen- were- 
theoretically- free- to choose- 
-the directors of-their-news-departments. This statutory-independence 
was emphasised-in -a letter--from Giscard d'-Estaing_t - 
the programme 
company chairmen in January 1975. 
"The authorities do not intend to run (name of the company) 
through you. They delegate this role to you in its entirety 
until the end of your term of office. That is why they must 
establish relations with your company, as they do with the 
other important media of press and information, that is to 
say by a periodic exchange of views on their initiative or 
yours regarding the most important problems in the life of 
(name of the company), but without ever interfering in your 
managerial and news broadcasting responsibilities. If you 
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come across any exception to this principle which I regard as 
fundamental, I ask you to bring it to my attention. personally. " 39 
Yet in practice this freedom of appointment was severely restricted 
and abused by ministerial interventions particularly from the Ministry 
of the Interior. During late 1974 the Minister of the Interior, 
Poniatowski, and one of his advisers, Andre Mousset, exercised a power 
of veto over appointments to the top news posts At the same time they 
supervised the removal of a number of journalists suspected of being 
unsympathetic to the new regimes Taken together these measures were 
indicative of the Government's determination to establish a frame- 
work within which news content could if necessary be regulated without 
recourse to the crude forms of direct censorship which had characterised 
the Government's relationship with the ORTF during de Gaulle's presidency. 
As in the field of general managerial appointments the Government's 
desire to ensure the selection of politically reliable news personnel 
did not necessarily require the overt exercise of power since some 
company chairmen were unlikely in any case to appoint people of whom 
the Government disapproved. At TF1, FR3 and Radio France the company 
chairmen (or in the case of TF1 the director general, Guillaud) did 
not need external pressure from ministers or their staff to make the 
politically correct choice. Guillaud, Contamine and Baudrier had had 
long professional experience in top managerial posts at the ORTF where 
they had demonstrated their ability and willingness not to seek conflict 
39. Le Monde, January 18 1975. See also M. Jullian, Courte supplique 
au roi pour le bon usage des 4narques, Paris, Mazarine, 1979, pp. 
20-21. 
40. C. Durieux, La Telecratie, Paris, Tema, 1976, pp. 82-85 and 
J. Diwo, Si vous avez manaue le debut, Paris, Albin Michel, 
1976, pp. 264-265. 
41. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
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with the Gaullist authorities. Moreover both Guillaud and Baudrier 
were journalists by career and already had their own news staff at 
channel three and channel one respectively. 
At TFl, therefore, Guillaud readily accepted as director of news 
Henri Marque, who had turned down the opportunity to go to A242 
Christian Bernadac moved along with Guillaud from channel three 
at the ORTF to TF1 where he retained the post of news editor. 
43 
Jacques 
Alexandre, who had been assistant director at channel one in charge of 
news, was appointed documentary advisor at TF1 and head of Guillaud's 
cabinet. 
44 
Roger Gicquel, former assistant director of radio at the 
ORTF in charge of radio news, became TF1's main news reader. 
45 
Finally 
among the -news staff several-high ranking=journalists accompanied-Guillaud 
42. Marque had -been press attache-to the cabinets-of Antoine -Pinay 
(1950-1952) and General Corniglion-Molinier 1953-195+)" before 
joining Paris-Presse as assistant--head of the politics desk in 
1955. --He had -been -editor of -Nouveau _Candide_(1962-1965) 
and _ 
then of Paris-Presse---l'Intransi eant --France-soirA-1965-1970). - 
Marque had worked at the ORTF in-the late 1960s as--joint producer 
of a magazine programme with Pierre Charpy, who was later to 
become director-of the--Gaullist-newspaper-ia-Nation: -Marque's 
last pöst before joining-_TFl was as editor-of the -politics =desk_ - 
at the peripheral radio station R TL. 
43. Bernadac had been assistant-editor in the news department of channel 
one at-the-ORTF underPierre Desgraupes before-moving to channel 
three in 
-late -1972 _as -. news editor. - 
Guillaud -was 
director--of--channel 
three --at- this time. -(In-an-internal reshuffle Bernadac was-replaced - 
as news editor -by-Andre -Celarie in November 1979. Le Monde November 
14 1979. ) - -- 
44+. Alexandre had a long journalistic career at the ORTF. Promoted in 
1968 after refusing to join with the journalists on strike, he 
became Baudrier's assistant in the channel two news department in 
1969. He then moved with Baudrier from channel two to channel one in 
1972. Alexandre left TF1 in 1976 to take up the post of press 
secretary to the Prime Minister, Raymond Barre. 
45. In 1961 Gicquel had been a journalist for the newspaper Parisien 
Lib&rg, before moving to France-Inter after the purges of 1968. At 
the end of 1969 he became responsible for France-Inter's daily press 
review. In April 1973 Conte appointed him assistant director of 
radio in charge of news, a post he held until the break-up of the 
ORTF when he moved to TF1 to become the company's main newscaster. 
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and Bernadac in their move from channel three to TF1.46 
At Radio France Baudrier appointed as director of news a fervent 
Gaullist, Michel Pericard, who had worked alongside Baudrier since 
1969.47 Along with some other journalists Pericard moved with Baudrier 
from channel one at the ORTF to Radio France at the time of the break- 
up of the Office. 
48 
His immediate subordinates in the news department 
of the radio company included Jacques Perrier and Robert West. 
49 
At FR3, whose national news department is of relatively minor 
importance in comparison with the news departments of TFl and A2 and 
with FR3's own regional news centres, Claude Lefevre was appointed 
46. Jean Barberousse, Claude Lagaillarde, Francis Mercury, Robert Ville- 
neuve and several other journalists-and news cameramen accompanied 
Guillaud and Bernadac in their move from channel three at the ORTF to 
TF1. 
47. Pericard had worked at the RTF and-then at-the ORTF since 1945. He 
had been editor --of Baudrier's - news -team on-channel-two-(1969-1972) 
and had--then moved-with Baudrier from channel-two to-channel-one--to 
become editor and head of the politics desk on the ORTF's main 
channel (1972-1974). Pericard accompanied_Baudrier from channel one 
to Radio- France in January--1975. - --A 
Gaullist candidate in the 1971 municipal elections, Pericard-was 
elected in the 1977 municipal elections -as Gaullist mayor of 
Saint- 
Germain-en-Laye. Later in the same year -he -was voted onto--the -- 
central- council-of the-RPR, -which led -to'-his -resignation--from-his-- 
post as director of news at Radio France. In the 1978 legislative 
elections he was successfully elected as Gaullist deputy for the 
second constituency of the Yvelines department. Earlier in his career 
Pericard had- been- a-member of -severalGaullist--ministerial-cabinets: - 
that of-M. Missoffe (Youth and-Sport, -1966-1968), --of-M. Guen 
(Information, then Posts and Telecommunications, 1968-1969) -and--of 
M. Pons--(Agriculture, -1969). - -- - 
48. About half a dozen top journalists went with Baudrier and Pericard 
from channel one at the ORTF to Radio France. Among them was Joseph 
Paletou who was appointed head of the politics and economics desk in 
the news department. 
49. Perrier had been a journalist for the right-wing newspapers l'Aurore 
and Minute and then for the weekly magazine 1' ress before joining 
Radio France in 1975. He had taken a pro-Giscard d'Estaing stance 
during the 1974 presidential election campaign. 
West had been responsible for news programming on France Culture 
prior to the break-up of the ORTF. 
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director of news on the national channel. 
50 
In contrast with the spirit of calm in which appointments to the 
top news posts were made at TF1, FR3 and Radio France, there was a 
succession of minor storms at A2 in the autumn of 1974. Despite the 
fact that the viewing figures for channel two's main evening news 
bulletin had tripled over the previous two years from 1972 to 1974, the 
director of news, Jean Lefevre and the news editor, Jean-Claude Heberl4 
were both transferred and in effect demoted on the recommendation of 
the Minister of the Interior. 
51 The deputy news editor at channel two, 
Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, was also transferred to become editor of France- 
Inter at Radio France. 
Since Jullian-was unable to give--Marque the financial guarantees 
the latter required before accepting the post as director of news at 
A2, the chairman of the company decided instead to appoint Jacques 
Sallebert, former director of radio at -the -ORTF-and-t the time without-- 
a post in-the reorganised broadcasting structure 
52 
_ 
Angered-. by-this - 
50. Claude_Lefevre --entered_-the=ORTF ini964_and-in 1969=became-a-member - 
of the Baudrier news team on channel two. . 
In June-1973 he was 
appointed -to -the regional news station for__the__Loire valley region, 
before being appointed head -of national news at 123 
in January-1975. 
Claude lefevre was a_former member of -the 
Gaullist parallel 
police force, the SAC. 
51. Jean Lefavre was appointed A2's correspondent, in-the United States 
in January 1975. 
It appeared-likely that Jean--Lefevre--and-Heberlg were being-punished 
for having given in-the eyes of-the new -regime -overly sympathetic 
coverage of Chaban-Delmas during the 1974 presidential election 
campaign. C. Durieux, op. cit. pp. 83-84. This view was confirmed 
by Jullian in an interview with the author on September 19 1979. 
52. Sallebert had started work on French radio as far back as 1940. He 
had helped produce the first television news bulletin in 1949 and in 
1971 had been appointed head of the ORTF's radio services. In 1973 
he had come into conflict with the Minister of Information, Malaud, 
over the supposed left-wing tendencies of certain members of staff of 
France-Culture. It was this unsubstantiated charge which probably 
led to his not being offered a post in the reorganised broadcasting 
structure in the first instance. Just prior to his resignation from 
A2 in 1976 Sallebert stood successfully as an independent candidate in 
Cannes in the cantonal elections of that year with the active support 
of the local Gaullist party. In the same year he was appointed 
director general of the peripheral television station TAle-Mont e-Carlo. 
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appointment Poniatowski sought to mitigate its effect by ensuring 
the selection of a politically reliable news editor. The candidacies 
of Philippe Gildas, presenter on France-Inter, Michel Bassi, former 
head of the politics desk at le Figaro, and Roger Gicquel, Sallebert's 
assistant in the radio services of the ORTF, were all rejected by the 
Government. 53 
"The Government, through the 1974 statute, declared that it 
was liberalising (broadcasting). But it was afraid of this machine 
which throws politicians into a cold sweat. Everybody knows that 
in the early days I tried to bring journalists like Gildas, Gicquel 
and Bassi(to A2). I was strongly advised against the three of 
them because they had been labelled (undesirable) or because they 
were a little left-wing. ... " 54 
Finally, Georges Leroy, who had resigned from the peripheral radio station 
Europe 1 in October 1974 at the time of the Siegal affair, was chosen 
by Jullian to fill the vacant post of news editor. 
55 
53. Gildas had been editor of the Desgraupes-news-team on_channel-one - 
at the ORTF from 1969 to 1972. While there he had blotted his 
copybook by refusing-to cover a--ceremony which-"Mme. Pompidou_-was- 
attending. -Apparently this intransigeance_to cooperate_with -the- 
authorities was-sufficient-to scuttle-his--candidacy-for-the post - 
of editor at A2 -in-1974. Gildas is `at present 
1. 
__= 
Gicquel -moved - from the radio services at the ORTF to become-=the=main 
news reader at TF1! 
Bassi was turned down because he was considered a Chabanist. Later, 
however, he was given a post at the Elysee as assistant to Jean- 
Philippe Lecat, the_Elysee spokesman: In May-1977- he_was appointed 
head of : the--pro-Uiscardian -propaganda-organisation, Association=amour- - 
la d4mocratie_ and in 1978-became-director--general-of-Radio-Monte- 
Carlo. - 
Interview with Marcel Jullian, --September 19 1979. See also-Le-Monde, 
November 24-25 1974. 
54. Le Point, October 25 1976. 
55. Leroy resigned from Eurem in sympathy with the station's director 
general, Maurice Siegel, who had been dismissed from his post by 
the head of Sofirad, Denis Baudouin, on the orders of Chirac. 
During his interview with the author, Jullian could not explain why 
the Government agreed to Leroy's appointment. For more information 
. on 
the Si6gel affair see chapter on the State Monopoly. 
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Even before the new broadcasting companies were operational, 
therefore, A2 gave the Government the greatest cause for anxiety 
in the key area of news appointments. In large part this was due 
to the more independent stance adopted by the newcomer to broadcasting 
management, Jullian, who appeared to believe the Government's own 
propaganda regarding the independence of the companies from government 
interference. In stark contrast to its direct competitor TF1, whose 
top news staff remained unchabged throughout the first three year 
period of transmission, A2 continued to project an image of instability 
and constant flux. Thus, from January 1975 to December 1977 A2 had 
four different directors of news: Sallebert, Leroy, Baudinat and Elkabbach, 
with all of them adopting different formats in a bid to improve the- 
viewing figures-for A2's main evening news programme. 
The appointment in January 1977-of Elkabbach as director-of-news 
provides an excellent example-of--the manner in-which government- 
pressure may be exerted on a programme company in the field of news-- - 
braodcasting. To understand the- causes of-Elkabbach's-appointment 
and its consequences for A2's news staff it-is first of all 
necessary to describe and analyse the instability at-the top of 
the news department in the two year period prior to Elkabbach's = 
selection. The causes of this instability are-diverse-and complex, -- - 
involving_ professional.. and_personal. as__well_as__political=considerations. 
At the end of 1974 Sallebert was appointed by Jullian as director 
of the news department with Leroy as news editor. Sallebert, however, 
never really took to his new responsibilities and as early as mid-1975 
Leroy, Sallebert's nominal second in command, was given the task of 
running the department and producing the main evening news programme. 
Sallebert retained his post as director of news until April 1976 
-200- 
when he resigned from A2 to become director general of Tele-Monte-Carlo. 
From mid-1975 to mid-1976, therefore, Leroy, and not Sallebert, was 
responsible for A2's news programming. 
In June 1976, following an internal reorganisation of the 
company, Leroy was officially appointed director of news. 
Ironically, at the very moment when Leroy appeared to have 
consolidated his position, he found himself once again occupying 
only the second top post in the news hierarchy. This was due to 
the fact that the internal reform which had been the occasion of 
his promotion to the post of director of news (directeur de l'information) 
had also lead to the creation of a completely new post, directeur de 
1'actualite, which had overall responsibility over_-A2's news, documentary 
and magazine- output. This position of news overlord was given to---- - 
Baudinat, who thus became Leroy's official superior. 
Annoyed -at - once -again -being only second in--command, Leroy - resigned 
from A2 in September 1976. News programming-then became the -responsibility 
of Baudinat with the help of his news editor, Jean-Marie Cavada. In 
- fact it was Cavada who in the finalmonths of 1976 was in charge of 
A2's main evening news programme, since Baudinat was in the process of 
being implicated _in -a 
bribery 
. 
scandal : which-finally led _to- : his resignation_- 
from the -company. 
56 
= Baudinat's enforced -resignation 
in-turn-opened up 
the way for Elkabbach's return to television as director of news at 
A2 in January 1977. 
The succession of changes at the head of A2's news department 
could possibly be explained with reference to personal and professional 
considerations. Inevitably, however, such instability was not without 
political reverberations. Partly attributable to the poor viewing figures 
56. Baudinat was accused of accepting money from the company which hoped 
to build AZ's new headquarters. 
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for the company's main evening news programme compared with that of 
TFl, the lack of stability at the head of A2's news team had itself 
contributed to this worrying state of affairs. 
57 In the early months 
of 1975 A2's main evening news programme failed to maintain the viewing 
figures of its predecessor at the ORTF, INF 2. Moreover, after 
Leroy's departure the figures, which had shown some improvement during 
late 1975, plummeted with the result that by late 1976 the average 
audience for A21s main evening news broadcast was around 15% of the 
possible viewing public compared with about 30% on TF1. This low 
level of popularity was particularly worrying for A2's management, and 
not only for reasons of prestige. Since the peak advertising time on 
both TFl and A2 is immediately before and after the main evening news 
programmes, screened-simultaneously-between-8.00 and 8.30 p. m., any 
long-term decline in the viewing figures for the news broadcasts can 
have a significant effect on advertising-revenue. 
58 
The endemic instability--at A2 was brought to a head by=8audinat's __ 
enforced departure at the end of 1976, since the internal organisational 
crisis at-A2-was now accompanied by a serious political crisis in the--- 
electoral appeal of the presidential-coalition. Already-Gaullist and 
Giscardian candidates had done relatively poorly in the cantonal 
elections of March 1976. Moreover during the summer"political -- 
differences between President Giscard d'Estaing and his Gaullist 
Prime Minister, Chirac, -had become amplified, culminating in the 
latter's resignation from the premiership in August. By late 1976 
the Giscardian wing of the Government and the President himself could 
57. See tables 5-ii and 5 iii. 
58. See chapter on Finance. 
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hardly relish the prospect of the forthcoming municipal elections 
to be held in March 1977 at which candidates of the governing coalition 
were opposed by those of the Socialist-Communist left while in Paris 
the majorite itself was split into rival Giscardian and Gaullist 
camps. Moreover, with the crucial 1978 legislative elections and 
the strong possibility of defeat at the hands of the united left only 
just over a year away, the President and his supporters were naturally 
anxious to stabilise the situation at A2. 
Thus, in January 1977 the director of the company, Larere, was 
promoted to the newly created post of director general. Jullian 
defended this decision on the grounds that the promotion had been 
under consideration for some time and was intended to give Iarere 
equal status to Guillaud at TF1.59 The timing of the decision, however, 
led several -of=A2's staff to-regard the promotion-as evidence -of-the 
Government's-displeasure with Jullian's management and of its desire 
to restore-order-within the company. This view can . only-have--been- - 
reinforced when Jullian's contract-as chairman of A2 was not renewed 
at the end of 1977. - 
Iarere's promotion was overshadowed, --however, by Elkabbach's 
appointment-as-directorrof news. --It 
is easy-to understand why 
A2 required-a-new director of news-to replace the= discredited--Baudinat. 
Nor was-there the-least doubt that Elkabbach had the professional 
experience in broadcasting to take on the post. 
60 
However, at first 
sight it appeared difficult to explain his selection on political grounds. 
59" Antenne 2: Minutes of the Comity d'entreprise, extraordinary 
meeting, February 7 1977. 
60. Elkabbach had joined the staff on France-Inter in 1961. Disciplined 
after the 1968 strike, he was moved to Toulouse and then became the 
ORTF's correspondent in Bolin. He was assistant editor on channel 
two's news team from 1972 to 1974 and edited the magazine programme 
Act uel 2. After the break-up of the ORTF he moved to Radio France 
where he became editor of France-Inter and presented the magazine 
programme 13-14. 
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After all Elkabbach had been transferred from his post as deputy 
editor of channel two's news team following the break-up of the ORTF. 
Furthermore, this step could not have been made on professional 
grounds since the viewing figures for channel two's news programme 
had shown a substantial increase over the 1972-1974 period. Certainly 
Elkabbach's success at Radio France played a part in influencing 
the Government's choice, as did Elkabbach's long-standing desire 
to return to television. By themselves, however, they were 
hardly sufficient. More importantly by late 1976 Elkabbach had 
established his political credentials with the Giscardian regime. 
Elkabbach's appointment in January 1977 illustrated the return 
to presidential-favour of the supporters of Chaban-Delmas and the 
emergence -of aG iscard-Chaban --axis -in -opposition -to-the-Chirac - 
dominated Gaullist party. As a leading member of channel-two's news ----- 
team at the ORTF fröm 1972 tö 1974, -Elkabbach had been suspected of 
favouring Chaban-Delmas'. candidacy to the presidency in 1974 and along -- 
with -other- Buspected--Chabanists had--been amjnor victim of 
Giscard 
d'Estaing's presidential victory. 
61 
Indeed, Jullian recounted--that -- -- 
on arriving at A2 "... the-capital-sin-in the eyes of--the witch- 
hunters was to have been regarded as a chabanist. "62 -Elkabbach's 
appointment as-director-of_-mews-at---A2 -was- evidence-that after Chirac Is-- 
resignation from, the -premiership, - Chaban-Delmas: and-his Tresumed-- 
61. The news department on channel two at the ORTF from 1972 to 1974 
contained a significant rump of the original Desgraupes team which 
had been the news team on channel one between 1969 and 1972. 
The reform which had led to the creation of the Desgraupes team 
in 1969 had been the personal responsibility of the then Prime 
Minister, Chaban-Delmas. 
62. M. Jullian, Courte su li ue au roi pour le bon usage des gnar ues, 
Paris, Mazarine, 1979, p. 66. See also E. N. Suleiman, Les hauts 
-fonctionnaires et la politigue, Paris, Seuil, 1976, pp. 234-236, 
and P. Birnbaum, Les sommets de 1'Etat, Paris, Seuil, 1977, pp. 180-181 
for similar examples from the civil service. See also chapter on 
the State Monopoly. 
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supporters were no longer out of favour with the Giscardian regime. 
This was later confirmed by Chaban-Delmas' election to the presidency 
of the National Assembly with Giscardian support in the face of 
opposition from the Chirac-led RPR. 
63 
Whatever the external political reasons for Elkabbach's appointment, 
there is no doubt that the choice was not made inside AZ. Jullian 
did not know Elkabbach personally and displayed no enthusiasm about 
his appointment. At first the chairman of A2 rejected the suggestion 
that the appointment had been forced on him by strong external 
pressure: "... the choice ... is totally and without reservation 
that of the chairman of the company., 
64 
Later, however, Jullian 
admitted that the Government had-played-an influential role in the - 
selection of almost all the directors-of -news, -65-and- that -Elkabbach -- 
had been-appointed to- prepare- the ground for the 1978 legislative--___ 
elections . _66 Though it-proved impossible-±o-ascertain whether = -- 
Elkabbach's appointment was -made -by-the President-personally, -by_a -- 
member-of- the presidential _staff_or 
by-_a government- ministers it-is-_-_ _ 
certain--that it -was made -by -a member of . 
the Giscardian -administration ---- 
and not by the chairman of A2.67 It is fair to state, therefore, 
that Elkabbach's-nominat. on-represented_a_"partisan_political-appointment. " 
The immediate consequence-of-Elkabbach's-appointment-was--the--- 
formation of his own personal news team. Though the key posts of 
director of news and news editor had been filled by various incumbents 
63. Le Monde, April 5 1978. A sign that Elkabbach had returned to 
political favour by late 1976 was the fact that Giscard d'Estaing 
allowed himself to be interviewed on Elkabbach's radio programme 
in December barely a month before the latter's appointment to A2. 
64. Antenne 2: Minutes of the Comite d'entreprise, extraordinary 
meeting, February 7 1977. 
65. - Antenne2: Minutes of the Comite d'entreprise, March 3 1977. 
66. Interview with Marcel Jullian, September 19 1979. Jullian described 
Elkabbach as a "faithful servant of the authorities. " 
67. The appointment was generally regarded by broadcasting journalists 
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since the break-up of the ORTF, Jullian had always been opposed to 
staff changes in the main body of the news department. 
68. 
Consequently, 
neither Sallebert, Leroy or Baudinat had sought to make major changes in 
news staff, preferring to work with those journalists reallocated to A2 
after the break-up of the ORTF. 
69 
Elkabbach, however, set as one of his conditions of acceptance 
the proviso that he would have full powers over the choice of his news 
team. Louis Beriot, who had worked with Elkabbach at France-Inter, was 
made news editor by Elkabbach, and his was only the most important of 
several personal appointments made by the new director of news in 
early 1977.70 At the same time several top members of the old news 
team were effectively demoted by--Elkabbach. For-example, Cavada, news 
editor under Baudinat, was-removed--from-his-post--in--what appeared-to --- 
be the settling of -a personal score. 
71 The reorganisation of the news 
67. - and interested politicians as--having been-made on-the-strong 
(Cont. )_recommendation_of_. a_member of the presidential--staff. -Jullian, - 
in an interview with the author, attri. buted-responsibility-to- - 
the Elysee staff and not to the President of the Republic------ 
personally. - --- --- 
68. There-was, -and-ism a strong trade union membership among-. A2's - -- 
news staff. -Approximately-80%-are-trade-union-members_compared 
with less-than 50% of TF1's news team. 
69. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
70. Beriot had been assistant editor at France-Inter under Elkabbach 
where he-had -been-producer of the magazine programme-Questions 
pour un-samedi. ------ 
Jean-Claude Mangeot was appointed assistant editor. Noel Copin 
became head of the politics desk, while Georges Bortoli was made 
head of the foreign news desk. Elkabbach also made use of out- 
side consultants to provide specialist information, a practice 
he had developed at Radio France. L'Humanite, February 
8 1977 
and Tel4cine, no. 217, April 1977. 
71. About a dozen members of the former news team were downgraded or 
resigned, including Claude Manuel (assistant editor), Christian 
Dutoit (technical editor), Christian Guy (assistant editor), 
Didier Lecat (assistant head of the politics desk), Michel 
Thoulouze (sector head), Jean Lanzi (editor responsible for the 
weekend news, programme) and Benoit Gelot (assistant editor for 
magazine programmes). 
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department mainly affected former members of the Desgraupes team, with 
the result that of the few former members of the Desgraupes team who 
still remained in the news department at A2 none held a major position 
of responsibility following Elkabbach's appointment. 
72 
Elkabbach's appointment at A2 left a vacant position at Radio 
France. Jean Lefevre took over responsibility for the midday magazine 
programme on France-Inter in January 1977 and was simultaneously appointed 
assistant director of news at Radio France under P&ricard. 
73 In June 
of the same year, following Pericard's election to the central committee 
of the BPR, the director of news at Radio France was forced to resign. 
Pericard was then replaced by Lefývre who in the space of six months had 
made a-spectacular. comeback after his-demotion in late 1974-following 
the break-up of the ORTF. 
The reasons for Lefevre Is -appointment - to--the top news--post-Bt 
Radio France were, as in the-case of Elkabbach, ^not_immediately apparent. 
Certainly-Pericard had-to be replaced once-le had decided to embark 
overtly-on-a political career. Moreover, Lefevre had all the necessary 
71. Cavada had worked on-channel-two from--1972-to-1974-alongside 
(Cont. ) Elkabbach and had gone to A2 after the break-up-of the ORTF. 
During this five year spell Cavada had successively-held the 
posts of-news presenter-and-head of-the-foreign news desk, 
assistant editor, magazine editor and news- editor. -- -- 
72. Manuel, Dutoit, -Guy, _Thoulouze-and-Gelot-had all-been--members 
of the Desgraupes--team at the ORTF (1969-1972). = = 
73. ' --Lefývre had-had-a -long career in French broadcasting. -Director 
of-the regional-station-at-Strasbourg (196&-1969), channel one's 
London correspondent (1969-1972), he was then appointed assistant 
director in charge of news on channel two (1972-197k). * After 
the break-up of the ORTF he became A2's Washington correspondent 
(1975-1977) before coming to Radio France in January 1977. 
The management of Radio France indicated that Lefevre had been 
brought to their company in January to cover the eventuality 
of Pericard's departure. Pericard was given the post of 
inspecteur g ngral which he held from July until the end of 
December 1977. He resigned completely from Radio France at the 
beginning of 1978 to devote himself to his election campaign 
in the Yvelines where he successfully stood as an RPR candidate 
in the 1978 legislative elections. 
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professional experience for the post. His appointment to Radio France 
immediately prior to the 1977 municipal elections and his promotion a 
mere nine months before the 1978 legislative elections in place of a 
recognised Gaullist indicated, along with Elkabbach's appointment, that 
Giscard d'Estaing and his entourage were more than ever keen to appoint 
persons sympathetic to the Giscardian regime in these key broadcasting 
posts. While the appointment of Lefevre and, to a lesser extent, 
Elkabbach seemed paradoxical after their transfer in 1974, it was 
noticeable that their return to favour coincided with the run-up to the 
1978 elections and a significant change in the relationship between the 
Gaullist and Giscardian wings of the governing coalition. 
74 
The appointment of Elkabbach in particular demonstrated the very 
real limits on the freedom of manoeuvre of the chairmen of the broad- 
casting companies in the politically sensitive field of news programming. 
In some cases these limits were readily accepted by the company chairmen, 
with the result that overt interference by the Government was unnecessary. 
In other cases constraints were imposed by the Government either in the 
form of ministerial veto or positive recommendation. In any event whether 
overt or covert, willingly accepted or not, the existence of these 
constraints belied the Government's guarantees regarding the autonomy 
of the broadcasting companies. 
74. Following Lefevre's appointment as director of news at Radio France 
in July 1977 various changes of personnel took place in the upper 
echelons of the news department. The assistant director of news 
under Pericard, Jacques Perrier, resigned from the company immediate- 
ly, as did Francois Bonnemain, assistant editor. (Bonnemain was to 
coproduce with Pericard a television programme on TF1 La France 
defiguree in early 1978). 
Perrier's post was taken by Michel Tauriac. Tauriac had been 
assistant editor on France-Inter and then in the news department 
on channel one. After the break-up of the ORTF he had moved to Radio 
France as editor responsible for special duties and adviser to the 
head of the company. Gilbert Denoyan and Jerome Bellay were appointed 
assistant editors. The major survivor from Pericard's news team was 
West who became general secretary of the news department. 
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The President's men? 
A charge increasingly made during the Giscardian presidency has been 
that Giscard d'Estaing is engaged in a process of placing his political 
supporters in key decision-making posts in the broadcasting media and 
related organisations as part of a deliberate attempt to colonise the 
ministerial, administrative and para-administrative power bases in the 
French political system. 
75 Asked at a presidential press conference in 
June 1978 about the development of a "UDF state" in place of the previous 
"UDR state", Giscard d'Estaing replied quite categorically: 
"... there is not, on my part, any desire to do anything other 
than apply my rule: that is for each post I look for "the best", 
and you have only to see that, in all the appointments which have 
taken place during the past few years, my idea is that everywhere 
we should appoint the best. I do not know if the best have in 
common a political preference. ... "76 
In the preceding section we analysed the overriding influence of 
the authorities in the choice of top news staff in the state broadcasting 
companies. In this section we shall argue that far from being random 
events these appointments form part of a coherent strategy. Particularly 
since Chirac's resignation from the premiership the number of Giscardian 
appointments to key broadcasting posts has steadily increased to the point 
where one can speak of a pattern of control via presidential appointments. 
75. See, for example, the criticisms made by the Socialist, Communist 
and Gaullist members of the parliamentary committee of inquiry 
on the state of the French mass media. Journal Officiel, Documents 
Assemblee Nationale, 1979, no. 1289, Rapport fait au nom de la 
commission d'enquete sur les conditions de 1'information* publique, 
presente par Claude Martin, dep6t publie au Journal Officiel 
du 18 septembre 1979. 
See also P. Birnbaum, op. cit., pp. 151-192 and T. Agnes, I'L'Etat- 
Giscard", in Le Monde, March 2 1980. 
76. Presidential press conference of June 14 1978. Le Monde, June 16 
1978. The UDF (Union pour la Democratie Francaise is the federat- 
ion of Giscardian, Centrist and Radical parties which provides the 
parliamentary support for the policies of President Giscard d'Estaing. 
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Apart from Elkabbach, other Giscardian appointments include 
Xavier Gouyou-Beauchamps, former head of the Elysee press service, 
as head of Sofirad in April 197777; Yves Cannac, the President's 
deputy general secretary, as head of the Havas advertising agency, which 
has a controlling interest in Radio T41evision Luxembourg, in June 197878; 
Michel Bassi, head of the Giscardian propaganda organisation Association 
pour la democratie in the run-up to the 1978 elections as director 
general of Radio-Monte-Carlo in November 197879; Gerard Montassier, 
Giscard d'Estaing's son-in-law and unsuccessful UDF candidate in the 1979 
cantonal elections, as head of the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel in 
80 
October 1976; Roland Faure, former head of the petty bourgeois 
77. A graduate of ENA, Gouyou-Beauchamps was from 1969 charge de mission 
and then technical adviser in Giscard d'Estaing's cabinet at the 
Ministry of Finance. In 1974 after Giscard d'Estaing's election to 
the presidency he was appointed head of the Elysee press service 
until August 1976 when he became-prefect of the Ardkhe department. 
Gouyou-Beauchamps--replaced Denis Baudouin at the head of Sofirad 
in April 1977. For more information on Sofirad see chapter on the 
State monopoly. 
78. A former member of the cabinet of Chaban-Delmas at. Matignon and 
then deputy-general-secretary on President Giscard-d'Estaing! s-staff 
at the Elysee, Cannac had been largely-responsiblefor drafting-the 
1974 broadcasting reform which broke up-the ORTF. .. His appointment 
as head of the Havas advertising agency in June 1978 was significant 
because Havas owns 15% of the-shares"in: the company Audiofina which 
itself owns 54% of the shares in Radio Television Luxembourg. Thus, 
through Havas-the French government-has a voice in the running of 
RTL and in the appointment of top managerial staff there. 
In 1979 Cannac-prepared a special report-on France's role in the 
development of satellite-broadcasting. For more information-on 
this see chapter--on-the--State-monopoly. 
79. Bassi was appointed deputy director general of Radio-Monte-Carlo 
in May 1978 in preparation for his appointment to the post of 
director general at the end of the year. Former head of the politics 
desk and then deputy editor of le Figaro, Bassi had from September 
1976 to May 1977 been assistant to Lecat, the Elys6e spokesman. 
In May 1977 he had left the Elysee to take up the new post of head 
of l'Association pour la democratie, a propaganda organisation for 
the President and the UDF set up after the 1977 municipal elections 
to rally support for UDF candidates in the forthcoming 1978 
legislative elections. Following Bassi's appointment at Radio- 
Monte-Carlo there was a reshuffle amongst the station's top 
managerial staff. A new director of news was appointed, Jacques 
Paoli, and a newly created post of general secretary was filled by 
Antoine Schwartz, a former member of Raymond Barrels cabinet. 
80. See chapter on the Liquidation of the ORTF. 
-210- 
newspaper 1'Aurore and press representative on A2's board of governors, 
as director of news at Radio France in September 197981; ' Jean-Marie 
Cavada as head of national news at FR3 in September 197882; Henri 
Pigeat as head of the French news agency Agence France Presse in October 
197983; Alain Quintrie-Lamothe as deputy director general of Sud-Radio 
in August 197984; Patrice Duhamel as head of the politics desk at TF1 
in the autumn of 197685; and Jacques Rigaud as head of Radio Television 
81. A journalist by profession Faure became editor of 1'Aurore in 1963 
and remained in this post until his resignation in November 1978. 
From January 1975 Faure was press representative on the board of 
governors of A2. 
82. Former news editor at A2 before Elkabbach's appointment as director 
of news, Cavada was appointed assistant director of FR3 in charge 
of national news and of the regional news of the Paris-Ile-de- 
France station in September 1978. He replaced Claude Lefevre, the 
former editor of national news who was appointed regional director 
of the station Lorraine-Champagne- Ardennes. 
83. Pigeat was a graduate of ENA and a former member of the cabinets 
of Pompidou (Prime Minister) and Malaud-(Civil Service and Inform- 
ation). In 1973 he became general secretary of the comite inter- 
ministeriel pour l'information, a government information service. 
He became -head of 
its successor, -the - delegation: generale -ä _ ._ 11information-in 1975 after working under Denis Baudouin for a 
year and a half-as his deputy at the DGI. - In April 1976 he 
became deputy director general of Agence France Presse, -a position 
he held until his promotion to the top post in October 1979. 
For more -information--on the relationship between 
the AFP and the 
French state see M. S. Palmer., L'AFP_et le ouvoir, - -paper--presented- 
to a round-table on new developments-in the (French) press, radio 
and television, Paris, November 23-24 1978. 
84. Le Monde, _August_31 and September_5 1978 
85. In several interviews with broadcasting journalists Patrice 
Duhamel was most often cited as the archetypal Giscardian 
journalist. 
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Luxembourg in October 1979.86 
Three important points are common to the above appointments. First, 
all concern important decision-making posts, managerial or editorial, in 
the broadcasting media or related organisations. Secondly, all date 
since Chirac's resignation from the premiership and most have taken place 
since the crucial 1978 legislative election victory of the Giscardian- 
Gaullist coalition. Lastly, all the above appointments form part of 
the colonisation of the broadcasting media by supporters of the Giscardian 
regime. In the cases of Gouyou-Beauchamps, Cannac and Bassi, those 
appointed had formerly been part of the President's own staff at the 
Elysee. In other cases it was clear that those chosen were at the very 
least not antipathetic towards the Giscardian regime. 
While Giscard d'Estaing himself denied the charge that there was 
a pattern of Giscardian appointments to key posts in the broadcasting 
media, his parliamentary supporters were less evasive. Replying 
to criticisms made by the RPR members of the parliamentary committee 
86. At Radio Tele Luxembourg after the departure of Jean Farran, 
director general of the station, in September 1978 and of Christian 
Chavanon, administrateur d4legue and de facto head of the station, 
barely a fortnight later, the French government attempted to place 
one of its own men in the top post at RTL, despite the fact that 
unlike its links with Europe 1, Radio-Monte-Carlo and Sud-Radio, 
Sofirad does not have any shareholdings in RTL. 
The appointment of Cannac at the head of the Havas advertising 
agency was intended to help in this manoeuvre (see above). However, 
the French government met with considerable opposition from the 
Luxembourg government, with the result that a permanent appointment 
was not made until one year after Chavanon's departure. The board 
of governors of the parent company of RTL gave as the reason for 
this long delay the fact that the . two candidates originally 
proposed by the French government were "too obviously Giscardian. " 
Le Monde, March 4-5 1979. 
It was only in October 1979 that Rigaud was appointed administrateur 
dele e of RTL. A graduate of ENA and member of different minister- 
ial cabinets, Rigaud's most recent post was as charge de mission 
in the cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Franrois- 
Poncet, who himself had previously been Giscard d'Estaing's 
general secretary at the Elysee. 
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of inquiry on the French mass media which reported in September 1979, 
the UDF committee members affirmed that since the State was the sole 
shareholder in the national broadcasting companies and in Sofirad 
and the major shareholder in the Havas agency and certain radio 
stations, it was logical that it should be the State, and therefore the 
Government, which should have the role of appointing the management of 
these companies according to its own criteria. 
87 
Documenting the 
Gaullist colonisation of the broadcasting services during the first 
twenty years of the Fifth Republic the IIDF committee members then went 
on to make the following illuminating comment: 
"... Therefore, one has to be very naive or suffer from a 
curiously selective amnesia to find in the present situation 
a worrying innovation. For what reasons should something which 
was natural twenty five or ten years ago suddenly become scandalous? 
Other systems of appointment would undoubtedly be possible and 
perhaps better, in the tradition-of. -the anglo-saxon 
democracies. 
One must, however, understand that they have never-been adopted - 
in our country where the weight of tradition is quite-different. "88 
In other words, far from denying the criticisms made by-the Gaullist 
committee members-among others, the UDF committee members accepted 
the 
validity of the charge-and defended -the practice -by. -reference -to- 
tradition. 
In essence-their-argument-was- that if _it_-had--been alright 
for the Gaullists 
to appoint their men to-the key-broadcasting posts between 1958 and-1974, 
then there was no reason to expect--the Giscardian regime to -do other-rise. 
While the UDF committee members then-sought to modify this view somewhat 
by stating that the authorities--appointed the new sets of management 
"to 
apply the new policy of liberalising the media", this seemed only a 
token 
acknowledgement of the supposed changes introduced by the 1974 reform. 
Their views certainly contrasted with the optimistic appraisal of the 
objectives of the reform made by ministers at the time of the break-up 
of the ORTF 
87. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979, no. 1289, Rapprt 
fait au nom de la commission d'enqutte sur les conditions de 1'inform- 
ation publique, presente par Claude Martin, d6pet publie au Journal 
Officiel du 18 septembre 1979, p. 28. 
88. I_ a, - P" 29. 
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Boards of governors: composition 
Each of the broadcasting companies which replaced the ORTF possesses 
its own separate board of governors. Since there is no central body in 
the new broadcasting structure, it follows that there is no board of 
governors with overall responsibility for the administration of the 
state broadcasting services. With the exception of the production 
company, the composition of the boards was explicitly laid down in the 
1974 legislation, after being the subject of impassioned debate in 
Parliament. 
89 
The transmission company has a sixteen member board. 
go Of the 
sixteen governors twelve are appointed by the Government, with eight 
chosen directly as governors plus the chairmen of the four programme 
companies sitting as of right. - In addition there are two parliamentary 
representatives (one deputy-and one senator) and two staff representatives 
on TDF's governing-board. --The members of the board of governors are 
appointed forthree years and the chairman, who is-also the de facto - 
managerial-head of the company, is appointed-by the- Government - from 
among the members-of-the board. The term of office-of the eight 
representatives of the State may at any time by decision-of-the 
Government be put to an end. 
The archive -and-research institute _has 
twenty-two governors. - 
Ten 
are appointed directly by the Government, six represent the other broad- 
casting companies, two governors represent the staff and four are 
appointed in recognition of their competence in the field. The members 
of the board are appointed for three years, except in the case of the 
State representatives whose mandate may be ended at any time. 
91 
89. See chapter on Parliamentary control. 
90.1974 broadcasting statute, article 5. See also Journal Officiel, 
Lois et decrets, decree no. 74-795 of September 2 -1-1-97-7. - 
91. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 74-946 of November 1,1974. 
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The boards of governors of the four programme companies have 
only six members, two of whom, including the chairman are appointed 
by the Government. 
92 This minority of government appointments to the 
governing boards of the four programme companies seemed at first sight 
to reflect the Government's desire that once established the companies 
should not be susceptible to governmental interference. In particular, 
this minority representation contrasted sharply with the practice at 
the ORTF where at least half the members of the board of governors had 
been appointed by the Government? 
3 
The method of appointment of the other four governors on each 
board, however, worked against the possibility of the two government 
appointees finding themselves in the minority on any important policy 
decision at board meetings. For example, the representative of the press 
on each of the four programme company boards is also chosen by the 
Government. - 
The representative of Parliament is elected in a joint 
meeting of the social and cultural affairs committees of the National 
Assembly-and the Senate. 
94 
A balance -is -maintained between both 
parliamentary chambers and between the majorite and opposition in the 
election of the parliamentary representatives for the six governorships, 
one in each of the four programme companies and two in the transmission 
company. However, in both 1975 and 1978 two of the three parliamentary 
representatives from the ranks of the opposition were placed at TDF 
where they were vastly outnumbered by the government appointees. 
95 
92.1974 broadcasting statute, article 11. 
93. See tables 5-iv and 5. v for the numerical composition of the boards 
of governors of the ORTF (1964-1974) and of the new broadcasting 
companies. (1974- ) 
94. Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Decree no. 74-791 of September 24 
1974, article 2. 
95. From 1975 to 1977 the two parliamentary representatives at TDF were 
Roger Gouhier (Communist deputy) and Georges Lamousse (Socialist 
senator), and after 1978-Guy Ducolon6 (Communist deputy) and 
Claude Fuzier (Socialist senator). 
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The representatives of Parliament on the boards of governors of the 
three television companies were all drawn from the ranks of the 
majorite in both 1975 and 1978, while only in one programme company, 
Radio France, was the parliamentary representative on the governing board 
a member of the opposition parties. 
96 The staff representative is 
chosen by the Government from lists of at least three candidates drawn 
up by each of the recognised broadcasting trade unions. 
97 Finally, the 
representative of the world of culture, who must come from the cinema 
industry in the case of FR3, is chosen by the other five governors. 
98 
In short, therefore, even in the programme companies where 
representatives of the State are apparently in the minority on the boards 
of governors, the reality is very different. As in the transmission 
company, it is virtually unthinkable that on any -major policy-decision 
the two state representatives would ever find themselves in a-minority 
at board meetings, The -fact that the chairman--of- the board is--chosen 
by 
96. Among the representatives of the ma orite a balance is preserved 
among the constituent parties. Since 1975 the parliamentary 
representatives on the governing boards of TF1, A2 and FR3 respect- 
ively have been Pierre-Roger Gaussin (reformateur deputy), who was 
replaced by Gerard Longuet (UDF deputy) after losing his seat at 
the 1978 legislative elections; Robert-Andre Vivien 
(Gaullist deputy); 
and Michel Miroudot-(Giscardian senator). 
At Radio France the parliamentary representative since 1975 has 
been Jacques Carat (Socialist senator). 
97. Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Decree no. 74-791 of 
September 24.1974, article 3- 
98. Ibid, article 4. See tables 5. vi and 5. vii for a full list 
of the governors of the programme companies since 1975. 
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the Government and not, as the opposition parties wished, elected 
by the other governors merely reinforces the dominant position of the 
state representatives. 
Boards of governors: functions 
The functions of the boards of governors of the transmission 
company and the programme companies were set out in article 17 of the 
1974 statute. 
99 
"The boards of governors ... lay down the general guidelines 
of company policy within the framework set by the cahiers des 
cam. They vote the budget ... which must be balanced and 
supervise its implementation. The boards of governors of the 
radio and television companies ensure the quality and morality 
of the programmes. They guarantee the objectivity and truth- 
fulness of the news presented and ensure the expression of the 
major trends of opinion and currents of thought. " 100 
Wide sweeping-as -these -powers -appear to -be, -the boards of governors 
in fact -play -a-very minor role 
in-the long-term policy formulation of the 
companies- and almost-no part in their everyday management. They generally 
meet only once a month at most for a morning or afternoon. The govern- 
ors have, -with the exception-of the-chairman-who is also usually the 
managerial head of the company, --neither the-time nor the expertise to 
challenge effectively the decisions of the company's management even if 
they wished to do so. As one interviewee remarked, the board of governors 
is an administrative not a managerial body. 
101 
99. Article 17 of the 1974 broadcasting statute reproduced almost verbatim 
the terms of article 7 of the 1972 ORTF statute, which itself copied 
the provisions of article 4 of the 1964 ORTF statute which had 
instituted the creation of a board of governors for the state broad- 
casting services. 
100. The functions of the board of governors of TDF were made more explicit 
in decree no. 74-795 of September 24 1974. For the functions of the 
board of governors of INA see decree no. 74-946 of November 14 1974. jj 
101. Interview with Jean-Loup Rosset, secretary to the board of governors° 
of TF1, September 14 1979. 
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A member of the board of governors at TF1 agreed that the board 
does not run the company, make staff appointments or make detailed 
choices. 
102 Moreover, it was apparent from this interviewee that the 
board meetings of TF1 are dominated by Guillaud and the controleur 
d'Etat. One of the governors at A2 complained that the board had 
insufficient time or information to discuss the company's budget 
properly, that the board was consulted after the programme schedules 
had been drafted and that it previewed only five or six programmes per 
year. 
103 A governor at Radio France agreed with this assessment of the 
powers of the board, arguing that the board is consulted or merely 
informed of many of the crucial decisions affecting the running of the 
company. 
104 He gave as an example of this practice the fact that the 
board was told about the appointment of Roland Faure as-director of 
news in place of Jean Lefevre after the event. In short, the role of 
the governing boards is essentially to rubber-stamp decisions already-- 
taken by the company's management, the same role that the board of 
governors apparently-fulfilled at-the ORTF. 
105__ 
Conclusion 
The power of-appointment which the Government enjoys in practice 
far exceeds the minimal statutory rights contained in the 1974 broadcasting 
legislation. The legal right of appointment to and dismissal from the top 
102. Interview with Gerard Longuet, parliamentary representative on the 
board of governors of TF1, September 6 1979. 
103. Interview with Jean Favre, trade union representative on the board of 
governors of A2, September 10 1979. 
104. Interview with Jacques Carat, parliamentary representative on the board 
of governors of Radio France, September 18 1979. 
105. For the role of the ORTF board of governors see R. Thomas, Broad- 
. 
casting and Democracy in France, London, Crosby Lockwood Staples, 
. 
19769 pp. 55-56; J. Chevallier, la radio-television francaise entre 
deux reformes, Paris, Librairie g nerale de droit et de juris- 
prudence, 1975, pp. 18-19 and 209; and A. Astoux, op. cit. p. 206. 
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one or two posts in each of the broadcasting companies has in practice 
been extended without any basis in law to cover other key posts, most 
crucially in the news departments of the four programme companies. 
Moreover, it is clear that appointments to the top managerial and 
editorial posts have been made with regard to the political loyalties 
of those appointed with the overall aim of securing a politically 
sympathetic management, especially at the head of the separate news 
departments. Partisan political appointments, in short, form one of 
the most important control mechanisms the Government possesses. 
Undoubtedly Giscard d'Estaing and his supporters would have been 
keen to fill as many posts as possible with persons sympathetic to the 
new Giscardian regime, as previous Gaullist administrations had done 
with their supporters at the ORTF. The new President, however, had 
less freedom of manoeuvre than his predecessors for both professional 
and political reasons. To maintain the functioning of the state 
broadcasting services, which included--three television channels and 
a comprehensive radio network, it was necessary to draw on the skills 
o had of many administrators, frequently with Gaullist sympathies, wh 
worked in managerial posts at the ORTF. They in turn frequently 
appointed to subordinate managerial positions their own acquaintances 
from the Office. 
More importantly, however, the political constraint on Giscard 
d'Estaing's freedom of manoeuvre was that the President initially 
depended on the Gaullist party in Parliament to pass the Government's 
proposed legislation and on the Prime Minister and leader of the 
Gaullists, Chirac, to organise and rally this Gaullist parliamentary 
support. 
106 As the quid pro quo for this Gaullist backing in the 
106. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
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National Assembly, some Gaullist supporters were given key posts in 
the new broadcasting companies. For both professional and political 
reasons, therefore, the top managerial and editorial posts in the 
new companies were manned to a large extent by personnel from the 
defunct ORTF. 
Since the first wave of appointments in 1974-75, however, the 
political constraint has been modified by Chirac's resignation from 
the premiership in August 1976 and the increasingly critical stance 
adopted by the Gaullist party towards the President and his government. 
Within the Government the balance of power has shifted more clearly 
towards the Giscardians and their allies and this has been reflected 
in appointments to the broadcasting companies and related organisations. 
Throughout 1978 and-1979-Chirac ian Gaullists--have- been steadily- -replaced 
by persons more favourable -to the Giscardian regime. -Even where-no 
change in the person holding the post has taken place, as is the case 
at the head of FR3 and Radio France where Contamine and Baudrier - 
retained their posts-as-company chairmen-at the end of 1977, this is 
because, in the words of one interviewee, It... they have seen the way 
the wind is blowing. "107 Since the company chairmen are chosen by 
the Government they not unnaturally regard themselves as responsible 
to the Government. In short, the tradition of control through partisan 
political appointments, the origins of which can be traced back to the 
Fourth Republic, has gone largely unchecked by the 1974 reform. 
107. Interview with Bertrand Cousin, June 29 1979. In any case, of course, 
Contamine is more associated with the "Giscardian" supporters in the 
RPR such as Peyrefitte. 
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CHATS 6 
Reallocation of ORTF staff 
The 1974-75 reform had immediate and far-reaching consequences for 
the staff of the state broadcasting services and particularly for their 
capacity to organise effectively in trade unions. The break-up of the 
ORTF into seven separate companies was regarded by many trade union 
militants as designed to hamper union and inter-union activity. In the 
long term there was the possibility that trade unionists would feel 
increasingly cut off from their colleagues in the other companies. This 
would mean that the use of traditional sanctions such as the strike could 
be more easily isolated by the Government and broadcasting management 
within one company, thus making it a much less effective weapon. In 
the short term the splitting up of the ORTF-caused the unions to reform 
their own organisational structures. As a result, --during the early-months 
of 1975 the various trade unions were. more preoccupied with reorganising 
themselves and rebuilding their membership than with-open confrontation 
with -the new- sets -of -management. 
l- 
The most immediate problem which the broadcasting unions had to 
deal with, however, gras the changeover from the ORTF to the new companies- 
which were -due to--begin their -operations inJanuary-l975. 
Given'_the 
circumstances in which-the 1974 reform-had taken-place, there was a 
widespread -fear among- the staff that the reorganisat-ion- would - lead- to -- 
a sharp decline in the number of those employed in the state broad- 
casting services. The main task facing the broadcasting unions in late 
1974, therefore, was to defend as best they could the employment of 
ORTF staff in the new companies. 
1. See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
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Reduction in staff numbers 
During the debate on the broadcasting reform bill in the ! iational 
Assembly in July 1974 Rossi was at great pains to deny that the proposed 
reorganisation would necessarily lead to a reduction in the number of 
staff employed in the state broadcasting services. Introducing the 
bill in the Assembly Rossi asserted that, 
"The fact that temporary measures are included in the text 
... is not based on a deliberate desire to reduce staff numbers, 
but arises simply from the necessity to lay down a relevant 
judicial procedure to cover the hypothetical situation of 
certain staff not finding a post in the new companies. ... 
... I repeat that nobody in the present state of affairs 
can make a prediction regarding the future (staff) needs of the 
new companies. " 2 
Only after the demands for staff by the new companies had been satisfied, 
Rossi argued, would it be known whether there would be any redundancies. 
Yet despite these ministerial assurances to the contrary there can 
be no doubt that one of the Government's objectives in splitting up the 
ORTF was to cut the number of broadcasting staff. Both Marceau Long, 
PDG of the ORTF at the time, and Jean-Claude Perier, vice-chairman of 
the Staff Reallocation Committee, admitted that the Government's aim 
was to reduce the size of the broadcasting staff. 
3 The Chinaud report, 
published immediately prior to the Government's decision to dismantle 
the ORTF, had after all attributed the supposedly inefficient management 
of the ORTF in part to the excessive numbers of staff and particularly 
to the number of temporary staff employed by the Office. 
4 
In vain 
the broadcasting unions pointed out that in terms of size of staff the 
ORTF was no worse off than its counterparts in other western European 
2. Journal Officiel, D9bats Parlementaires Assemble Nationale, 
July 24 19749 PP- 3 51-3 52. See also p. 3804.3. 
Interview with Marceau Long, July 10 1979. 
Interview with Jean-Claude Perier, September 13 1979. 
4. Chinaud report,, 1974, chapter III section 2, pp. 103-131, "L'absence 
de v ritable politique du personnel". As in other sections of the 
report the Government was also blamed for this state of affairs, 
though this was rarely evoked by ministerial spokesmen at the time 
of the reform 
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countries. 
5 The belief that the ORTF was grossly overstaffed was 
strongly held in ministerial circles and became apparent as the 
opposition of the trade unions to staff cuts intensified in the autumn. 
For example, referring to journalists made redundant by the reorganisation, 
the Prime Minister, Chirac, stated quite unequivocally: 
"We must be clear about this: the principal function of 
the television companies is not to pay, from a budget largely 
based on the viewers' licence revenue, an excessive number of 
staff. " 6. 
With the aim of facilitating the cutback in staff the Government 
included in its reform bill a series of special provisions which super- 
seded the measures usually applied in the case of a company undergoing 
reorganisation and rendered obsolete the procedure regarding redundancies 
set out in the 1964 ORTF staff statute and subsequent decrees. 
7 These 
special provisions included both particular clauses covering specific 
categories of ORTF staff8 and a general clause dealing with the Office's 
statutory staff. 
9 Staff not covered by the 1964 ORTF staff statute 
were excluded from the provisions of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
5. The broadcasting unions based this claim on figures provided by 
the ORTF management in 1972. These showed the following: 
ORTF - 13,386 employees, BBC - 23,753, AM (W. Germany) - 16,200, 
RAI (Italy) - 10,850. When programme hours were taken into account 
the-broadcasting unions calculated that the ORTF was the least well 
off of the above four broadcasting organisations in terms of staffing. 
L'Humanite, November 29 1974. See also Presse Actualit4, no. 96, 
December 1974. 
6. Le Monde, November 29 1974. 
7. J. Chevallier, La radio-television fran aise entre deux reformes, 
Paris, Librairie g nerale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975, pp. 277-281. 
Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 64-738 of July 22 1964. 
This was the ORTE staff statute applied to staff permanently employed 
at the ORTF: the statutory staff. See also, Journal Officiel, Lois 
et decrets, decree no. 69-1023 of November 12 1969. 
See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
8. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, Loi no. 74-696 du 7 aoüt 1974 
relative ä la radiodiffusion et ä la television, articles 27-30. 
9. Ibid., article 31. 
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Officially classified as temporary staff, whether in fact they were 
so or not, these employees suffered very badly from the break-up of 
the ORTF, with many of them not finding posts in the new broadcasting 
10 
companies. 
In this chapter we shall first look at those provisions of the 
1974 statute which deal with specific categories of staff employed at 
the ORTF such as civil servants and licence fee collection personnel. 
Then will follow a section on the reallocation of the general statutory 
staff. A third section will examine more closely the reallocation of 
ORTF journalists among the new companies. The broadcasting unions' 
reaction to the staff cuts will be the subject of a fourth section. 
Finally, we shall consider whether the 1974 reorganisation has in fact 
led to a decrease, either absolute or relative, in the numbers of those 
employed in the state broadcasting services. 
This chapter comes to two main conclusions. First, the reallocation 
of broadcasting staff which took place in late 1974 was a short term 
measure carried out for political rather than administrative reasons. 
Secondly, in the case of the journalists in particular the reallocation 
involved partisan political sanctions. 
Measures affecting specific staff categories 
The first means adopted by the Government to cut the numbers 
employed in the state broadcasting services was to transfer certain 
staff away from broadcasting and place them under the responsibility 
of another employer, in this case the State. For example, article 27 
10. Temporary staff (occasionnels, pigistes) were not covered by 
article 31 of the 197statute, with the exception of certain 
journalists who worked on a permanent basis at the ORTF. 
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of the 1974 broadcasting statute applied to those members of the 
ORTF's staff who had chosen to remain civil servants after the 
RTF's-change of legal status in 1959 to that of a public corporation 
of an industrial and commercial character (etablissement public ä 
caractere industriel et commercial). Employed in administrative posts 
at the ORTF, these civil servants were to be reintegrated within the 
mainstream civil service. The only way for these employees to avoid 
this compulsory transfer was to opt for the ORTF staff statute in the 
last few months of the ORTF's existence and so be subject to the 
reallocation procedure for the ORTF's general statutory staff. If not, 
they were guaranteed a post in a civil service department. 
By the provisions of article 28 those members of the ORTF's 
staff under 60 years old who had in the past relinquished the status 
of civil servant in favour of the ORTF staff statute could, if they 
so wished, agree to be transferred back to the civil service. In this 
case they too were guaranteed a civil service post. If, on the other 
hand, they chose to remain employed in broadcasting they also were 
subject to the provisions of the reallocation procedure along with the 
rest of the statutory staff. 
11 
11. The procedure for the transfer of civil servants and former civil 
servants from the ORTF to the civil service was laid down in decree 
no. 74-792 of September 24 1974. A committee was set up under 
the chairmanship of Jean-Claude Perier to supervise the transfer 
during the first six months of 1975: La commission de reclassement 
des fonctionnaires et anciens fonctionnaires de 1'ORTF. This 
committee held 13 full meetings between January and June 1975. 
In his report to the Prime Minister dated June 28 1975 Perier 
complains of the ambiguities of the 1974 broadcasting statute, 
the inadequacy of documentation on the civil servants to be 
reclassified and of the reluctance on the part of the various 
administrative departments to take on staff who had worked in the 
broadcasting services for anything up to 15 years or more. Nonethe- 
less, despite these difficulties the reclassification of civil 
servants and former civil servants would appear to have gone ahead 
without any major difficulties or dissension. 
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By the terms of article 29 of the 1974 statute employees in the 
licence revenue collection department of the ORTF, whether civil servants 
or statutory staff, were to be transferred mainly to the Ministry of 
Finance, which now assumed the task of collecting the licence fee. 
12 
Only full-time staff at the ORTF were concerned by this article, with 
temporary staff effectively being made redundant. The transfer was 
compulsory for the full-time staff. As a result, many of the ORTF's 
employees became civil servants despite the fact that most of them 
had never previously worked in the civil service in any capacity. 
13 
According to Paul L'Ollivier, who assisted the working group in the 
preparation of the decrees on the reallocation of ORTF staff, the 
execution of article 29 and the subsequent decree posed particular 
administrative problems since the Ministry of Finance did not want to 
take on the ORTF staff, while in many cases the staff themselves did 
not want to be transferred. 
14 
The last clause to deal with a specific category of staff was 
article 30. This article provided for the compulsory early retirement 
(la position speciale) of all statutory staff over the age of 60, 
unless they had dependent children or relatives. Statutory staff over 
55 years old could volunteer to benefit from early retirement. In 
the original bill submitted to the National Assembly the Government's 
proposals had been even tougher than those finally included in the 
statute. The bill provided for the compulsory retirement of statutory 
12. This transfer had been one of the recommendations of the Chinaud 
re port, 1974, pp. 165-166, which had mistakenly predicted that a 
simpler and cheaper licence collection would result. 
13. The procedure for the transfer of the licence collection staff 
was laid down in decree no. 74-1107 of December 26 1974. 
14. Interview with Paul L'Ollivier, July 13 1979. 
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staff over the age of 60 and of journalists and musicians over the age 
of 55, though those between 55 and 60 could be kept on "in the interests 
of the service. "15 It was only during the debate in the Assembly that 
the Government accepted an amendment, which was then passed without a 
public vote being taken, which made 60 the age at which all staff should 
be compulsorily retired. 
16 
The application of article 30 posed severe 
psychological problems for many of the staff affected, who were now 
forced to retire from employment at an earlier age than they had envisaged. 
On the other hand, some staff came off financially better than if they 
had been re-employed in one of the new companies and were glad to leave. 
17 
Some staff over 55 even took the option of volunteering for premature 
retirement. 
Articles 27,28,29 and 30 were designed to reduce the number of 
staff employed in the state broadcasting services. 217 staff were 
transferred to a post in the civil service, over 1,000 were moved from 
the ORTFts licence revenue collection department to the Ministry of 
Finance and 914 persons were prematurely retired, some of them 
voluntarily. 
18 However, the effect of the application of-these articles 
was very largely symbolic. Though no longer employed in the state 
broadcasting services the staff affected by articles 27-30 of the 1974 
statute were either -given a post elsewhere in the public service or 
15. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1973-1974, no. 1161, 
"Projet de loi relatif ä la radiodiffusion et A la television", 
annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 23 juillet 1974, article 23. 
16. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, July 25 
197 , PP. 3604-3606, amendment no. 170 presented by M. Claudius- 
Petit. 
17. Interview with Paul L'Ollivier, July 13 1979. 
18. Cour des Comptes, Rapport au President de la Republique suivi 
des reponses des administrations, Paris, Journaux Officiels, 1978, 
document no. 5025, p. 99. 
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benefited from early retirement. The real financial saving, therefore, 
was limited, since in either case the State continued to pay these 
staff. Thus the citizen in his role as a television viewer might have 
thought to save money by the application of these measures, but only 
to spend more in his role as a taxpayer. 
Reallocation of general statutory staff 
The vast majority of the ORTF's statutory staff did not fall into 
any of the specific categories covered by articles 27-30. The 
provisions governing their re-employment in the state broadcasting 
services after the break-up of the ORTF were outlined in article 31. 
This article prescribed a special procedure for the allocation of ORTF 
staff to the new broadcasting companies with the major provision being 
that the re-employment of ORTF staff in the new companies would be 
based on the perceived staff requirements of the heads of these 
companies. Two different procedures for the reallocation of staff were 
set down in subsequent decrees published in the autumn. One procedure 
dealt with the reallocation of general statutory staff such as 
technicians, administrators and production and ancillary staff. The 
other procedure applied to journalists and musicians. 
19 
For general statutory staff the procedure laid down in the decree 
was as follows. The heads of the new broadcasting companies, with the 
exception of INA, were to make their staff requirements known to the 
PDG of the ORTF before October 14 1974.20 He was to pass on these 
19. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 74-793 of September 24 
197 and decree no. 7 -79 of September 24 1974. 
20 Journal Officiel Lois et decrets, decree no. 74-793 of September 24 
1974, article 1. 
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staff requirements to the chairman of the Staff Reallocation Committee. 
It was the task of this committee to allocate staff to the new broad- 
casting companies. 
21 The Staff Reallocation Committee was composed of 
the chairman and vice-chairman, both members of the Conseil d'Etat, 
and representatives of the ORTF, the new companies and the broadcasting 
unions. 
22 In order that the possible non-participation of the union 
representatives would not invalidate the committee's decisions, the 
committee was deemed to be quorate when at least half of its members 
were present. 
23 Finally, the criteria used by the committee in its 
deliberations in the likely event of supply outweighing demand were 
the classic ones of, first, length of service at the ORTF and, secondly, 
the number of dependent children. 
24 Erwin Guldner and Jean-Claude Perier 
were appointed by Rossi as chairman and vice-chairman of the committee 
respectively. 
25 
For the reallocation of the ORTF's general statutory staff the 
21. Ibid, article 2. The PDG of the ORTF officially allocated the staff 
to the new companies. 
22. Ibid, article 3. See table 6. iifor the composition of the Staff 
Reallocation Committee. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid, article 4. 
25. Guldner had followed a politico-administrative career. A member 
of several ministerial cabinets during the Fourth Republic, he was 
elected mayor of Sceaux, a residential suburb of Paris, in 1959 and 
re-elected in 1965 and 1971. Since 1967 he has also been a 
conseiller general in the Hauts-de-Seine department. 
Perier had followed a career in the French judiciary, being appointed 
director of the gendarmerie in 1962. Following the break-up of the 
ORTF he was appointed a member of the committee responsible for 
administering the broadcasting right of reply and also became chair- 
man of the Quality Committee. In 1976 he was appointed director of 
the cabinet of Olivier Guichard, minister of Justice. Though 
officially vice-chairman of the Staff Reallocation Committee, there is 
no doubt that Perier rather than Guldner was its de facto head. 
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committee held 8 official meetings throughout November and, December. 
26 
Its decisions were passed on to Long who notified staff of their new 
post or redundancy during the third week of December 1974, barely a 
few days before the new companies were to begin their operations. With 
the exception of FC the broadcasting unions (SCORT, SNRT-CGT, FSU 
and SIRT-CFDT) refused to participate actively in the work of the 
committee though they did attend its meetings as observers* 
27 
Instead the broadcasting uions proposed talks with the PDG of 
the ORTF and the heads of the new broadcasting companies to discuss all 
the problems relating to staff posed by the break-up of the ORTF. These 
problems included the staff requirements of the new companies, the fate 
of the permanent- non-statutory. staff= . 
(pigi'st'es; 
- cantractaels), - the, content 
of the new staff- contracts _and_ 
the alternative- employment- proposals made--- 
to staff not reallocated to-one of the new companies. In refusing to 
participate in-the work--of-the Staff-Reallocation Committee . the broad- 
casting=-unions-also-wished -to show-their--protest--against the provisions-of. - 
26 The 8 meetings were as follows: 
November 6 and 15: ORTF executive staff (cadres de direction) 
December 11 : cadres administratifs and cadres de 
production-. - - December 12 : technicail staff 
December 13 . computer staff' 
December. 16_ minor.. administrative.. staff 
December-18. - : production--staff 
December 19 : general workforce (personnels ouvriers) 
A meeting was also held on December 18 to reallocate the ORTF 
musicians and choristers. 
Source: Report made by the chairman of the Staff Reallocation 
Committee to Rossi, dated January 28 1975. 
27. Report made by the chairman of the Staff Reallocation Committee 
to Rossi, dated January 28 1975. 
See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
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the 1974 statute which in their eyes amounted to a collective 
redundancy measure and yet excluded staff made redundant from the 
protection laid down in the code du travail. 
Rossi was explicitly opposed to general negotiations between the 
unions and the different sets of management because they would have 
infringed the spirit of the 1974 statute and its creation of separate 
companies. 
28 The only course left to the unions, therefore, was to 
demonstrate their opposition publicly in the form of strikes and 
work stoppages during the last few months of the ORTF's existence. 
29 
However, given the committee's terms of reference and procedural rubric, 
the refusal of the broadcasting unions to nominate representatives 
was a symbolic gesture of little effect. 
30 
It is important to remember the context in which the discussions 
of the Staff Reallocation Committee took place. The 1974 statute 
had to be applied in a hurry so that the new companies could start 
operating at the beginning of January 1975. The heads of the new 
companies had to estimate their staff requirements in conditions of 
extreme uncertainty. 
"In order to determine-their staff requirements, the 
heads of the new companies would have had to know the size of 
their budgetary allocations, the content of their cahiers des 
charges, the results of the division of the central departments 
of the ORTF, the sharing out of production between the channels 
28. Le Monde, October 1 1974. 
29. See section on trade union reaction to the staff cuts. 
30. Perier thought that the unions ought to have participated in the 
work of the Staff Reallocation Committee. In his eyes the unions 
-wege trying to change the terms of the statute when the battle had 
already been lost. Interview with Jean-Claude Perisr, September 
13 1979. However, one can appreciate the difficulties the unions 
faced in not wishing to be seen to condone redundancies. 
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and the production company, the allocation of buildings 
and of ORTF property and equipment, etc. Yet with regard 
to many of these questions uncertainty reigned up until 
the beginning of December 1974. " 31 
Thus, the estimated staff requirements originally drawn up by the 
new company heads had to be revised downwards when the Government 
imposed its strict budgetary constraints on the companies for 1975.32 
With length of service at the ORTF the major criterion there was 
no attempt by the Staff Reallocation Committee to evaluate the 
professional ability of the staff. Length of service was not only 
a traditional criterion to employ in the reorganisation of a company, 
it was also, given the tight time schedule to be followed, the only 
one feasible in the circumstances. The ORTF was in chaos and there 
were over 11,000 staff to be considered for reallocation to the- new 
companies. The criterion of length of service could be applied both 
simply and objectively in a short period of time. This does not mean, 
however, that its appbcation posed no problems to the committee. 
Staff residing in Paris, the French -provinces-and- 
the- overseas 
departments and territories were not interchangeable. -The heads of f 
the new companies frequently did not want to take on staff conside_ýµ 
undesirable -for professional-reasons. 
33 Moreover, -in certain case_ 
staff had to be retained because they were indispensable to the- nee: 
31. Report made by the chairman of the Staff Reallocation Committee 
to Rossi, dated January 28 1975, p. 2. 
32. In reply to questions by trade union representatives as to how 
she had drawn up the staff requirements for Radio France, 
Baudrier confessed that the figure was hypothetical since she 
did not as yet know the size of the company's budget or the 
content of its cahier des charges. Le Monde, November 30 1974. 
33" For example, Guillaud, the new director general of TF1, wanted 
to choose his staff on the basis of his opinion of their 
professional ability. Interview with Jean-Claude Perier, 
September 13 1979. 
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companies. This sometimes entailed reducing the length of service 
required for the re-employment of that particular category of staff 
and thereby compelling the companies to take on other persons who 
were quite dispensable. 
34 
The reallocation of statutory staff was carried out category by 
category, with varying demands for staff depending on the category 
in question. For example, because of the compulsory retirement of 
ORTF staff over the age of 60 and the transfer of civil servants 
back to the civil service, demand in some categories was greater than 
supply. This was the case in respect of executive staff (cadres 
de direction, cadres administratifs and cadres de production) and 
technical staff. On the other hand, in the case of minor administrat- 
ive staff and general workers supply outweighed demand. Many staff 
were transferred only on paper. Thus, in general those staff who 
prior to the reorganisation had worked in the production services 
of the ORTF were allocated to the new production-company, the SFP. 
Their place of work, thestudios at Buttes -Chaumont, - remained-the--- -- 
same. Those employed in the radio services of the ORTF were in 
general allocated to the new radio company, Radio France. - Similarly, 
those employed in the ORTF's transmission services or in the regional 
stations were with few exceptions transferred to the new transmission 
company, TDF, and to- the regional programme-company, FR3, respectively. 
On the other hand, the two major television companies, TFl and A2, 
did not simply take on the staff from channels one and two at the ORTF. 
For the top posts personal acquaintance played an important role 
34. Report made by the chairman of the Staff Reallocation Committee 
to Rossi, dated January 28 1975, p. 10. 
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in deciding who was allocated to which company. The new company 
heads were often solicited for preferential treatment by some, 
while in other cases they or their immediate subordinates picked out 
suitable candidates. Specialist staff were most in demand. 
35 Most 
staff, on the other hand, had no choice in the allocation to their 
new company. While some ORTF departments were transferred to a new 
company en bloc, others, particularly the central departments were 
broken up. 
36 The reallocation procedure was variously described by 
both staff and management representatives as "every man for himself", 
"like a slave market", "completely chaotic" and "anarchy". 
37 
Near the end of the reallocation procedure some sections of staff 
were being reallocated on the basis of which of the new companies 
was nearest their home! 
The staff reallocation procedure laid down in the 1974 broad- 
casting statute and subsequent decrees replaced the procedure set 
out in the 1964 ORTF staff statute in cases of staff transfers-and 
redundancies. 
38 The commission paritaire of the ORTF was not consulted 
35. For example, Maurice Geoffroy, head of technical services on 
channel two at the ORTF, was wanted by TF1, A2 and the SFP. 
He was eventually allocated to A2. Minutes of the meeting of 
the Staff Reallocation committee to reallocate the cadres 
de direction, --November and 15-1974. 
36. For example, the-top staff-in the ORTF's. _audience research department were dispersed among the new companies. Jacques 
Durand, head of the audience research service (1972-74), 
became assistant director of the new central audience research 
service, the Centre d'etudes d'opinion. Mme Nicole Casile 
went to TF1 as head of its audience research department, 
Michel Demaison went to A2 to fulfil the same role there and 
Michel Souchon joined the research department at INA. 
37. Interviews with Mario Andre, May 2 1977, Robert Favre, 
February 28 1977, and Jacqueline Furbeyre, June 16 1977. 
38. Journal Officiel Lois et decrets, decree no. 64-738 of July 22 
1964, articles 56 and 57; decree no. 69-1023 of November 12 
1969, article 2. 
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as it had been in cases of individual redundancies since 1969.39 
The comite central d'entreprise, set up in 1969 as part of the Chaban- 
Delmas reform of the ORTF, was not consulted either, despite the fact 
that it was supposed to discuss measures affecting staff numbers. 
4o 
Thus, by instituting a new procedure for the reallocation of ORTF 
staff among the new companies the Government was able to circumvent 
the protective measures gained by the staff in 1964 and 1969.41 For 
example, while by the terms of the 1964 ORTF staff statute any member 
of staff made redundant as part of an overall cut in staff benefited 
from priority treatment in the event of staff being taken on at the 
ORTF within six months of the redundancy measure, no similar guarantee 
of priority treatment was included in the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
Article 31 of the 1974 statute included the provision that staff 
who were not reallocated to one of the new broadcasting companies could 
request to be transferred to a state controlled company, public corporation 
or administrative -department. -- Those members of staff who were not re- 
allocated and did not make such a request were automatically made re- 
dundant as from January 1 1975. If those who did ask tobe transferred 
were unsuccessful, then they too were automatically made redundant as 
from July 1 1975. A committee-was set up under the chairmanship of Perier 
to administer the transfer of non-reallocated staff to state run services, 
39" Journal-Officiel, Lois et -decrets, decree no. 69-1023 of November 
12 1969, article 2, modifying articles 10-14 of decree no. 64-738 
of July 22 1964. For an analysis of the role of the commissions 
paritaires at the ORTF, see chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
40. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 69-1023 of November 
12 1969, article 14, replacing articles 63-65 of decree no. 64-738 
of July 22 1964. 
41. C. Floch, La reorganisation dune entreprise publique et les relations 
du travail: le cas de la radiodiffusion et t4levision fran wise, 
unpublished memoire de DES, University of Paris I, 1976, pp. 81-100. 
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but in the event very few staff had to be transferred in this way. 
42 
It is difficult to obtain precise figures about the number of ORTF 
staff, excluding journalists, who were not originally re-employed 
in one of the new broadcasting companies. Hundreds of temporary 
staff, whose cases were not included in the deliberations of the 
Staff Reallocation Committee, lost their jobs after the break-up 
of the ORTF. Of the statutory staff, excluding journalists, 
employed at the ORTF 538 were originally not allocated a post in the 
new broadcasting companies. 
43 
Excluding journalists and temporary 
staff, the original total of ORTF staff (civil servants, former 
civil servants, licence revenue collection staff, employees prematurely 
retired, and redundancies) not given a post in the broadcasting 
companies amounted to around 3,000. 
However, once the new-companies had come into operation their 
management realised that--they had underestimated their staff re- 
quirements. Consequently, -. within the first six months of 
1975 many 
of those staff originally-not allocated. a post were in fact taken on 
by the new companies. --During -this early period exchanges of staff 
among the companies were common as new teams were constituted. By 
the end of their first year the companies had re-employed almost. all of 
the ORTF's statutory staff and it was not long before they in their 
turn were being criticised for being overstaffed! The ORTF's 
temporary staff, on the other hand, were not readily employed by 
42. Interview with Jacqueline Flzrbeyre, June 16 1977. According 
to Paul L'Ollivier, July 13 1979, staff transferred in this 
way were given a very raw deal in that the proposals made to 
them were inferior to the post they had held at the ORTF. 
43. This is the figure in the report made by the committee to 
Rossi, dated January 28 1975, p. 9a. 
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the new companies and along with certain journalists they suffered 
most from the 1974 reform. Civil servants, former civil servants, 
staff in the licence collection service and staff prematurely 
retired were also hard hit, psychologically if not always 
financially. Moreover, even if few of the ORTF's statutory staff 
did not find employment in one of the new companies, the fear of 
being made redundant which pervaded the Office in late 1974 adversely 
affected the resurgence of trade union activity during 1975. 
Reallocation of ORTF journalists 
The reallocation of the ORTF's technical, administrative and 
general staff was largely overshadowed by the procedure to reallocate 
the ORTF journalists among the new companies. In the first instance 
over 250 journalists out of a total of just over 1,000 were not given 
a post in the new companies. This cutback in the number of journalists 
was motivated by two considerations. First, the reduction-in-numbers 
was made-in line with the Government's wider objective of reducing 
the size of the broadcasting staff in general. The journalists 
could hardly expect to be spared the consequences of this aspect of the 
Government's broadcasting-policy, particularly as they had been singled 
out for special criticism in the Chinaud report. 
44 
More significantly, 
44. Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 114-118. This section entitled "Les 
journalistes offrent un bon exemple de l'ensemble des errements 
de la politique du personnel de l'Office" is an attack on the 
number of journalists employed at the ORTF. The section concludes 
"... a large number of full-time journalists are seriously under- 
employed, or even not used at all. " (p. 118) 
According to Presse Actualite there were 1,400 journalists employed 
at the ORTF including part-timers. This compared with 1,500 at 
the BBC and 2,400 in the German broadcasting services. J. Buisson, 
"Requiem pour un office", Presse Actualite, no. 96, December 1974. 
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there is evidence that the Government availed itself of this 
opportunity to try and remove from the state broadcasting services 
a number of trade union activists, particularly in the largest journal- 
ists' union, the Syndicat National des Journalistes (SNJ), and 
suspected political opponents of the Giscardian regime, both left- 
wing supporters and Gaullists. 
The reallocation procedure for the ORTF journalists was different 
from that used for the technical, administrative and general staff 
in two respects. First, the size of the Reallocation Committee was 
reduced from 18 to U members. 
45 
Secondly, and more importantly, 
the major criterion to be employed in the reallocation of the 
journalists was that of professional ability (aptitudes professionnelles). 
Length of service and number of dependent children were in the case of 
the journalists to be secondary considerations. 
46 
The committee held four meetings on November 4 and 25 and December 
3 and 13 1974. Perier had been given the task by Guldner of preparing 
the ground for the reallocation of the journalists. Only statutory 
journalists were considered by the committee with the result that 
even "permanent temporaries" (pigistes permanents) were not included 
in the committee's deliberations. 
47 
The first problem the committee 
faced, leaving aside the question of the non-participation of the 
trade union representatives, was how to implement the provisions of 
the decree. Perier discovered that there was no recognised grading 
45 Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 74-794 of September 
2 1974, article 3. See table6. iiifor the composition of the 
committee. 8 of the 11 members proposed in the decree were directly 
or indirectly appointed by the Government. 
46. Ibid" article 4. 
47. Minutes of the meeting of the Reallocation Committee held on 
November 4 1974. Statutory-journalists were covered by the 6 provisions of decree no. 4 739 of July 22 1964. There were 250- 300 piristes permanents at the ORTF. SNJ tract, November 14 1974. 
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system for the ORTF journalists. 
48 
Therefore, he proposed that the 
ORTF news directors and the news directors of the new companies should 
classify the journalists on the basis of past performance and future 
utility respectively. When questioned about this, Perier remarked 
that "after all these people were their bosses. 
" 
A points system was thus established with a maximum of 30 for 
past performance and 20 for future utility. The journalists were 
then classified on this scale from 0 to 50 points. At the end of 
the first classification 788 journalists had more than 30 points. 
This figure was below the estimated requirements made by the new 
companies on October 18 1974 of 816 journalists. 
50 After further 
discussion the total was then raised from 788 to 842. At this stage 
of the process 261 journalists were not reallocated to one of the new 
companies after obtaining less than 30 points. 
51 
Understandably the journalists' unions (CFDT, FO and SNJ)_Xiewed 
the whole reallocation procedure with suspicion and a deep mistrust of 
the Government's motives. After all the journalists-had suffered before 
during reforms of the ORTF, most notably in-the-1968 backlash and after 
the passing of the 1972 ORTF statute. 
52 Though allowed by the decree 
48. Ibid, p. 5-and interview with Perier, September 13 1979 
49. Interview with Perier, September 13 1979 
50. Minutes of the meeting of the Reallocation Committee held on 
November 25 1974. 
51. Ibid. 
52. In 1968 over 100 journalists were affected by the sanctions taken by 
the Government in response to the strike at the ORTF. For a list of 
those sacked and demoted see Le Monde, August 14 1968. 
In 1972, according to the SNJ, about 20 journalists were sacked and 
others demoted following Conte's appointment as PDG of the ORTF and 
the ending of the Desgraupes "experiment". Le Journaliste, no. 139, 
September-October 1972. 
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to appoint three representatives to the committee, only FO sent a 
delegate, with the other unions refusing to attend even in an observer 
capacity. 
53 For its part the SNJ refused to nominate a representative 
and denounced the committee's deliberations as a political charade. 
54 
The proceedings of the Journalists' Reallocation Committee were 
described in an interview by the PD representative, Roger Michaud: 
"FO discussed whether to send a representative to sit on the 
Reallocation Committee. We had semi-official talks with the ORTF 
management beforehand. The SNJ and the CFDT both refused to 
participate in the Committee's discussions. FO decided to send 
a representative to see how things worked out. ... I went as the FO representative in an observer capacity. FO's position was 
that we would not refuse a general discussion, but that we would 
not be a party to any disguised redundancies. ... Guldner and Perier arrived with the attitude that all they had 
to do was execute the provisions of the statute. Later they came 
to realise the difficulties involved. The management of the ORTF 
had already drawn up lists of those journalists they wanted to 
keep. Guldner and Perier decided that they could not simply 
endorse the decisions of the ORTF management. Therefore, they 
devised the points system. ... The procedure was fixed so that 
certain journalists would be retained and others made redundant. 
At the start of the first meeting we were given a sheet with 
each journalist's marks noted down. It was obvious that the 
decisions had already been made before the committee officially met. 
"". " 55 
The provisions of the 1964 ORTF journalists' statute, which had 
been strengthened in 1969, were superseded by the terms of the 1974 
reform. 
56 The redundancies were considered to be collective rather 
than individual, with the result that the specialist commission 
paritaire dealing with the transfer and sacking of journalists was not 
53" Minutes of the meeting of the Reallocation Committee held on 
November 4 1974. 
54. SNJ communique dated November 5 1974. 
55" Interview with Roger Michaud, June 20 1977. Perier specifically 
denied the charge that the journalists had already been reallocated 
before the meetings of the committee. Interview with Jean-Claude Perier, September 13 1979. 
56 Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, 
12 
decree 
196964-739 
of July 22 1964 and decree no. 9-102 61 November 1969. 
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consulted. The sole forum for discussion available to the journalists' 
unions was the Reallocation Committee itself, since the Government 
steadfastly refused to enter into negotiations directly. In 
refusing to participate in the work of the Reallocation Committee, 
the journalists' unions found themselves at the end of November 1974 facet 
with the fait accompli of a severe cutback in staff and a purge of 
the ORTF news teams. Perier severely criticised the unions for not 
participating in the work of the committee. 
57 Yet it is difficult to 
see what they could have achieved given the composition of the committee 
and the terms of reference laid down in the decree. In their opinion 
they could not have been expected to condone through participation 
decisions which adversely affected the interests of their members. 
This reduction in the number of journalists employed in the state 
broadcasting services came as a cruel blow to a profession already 
suffering from a high rate of unemployment. The journalists' unions 
argued that the- number of journalists- employed at the ORTF was in 
proportion to the Office's news output. It was certainly ironic that 
only recently the ORTF management had refused to agree to the unions' 
demands for a maximum five day working week on the grounds of a shortage 
of staff. 
58 
More important -than the overall cutback in the number of 
journalists 
employed in state broadcasting, however, was the fact that trade union 
activists and suspected political opponents of the new regime were 
57. Perier asserted that the unions made a great mistake in not 
coming to the meetings of the committee, arguing that they could 
have defended their case better if they had attended. Interview 
with Jean-Claude Perier, September 13 1979" 
58. SNJ Section ORTF, L'ORTF, le pouvoir et les journalistes, 
Paris, 1974, p. 84. 
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hardest hit by the reallocation. The unions complained that of the 
journalists not reallocated to one of the new companies an excessively 
high proportion were trade union activists. 
59 Thus, while only half 
the journalists employed at the ORTF were trade union members, two 
thirds of those originally not re-employed by one of the new 
companies belonged to a trade union. The SNJ, by far the largest 
of the broadcasting journalists' unions, lost over 100 members in 
the reallocation procedure. Guldner and Perier denied any inherent 
procedural bias against trade union activists, arguing that from the 
reports on the journalists given to them by the news directors and 
editors they had taken account of professional ability only "and 
of nothing-else". 
60 
Certainly there is-no evidence that these two 
civil servants did not carry out their task according to the letter 
of the decree. 
61 
However, 'the decree-itself was not a neutral device, 
and it was increasingly apparent that Guldner and Perier were being 
used to give credibility to decisions already made elsewhere. _The 
representatives of the new companies on the committee had all worked 
at the ORTF and knew which journalists did not have the seal of 
approval of Poniatowski, Minister of the Interior and Giscard's 
right hand man. 
62 
The SNJ'sllosses originally included-six members of the-national 
59" See the CFDT and PS communiques in Le Monde, November 29 1974. 
60. Interview with Guldner and Perier in Le Monde, November 29 1974. 
Perier confirmed this opinion in his interview with the author 
of September 13 1979. 
61. On the reports on certain journalists of the external services 
seen by the author there was no mention of any political criteria 
being employed to rank the journalists. This reinforces 
Perier's view that at his level political criteria played no 
part in the re-employment of the journalists. However, it does 
not mean that political criteria played no part at any stage in 
the process. 
62. L'Unite, November 1 1974. 
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bureau of the union's ORTF section and twelve representatives of the 
union in the regional broadcasting stations where the SNJ was particularly 
strong-63 In these regional stations three members of the SNJ's national 
bureau were originally not re-employed in the new regional programme 
company, FR3. All three were reinstated after pressure had been 
exerted on the management, but two of the journalists involved were 
transferred to other stations. One moved from a large news department 
in Marseille to a much less important one in Orleans, while the other 
was transferred from Nice to Bordeaux. Both left fellow journalists 
and union colleagues to move to an unfamiliar news team in a different 
regional station. 
64 
Other SNJ representatives did not find a post in 
the reorganised structure. For example, the representatives in Roueen 
and Bezancon_. were not reallocated in the original process and were not 
fortunate enough to be saved by the union's militant action through- 
out November and December 1974.65 Neither of these two journalists 
has worked in the state broadcasting services since the break-up 
of the ORTF. 
Other SNJ militants were transferred to INA, well away from 
the news departments of the radio and television companies. A 
63. The six members of the national bureau originally not re-employed 
in the new companies were Frederi Astoux, -Jean Calvel, Cecile 
Philippe, Josiane Romero, Raymond Sedbon-and-Richard Someritis. 
SNJ communique, December 5 1974. See also le Journaliste, 
no. 149, October-November 1974. 
64. Astoux was transferred from Marseille to Orleans and Jean- 
Jacques Filleau was moved from Nice to Bordeaux. Interview 
with Michel Barre, SNJ representative at FR3, June 14 1977. 
65. Annette Vial (Bezangon) and Josiane Romero (Rouen). Interview 
with Edouard Guibert, general secretary of the SNJ's ORTF 
section, May 31 1977 
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journalist with Socialist sympathies, Christian Colombani, was not 
reallocated on professional grounds and is now employed on the 
politics desk of Le Monde! 
66 
Even those SNJ activists who were 
allocated a post in one of the new companies, particularly those 
only reinstated after the application of union pressure, were not 
given positions of responsibility within the new structure. For 
example, one SNJ representative recounted his own story as follows: 
"I worked in the external services of the RTF and then the 
ORTF from 1956 to 1974 and became assistant editor in the 
central news division. In the autumn of 1974 the authorities 
wanted to sack me, but they did not have the right as I was 
a staff representative. I was reinstated, but was placed as 
far away from the news team as possible. Despite the fact 
that I had never worked in television I was transferred from 
the external services to A2. But I have never worked in the 
news department at A2 though I have applied to do so several 
times. At the moment I am responsible for the company hand- 
book and the company newspaper, that's all. I still keep iri 
touch with colleagues in the news team, but my career as a 
journalist has been rujned. " 67 
The very top representatives of the journalists' unions were given 
a post in the new companies. For example, Edouard Guibert, general 
secretary of the SNJSs ORTF section was reallocated to A2. However, 
in an act of solidarity with those journalists who had not been 
offered a new post Guibert refused to accept his new position and 
voluntarily resigned from the state broadcasting services. 
68 
Since 
the break-up of the ORTF he has been working on a freelance basis and 
has not worked for any of the new broadcasting companies in his 
capacity as a journalist. Ironically in early 1977 he was employed 
66. Le Nouvel Observateur, no. 525, December 2-8 1974. 
67. Interview with Richard Someritis, May 20 1977. 
68. See Le Journaliste, no. 150, March-April 1975, for the text 
of Guibert's letter of resignation. 
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as a teacher by INA to help in the training programme for young 
journalists attached to A2! 
69 
The reallocation procedure, therefore, 
affected the SNJ more than the other journalists' unions and within 
the SNJ it was the activists rather than the leadership who were 
hardest hit. 
7° 
The announcement by the Reallocation Committee that 261 
statutory journalists were not to be given a post in the new 
companies produced an immediate reaction on the part of the journalists' 
unions. Following the second meeting of the committee on November 25 
the journalists' unions called their members out on a strike which 
quickly spread to other sections of the ORTF's staff. There was no 
official notice of the strike as required by the 1972 ORTF-statute, - 
nor did the journalists agree to broadcast a normal news programme 
as they were legally obliged-to do by-the requirements of the'fninimum 
programme. '"71- Instead only- very short news- bulletins- were broadcast, 
consisting of still pictures and a voice speaking off screen. 
Attacking the illegality-of this action, Chirac ordered the 
occupation of the news studios by the police to keep the striking 
journalists out. The minimum programme was restored and the strike 
ended on December 2, the day before the third meeting of the Reallocation 
Committee. 72 Partly due to the pressure exerted by the journalists' 
unions, the number of journalists not reallocated to the new companies 
69. Interview with Edouard Guibert, May 31 1977- 
70- Interview with Daniel Esteve, CFDT representative at A2, 
September 20 1979. 
71. For an explanation of the "minimum programme" see chapter on the 
Broadcasting Unions. 
72. For a chronological account of the strike, see Temoignage 
Chr etien, December 5 1974. 
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fell fron 261 to 182.73 Moreover, as we have seen, the SNJ 
succeeded in having many of its representatives reinstated, though 
usually to less favourable posts. 
74 
However, though the SNJ succeeded in defending many of its 
representatives in the end, there seems little doubt that in the 
first instance the reallocation procedure was designed to remove 
these journalists from the state broadcasting services. This is not 
to say that Guldner and Perier were themselves responsible for this 
anti-trade union bias in the reallocation procedure. On the contrary, 
their bona fides is not in question. Perier in particular went 
beyond the strict terms of the legislation to try to save several 
journalists from redundancy, including temporary journalists not 
considered by the official Reallocation Committee. Moreover, the 
trade unions-themselves far from holding Perier responsible thanked 
him for his efforts on their behalf in a private -letter dated -- 
December 30 1974.75 
The real source of the problem lay in the terms of reference 
imposed on Guldner and Perier by the relevant decree: -- The importance 
attached-to the subjective criterion of professional ability meant 
that the reallocation of ORTF journalists was open to all sorts of 
personal and political abuse. The lack of official files kept on 
these journalists at the ORTF further weakened the possibility that 
the criterion of professional ability would be respected. In the 
73. Minutes of the meeting held on December 13 1974. 
74. As always it is difficult to be precise about the number of 
journalists who were not given a post in one of the new companies. 
See table 6. ivfor the SNJ's own tentative estimate. 
75. Perier showed me the letter during our interview on September 13 
1979. 
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absence of these files Perier was obliged to rely on the representatives 
of the ORTF news management on the one hand and on the news directors 
of the new companies on the other. In certain cases these were the 
same people and in all cases they shared the same general political 
outlook. Thus, by the time the committee came to reallocate the 
journalists, Perier had little room for manoeuvre, though the little 
he did have he used well. 
Trade union reaction to the staff cuts 
Not surprisingly the various measures taken to reduce the number 
of staff employed in the state broadcasting services met with strong 
opposition from the various broadcasting unions, the high-point being 
the general strike which -took -place at the end of November. - This 
strike, which started among the , 
journalists and quickly spread to 
other sections of staff, marked the culmination-of the unions' 
opposition to the 1974 statute which began in July and continued up 
to the final days of-the ORTF. z_ - 
The broadcasting unions had been opposed-to the break-up of the 
ORTF since the publication-of the Governments proposals-in the summer. 
In fact, they had always been-in favour-of preserving not only the 
state monopoly, which they regarded as the best means of maintaining 
the public service nature of French broadcasting, but also the unitary 
structure of the ORTF. Hence the broadcasting unions had opposed the 
decentralising provisions of the 1972 ORTF statute and a fortiori 
the splitting up of the ORTF into separate companies. A unitary 
structure, within which programme schedules would be complementary 
rather than competitive, was in their eyes a necessary prerequisite 
if programme standards were to be maintained or even improved. 
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However, though the unions cast themselves in the role of 
protecting the interests of the viewer, there is no doubt that they 
also wished to protect their own vested interests. Several of the 
unions had built up strong organisations at the ORTF, which would 
come under threat if the ORTF were itself to disappear. For example, 
the Federation Syndicale Unifiee was particularly strong among the 
ORTF technical staff, while the SNJ was the most representative of 
the journalists' unions. 
76 For these and other broadcasting uions 
the break-up of the ORTF would, they feared, pose serious problems of 
organisation. The unions each might have to build up seven separate 
organisational structures in place of one. There was the danger that 
the reform would lead to staff in different companies being cut off 
from, and in some cases even being opposed to, each other. Inter- 
union activity, which had been common at the ORTF under -. the-aegis 
of the Intersyndicale, -would 
in-all probability be . seriously 
impaired.? 
In the short term the--unions' prime-concern--was to -protect their members' 
jobs and to fight any proposed redundancies. For all these reasons, 
therefore, - the broadcasting unions were pledged first -to -oppose the 
statute itself and, once this was seen to be a futile exercise, at 
least to mitigate the most -undesirable consequences of 
the reorganisation 
for the staff of the ORTF. 
The main instrument of union opposition to the reform was the Inter- 
syndicale, which was responsible for putting forward the demands of 
the different unions to Rossi. The principal demand made by the 
76. See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
77. The Intersyndicale grouped together representatives of the 
following unions: the FSU, SNRT-CGT, SIRT-CFDT and SNJ. 
See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
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Intersyndicale in late 1974 was that all the staff employed at the 
ORTF should be given a post in the new companies. In addition, the 
broadcasting unions wanted the advantages gained by the staff at 
the ORTF with regard to salary scales- and qualifications to be main- 
tained in the new companies while they also pressed for a single 
staff statute for the staff in all seven companies, journalists 
excluded. 
78 Moreover, the Intersyndicale wanted to discuss these 
demands within the framework of negotiations covering all the 
measures relevant to the ORTF staff. 
Rossi, on the other hand, steadfastly refused to enter into 
any such negotiations, pointing out that they would be in flagrant 
contradiction with the decentralist ethos of the 1974 statute. As 
a result of the Government's intransigeance on this matter, the 
broadcasting unions were compelled to defend their case piecemeal 
before different interlocutors: Rossi, the PDG of the ORTF, the 
heads of the new companies and the chairman and vice-chairman of 
the Staff Reallocation Committee. None of-these meetings came-anywhere 
near to satisfying the demands of the unions and on October 8a 
general strike call was made by the Intersyndicale with only a 
minimum programme being broadcast. The CGC, CFTC and P0, however, 
refused to participate in this strike which-lasted three days. 
Partial strikes and stoppages continued to affect the ORTF 
throughout the autumn, culminating in the journalists' strike on 
November 25 and the general strike on November 29 in opposition to the 
announced redundancies. During the general strike strains began to 
78. Le Monde, October 1 1974. 
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appear within the Intersyndicale on the question of the best tactics 
to adopt in defence of the interests of the staff. The FSU was 
opposed to an unlimited general strike, favouring instead partial 
strikes confined to particular categories of staff. The FSU leader- 
ship feared that the continuation of the general strike might lead 
to a lock-out of the staff by the ORTF management, in which case 
the staff would have no further weapons at their disposal. The 
SNRT-CGT, on the other hand, favoured the use of the general strike 
on the grounds that a concerted attack on the staff of the ORTF required 
a concerted response by them. 
79 
This divergence over tactics within the Intersyndicale certainly 
did not help the cause of the broadcasting unions in their opposition 
to the application of the 1974 statute. But in any case their 
freedom of manoeuvre was extremely limited. As negotiations with 
the different parties involved proved increasingly futile, the unions 
were compelled to 'resort tö strike action. This may have helped save 
the jobs of some staff, but the overall effect remained marginal. On 
the other hand strikes were universally unpopular with the viewers 
whose major concern was for an uninterrupted service. The broad- 
casting unions complained that they received very little active 
support from the political parties of the left, who were accused 
of allowing the Government's case to go by default; though it is 
not at all clear what the Socialist and Communist parties could have 
done in any case. 
8o 
Finally, even the staff themselves were frequently 
79. Le Monde, November 30 1974. 
80. Interview with Edouard Guibert in Temoignage Chretien, January 2 
1975. 
F- 
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ambivalent in their attitude to opposition to the reform. In several 
cases, as the unions found to their cost, once an individual had been 
reallocated to one of the new companies, his (or her)ardour for the 
struggle waned. 
During December 1974 only partial strikes were carried out at the 
ORTF, affecting notably the Christmas holiday programmes. As the 
ORTF moved inexorably towards its demise the unions concentrated on 
saving as many staff as possible from redundancy, with some success. 
However, as the changeover date to the new companies approached other 
problems had to be considered. Of these the most immediate was how 
the separate unions would organise themselves in the new companies in 
the face of seven different sets of management. 
Conclusion: reduction in staff-numbers? 
The 1974 reform was regarded by the broadcasting unions as a 
move directed against the ORTF staff in general and against the unions 
in particular. The Government's wish was that with the introduction 
of new smaller companies less staff would be required to-run the 
state broadcasting services than-had-been employed at-the overmanned 
ORTF. The unions, on the other hand, argued that the ORTF was not 
overstaffed when compared with equivalent broadcasting organisations 
in other European countries. 
It is true that the steps taken in late 1974 did cut the 
number of people employed in the state broadcasting services. 
However, partly this was due to staff being transferred on to other 
pay rolls, particularly in the case of the licence collection staff 
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transferred to the Ministry of Finance. Other staff (civil 
servants, former civil servants) though no longer employed in a 
post connected with broadcasting still had to be paid by the State 
after 1975. In any case the reduction in staff numbers was only 
a short term cutback, with the result that two years after the 
reorganisation the staffing levels in the new companies were on a 
par with those at the ORTF in its last year. 
It might be argued that the increase in the number of staff 
employed in the state broadcasting services since January 1975 can be 
justified by the extension of viewing time on the television channels 
during the same period. 
81 
However, this would be to establish a 
correlation between manpower levels and programme output which was 
not investigated in 1974 when the ORTF was constantly being criticised 
for being overstaffed. In any case the fact that in the early months 
of 1975 the new-companies-already realised that they had underestimated 
their staff requirements-and-started to take on-former ORTF staff 
who had not been reallocated indicates that from the very beginning 
the cutback-in staff was not-justified, or at the very least had been 
exaggerated. 
In the absence of any correlation between staff numbers and 
programme output it seems much more likely that the cutback in 
staff at the end of 1974 was an integral part of the new Government's 
policy to discredit the ORTF and reorganise the state broadcasting 
81. The three television channels of the ORTF screened under 7,000 
hours of programmes in 1973. This compares with over 9,000 by the 
three television companies in 1977. ORTF 73, Paris, Presses 
Pocket, 19733 P"95" M. Souchon, "L'evolution des programmes et des 
publics de television", paper presented to a conference on new 
developments in the French press and broadcasting, Paris, 1978. 
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services into new smaller units. In addition, the general 
reduction in staff afforded the new regime the opportunity to seek- 
to rid the state broadcasting services of journalists considered 
undesirable because of their trade union activities or political 
views. It is noticeable that though since 1975 the number of 
journalists employed by the new companies has risen from 928 to 
1,116 in 1978, there has been no ministerial outcry comparable 
to that directed against the journalists in the autumn of 1974.82 
In short, the reduction in staff appears to have been a political 
rather than administrative exercise, especially in the case of the 
journalists where political rather than professional considerations 
were of paramount importance. 
82. Source: Annual budgetary reports of the National Assembly 
Finance Committee on broadcasting, rapporteur special: Joel 
Le Tac. 
See table 6. v which gives staff numbers in the new companies: 1975-1979. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The broadcasting unions 
Once the partially successful rearguard action against the 
cutback in staff had been fought, the broadcasting unions faced other 
more long term problems connected with the break-up of the ORTF. First, 
there was the question of organisation within the new decentralised frame- 
work. During the first few months of 1975 the different broadcasting 
unions had to reform their organisational structures to cope with the 
changed set of circumstances posed by the197l statute. Secondly, during 
1975 also the unions had to negotiate collective staff agreements in each 
of the programme companies and at the SFP. Replacing the 196+ ORTF 
staff statute, these agreements were due to come into effect at the 
beginning of 1976. Finally, in any calculations about recourse to 
industrial action the unions had to take account of the new anti-strike 
-provisions introduced by the 197+ statute and reinforced by 
supplementary legislation in 1979. 
This chapter contains sections on each of these problems facing 
the broadcasting unions in the new companies. A concluding section then 
examines the efficacy of the unions' response to these problems with 
reference to the dispute which took place at the production company 
during 1978-79 when, faced with heavy financial losses, the SFP's management 
threatened to make redundant a sizeable proportion of the company's workforce 
In this chapter we shall argue that one of the objectives of the 
1974 reform was to weaken the broadcasting unions, which were held 
responsible for many of the problems of the ORTF. First, the break-up 
of the ORTF was intended to reinforce divisions within and between 
the broadcasting unions. Secondly, the content of the collective 
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agreements was designed to reduce the unions' role in negotiations 
with management. Finally, the anti-strike provisions of 1974 were 
supposed to minimise the efficacy of industrial action on the part of the 
unions, as was the supplementary legislation introduced in 1979. In 
short, one intended consequence of the 1974 reform was to minimise the 
unions' effective capacity for opposition within the broadcasting companies 
Broadcasting union organisation 
The most striking aspect of the trade union organisation at the 
ORTF was its sheer diversity. The historical and ideological cleavages 
which had prevented the formation of a unified trade union movement at 
the national level were apparent at the ORTF with the CGT, the CFDT and 
FO all represented within the state broadcasting services. 
1 In addition, 
the ORTF contained powerful trade unions not affiliated to one of the 
big confederations. The most important of these "house unions" was 
the FSU, itself an amalgam of-four smaller professional unions each 
representing a distinct category of staff. 
2 The broadcasting services' 
journalists were also organised in separate unions, either attached to 
one of the national confederations, the CFDT or FO, or autonomous, as 
in the case of the SNJ. Thus the lack of unity in the French trade 
union movement at the national level was exacerbated by demarcation 
on professional lines within the ORTF to produce an extremely fragmented 
trade union organisation at the Office. 
1. For the history of the French trade union movement at the 
national level see J. D. Reynaud, Les syndicats en France, 
Paris, Seuil, 1975; G. Caire, Les syndicats ouvriers, Paris, 
PUF, 1971; G. Lefranc, 'Le syndicalisme en France, Paris, PUF, 
1973 and Le mouvement syndical, Paris, Payot, 1969. 
2. The FSU was made up of le S dicat Unifie des Ouvriers (SUO); 
1e'S dicat`Unifi4 des Techniciens SUT ; le Syndicat Unifie 
'des Administratifs SUA ; and le Syndicat Unifi4 des Personnels 
Artistiques (SUPA). 
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The main broadcasting unions represented at the ORTF were: 
1a Feddration Syndicale Unifige (FSU); 
le Syndicat National de Radio_ et de Television (SNRT-CGT); 
le Syndicat Interprofessionel de Radio-Television (SIRT-CFDT); 
le Syndicat National Force Ouvriere (FO); 
le Syndicat des Cadres de l'Office de Radio-Television (SCORT); 
and le Syndicat National des Journalistes (SNJ). 
Of these six unions the FSU, SNRT-CGT, SIRT-CFDT and the SNJ 
frequently grouped together in militant action within the 
Intersyndicale of the ORTF. 
3 The three most representative unions 
were the FSU, the SNRT-CGT and the SNJ. All the broadcasting unions 
at the ORTF were highly centralised organisations with a unified 
hierarchical structure, and together they represented over 60% of the 
Office's staff 
4 
However, there were important differences between them 
as will become clear when we look at the most important ones in turn. 
The autonomous broadcasting union, the FSU, was strictly speaking 
a federation of four separate professional unions representing technicians, 
administrative staff, actors and general workers. By far the'most 
important of these four unions was the 5v ducat Unifie des Techniciens 
(SUT) which alone represented approximately 80% of the ORTF's technical 
staff. 
5 As a result of this dominance among the technical staff the 
FSU was able effectively to paralyse the ORTF by preventing the 
3. Thomas gives a figure of around 30 separate unions at the 
ORTF "differentiated both-by skills and professions and 
by political allegiance to national union organisations... " 
R Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, London, 
Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976, p. 2. 
1+. Ibid. 
5. Chinaud report, 19T14, p. 129. 
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transmission of programmes. Thus during 1973, immediately prior 
to the break-up of the ORTF, 72% of the strike calls were proposed 
by the technical staff and the FSU backed the overwhelming majority 
of them. 
6 
The FSU represented overall about 50% of the ORTF's statutory 
staff and was, therefore, the most important union at the ORTF. 
An immediate consequence of the break-up of the ORTF was the 
decision by the autonomous FSU to affiliate to the CFDT. In fact 
this particular step had been under discussion among the leaders of 
the FSU since the upheavals of 1968. Following the strike at the ORTF 
in May-June of that year and the reprisals taken against the staff, 
the FSU decided that it would be in its interest to affiliate to one 
of the large trade union confederations. 
7 The publication of the 
Paye report in 1970, with its recommendations in favour of decentralising 
the ORTF, and the passing of the 1972 ORTF statute reinforced the 
desirability of such a move in the eyes of the FSU. During the early 
1970s, therefore, the FSU conducted negotiations with both the CGT, 
B 
from which it had originally broken away in the 1950s, 'and the CFDT. 
At the 1972 FSU congress the decision wastaken to affiliate to the 
CFDT though the decision was not carried out until 1974 during the very 
last days of the ORTF's existence. 
The break-up of the ORTF obviously precipitated the execution 
of the decision by the FSU to affiliate to the CFDT since the FSU 
leadership recognised the danger of remaining an autonomous union 
6. 'Aid, p. 130. 
7. C Floch, La r4organisation d'une entreprise publique 
et les relations du travail: le cas de la radiodiffusion 
et television francaise, unpublished m moire de DES, 
University of Paris I, 1976, p. 30. 
8. Interview with Gilbert Costa, February 28,1977. 
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concentrated largely in only one of the new broadcasting companies, 
the transmission company. If this had been allowed to happen, the FSU 
would have found its previously dominant position seriously at risk, 
isolated as it would have been from staff in the other companies. The 
decision to affiliate to the CFDT posed problems, however. The FSU 
had the choice of being absorbed by the SIRT, which it refused, or joining 
with the SIRT to form a new union. 
9 At a congress held on December 14 
1974, the FSU and the SIRT agreed to join forces in anew broadcasting 
union, le Syndicat Unifie de Radio et de Television (SURT-CFDT). 
The fusion of the small CFDT union, the SIRT, and the large 
autonomous union, the FSU, was not without its problems. The FSU 
had not always associated itself with the strike action'of the 
SNRT-CGT and SIRT-CFDT during the final months of the ORTF's existence 
and this led to some disgruntlement among many, SIRT activists. For 
example, the SIRT section in the production services of the ORTF refused to 
attend the December. congress because over the previous two weeks it 
had been taking part along with the SNRT-CGT in strike action which the 
FSU had refused to support. Within the SIRT opponents of the fusion 
produced a manifesto condemning the position of the FSU with regard to 
strike action at the ORTF and criticising the lack of debate within the 
SIRT prior to the congress decision. However, while some SIRT activists 
refused to join the new union, the fusion was accepted by six out of 
the nine members of SIRT's executive bureau and by a majority of its 
ordinary members, who preferred to see the SIRT merge with the FSU 
9. The SIRT, which had come into existence after the events of 
May 1968, was a relatively small union with under 1,000 
members, mostly those technicians who did not belong to the 
FSU and some journalists. Le Monde, March 3 1975. 
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rather than witness its decline through its membership being dispersed 
among the new companies. 
10 
The structure of the newborn SURT-CFDT was decided on during its 
first congress held in June 1975. The SURT is organised on the basis 
of sections d'entreprise, one for each of the separate broadcasting 
companies, which deal with the internal problems relevant to their 
particular company. Problems common to all the broadcasting companies 
are dealt with by the bureau national which is composed of a general 
secretary, the secretaries of the sections d'entre rise and two elected 
members. Above the bureau national is the conseil syndical national 
composed of the members of-the bureau national and four advisers from 
each of the broadcasting companies. This body meets every two months 
and is responsible for the execution of the decisions made by the SURT 
congress which meets every two years. As far as the everyday running 
of the union is concerned, therefore, the important bodies are the 
sections d'entreprise and-the bureau national. As regards the 
organisational structure of the SURT, it should be noted that while 
prior to the "break-ixp of the ORTF the T3U was split into professional 
categories (technical staff, administrative staff, etc. ), the SURT is now 
split up along the lines of the break-up of the ORTF. The organisational 
division is no longer between professional categories of staff but 
between the different companies set up by the 1974 broadcasting reform. 
11 
10. 'Le*Monde, July'9 1971 and March 3 1975. Also interviews 
with Jacques Rochet, February 24 1977 and Maurice Billy, 
June 13 1977. 
11., Statuts du SURT-CFDT. 
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The SNRT-CGT had about 3,500 members at the ORTF and was 
particularly strong in the production services and among the general 
workforce. It represented around 30% of the staff on the committees 
with staff representation. After the break-up of the ORTF the new 
structure of the SNRT-CGT was adopted at its congress in April 1975. 
Like the SURT-CFDT, the SNRT-CGT decided to organise itself 
in sections d'entreprise,, one for each of the separate broadcasting 
companies. A federating body was retained to deal with common problems. 
12 
FO and SCORT were both small unions at the ORTF with few 
members compared with the FSU or the SNRT-CGT. FO represented about 
10% of the staff on the staff-management committees and drew its 
membership largely from among the administrative staff and the journalists. 
SCORT represented about--5% of the staff-and was naturally-strongest amongst 
middle-management. ---After the reform-of the ORTF-FO -also--chose to establish 
sections d'entreprise =while___at 
the same time retaining- a centra]t- 
co-ordinating- body. 
Finally, the SNJ had members not only at the ORTF but also in the - 
peripheral radio stations and in the national and regional press. Its 
ORTF section was by far the largest -of-the -journalists' unions-at. -the- - 
Office with approximately 600 members from 1,200 journalists. It 
represented over-60% of the ORTF's journalists-on the management-staff 
committees and was especially strong in the regional stations and in 
the radio services. 
13 An autonomous union like the FSU, the SNJ was 
one of the first unions to reorganise itself after the break-up of 
12. Chinaud report, 1974, p. 129. Interviews with Mario Andre, 
May 2 1977 and Danielle Urbin, February 21 1977. 
13. Interview with Edouard Guibert, general secretary of the 
SNJ's ORTF section, in T61ecine, no. 196, February 1975"- 
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the ORTF. The centralised ORTF section was replaced by five sections 
in those companies which employed journalists (TFI, A2, FR3, Radio 
France and INA), while a federating body was set up to co-ordinate 
the work of the individual sections. 
14 
The two principal unions in the new broadcasting structure, therefore, 
the SURT-CFDT and the SNRT-CGT, as well as FO and the SNJ, reorganised 
themselves on the same lines as the break-up of the ORTF with one 
important distinction. While the Government eschewed the establishment 
of any central body to co-ordinate the running of the separate companies, 
the unions each set up its own co-ordinating body to link the work of 
the various sections d'entreprise and to deal with problems common 
to all the companies. For example, with regard to the question of 
staff training the bureau national of the SURT-CFDT ensured that the 
same demands were put forward in each company so that common standards 
could be maintained. 
15 
Structural reorganisation was only part of a wider problem of 
reconstruction facing the broadcasting unions in early 1975. Other 
aspects. of the same. problem were the need to replace members, particularly 
activists, no longer employed in the state broadcasting services and the 
necessity to find members willing and able to represent the union in a 
particular company section which was frequently being built up from 
scratch. The replacement of the ORTF's unitary structure by seven 
separate companies would of itself have placed a great strain on the 
manpower resources of the. smaller unions such as FO. To this must be 
added the fact that as a result of the reorganisation of the state 
14. Le Journaliste, no. 157, September/October/November 1976. 
15. Interview with Jacques Rochet, February 24 1977. 
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broadcasting services and the concomitant reallocation of staff, 
certain unions had seen the number of their members and activists 
drastically reduced through redundancies, transfers and early 
retirement schemes. For example, FO had many members among the 
licence collection service of the ORTF and was adverseley affected 
by the transfer of these staff to the Ministry of Finance. 
16 FO 
was also disproportionately hit by the compulsory premature retirement 
of staff over the age of 60. The SNJ had also lost many members and 
activists as a result of the reallocation of ORTF journalists to the 
new companies and yet now had to organise itself in five different 
companies rather than just one. 
Moreover, the unions were hampered in their task of 
reconstruction by. the fact that. their opposition to the 197+ statute 
and to the reallocation of ORTF staff among the new companies had, 
with few exceptions, been in vain. This overall failure of their 
activities during the final months of the ORTF's existence did not help 
in the recruitment of new members. This was particularly true in 
the case of the SNJ who found it impossible to replace the members 
lost in the reallocation of journalists in late 1971. Journalists 
newly recruited to the broadcasting companies after 1975 tended to 
remain non-unionised or to join a journalists' union affiliated to one 
of the large confederations, most notably the CFDT-journalistes, rather 
than become members of the autonomous SNJ. Some members of the SNJ 
even transferred their allegiance to the CFDT-journalistes, in 
particular at TFI. As a result, while in 1974 the SNJ. had between 500 
16. C. Floch, op. cit. p. 106. 
I 
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and 600 members, by 1976 the membership totalled nearer 300-400.17 
Even the large SURT-CFDT and SNRT-CGT unions had problems at the 
beginning to find enough activists prepared to fill the many staff 
representative posts created by the break-up of the ORTF. This was 
especially the case in the smaller companies such as TFI and A2. At 
FR3, Radio France and the SFP there was a certain continuity in staff from 
the equivalent sectors at the ORTF, with the result that in general 
these companies posed the unions comparatively fewer problems. At 
TFI and A2 the situation was different. For example, the chief 
representative of the SURT-CFDT at A2 commented that, 
"At A2 the SURT-CFDT had a lot of problems at 
the beginning. The union's organisation was established 
around me personally as I was the only member of the CFDT 
bureau allocated to A2. The. CGT and FO had even greater 
problems than us, especially the CGT.... When I arrived 
at A2 there were CFDT members whom I didn't even know. 
Therefore for the first year or so we concerned ourselves 
--with sorting out 
things inside each company. We had very 
little time for contact between companies..... 
At A2 the comit4 d'entrevrise has twelve members and there 
are also twelve staff delegates (delegu(; s du personnel). 
At the beginning we had great difficulty in finding 
enough people to represent the staff in these posts. However, 
at'the end'of'the f. rst year we had succeeded in adapting 
to the new system. 
l° 
It is impossible to obtain accurate figures regarding trade union 
membership in the new broadcasting companies compared with that at the 
ORTF. However, it is possible to show the relative strengths and 
17. As always it is impossible tobe precise about membership figures 
of the broadcasting unions, since the natural tendency on the 
part of union representatives is to inflate them beyond recognitý.: 
ion. The figure of 600 in 197+ was given by both Edouard Güibert 
(May 31 1977) and Richard Someritis (May 20 1977) in interviews. 
Official SNJ figures put the total membership as high as 435 in 1976, 
but this seems an unduly optimistic estimate. 
See Institut Francais de-Presse et des Sciences de 1'Information, 
Le Droit Professionnel de la Presse, annex - rapport d*enquete sur 
l'action des syndicate dans les organismes de radio-television, p. 27. 
Guibert estimated the total membership of the SNJ in 1977 at 
around 380. 
18. Interview with Jean Favre, February 28 1977. 
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weaknesses . of the separate unions in the new structure. On the 
basis of the 1977 election results for staff representatives on the 
comites d'entreprise and staff delegates, the most representative 
union overall is the SURT-CFDT, which has majority support in the three 
television companies and in the transmission company. 
19 
The SNRT-CGT 
is the best supported union in the production company and in the 
archive and research institute, while in the radio company the two 
main unions are almost equally balanced. Essentially these two unions 
have preserved their power bases fromthe ORTF since the SNRT-CGT is still 
strong among the production staff at the SFP, while the SURT-CFDT 
draws its strength from among the technical staff at TDF, TFI, A2 and FR3. 
Collective agreements: technical and administrative staff 
Apart from-the-structural-reorganisation-to--cope with the 
problems_ posed-by-the- new -decentralised-broadcasting-system, -the -main =- - 
task facing the broadcasting unions during 1975--was-the-negotiation of-- 
collective agreements (conventions collectives )---in--teach-Öf he four 
programme companies-and--, at-the-SFP. Replacing the-ORTF-staff-statute---- 
of July 1964, these-collective--agreements-Mere-in-theory to be 
negotiated separately in each-of-the-five companies concerned. Thus 
in keeping with the decentralist ethos of the 1974 reform there was to 
be no-common collective agreement to cover conditions of employment and 
staff-management relations in all the companies. 
While staff-statutes are the general rule in public bodies, 
collective agreements are the accepted form of staff contracts in private 
19. Elections were held on May 12 1977. Trade union representatives 
interviewed confirmed that these elections reflected the 
-traditional strengths of the two main unions. 
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enterprise. Their introduction into the state broadcasting companies 
was indicative, therefore, of the Government's desire to move towards 
a more commercial approach in labour relations by making the management 
of the different companies rather than the Government responsible for 
staff policy. Officially the Government, therefore, was adopting a 
non-interventionist stance very much in keeping with the declared 
objectives of the 1974 reform, since whereas a staff statute is imposed 
by the Government in the form of a decree without any formal negotiation 
with the staff, a collective agreement is negotiated between the 
management and staff of the respective company. Moreover, collective 
agreements allow for greater flexibility within the company, particularly 
with regard to salary scales and promotion. 
20 
As at the ORTF the new companies relied on the co-operation of a 
wide range of professions in the making and transmission of radio and 
television programmes: administrative staff, technicians, journalists, 
musicians, producers and actors. This diversity had prevented the 
drafting of a common statute to cover all categories of staff at the 
ORTF. Thus, from 1961i to 1974 the ORTF's administrative staff, technicians 
and general workforce were covered by the 1964 staff statute, 
21 
while 
because of their specific contributions the ORTF's journalists and 
musicians each benefited from separate staff statutes. 
22 
20. Paye report, 1970, pp. 126-127- 
Because of their different legal status as public corporations 
(eteblissements publics) TDF and INA each retained staff statutes 
imposed on them by the Government and similar in content to the 1964 
ORTF staff statute. Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, decree 
no. 75-1216 of December 2 1975 (TDF staff statute) and decree 
no. 75-1352 of December 31 1975 (INA staff statute). 
21. ' Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, decree no. 64+-738 of July 22 1964. 
22. Jöurnal Officiel'Lois et decrets, decree no. 64-739 of July 22 196+ 
Journalists' statute and decree no. 63-l27 of April 22 1963 and 
decree no. 69-111+3 of November 28 1969 (Musicians' and choristers' 
statute). . 
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Television producers (realisateurs) and actors (artistes-interpretes) 
on the other hand were not covered by staff statutes at the ORTF, but 
negotiated separate agreements regarding conditions of employment 
with the ORTF management. 
23 Finally, temporary staff were not 
covered by a staff statute either. 
The 1974 broadcasting reform did, however, mitigate this diversity 
of staff by removing one professional category which had been employed 
at the ORTF: civil servants. No civil servants were employed as such 
in the new broadcasting companies. The 1974 reorganisation, therefore, 
broke finally with a tradition whose origins can be traced back to the 
earliest days of broadcasting in France. 
After the end of the second world war and the establishment of 
the state broadcasting monopoly in 1945, many of the staff employed 
at the RTF were civil servants. 
24 When in 1959 the RTF changed its 
legal status to that of a public corporation with an industrial and 
commercial character, the status of the broadcasting staff was-altered- 
accordingly. Some staff opted to retain their position as civil servants 
and continued to be covered by the civil service staff statute'(statut 
general de la fonction publique). This ever declining minority, 
bering around 1,000 in. 1970 and about 300 in 1974, stayed on at 
the RTF and then the ORTF until the reorganisation when either they 
were reintegrated within other branches of the civil service, or 
23. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
24. C. Debbasch, Traite du Droit de la Radiodiffusion: Radio et 
Television, Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1967, pp. 126-128. See also Paye report, 1970, 
p. 122. 
There were also some staff employed on a contract basis (agents 
contractuels de droit public) as well as journalists covered 
by their own distinct staff statute. 
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prematurely retired, or opted to be covered by the 1964 ORTF staff 
statute prior to the reallocation of the Office's staff among the 
new companies. 
25 
After 1959 the majority of the RTF staff were covered by a 
broadcasting staff statute, which distinguished between 200 different 
functions within the state broadcasting services. 
26 
Special 
bipartite committees (conseils paritaires specialis4s) were 
established composed of an equal number of staff and management 
representatives. These bipartite committees were consulted of right 
on certain staff matters, notably internal recruitment, disciplinary 
questions, individual redundancies and some staff transfers. 
27 
This broadcasting staff statute of February 4 1960 was replaced 
by a new staff statute in July 1964, following the establishment of 
the ORTF in June of that year. 
28 The 1964 ORTF staff statute applied 
. to-over T5% of the Office's staff, including administrative staff, 
technicians and production staff. In certain key respects the 
broadcasting unions considered it to be more restrictive than its 
predecessor, particularly as the role of the bipartite committees was 
severely circumscribed. They were now confined to giving their 
opinion on very limited disciplinary matters, with redundancies being 
25. The estimate of 1,000 civil servants at the ORTF in 1970 
comes from the Paye report, 1970, p. 21+7. 
See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
26. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 60-125 of 
"February 1990. Paye report, 1970, p. 123. 
27. Ibid, article 15. 
28. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 64-738 of 
July 22 1964. 
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excluded from their-field of competence. 
29 According to 
Charles Debbasch, 
"The 196+ (staff) statute.... sought to increase 
the powers of the management over the staff.... 
It gave the management very wide powers with regard to 
conditions of staff recruitment, promotion,.... and 
termination of contract. " 30 
The 1964 ORTF staff statute was in turn modified in 1969 as 
part of Chaban-Delmas' reform of the ORTF following the strike by 
broadcasting staff in 1968. By the terms of the new supplementary 
decree the special bipartite committees had their powers extended 
to cover promotion and individual redundancies, powers they had 
already enjoyed between 1960 and 1964.31 Bipartite committees in the 
regional stations were also created with more limited functions,. The 
1969 decree also provided for the setting up of a central works committee 
(comite central d'entreprise) which was to meet once a quarter and had 
a consultative role a. 
it.... on matters affecting the organisation, 
management and general running of the corporation and in 
particular on policy measures likely to affect the number 
or allocation of staff, work schedules, or the conditions 
of staff employment, with the proviso that these matters 
remained within the competence of the board of governors 
and the general management of the ORTF. " 32 
In addition; the central works committee had to be consulted in advance 
regarding any plans to reduce staff numbers and was to give its 
opinion on the planned measure, though this provision was not put into 
29. Ibid, article 14. 
30. C Debbasch, op. Cit. pp. 139 and 130. 
31. Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, decree no. 69-1023 of November 
12 1969, article 2 modifying articles 10-14 of the 1964 
ORTF staff statute. 
32. Ibid, article 14 modifying articles 63-65 of the 1964 
ORTF staff statute. 
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effect when the ORTF was being dismantled in late 19T1. 
The break-up of the ORTF necessarily made the 1964 ORTF staff statute 
obsolete and required-the drafting of new regulations-governing the 
conditions of employment and staff-management relations in the new 
companies. Staff in the two public corporations, TDF and INA, were to 
be covered by separate staff statutes imposed by government decree. 
The- staff- of-TFI, -A2; FR-3-, -Radio-France-and-the-SFP_ were to be 
covered-by separate-collective agreements in each of the respective 
companies. Neither the new staff statutes nor the collective 
agreements could adversely affect the gains made by the workforce 
at the ORTF in terms of salary scales, sickness benefit and industrial 
accident benefit. Moreover, length of-service-at-the ORTF was to 
be recognised by-the new companies, particularly in the event of 
possible redundancies. 
33 
--The first-company-to begin- negotiations -on-the--ncw collective 
agreements was-A2 where--meebings_between representatives of staff and 
management were held as early as February 1975, barely-a month after-the 
new companies had started to function. Eleven meetings took place 
before the summer break and a further twenty-six before the end of 
the year. 
3 In many respects, therefore, A2 was used as a model by 
both the staff and management in the other companies where negotiations 
did not. begin in earnest until the autumn. 
This late start in the other companies proved a crucial factor 
33.197I broadcasting statute, article 25. 
34. Minutes of the meetings to discuss the collective agreements (Antenne 2), February 21 1975 - December 22 1975. 
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in the negotiating process. By the terms of article 32 of the 
197+ broadcasting statute the staff in the new companies were to 
remain covered by the 1964 ORTF staff statute until December 31 1975 
at the latest. If by the end of 1975 the collective agreements had 
not been signed by management and staff representatives then the staff 
could negotiate individual contracts. While in theory, therefore, the 
two sides had a full year in which to negotiate the collective 
agreements in the five companies concerned, in practice the negotiations 
were compressed into the space of two or three months. Consequently, 
with the exception of A2, the discussions were superficial and the 
unions had little time in which to put pressure on the different sets 
of management in pursuit of their demands. The possibility of 
individual contracts coming into effect after December 31 if the 
collective agreememts were not successfully completed by that date was 
a strong incentive for the staff representatives to reach a speedy 
35 
conclusion to the mgotiations. 
Both the SURT-CFDT and the SNRT-CGT tried with the support of 
left-wing deputies Jack Ralite (Communist) and Robert Fabre (Left-wing 
Radical) to have the December 31 deadline postponed. 
36 Joel Le Tac 
(Gaullist) also defended the unions' case by emphasising the late 
starting date of the negotiations and asking Rossi for an extension of 
the December 31 deadline. 
3T Rossi, however, refused to countenance 
any postponement, arguing tongue in cheek that it was in the staff's 
35. C. Floch, op. cit., p. 115. 
36. See the SURT-CFDT's letter to the Minister of Labour, 
M. Durafour, appendix 7. i. See also, Le Monde, December 12 1975. 
37. Le Monde, December 4 1975. 
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own interests that the collective agreements be negotiated as quickly 
as possible so that they would benefit from conditions of employment 
which were legally secure. 
38 
In keeping with- the- decentralist ethos of the 1974 reform and 
the much vaunted independence of the new companies, negotiations 
between staff and management were to be conducted separately in each 
-- - of-the five-companies-concerned. Officially the Government was not 
involved in these negotiations and no central co-ordination was envisaged. 
In practice, however, there were- interpersonal contacts among the 
management representatives of the five companies, many of whom -ha& -been 
professional-colleagues at-the--ORTY, to establish a common policy on 
certain key issues. In addition-, Rossi, his ministerial staff and the- 
SJTI, intervened when necessary to co-ordinate the-response-of the 
different= sets= of-management- so- as to- prevent- the unions playing one 
company off against- another--in- an- attempt- to derive-maximum -benefits. 
For example, the interministerial committee responsible for the 
co-ordination of salaries in state enterprises (la commission 
interministerielle de co-ordination des salaires), attached to the 
Ministry of Finance, ensured that salary scales for similar functions 
in all the companies should be comparable. 
39 
Intervention by the Government in the autumn of 1975 disrupted 
negotiations in all the companies, particularly at A2 where the main 
union involved in the discussions, the SURT-CFDT, was pleased at the 
progress made before the summer break on several points, including 
38. Le Monde, December 12 1975. 
39. La Croix, December 21 1975. 
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promotion scales. 
4o 
However, when negotiations began in the other 
companies the Government stepped in to block certain proposals, even 
after they had been agreed to by both staff and management represent- 
atives in the company concerned -A result of this overt-- intervention 
-. 
was that at A2, -for example, Jullian had to apologise for the volts-face 
imposed by the authorities. 
41 
Despite the ritualistic denials by Rossi, there is abundant 
evidence from broadcasting union representatives, management and 
civil servants that the Government infringed the spirit of its own 
statute by intervening-to-block-certain-proposals in the negotiations 
between staff-and-management on the collective agreements. 
42 
A member 
of A2's-managementteam -luring-the-discussions-remarked: 
"If in theory the collective agreements were to 
be=negotiatedsePs atel in_each=company, _ in-practice-this was 
not the case. We did not start off from scratch, but from 
---the position-of-a formerly-unified-company; -the ORTF. The 
trade unions were intent on providing a concerted front in the 
negotiations and so we had to do so as well. We could not 
allow the trade unions to play each company's management 
off against the other. Thus, while the collective agreements 
in the companies are not identical, they do resemble each 
other. Apart from interpersonal contacts between the 
different sets of management, there was also a certain 
governmental co-ordination. "-13 
It was this blocking action by the-Government which in part 
precipitated the strike action by the broadcasting unions in November- 
December 1975. The SURT-CFDT and SNRT-CGT frequently combined forces 
in strike action in an attempt to push home their demands on the various 
40. Politigue Hebdo. no. 202, December 18-23 1975. 
41. Ibid. 
1+2. Le Quotidien de Paris, December 20-21 1975. 
1+3. Interview with Jacqueline Furbeyre, May 4 1977 and June 16 1977. 
-273- 
sets of management representatives. Both major unions were 
opposed to the proposed personalisation of salary scales, while 
both favoured the maintenance of the social benefits gained at the 
ORTF and the preservation of participatory bodies such as the bipartite 
committees. 
The two largest unions, however, were by no means united as 
to the best strategy to follow to achieve these desired objectives. 
Indeed their division was reminiscent of the split over strike action 
44 
which had taken place in the final months of the ORTF's existence. 
The SURT-CFDT favoured the negotiation of a single collective agreement 
to cover all the broadcasting companies with the exception of the 
public corporations, TDF and INA. The SURT-CFDT leadership defended 
this stance to the membership by emphasising that the strength of 
- the broadcasting staff was dependent on its unity. 
"... which' guarantees us the most: a national agreement 
applicä1'1e to more than 10; 000 workers or company 
agreements covering groups of 800 to 3,000 workers 
at most? "45 
In a letter to, the Minister of Labour, M. Durafour, the SURT-CFDT 
reiterated its demand for the negotiation of a national agreement, 
stressing that the recruitment, training and qualifications of the 
staff in the separate companies were similar and should therefore 
be governed by common regulations. 
46 
The SURT-CFDT demand for a national agreement to cover all the 
broadcasting companies with the exception of TDF and INA echoed a 
recommendation of the Paye report published in 1970: 
44. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
45. SURT-CFDT document, 6 conventions collectives: Pourcuoi? ; October 1975, 
p. 13. 
46. See appendix 7. i for a copy of this letter. 
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"In the event of the Office's evolving towards 
a decentralised structure, these collective agreements 
should remain common to the. whole(... communes ä 11ensemble). 
They could be supplemented by particular company agreements 
(conventions d' 4tablissement particulieres). " 47 
However, the Paye report had recommended decentralisation within 
an overall unitary structure. Since the 197+ broadcasting reform 
had specifically rejected any such unitary structure, the SURT-CFDT's 
demands for a common agreement was a non-starter as it was totally out 
of step with the spirit of the reform. 
The SNRT-CGT, on the other hand, while in favour of a collective 
agreement common to all the companies, was opposed to the negotiation of a 
national collective agreement. It preferred to negotiate a collective 
agreement company by company so'as to use any advantage gained in one 
company as a bargaining counter in discussions with the other companies 
with the overall objective of extracting the most possible from the 
different sets of company management. Moreover, the SNRT-CGT_. hoped 
that in those companies where it was strong, most notably at the SFP, it 
would negotiate a superior agreement than the SURT-CFDT in the programme 
companies and thus prove its negotiating strength. However, because of 
the interpersonal contacts between the different sets of 
management and the overall governmental co-ordination, this 
strategy was as doomed to failure as that of the SURT-CFDT. It is 
scarcely surprising, therefore, that the collective agreement 
at the SFP differs only marginally from those in the four programme 
companies. 
Just as the break-up of the ORTF had been pushed through with 
indecent haste, so the negotiation of the collective agreements in the 
47. Paye report, 1976 p. 126. 
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different companies, with the exception of A2, was carried out 
under severe time pressure. The December 31 deadline made the unions 
wary of allowing the negotiations to drag on into 1976 for fear that 
they would lose out from the legal vacuum thus created. Therefore, - 
despite dissatisfaction expressed by the unions on various substantive 
points, the collective agreements were signed at the SFP on 
December 29 1975, at TFI, A2 and Radio France on December 31, and 
at FR3, where the discussions had run into the greatest difficulties, 
on January 6 1976. 
Major differences in content between the new collective 
agreements on the one hand and the ORTF staff statute on the other 
were immediately denounced by the unions, except in the few cases where 
there was noticeable improvement. This proved the case, for example, 
with regard to social benefits with the new collective agreements 
givi b the broadcasting staff better rights to maternity leave, holidays, 
sickness benefit, and the like. 
Most substantive differences were, however, criticised by the 
broadcasting unions. For example, they condemned the fact that the 
criterion of length of service was now to be downgraded with respect 
to promotion and salary increases. This meant that the managements 
of the different companies now had greater freedom of manoeuvre in 
these areas. They would be in a position to promote staff on grounds 
of merit with less emphasis attributed to the criterion of length 
of service. 
48 
The unions opposed this personalisation of salary scales 
48. The different sets of management were intent on reducing the 
importance of the criterion of length of service and on 
introducing the possibility of differentiating between members 
of staff with the same length of service. Interview with 
Jacqueline Furbeyre, June'16 1977. 
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on the grounds that the subjective criterion of merit could be used 
to discriminate unfairly among staff with the same length of service. 
Another bone of contention was the move towards a system 
whereby staff were considered qualified. to perform a variety of functions 
which previously had been strictly demarcated. This system of 
polyvalence meant, for example, that a lighting technician could be asked 
by the management to perform the duties of a sound technician if the 
latter were indisposed through illness, strike activity or for any 
other reason. 
Moreover, the-special bipartite committees, whose powers had been 
extended in 1969, were not set up in the five companies whose staff 
were covered by the collective agreements. Their role was to be 
partly fulfilled by the creation of a system of staff delegates 
(delegues du personnel) who nonetheless have more limited powers 
than the bipartite committees. Thus, while the staff delegates 
receive information about matters relating to staff, they are not 
consulted beforehand nor do they give an opinion on disciplinary 
questions or promotions. The unions were violently opposed to the 
abolition of the bipartite councils which they regarded as a useful, 
if limited, body for staff-management consultation. 
Not all trade union representatives, however, regard the 
abolition of the bipartite committee as weakening the power of the 
unions vis-a-vis management. Thus while Maurice Billy, the 
SURT-CFDT-representative at TFI, bemoaned the lack of a bipartite 
committee in his company, his counterpart at A2, Jean Favre, did not 
regard the absence of this body as particularly damaging. 
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"At the ORTF many problems were settled outside 
the framework of the bipartite committee in any case. At 
A2 we have fewer problems now. Even if certain internal 
problems are not discussed within a bipartite committee, 
this is not serious. The staff delegates are informed 
about promotions and if they don't agree with them we 
can always come out on strike. " 49 
The SNRT-CGT representative at A2, Mario Andre, agreed with Favre's 
analysis. 
"At A2, which is a small company, we get to know 
about sackings, promotions, etc., just as quickly as we 
would if we had a bipartite committee. " 50 
On the other hand, the lack of a bipartite committee is felt more 
in the larger companies such as the SFP and FR3, particularly as in 
the latter case the company. performs a variety of functions rather 
like a mini-ORTF. 
In addition to staff delegates the staff at TF1, A2, FR3, 
Radio France and the SFP are also represented on their. respective 
w 
company's works committee (comite d'entreprise). The works committee 
looks after the welfare needs of the staff, supervising the running 
of holiday camps for children, staff canteens and other social 
facilites. It can also make suggestions to management with regard to 
matters affecting the staff in the company, though the management does 
not have to accept any recommendations the committee may make in this 
respect. 
Originally the Government was opposed to the establishment of a 
central works committee to look after the common welfare needs of 
ex-ORTF staff on the grounds that a common co-ordinating committee would 
be in contradiction with the aims of the 1974 reform. However, in 
4+9. Interview with Maurice Billy, June 13 1977, and Jean Favre, 
February 28 1977. 
50. Interview with Mario Andre, May 2' 1977. 
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late 1976 the Government relented and an inter-company works 
committee (comite inter-entreprises) was set up to co-ordinate 
the work of the separate works committees regarding the provision 
of welfare facilites. 
51 
Collective agreements: journalists 
The collective agreements analysed above applied to administrative 
staff, technicians and production staff in the companies concerned. 
Musicians and choristers, who in the new structure were attached to 
Radio France, had their own separate collective agreement to take 
account of their distinctive contribution and requirements. The 
journalists employed un the new companies also had separate collective 
agreements from the rest of the broadcasting staff, and in keeping 
with the objectives of the reform a separate collective agreement 
was negotiated-for the journalists in each of the four programme 
companies. 
52 
Thus, the specific role of the journalists within 
the state broadcasting services was once again confirmed, since at the, 
RTF and then at the ORTF the journalists had always been treated as a 
distinct professional group. 
Prior to the change of status of the RTF in 1959 the journalists 
in the state broadcasting services were governed by the provisions of 
their statute of March 1 1949. The main feature of this statute was 
51. SURT-CFDT document, Union Action, October 1976, P"17. The 
collective agreements in the five companies were renegotiated 
at the end of 1977. Demands made by the broadcasting unions at 
this time were very similar to those made at the end of 1975: the 
establishment of bipartite committees, the abolition of the system of 
polyvalence and stricter professional qualifications. The changes 
" introduced in 1975, however, have not been modified. See Le Monde 
November 23 and December 21 1977. 
52. Journalists attached to INA were covered by the collective agreement 
of the programme company which officially employed them. 
u 
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the creation of a bipartite committee representing management 
and journalists which was to be consulted on all matters relating to 
recruitment, promotion, sacking and collective or individual conflicts. 
53 
"This bipartite committee served the interests not 
only of the journalists but also, and I am tempted to 
write especially, those of the company since it allowed 
particular problems to be dealt with before they degenerated 
into public-conflicts--at a-time -when- the management . -. -. had to 
face up to the growth ... of radio and television news 
programmes. " 54 
The journalists' statute of November 7 1960, which followed 
the change of status of the RTF to that of a public corporation of 
an indüstriäl and commercial character, adopted many of the provisions 
of the statute-of 191+9. -However, in return for certain "permanent 
temporaries" being given a contractual status, the union representatives 
accepted in-the--negotiations which preceded the-drafting of the 
- --statute- a.. reduction-in the powers- of the- bipartite- committee. 
55 
The journalists' statute of November 7 1960 was in turn revised 
when the ORTF was established in 1964. The 196+ ORTF journalists' 
statute, imposed by the Government, was considered by the journalists' 
unions to be regressive compared with its predecessor, particularly 
with regard to the balance of forces between management and staff. 
The role of the journalists' bipartite committee was considerably 
reduced. By the terms of the 1960 journalists' statute the bipartite 
committee was competent in matters of promotion and individual redundancies 
and was consulted in cases of conflict between one or more journalists 
53. Report of the Commission consultative des Journalistes (Commission 
Fromentin), June 12 1973, p. 4. 6 
This committee was set up in January 1973 by Arthur Conte to examine 
the role of the journalists at the ORTF. It was composed of six 
" members of the. ORTF management and six representatives of the 
journalists' unions. The report was produced in June 1973. 
54+. Ibid. Statement by Pierre Fromentin, chairman of the committee. 
55. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 60-1176 of 
November 7 1960. 
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and the management. 
56 On the other hand, the 1964 ORTF 
journalists' statute restricted the powers of the bipartite committee 
to specific disciplinary cases with the result that the power of the 
journalists' representatives was very considerably weakened. 
57 
It was not until 1969 that the journalists'. bipartite committee 
had its powers extended in a reversal of the downward trend started 
in: 1960. Following the long strike by ORTF journalists in 1968, 
tie 1964 ORTF journalists' statute was modified as part of the 
Chaban-Delmas reform of the ORTF. 
58 The journalists' bipartite 
committee was now to be consulted on certain promotions, disciplinary 
matters and individual redundancies. 
59 
The ORTF employed well over 1,200-journalists in the early -1970S -60 
These were divided into three_categories-depending-on_their terms of 
employment. - _The -first category, - numbering äiout 
800in 1972, was 
governed by article-l-of -the 196+ ORTF-journalists! statute and 
employed on permanent contracts. The second category, comprising only 
about-1+0- journalists; --was made up of those -journalists who; -under the 
terms of article 2 of the 1964 ORTF journalists' statute, were engaged 
for a limited period of time on fixed contracts which could be renewed 
every three months but could not exceed two years in length. 
61 
The 
third category included those journalists who, in theory at least, 
56. Thid, article 13. See also the report of the Commission Fromentin, 
1973, pp. 4-5. 
57. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 64-739 of 
July-22 1964, articles 13,36 and 37. See also the report 
of the Commission Fromentin, 1973, p. 5. 
58. Journal Officiel Lois et decrets, decrees no. 69-102+ of 
November 12 1969 and no. 9-1188 of December 24 1969. 
59. ' Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 69-1024 of November 12 It. 
article 1 modifying articles 11-13 of the 1964 ORTF journalists' 
statute. See also the report of the Commission Fromentin, 1973, p. 6. 
60. ORTF 73, Paris, Presses Pocket, p. 591. 
61. J. Chevallier, La radio-television francaise entre deux reformes, Par Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975, p. 46. 
-281- 
were employed on a temporary basis only. The numbers in this 
last category were impossible to calculate, but certainly exceeded 
500.62 
In fact many of these so called temporary journalists were 
employed permanently at the ORTF and so benefited unofficially from 
the title of "permanent-temporaries" (pigistes permanents). As 
Thomas points out, this system-of--employing "permanent temporariesi" 
"had developed partly to circumvent the insufficient quotas-of-personnel 
set by the Ministry of Finance: ' 
63 
In other words, in the interests 
of economy the ORTF management had-to employ "temporary" rather than 
statutory journalists, with the added advantage that the former had no 
-guarantee-of 
long-term--employment. In 1973 the jzurnalists! =unions, 
notably the SNJ succeeded-in_persuading_ the-_ORTF' management to bring 
about 200-of these-"permanent__temporaries" under cover-of the 1964 
-- ---ORTF journalists' statute- on-the barely contestable-grounds that they 
---were--de-facto-permanent-employees-of-the-Office. - However; _as_we 
have 
seen, many temporaries, a large proportion-of whom were also regularly 
employed at the ORTF, did not benefit from this change of contractual 
status and they were among the journalists most severely affected by 
the reallocation of journalists which took place at the end of 1974.64 
The ORTF journalists' statute differed both from the ORTF staff 
statute and from the collective agreement which applied to journalists 
who worked in'the press. In effect the journalists employed in the 
state broadcasting services were considered to be journalists of the 
62. R. Thomas, op. cit., p. 61, puts the figure as high as 800. 
63. Ibid. 
64. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
-282- 
ORTF rather than merely journalists at the ORTF, in that they were 
subject to different regulations from their colleagues in the press. 
This distinction is of crucial importance. The successive statutes 
of the state broadcasting journalists have in effect sought to give 
them a special status which takes account of the public service nature 
of the French broadcasting services. 
The ORTF management sought to justify this distinction between 
ORTF and press journalists by stressing that the former had special 
responsibilities due to the pervasiveness of the television medium. 
Since the main evening news bulletin on channel one was regularly 
watched by 12-13 million viewers, the ORTF journalists had to cultivate 
11 a habit of prudence and even of reserve . 
"65 The distinctiveness of 
the task of the broadcasting journalists as put forward by the ORTF 
management was an accurate reflection of Pompidou's view of the ORTF 
as "tin-voice of France". 
66 
Giscard d'Estaing's explicit rejection 
of this concept in 1974, therefore, seemed a good omen for the 
journalists' unions who had been pushing for the broadcasting journalists 
to be treated as- journalists at and not of the ORTF. 
67 
Prior to the break-up of the ORTF at the end of 1974 the terms 
of employment of the broadcasting journalists were governed by the 
1964 ORTF journalists' statute as modified in 1969. In the new broad- 
casting companies the journalists had to negotiate with the managements 
of the four programme companies separate collective agreements due to 
65. ORTF 73, P. 590. 
66. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 1974 
reform. 
67. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
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cone into effect on January 1 1976. 
The demands of the journalists were most vociferously put 
forward by the SNJ, still the most representative union among the 
broadcasting journalists. It called for the application in all four 
programme companies of the national collective agreement for press 
journalists backed up by an agreement within each company to take 
account of the specific needs of broadcasting. This long-standing 
demand reflected the journalists' desire to be treated as journalists 
working in the state broadcasting services with similar professional 
goals as their press colleagues rather than as a group with special 
responsibilities because of the role of television as the most important 
mass medium in France. 
As part of its demand for the preservation in the new companies 
of the benefits gained at the ORTF, the SNJ demanded the maintenance 
in each of the programme companies of a journalists' bipartite committee. 
68 
This demand, if acceded to, would have allowed the journalists to have 
a greater say in management policy decisions affecting the journalists' 
conditions of employment, promotions, recruitment, transfers and 
redundancies. 
69 
In addition, the SNJ called for a reform of the 
journalists' salary scale and of their training facilities, as well as 
for an improvement in certain social benefits and the introduction 
of the five-day week. 
70 
Negotiations in all four programme companies were punctuated 
by strike action during December 1975 as the unions sought to exert 
68. Le Journaliste, no. 150, March-April 1975. 
69. These demands for a more powerful bipartite committee had recently beet 
put forward by the unions to the Commission Fromentin. Spe the 
report of the committee, meeting of April 9 1973', Pp" -14" 
70. Le Journaliste, no. 153, November-December 1975. 
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pressure on the different sets of management. Discussions 
progressed more smoothly at A2 than in the other three companies, 
though even here problems arose when the management was compelled 
by Rossi to backtrack on concessions already made. 
71 In the face 
of governmental co-ordination of the different managements' responses 
the journalists' unions failed to secure their major demands. Thus, 
while there- were some. references to the national collective agreement 
for press journalists in the collective agreements of the state 
broadcasting journalists, these scarcely satisfied the latter's 
demands for the full application of the collective agreement for 
press journalists to their colleagues in broadcasting. 
72 
Most importantly, the journalists' bipartite committees were 
not set up in the new companies, with the result that representation 
of the journalists in staff-management. discussions was restricted 
to a system of staff representatives and delegates tcx,. the works 
committee on the same terms*as those governing the general staff. The 
lack of bipartite committees was a huge blow to the SNJ and the other 
journalists' unions. 
73 
Their absence in the new structure was 
scarcely offset by the improvement in certain social benefits under 
the new agreements as compared with the 1964 ORTF journalists' statute. 
T4 
71. Politique liebdo, no. 202, December 18/23 1975. 
72. These demands were reiterated when the collective agreements came 
up for renegotiation at the end of 1977. See Le Monde, June 29 1977. 
73. Interviews with Jacques Barbot, February 10 1977 and with 
Richard Someritis, May 20 1977. 
74. Le Journaliste, no-154, January-February 1976. 
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As one SNJ communique commented: 
"The management are taking back in quality what 
they are giving us in quantity. They want to make of 
the journalists slightly-better off workers, but also 
more submissive ones. " 75 
Anti-strike provisions 
The 1974 reorganisation sought to limit the power of the 
trade unions to disrupt the broadcasting services by minimising 
the consequences of strike action on the programme schedules of 
the radio and television companies. In this respect the 1974 
legislation extended the provisions of the 1972 ORTF statute, which 
itself had been condemned by the broadcasting unions as a severe 
restriction on their right to strike. Moreover, in 1979 the anti- 
strike provisions of the 1974 statute were themselves strengthened in 
the wake of a series of disruptions in transmissions_.. caused by the 
unions' reaction to the financial crisis in the production company. 
Under the terms of the 1972 ORTF statute, continuity of those 
elements of the broadcasting service essential to the fulfilment of the 
Office's tasks was to be maintained by each of the television channels 
and radio networks in the event of strike action by any section of the 
ORTF's staff. The president directeur gendral of the office would 
decide which staff were indispensable to the running of the service 
during a strike and would have to continue working. 
76 
Between 1964 and 1971 the minimum service which was broadcast 
during strike action had consisted solely of the main evening news 
t 
75. SNJ communique, Faut-il signer la convention collective? 
December 30 1975. 
76.1972 ORTF statute, article 11. 
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bulletin. In 1964 the ORTF management had instructed the staff 
that during strike action the news bulletin was to be shown as usual 
at 8.00 p. m. to be followed by a film or films up to 10.30 p. m. 
77 
However, the broadcasting unions successfully protested against this 
step and in February 1966 the Conseil d'Etat abolished the obligation 
to show a film as part of the minimum service. 
78 
Notwithstanding 
this decision, -in early 1971 the ORTF management sought to impose 
separate news bulletins in the event of a strike and the screening of 
a film after the news. Prior to 1972 the minister with responsibility 
for broadcasting and the ORTF management had the authority to fix the 
content of the minimum service, while the Conseil d'Etat was empowered 
to decide on the legality of their. decisions. 
The interpretation of the anti-strike provisions of the 1972 
ORTF statute made by the Minister of Information and the-president 
directeur general-. Pf the ORTF was expressly designed to increase the 
requirements of the minimum service. The Office's radio networks were 
to broadcast a common programme during normal hours of transmission with 
news bulletins at the usual times. The three television channels had 
also to screen a common set of programmes in the evening consisting 
of a film or variety programme, followed by a cultural programme. 
Channels one and two were to show separate news-bulletins, which were 
77. J. Chevallier, op. cit., p. 40 
78. Arret du Conseil d'Etat du 4 fevrier 1966, reproduced in Droit Social, 
no. ll, November 1966, PP-565-566. 
This decision of the Conseil d'Ftat referred to the inadequacy 
on its own of "] a of du 11 _iuillet 1963 
(no 6-7.7) relative. 1 
certaines modalitýs de la greve cans ems services publics" and 
confirmed the Government's right to fix the nature and extent of the 
limits to be placed on the right to strike in the public services 
so as to protect public order. However, the Conseil d'Etat had the 
power to decide on the legal acceptability of the substance of the 
minister's decision. It was with part of the content of the 
minister's decision, taken with the co-operation of the ORTF 
management, that the Conseil d'Etat disagreed in 1966. 
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to be produced in the usual manner. The other programmes were 
to consist of pre-recorded material. The president directeur general 
of the ORTF was empowered to choose the staff who were indispensable 
to the fulfilment of the ministerial instructions. 
79 
This interpretation of the 1972 ORTF statute which effectively 
required the transmission of a normal news service during a strike, 
hit the journalists of the ORTF particularly hard. While in theory the 
journalists still possessed the right to strike, in practice any 
strike action on their part would have little effect on the ORTF's news 
broadcasting. The SNJ was particularly incensed at the ministerial ruling 
on the application of article 11 of the 1972 ORTF statute. 
80 
Along 
with the SNRT-CGT the SNJ made a formal protest to the Conseil d'Etat 
in a bi-d to have the ruling declared ultra vires. However, in a 
judgement made public in January 1975, after the break-up of the ORTF, 
the Ccnseil d'Etat found no fault with the minister's interpretation 
of the terms of the statizte81 As a result, the 1972 ORTF statute 
successfully extended the obligations of the minimum service in times 
of strike to cover entertainment programmes as well as news bulletins. 
The effectiveness of the strike weapon was thus apparently weakened. 
The provisions of the 1974 statute went even further, which 
considering the context of strike activity at the ORTF preceding the 
79. ORTF 73, PP. 50-51. 
80. See the SNJ ORTF section, LIORTF. le Pouvoir et les 
Journalistes: Livre blanc sur 1'information ä l'ORTF, Paris, 1974, 
pp. 16-20. Also, Le Journaliste, no. l 7, April-May 1974. 
81. Conseil d'Etat, Recueil des Decisions, 1975, PP. 37-39 and 
p. 1,236. 
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drafting of the reform is not altogether surprising. 
82 
The Chinaud 
report alone had devoted eight pages in an annex to a list of sectional 
and general strikes at the ORTF between 1972 and 1974.83 Article 
26 of the 1974 statute was almost a verbatim copy of article 11 of the 
1972 ORTF statute with some important differences. First, while 
the 1972 statute had spokeaof "those elements of the broadcasting 
service essential to the fulfilment of the ORTF's tasks.... " , the 
1974 law referred to "those elements of the broadcasting service 
necessary to the fulfilment_ot. the_tasks of the new companies.... " 
This change of adjective seemed to extend the requirements of the 
minimum service in the event of strike action. 
Mora: -importantly-, - 
the--1972-statute-ha&been-applied within the 
___ unitary structure of 
the ORTF. Consequently, it had been interpreted 
---- so-that==with=the-exception of-the news bulletins a common--programme 
schedule would be shown on all-three television- channels. . 
Since the 
1974 statute had broken up this unitary structure into separate 
companies, --there--was no-obligation on the-managements of-the-different 
programme companies to unite forces to screen a common set of 
progrannes. In fact any such common programme schedule would have 
been in contradiction with the spirit of the reform. 
In a letter sent in January 1975 to the heads of the four 
programme companies, Rossi laid down the Government's interpretation 
of the new legislation. Each television channel was to screen a 
distinct programme schedule. On Saturday, Sunday and public holidays 
82. See chapter on the Origins of the 19.71+ reform. 
. 83. Chinaud report, 1974, vol. 2 annexes, pp. 153-161. 
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the minimum service was to be extended to include the showing of a 
film in the afternoon as well as the evening programmes. TFI and A2 
would not suffer financially from any strike action since they would 
be allowed to increase the length of their advertising breaks once 
normal service had been resumed to compensate for the loss in revenue 
suffered during the strike. The transmission company, TDF, was to be 
obliged to continue transmitting for lengthy periods of time during 
any strike by its workforce. 
84 
As they had done in 1972 the broadcasting unions, in this case 
the SURT-CFDT, challenged the ministerial interpretation of the 
statute before the Conseil d'Etat. The judgement of the Conseil d'Etat 
was made public on November 12 1976.85 It decided that the obligations 
of the minimum service for each of the companies concerned should be 
determined in thelight of the particular rules laid down in its 
cahier des charges. 
With reference to TFI, and by implication to A2 since the latter's 
cahier des charges is almost an exact replica of the former's, the 
Conseil d'Etat decided that the production and screening of two news 
bulletins (one in the case of A2), of special news bulletins if 
required and of an evening programme schedule consisting of feature 
films or pre-recorded television programmes was within the minimum 
service requirements of the 1974 legislation. On the other hand, the 
84+. Le Monde, January 5-6 1975. The companies are bound by their 
cahiers des charges to respect the interpretation of the 
minister with responsibility for broadcasting as regards 
the provisions of the minimum service. - See article 8 of 
their cahiers des charges in the ease of TF1, A2, FR3 and 
Radio France, and articles 6 and 7 in the case of TDF. 
85. Conseil d'Etat. Recueil des Decisions 1976, pp. l81-486 
and pp. 1095-1096. See also Le Monde, November 23 1976. 
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Conseil d'. Etat considered that the obligation on the staff to ensure 
the screening of an afternoon programme on Saturdays, Sundays and 
public holidays exceeded the requirements of the statute and was 
therefore illegal. 
With regard to the regional programme company, FR3, the 
Conseil d'Etat decided that the obligations imposed on it by the 
ministerial interpretation of the statute were within the law: a 
television programme in the evening, consisting of either a feature 
film or a pre-recorded programme, and the production and screening 
in each region of a regional radio news bulletin and a regional 
television news bulletin. 
The Conseil d'Etat partially annulled Rossi's instructions 
regarding the minimum service on Radio-France-. The production and 
transmission of three news bulletins (morning, midday and evening), 
of special news bulletins if necessary and of a programme schedule 
during normal hours of transmission consisting of records and pre- 
recorded programmes-. were all within the provisions of the statute. 
However, the Conseil decided that there was no legal obligation to 
broadcast two distinct programme schedules on the radio netWOtl ... 
One single schedule of programmes on all networks was quite sufficient. 
Finally, the Conseil decided that the obligations imposed on 
TDF by Rossi were quite legal: to ensure the continuous functioning 
of the networks, the transmission of programmes scheduled by the 
programme companies and the maintenance, when the programme schedules 
of the programme companies were interrupted, of the service by the 
transmission of a test card or sound programme. 
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Thus in keeping with the spirit of the 19T1 reform each of 
the three television companies shows a distinct minimum service 
from its competitors. Moreover, this applies only if all three 
television companies are on strike simultaneously, an eventuality 
made more unlikely by the distinctive characteristics of each company 
and the obstacles against common strike action by the staff on an 
inter-company basis. Obviously, if only one programme company is on 
strike, the other two programme companies screen their scheduled 
programmes as normal. 
In practice, if the staff in the programme companies are on 
strike simultaneously, the three television companies show three 
separate films after their own news bulletins. Furthermore, in a 
rare example of-harmonisation of programme schedules, the programme 
planners of the television companies ensure that the three films 
86 
shown are of a different genre. As a result, far from showing 
discontent during a strike by broadcasting staff, the viewers benefit 
from a choice of three films, one of their favourite types of 
programme. 
87 
The chairman of each company decides which categories 
of staff must remain at work. 
The absence of any co-ordinating body in the new structure led 
to some curious situations during strikes by sections of the broadcasting 
staff. For example, if the technicians at TDF went on strike but the 
86. Article 9 of the 197+ statute requires that the heads of 
the television companies meet periodically to ensure the 
harmonisation of programme schedules. Introduced by 
parliamentary amendment, this article is honoured more in 
the breach than in the observance. See chapter on Criticisms of the 
reform. 
87. Le Monde, January 16 1975. Obviously, however, the minimum 
service may displease viewers in other ways by preventing 
the screening of certain programmes. 
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staff in the programme companies continued working normally, TDF 
was obliged to provide transmission services only up to 10.15 p. m. 
In one case during a discussion programme on TF1 the presenter was 
cut off in mid-sentence when the transmission facilities were 
withdrawn. 
88 
On the other hand, because of the decentralised system 
introduced in 1974, article 26 of the statute applies only to TDF 
and the four programme companies. Staff at the SFP and INA-are not 
affected by the stringent minimum service requirements since they are 
not involved in the crucial transmitting or programming sectors. 
There can be no doubt that the 1974 statute, like its predecessor 
of 1972, extended the provisions of the minimum service to the 
detriment of the staff's right to strike to an extent which could 
__ scarcely__be_justifieli 
by 
-the necessity-to maintain 
theý-continuity of 
89- 
the public service. The efficacy of the unions' main weapon in 
staff-management-negotiations ; -the threat of -strike-Faction -, was thus 
reduced since its effects became much less apparent -tothe_viewer. 
Furthermore, -in-1979-this trend of weakening the unions' strike 
weapon was further extended when supplementary legislation was introduced 
to reinforce the minimum service provisions. 
The provisions of the 1974 statute with regard to the service 
provided in the event of a strike by broadcasting staff were altered 
in the spring of 1979 following a series of damaging strikes in the 
broadcasting companies. The cause of these strikes was the decision by 
88. Le Quotidien de Paris, December k 1975. The victim of 
this withdrawal of transmission facilities was Michel Droit, 
whose documentary programme was interrupted twelve minutes 
before it was due to end. 
89. For a juridical account of the extension of the minimum 
service provisions up to 1977 see J. Y. Plouvin, "La resistible 
ascension du service minimum dans le service public national 
de la radiodiffusion et de la television.... et ailleurs", 
Droit Social, no. 6, June 1977, pp. 243-253 
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the new chairman of the SFP, Antoine de Clermont-Tonnerre, to 
make over 400 members of the production company's staff redundant 
in a bid to restore the company to a state of financial solvency. 
The staff of the SFP immediately came out on strike in protest 
against this decision and during their prolonged stoppage staff in the 
other broadcasting companies. frequently came out in sympathy. 
90 
This involved the frequent application of the minimum programme with 
a reduced service on all three television channels and on the radio 
networks. Moreover, the broadcasting unions skilfully worked within the 
framework of the minimum service provisions to bring out small but 
important sections of the workforce at any one time, thus producing 
the maximum inconvenience permitted by the 3971 statute at minim 
cost to their members. 
91 
This tactic was perceived by Lecat, the Minister of Culture and 
Communication, as an unwarranted abuse of the unions' constitutional 
right to strike, since it meant the automatic introduction of the 
minimum service even when only a small percentage of the workforce 
was actually out on strike. The action which finally forced the 
Government to review the minimum service provision was a one day stoppage 
on March 18 1979 by technical staff at TDF, TFl and A2 called at the 
request of the SURT-CFDT in protest against the downgrading of three 
90. See next section. 
91. For example, on February 23 1979 at TDF only 152'out of a total of 
2,368 staff came out on strike. The remaining staff were payed and, 
since all 152 were required to keep transmission facilities running, 
the strikers were also paid. Therefore, no member of TDF's staff lost 
out financially from the strike, even though only the minimum service 
was shown on television screens. 
For this and other examples see Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl ee 
Nationale, 1978-1979, no. 990, Rapport fait au nom de la commission 
des affaires culturelles, familiales et sociales sur la proposition de 
loi (no. 91+1) de Robert-Andr4 Vivien et plusieurs de ses collegues 
tendant ä modifier les dispositions de la loi no. 7l-696 du 7a oüt 
197+ relatives au droit de greve au sein du service public de Is. 
radiodiffusion-television francaise, par Francisque Perrut annexe au 
proces-verbal de la seance du 19 avril 1979, pp. 6-7.1 
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engineers who had come out in solidarity with the staff at the 
SFP at the end of February. 
92 Lecat immediately appeared on the 
television news of TF1 and A2 to deplore this action and called 
the chairmen*of the programme companies together to discuss means 
of ensuring the continuity of the public service. 
At first the Government hoped to remedy this perceived abuse 
while still working within the framework of the current legislation. 
Thus, at the end of March Lecät wrote a letter to the chairmen of the 
four programme companies in which he asked their boards of governors 
to take the necessary internal steps to stop. "... the actions of 
a minority of the staff interfering with the normal functioning of 
the company. "93 
At the same time two private members' bills (propositions de loi ) 
were laid down in the National Assembly in response to the strikes. 
being held in the broadcasting companies. The first, put forward by 
Robert-Andre Vivien, chairman of the Assembly's finance committee, 
proposed quite simply that in the event of strike action by the 
broadcasting staff the functioning of the public service should be 
maintained as normal. As the deputy himself stated in the introduction 
to his bill: 
"French television ensures an essential public 
service financed... by the licence.... No interruption of 
this public service can be accepted. " 94 
The second private members' bill, put forward by Alain Madelin 
(UDF), sought to extend the provisions of the minimum service to 
include the following: mid-day as well as evening news bulletins; 
92. Le Monde, March 20 1979. 
93. Le Monde, March 28 1979. 
94. Le Monde, March 22 1979. 
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an evening programme. schedule from 7.20 P. m. -'to 10.05 p. m. on 
FR3, to 10.20 p. m. on TF1 and to 10.30 p. m. on A2; on Wednesdays 
Saturdays, Sundays, public holidays and school holidays the programme 
schedules should-begin with the-mid-day news bulletin-and end at 
10.20 p. m. onTFl and. 10.30 p. m. on A2; on Sundays and public holidays 
the religious programmes should. be broadcast; and finally programmes 
resulting from agreements made between'the companies on the one hand 
and sports bodies on the other (whether national, European or 
internationall-should be--shown-according to the agreed time-table. 
95 
In short, Madelin's bill sought to enlarge and make specific the 
programming obligations of the different companies in th event of 
strike 
-action , _a-task-. 
eft- i the-past to --the- minister with 
responsibility for broadcasting. 
In-the- ed neither of these -two private members' bills was- 
debated in-the-Assembly. ---Instead. a very-different=private members' "_' 
bill was put forward jointly-'by: Vivien-and-Madelin; which gained 
the support of the- leaders of the two parliamentary groups of the 
majoriteL Claude-Labbe (Gaullist) and Roger Chinaud (UDF), and was 
signed by over 190 deputies of the majorite including Jacques Chirac 
and Joel Le Tac. 
96 
Though officially a private members' bill, it was clear that 
the new proposals were fully supported by the Government. First, 
the Government willingly found parliamentary time for debate on the 
95. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1978-1979, 
no. 918, Proposition de loi completant la loi no. 74-696 du 
7 aoüt 197+ relative ä la radiodiffusion et ä la television, 
presentee par Alain Madelin, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance 
du 15 mars 1979. 
96. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1978-1979, no. 941, 
Proposition de loi tendant a modifier les dispositions de la loi 
no. 74-696 du 7 aoüt 1974 relatives au droit de greve au sein du 
service public de la radiodiffusion-televis ion francaise, presentee 
par Robert-Andre Vivien, Alain Madelin et al., annexe au proses - 
verbal de la seance du 10 avril 1979_ 
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bill at the end of April 1979. Received at the Hotel Matignon, 
'Vivien was assured by Barre that the Government would secure 
parliamentary time for such a debate. 
97 
Secondly, the bill itself 
vas drafted by the Service Juridigue et Technique de 1'Information, 
part of the Prime Minister's office. 
98 
Thirdly, during the second 
reading of the bill in the Assembly Lecat supported the removal of 
several Senate amendments which had sought to qualify the rigour of the 
original bill, thus making it clear that the original bill was totally 
in line with the Government's thinking on the question. 
99 
Though certain minor changes were made in the Senate and by the 
Constitutional Council, the law as promulgated is very similar to the 
terms of the original bill. The provisions of the new law, are 
divided into three parts. The first part of the new legislation states 
that notice of an impending strike must be given to the chairmen of 
the-broadcasting companies at least five clear days before the start of 
the strike. This notice must-fix the place, date and time of the strike 
and whether it is due to run for a fixed or indefinite period of time. 
A new strike notice cannot be given by the same trade union organisation 
until the statutory time limit following the first strike notice has 
elapsed and, if need be, the strike following the first notice has 
0 
ended. 
100 The second part of the new law affirms that the creation and 
97. Le Monde, March 31 1979. 
98. Interview with M. Mougey, September 17 1979. 
99. Journal Officiel, Dgbats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale 
June 27 1979, pp. 5656-5663 . 
100. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, Loi no. 79-63l+ du 26 juillet 1979 
modifiant les dispositions de la loi no. 7l-696 du'7 aofit 1974 
relatives ä la continuite du service public de la radio et de la 
television en cas de cessation concertde. du travail. 
Part I of the new law was included by an amendment in the Senate, 
amendment no. 2l, proposed by Henri Caillavet on behalf of the cultural 
affairs committee. Though opposed by the Government in the Senate 
debate, the amendment was passed by the Senate and no attempt was 
made by the Government to have the amendment -removed. at the second reading stage of the bill. Journal Officiel. Debats Par3ementäires 
Senat, June 22 1979, pp. 2085-2087. 
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transmission of broadcasting signals must be ensured by the staff 
of the programme companies and the transmission company who normally 
carry out this task. Certain categories of staff, decided by decree 
in the Council of State, will be "strictly indispensable" for this 
to be carried out and the chairmen'of the programme companies and the 
transmission company will be able to demand that these staff remain 
at work. 
101 Finally, part three of the new law states that When there 
is an insufficient number of staff at work in the television companies, 
the chairman of each company can "if the situation requires it" demand 
that certain categories of staff must remain at work to ensure the 
continuity of the public service. Moreover, staff on strike will 
have their salaries reduced. 
In effect-the-new legislation had the following objectives. 
First, it väs--designed to prevent a union from giving a daily notice 
to strike an--thereby throwing the different sets of broadcasting 
management into confusion. Now. once a strike notice had been given, 
the statutory delay of five days has to be observed before another strike 
notice can be given by the same trade union. The abuse of the 1963 
law on strikes in the public services would, it was hoped, be put to 
an end. Secondly, in the event of a strike taking place the new 
law ensures the maintenance of transmission facilities. This means 
that those members of staff in the programme companies who are 
responsible for producing the transmission signals and the quasi-totality. 
of the staff in the transmission company are effectively deprived of 
their right to strike. Transmission facilities will always be available 
to the programme companies if they wish to use them. Thirdly, the 
101. The decree was published in September 1979. Journal 
Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 79-71+7 of September 5 1979. 
See table-7. ii. 
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chairmen of the television companies, acting in the knowledge that 
transmission of programmes is now guaranteed, can, even if a strike 
is supported by a majority of staff in. their particular company , put out 
almost a normal service. They can demand that certain categories of staff 
remain at work and, if necessary, use their pre-recorded stock of 
programmes to fill any gaps in their original programme schedules. 
Alternatively, they can screen some form of minimum service if they 
so wish or even decide to leave the screen blank. One might 
reasonably expect the television company chairmen to seek to screen 
a quasi-normal programme schedule in the event of-strike action. However, 
the new legislation gives them a choice of responses to the threat of 
strike action in. their company, "thus ending the-automatic application 
of the minimum service whenever a notice to strike was given by the 
broadcasting unions, whatever the number of strikers involved in 
the dispute. 
The Socialist and Communist parties and all the broadcasting 
unions condemned the new legislation as an unjustifiable attack on the 
staff's constitutional right to strike. As usual one of the broad- 
casting unions, the SURT-CFDT has made an official complaint to the 
Conseil d'Etat to the effect that a ministerial circular specifying to 
the company chairmen what services must be guaranteed exceeds the 
provisions of the new legislation. The decision of the Conseil d'Etat 
on this question has, as yet, not been published. 
102 However, since 
the new law is itself more specific than its predecessor, and has not 
been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council, the unions' 
I 
102. Le Monde, November 20 1979. 
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room for manoeuvre in this respect is even more limited than 
formerly. The Conseil d'Etat cannot declare the new law unconstitutional, 
but can only decide whether the minister is acting ultra vires 
with regard to its application. It seems unlikely that the unions 
can realistically hope for much solace from this söurce. 
While. 
_the_new 
legislation does not mean that all the 
broadcasting staff have lost the right-to strike, - it does signify-- that 
another step has been taken-to-restrict--the-effect any- strike-action 
would have on programme schedules. Article 26 of the 1974 law was 
itself more restrictive than the equivalent clause -of 
the-1972 ORTF 
statute. The legislation introduced is 1979 goes still further in 
diminishing the possibility of effective strike action in the state 
broadcasting companies. In. -short, the weakening of the urions. Lstrike 
weapon which was evident before 1974 was consolidated by the 1971+ 
statute and further accentuated by the 1979 legislation. 
Strike activity-irr-thw-new companies 
We have argued in this chapter that the break-up of the 
unitary structure of the ORTF, the Government's determination 
that the collective staff agreements should be negotiated separately 
in each of the new companies and the extension of the anti-strike 
provisions first in 1974 and again in 1979 were all intended by the 
Government to weaken the power of the broadcasting unions. 
It is opportune, therefore, to ask to what extent the 
Government has succeeded in making effective strike action a more 
difficult option for the unions. Since an insufficient period of time 
has elapsed since the passing of the new anti-strike legislation in 
% 
1979, we shall concentrate in this section on the period between the 
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establishment of the new companies in January 1975 and the series 
of strikes in early 1979 which led to the introduction of-the new 
legislation. 
103 
In particular, we shall concentrate on the most 
serious dispute in the new companies, which started in the SFP and 
soon spread to affect all the companies in the new system. 
It is certainly true that many minor areas of dispute have 
since the reorganisation of the broadcasting services been contained 
within one particular company. The isolation of disputes in this way 
has helped minimise the disruption of programmes in line with the 
Government's undeclared objective of weakening the power of the 
broadcasting unions. Moreover, as the new companies establish their 
own corporate identities and as new staff are recruited who have no 
experience of working at the old ORTF, it is likely that the attachment 
of staff to the former unitary structure and to a common sense of 
identity will diminish. 
lo4 
The different geographical locations of the 
separate companies are an integral part of this process. In addition, the 
different symbols of the programme companies, displayed not only on 
the television screen but also on a whole host of commercial products 
such as perfume, handbags and umbrellas, testify to the determination 
of the new companies to establish themselves as the main focus of 
loyalty for their staff. In time company man will replace ORTF man. 
Yet it is apparent that this process has still not come to full 
fruition. The break-up of the ORTF posed the broadcasting unions 
difficult problems of organisation and co-operation, particularly in the 
6 
103. See table 7-iii. 
104. Jean Favre, SURT-CFDT representative at A2, estimated that 
about half of A2's workforce, excluding journalists, had 
not worked at the ORTF. 
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months immediately following the implementation of the reform. Thus 
during 1975 relations between the two largest unions were strained, with 
tactical differences becoming evident during the negotiations of the 
collective agreements in the four programme companies and at the 
SFP. 105 During this first year of the new companies' existence there 
was little co-ordinated action between the two main unions, as each 
concentrated on reforming its internal organisation and building up its 
membership. There was no attempt to resurrect the Intersyndicale of the 
ORTF. However, the federal structure adopted by the unions has resulted in 
the maintenance of a unified approach within each union on questions 
which. transcend the particular problems of any one individual comapny. 
In addition, co-operation among the major unions on fundamental 
issues, such as the defence 6f staff employment or the maintenance 
of broadcasting as a public service, has, despite tactical disagree- 
ments, -demonstrated -that -the-inter-union solidarity. =f-the ORTF 
is not just 
a nostalgic souvenir. In spring- ;, 977 a week of-action was- held by the 
SURT-CFDT, SNRT-CGT and SNJ, culminating in a general strike -affecting 
all the companies on February-23 1977.106 
The best illustration -of -the -capacity-of-the-unions to -- 
overcome the isolationof disputes-in-one company can-be--seen--from the 
opposition of the unions to the measures proposed at the beginning of 
1979 by the new chairman of the SFP, Clermont-Tonnerre, in a desperate 
attempt to bring the production company -back- from. _th-e-Yerge of 
bankruptcy. 
107 During the autumn of 1978, as the financial crisis 
105. See section on collective agreements. 
106. See Le Monde, February 11,12,16,18,23 and 25 1977. 
Also, L'Humanite, February 11,23 and 24+ 1977. 
107. See chapter on Finance. 
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of the SFP became increasingly apparent, the unions represented 
in the production company decided to embark on strike action in 
protest against the intransigence of the Government and the 
chairman of the company, Edeline, in the face of union demands for the 
protection of the company from financial collapse. A series of 
one day strikes at the SFP were backed up by two one-day stoppages 
in all seven companies of the ex-ORTF in October and November. 
However, it was not until February 1979, when Clermont-Tonnerre 
announced his proposals for the restructuring of the company, that 
the main period of strike action began. 
On February 7 1979 Clermont-Tonnerre made public his 
decision to make 421 staff compulsorily redundant either through 
early retirement or by means of transfer to one of the other 
broadcasting companies. In addition, 130 members of staff had 
agreed to accept voluntary redundancy. The reaction of the broadcasting 
unions to this announcement was immediate and predictable. ---The staff 
of the SFP. came-out on strike to be joined by staff in all four 
programme companies. By week two'of the strike the unions-concerned, 
the SNRT-CGT, SURT-CFDT and the SNJ, made a common declaration in 
which they denounced the measures proposed by Clermont- 
Tonnere and put forward the following common objectives: the 
revision of the cahiers des charges of the programme companies to 
establish fixed links betwen them and the SF?; the drawing up of a 
national. collective agreement on conditions of employment common 
to all the companies of the ex-ORTF; a-guaranteed quota of 
broadcasting production; and, naturally, no redundancies at the SFP. 
108 
108. Le Monde, February 13 1979. 
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Outside of the production company itself the strike was 
apparently supported by a minority of broadcasting staff. 
Nonetheless this support was sufficient to ensure that only the 
minimum service was broadcast over a period of about three weeks 
following Clermont-Tonnerre's initial announcement. Moreover, 
it was noticeable that the main unions involved-remained united over the 
objectives to be attained by their concerted action. The strike in 
the programme companies stopped at the beginning of March, though 
further one day general stoppages did take place in the course of 
the month. Meanwhile at the SFP the strike continued until the 
middle of March. 
A division over tactics between the two major unions involved 
in the conflict, the SURT-CFDT and the SNRT-CGT, was, however, 
becoming increasingly manifest. The SNRT-CGT, the strongest 
union at the SFP, wanted to adopt a more hardline attitude towards 
the strike action, epitomised by its call for a renewed general 
strike among all the companies of the"ex-ORTF. The SURT-CFDT, on 
the other hand, wanted to continue negotiations and to seek to 
back up their negotiating stance with different forms of action, 
including lightning strikes in different companies. This difference 
of opinion over tactics, which brought to mind a similar division during 
the period of the liquidation of the Office in the autumn of 1974, 
came to a head at the end of March when the"SFP management reduced 
the total of staff to be made redundant from the original figure of 
424+ to 138. 
The SURT-CFDT supported the SNRT-CGT in renewing the strike 
in the production company itself, but refused to"_support the extension 
of the stoppage to the other broadcasting companies. This difference 
of opinion hardened a split between the. two unions which had been 
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building up over the previous ten days. The reaction of the 
SURT-CFDT to the new proposals made by the SFP management were summed 
up by the union's general secretary: 
"It is useless to go on strike merely to defend the 
principle of the strike; there has been a development, 
inadequate certainly, but nonetheless a development; 
negotiations which it is now important to expand on. " 109 
As far as the SNRT-CGT were concerned, the best means of 
influencing these negotiations was by a general strike in all the 
broadcasting companies. However, since the SURT-CFDT was the 
majority union in all three television companies and in the 
transmission company, this demand by the SNRT-CGT for a general 
strike was not heeded. The SURT-CFDT, very much in the minority at 
the SFP, though willing to support the SNRT-CGT in its fight to 
protect the production company staff from redundancy, did not share 
--the SNRT-CGT's view as to the best means of achieving this objective. 
... The SURT-CFDT was more willing to soft peddle and proposed an 
immediate return to work at the SFP for amonth on the understanding 
that if the negotiations did not progress satisfactorily recourse 
to the strike weapon would then follow. The SNRT-CGT, on the other 
hand, favoured at least recourse to lightning strikes twice a week 
in order to ensure maximum disruption at the least possible cost. 
A further strike did take place at the SFP in May, supported by both 
the main unions, once the negotiations had been completed, but the 
other companies remained unaffected by this dispute. 
109. Le Monde, March 21 1979. 
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The strike in the broadcasting companies at the beginning 
of 1979 demonstrated that when affected by a fundamental problem, 
such as redundancies, the broadcasting unions can overcome their 
inter-union rivalry and inter-company isolation to mobilise 
staff in all the broadcasting companies around a common objective. 
The 1974 reform, therefore, did not succeed in emasculating the 
powers of the broadcasting unions, as is evident from the fact that 
the Government was obliged in 1979 to alter its own statute by 
means of a private members' bill to reinforce the anti-strike provision 
of its original legislation. The disorganisation of the broadcasting 
unions evident in 1975 and 1976 would appear to have been overcome. 
110 
On the other hand, the break-up of the ORTF has had and will 
continue-to-have--important--consequences for the broadcasting -unions. 
While the problem of inter-company co-operation within each union, 
Vor example -between the different sections of the, 'SURT-CFDT, _has 
not proved--insuperable, inter-union co-operation -has-been-made 7more-=-- 
difficult-by--the-197h--reform. This is-because the two main unions 
have their power bases"i: n, different companies--suffering rom-dif'ferent--- 
problems: the SURT-CFDT is strong in the programme companies and 
I in the transmission company, while the SNRT-CGT is powerful. in_the'_ 
production-company. As the turn-over -of broadcasting staff 
continues, those with experience of working at the ORTF will 
become-fewer-and-any--common sense of-identity--will-become harder - 
to foster. Moreover, while the introduction of new anti-strike 
legislation may reflect the power of the unions to disrupt the 
110. See table 7-iii. Note especially the steady increase 
between 1975 and 1979 in the number of days lost through 
strike action. 
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service, it now means that the unions have a new factor to take 
into account in the future. The new legislation will not increase 
the unions' power in their negotiations with the different sets of 
management. For all these reasons, effective strike action by the 
broadcasting unions across all the companies is more difficult than 
at the ORTF and seems likely to become even harder in the future. 
Conclusion 
It would be a mistake to assume that the broadcasting staff 
have derived no advantage from the 1974 reform. Apart from the 
improvement in social benefits, interpersonal contacts among staff 
have been made easier by the creation of smaller organisational units. 
This is especially the case at TF1 and A2, each of which employs 
around 1,000 staff. Divisions among professional categories, 
very strong at the ORTF, have been. increasing. ',, y broken down within 
. the 
two major television companies, facilitating dialogue between, 
for example, technical and administrative staff. However, this 
improvement in human relations within the smaller companies scarcely 
compensates for the adverse consequences of the 1974 reform for the 
staff and particularly for the broadcasting unions. 
The break-up of the ORTF necessitated a wholesale 
reorganisation of the broadcasting unions to cope with the changed 
environment of a decentralised structure. The autonomous unions, 
which, though not affiliated to one of the large confederations, had 
been very powerful at the ORTF, were particularly hard hit by the 
ill 
reform. The FSU, including the important technicians' union, 
111. Prior to 1957 all the broadcasting unions were affiliated to 
one of the main confederations(FO, CGT or CFTC). It was only 
after 1957 that the autonomous house unions were created. It 
would appear that the wheel has now turned full circle. 
See C. Debbasch, op. cit., p. 132. 
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the SUT, finally decided to affiliate to the CFDT, a step it had 
been considering for some time, by joining forces with the small 
SIRT to form a large new union, the SURT-CFDT. The SNJ, the 
autonomous journalists' union, refused to affiliate to any of the 
large confederations. It has, however, emerged severely weakened 
from'thebreak-up of the ORTF. The SNJ lost many members not 
reallocated to one of the new companies in 1974, has been some 
of its members swäch to the CFDT journalists' union and has been 
unable to attract sufficient new journalists employed in the 
state broadcasting. services to compensate for these losses. 
112 
Unions affiliated to one of the large confederations 
were also affected by the 1974 reform, though in general they 
were better able to recover. While FO suffered badly from the 
reform, losing many of its members through the transfer 
of the licence collection staff to the Ministry of Finance and 
through the compulsory premature retirement clause, the newly 
created SURT-CFDT and the SNRT-CGT have succeeded in maintaining 
power bases in the new companies. The SNRT-CGT's power bases are 
confined to the production company and the archive and research 
institute. The SURT-CFDT, on the other hand, is strong in all the 
programme companies and in the transmission company. It seems clear 
in short, that the union which has best survived the 1974 reorganisation 
is the BURT-CFDT, the natural successor of the FSU at the ORTF. 
112. The SNJ, the principaLjournalists' union in France, is losing 
ground in the press as well as in broadcasting. -In 1976 
it 
gained over 37% of the vote in the elections to the commission 
de la carte, the body which distributes the journalists' 
professional card. In 1979 the SNJ's share of the poll had 
dropped to just over 31%. In 1976 the CFDT gained 
23% of the vote, while in 1979 this-figure rose to over 
26%. The decline of-the SNJ in the broadcasting companies, 
therefore, would appear to be part of a wider trend. 
Presse Actualite, no. 1)+4, March 1980, pp. 18-28. 
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The collective agreements which replaced the ORTF 
staff statute in the four programme companies and attha SFP were 
also a disappointment to the broadcasting unions. The major 
demands of the unions were steadfastly refused by the different 
sets of management co-ordinated by Rossi. In the negotiations 
of both 1975 and 1977 the unions failed to secure any major 
concessions on matters such as the establishment of bipartite 
committees and the abandonment of the system of polyvalence. 
As far as the broadcasting journalists were concerned, the 
SNJ's demand for the application of the national collective 
agreement for press journalists was refused both times. 
Finally, the anti-strike provisions adopted in 1974 and- 
strengthened in 1979 were designed to make effective industrial 
action by the unions more difficult. There can be little doubt, 
in short, that the 1974 reform reflected the Government's desire 
to weaken the broadcasting unions as a form of opposition within 
the new companies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Parliamentary control 
6 
It has become almost commonplace for commentators on 
French politics to write about the decline of Parliament during 
the Fifth Republic. ' The weak position of Parliament, it is 
generally argued, can be attributed to certain provisions of the 
1958 Constitution and to the existence since 1959 of a pro-governmental 
majority in the National Assembly. In this chapter we concentrate 
our attention on the role played by Parliament in the policy field 
of broadcasting, with particular emphasis on the period since the 
1974 reform. Our object is to examine the powers available to 
Parliament and Parliament's use of these powers to see whether taken 
together they enable Parliament to act as an effective check on the 
political executive and make it accountable to the legislature. The 
conventional picture of parliamentary weakness in the Fifth Republic 
will thus be studied in the light of evidence from one specific 
policy area. 
This chapter devotes a section to each of the means possessed 
by Parliament to influence the formulation and execution of broadcasting 
1. See, for example, P. M. Williams, The French Parliament 1958-1967, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1968, especially p. 21; 
"Under the new regime the Parliament of France, once among the 
most powerful in the world, became one of the weakest. ". 
See also, D. Pickles, The Government and Politics of France, 
vol. 1, London, Methuen, -1972, pp. 4-68; M. Anderson, Government 
in France, Oxford, Pergamon, 1970, pp. 169-17l; and H. Ehrmann, 
Politics in France, 'Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971 (2nd edition) 
pp. 276-303. 
V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France, London, 
Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 107-123 and J. Hayward, The One and 
Indivisible French Republic, London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
1973, pp"69-79, adopt a more nuanced position on this question. 
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policy. These may be listed as follows: 
a) the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting;, 
b) the parliamentary standing committees; 
c) the annual budget debate on broadcasting; 
d) special *ad hoc committees; 
e) parliamentary representation on the boards of governors 
of the broadcasting companies; 
f) debates and legislation. 
The reform would appear to have strengthened the powers of 
Parliament when compared to the 1964 and 1972 ORTF statutes. 
Moreover, the lack of a Giscardian parliamentary majority in the 
National Assembly might reasonably have been expected to reinforce 
the role of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive. 
2 Nonetheless, 
overall it would seem-that Parliament is_ill-equipped to act as an 
effective check on the executive in the policy field of broadcasting. 
Its powers remain limited when compared=withthose of the executive 
and Parliament is often unwilling or unable to use effectively even 
those powers which it does possess. 
The parliamentary delegation'for broadcasting 
The parliamentary delegation for broadcasting was first set up 
in 1961+, -though it was given this title only in 1972. Under the 
terms of the 19641 statute - 
"The minister in charge of information is obliged 
to call a meeting, at least once every quarter, of a 
body representing Parliament, made up of the rapporteurs 
generaux of the finance committees of the two chambers, 
four deputies and two senators, among whom must figure 
at least one representative of each of the committees 
responsible for the cultural affairs in the National 
Assembly and in the Senate....... " 3 
2. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
3.1964 ORTF statute, article 8. 
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As the 1968 Diligent report commented, the powers of this 
body were vague and inadequate. The responsible minister was obliged 
to call a meeting only once every three months and even this minimal 
frequency was not adhered to. Moreover, as the minister was in 
charge of the agenda of the meetings, the body could not discuss 
matters unless they were raised by the minister. 
The 1972 ORTF statute expanded on the relevant provisions of 
its 1964 predecessor. The consultative parliamentary delegation, 
as it was now called, was still to meet at least once every three 
months. It was to give its opinion (avis) on any reform of the state 
broadcasting monopoly including exceptions to the monopoly legislation 
(derogations) permitted by the Government. It was also to be consulted 
on the creation of decentralised units within the unitary structure 
of the ORTF, on agreements signed by the ORTF and outside bodies 
concerning the production, reproduction and transmission of programmes 
and on any other questions on which the Government or the Office 
wished to consult it. 
5 
However, by the terms of the 1972 statute 
the consultative parliamentary delegation could still not discuss 
broadcasting policy matters on its own initiative. 
6 
The original intention of the Government in 1974 was to maintain 
the parliamentary delegation in existence with the same powers as it 
had been granted in the 1972 ORTF statute. Thus, the Government's 
1974 broadcasting bill altered neither the composition nor the functions 
of the delegation. 
7 
However, two almost identical amendments were presented 
4. Diligent report, 1968, PP-70-71- 
5.1972 ORTF statute, article 13. 
6. See J. Chevallier, La radio-television francaise entre deux reformes 
Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975, 
pp. 262-265 and R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, 
London, Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976, pp. 95-96. 
7. The composition of the delegation had been increased in 1972 
from 8 to 10 parliamentarians. 
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in the Senate by the cultural affairs committee and the finance 
committee with the former being passed despite government 
8 
opposition. This amendment was accepted by the commission mixte 
paritaire and included in the 1974 statute as article k. 
The composition of the parliamentary delegation was extended by 
the 1974 statute from ten members to fourteen. Its membership was 
now to consist of the rapporteurs generaux of the finance committees, 
the rapporteurs responsible for broadcasting in the two cultural 
affairs committess, five deputies and three senators. The eight 
parlimentarians who are not ex officio members of the delegation are 
chosed by their parliamentary groups and together they have to reflect 
the balance of political forces in the two chambers. 
The functions of the parliamentary delegation were also spelled 
out in article 4+ of the 197+ statute. The delegation is to be consulted 
as of right on any proposed exceptions to the state broadcasting 
monopoly and on any agreements signed by the broadcasting companies 
concerning-the production, reproduction and transmission of programmes. 
10 
The delegation thus monitors among other things the application of the 
companies' cahiers'des charges. Moreover, in contrast to its limited 
powers under the 1972 statute, the delegation may not only be consulted 
on anynatter-*concerned with the'V71 statute, but may also give its 
opinion on its own initiative. In other words, the delegation can 
discuss a matter of broadcasting policy without having to wait for 
8. J6urnä. 1 Officiel Debets Parlemeintaires Snit-, July 27 1974, 
pp. 956-957, amendments no. 34. (cultural affairs committee) and 
No. 79 (finance committee). 
See section on parliamentary debates and legislation for more 
details of the significance of these amendments. 
9. See tables 8. i and 8. ii for the composition of the parliamentary 
delegation for broadcasting. 
10. In May 1978, however, the delegation complained that it had not 
been consulted on the Government's decree of March 20 1978 
regarding permitted exceptions to the monopoly. Le Monde, May 20 1978. 
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the Government or the companies to ask it to do so. 
Yet though the delegation's composition and powers. have been 
increased by the 1974 statute, the question still remains as to 
how effective this parliamentary body is in influencing the 
formulation and implementation of broadcasting policy. Certainly 
since 1974 the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting has met more 
frequently than did its predecessor at the time of the ORTF. Thus, 
in 1974-75 the delegation met seventeen times, in 1975-76 five times, 
in 1976-77 thirteen times and in 1977-78, during the busy electoral 
period, six times. 
ll 
Moreover, the delegation has discussed a wide 
variety of topics concerned with broadcasting policy including the 
negotiation of the collective staff agreements at the end of 1975, 
the problem of creativity'on television, exceptions to the broadcasting 
monopoly legislation, local radio and television-cinema relations. 
However, opinions as to the effectiveness of the delegation 
differ. For example, at the end of chapter two-of its second annual 
report the delegation notes: 
"In short, one can state that in paying great 
attention to the conditions in which all the new 
broadcasting companies can operate properly, the 
parliamentary delegation has fulfilled the role 
accorded it by the statute. It has thus been able to 
reinforce its authority vis-a-vis the heads of the 
companies and the responsible minister. " 12 
11. Up to December 1978 the delegation had published four annual 
reports: Journal Officiel Documents Assemblee Nationale 
1975-1976, no. 2067, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 
15 decembre 1975; 1976-1977, no. 2724, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 18 decembre 1976; 1977-1978, no-3265; and 
1978-1979, no. 783, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 
12 decembre-1978. 
12. Journal Officiel, DocumentsAssemblee Nationale, 1976-1977, 
no. 272 , Rapport d'infornmation etabli au nom de la d6l6gation 
parlementaire pour la radiodiffusion-television frangaise... 
par MM. Jacques Blanc, Georges Fillioud, Jack Ralite, 
vice-presidents de la delegation, annexe au proces-verbal de 
la seance du 18 decembre 1976, p. 9 
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One of the delegation's chairmen, Jean Boinvilliers, a Gaullist 
deputy, commented that 
"... while it is not the delegation's job to become 
involved in the running of the companies or to interfere in 
their management, the delegation is nonetheless the 
guardian of the 1974 statute. " 13 
On the other hand, not all the members of the delegation 
subscribe to this rather rosy appreciation of its efficacy. For 
example, Joel Le Tac argued that 
".... the parliamentary delegation is still really 
only a consultative body. Its powers are largely formal. 
The delegation has a critical role which it does not 
fulfil, though this does not mean that it is always 
ineffective. " 14 
Georges Fillioud, Socialist deputy and member of the delegation, 
went even further in his criticism of the delegation. 
"When one knows what goes on in the radio and 
television companies, one wonders what use our delegation 
is. It was created to ensure the respect of the statute 
and to exercise in Parliament's name a contröl over the 
broadcasting companies. Yet freedom and independence 
of these companies are ignored daily through the overt 
or covert interventions of the authorities. " 15 
Jack Ralite, *Communist deputy and also a member of the delegation, 
echoed Fillioud's criticisms. 
"The parliamentary delegation works very badly and I 
do not believe much in its usefulness. I have asked the 
chairman of the delegation to call a meeting on several 
matters such as the crisis at the SFP, the actors' strike, 
satellite broadcasting, creativity on television and 
news programmes. But the chairman, always a member of 
the maiorite, does not want the delegation to discuss 
these questions. " 
13. Interview with Jean Boinvilliers, January 26 1977. 
14. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979. ' 
15. Le'Monde, October 22 1976. 
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"For example, while the delegation has held 
two meetings on the problem of satellite broadcasting, 
one with Lecat and the other with Giraud (the Minister 
of Industry) there has been no meeting with the 
technicians. Nor was the delegation shown the Cannac 
report on satellite broadcasting. 
The meetings of the delegation generally last 
between one and two hours, which is indicative of their 
lack of importance. The delegation is a chambre 
d'enregistrement which is of little value. Its weakness 
reflects the weak role of Parliament in the Fifth Republic. "16 
Similar comments were given by Jean Cluzel, rapporteur 
special of the Senate finance committee's annual budgetary report on 
broadcasting and a member of the delegation, who argued that though 
the parliamentarians had fought in 1974 to increase the powers of 
the delegation, they have not subsequently used these powers to the 
full. 17 One explanation of this reluctance to exploit its powers was 
put forward by Antoine de Tarle, an administrateur at the National 
Assembly concerned with broadcasting policy: 
"The parliamentary delegation is not very active 
because outside the parliamentary sessions there is 
nobody here, while during the-sessions all the parliamentarians 
are concerned with, other things as well. Moreover, the 
delegation has no permanent secretariat and I have to work 
for it when I have the time. It is difficult to arrange 
a convenient time during the parliamentary sessions when, 
both senators and deputies can meet. Finally, neither 
Boinvilliers nor Pado (up until now the two rotating 
1118 chairmen of the delegation) is particularly dynamic. 
In opposing the Senate amendments which sought to extend the powers 
of the delegation, Rossi had asserted that Parliament must not create 
a kind of permanent committee of inquiry into the running of the new 
broadcasting companies as this would be to prejudice their autonomy. 
19 
16. Interview with Jack Ralite, July 10 1979. 
17. Interview with Jean Cluzel, September 11 1979. 
18. Interview with Antoine de Tarle, September 8 1979. 
19. Journal Officiel, Debats'Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1974, P. 957. 
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Chevallier appears to have accepted this argument at face value 
since he regards the new role of the delegation as inimical to the 
maintenance of the public service. 
20 
y, , In reality, however, the 
fears expressed by Rossi and Chevallier have not been realised, since 
the parliamentary delegation lacks both the capacity and the will to 
be a permanent committee of inquiry. Moreover, far from being 
unfavourable to the maintenance of the public service, the delegation 
has in the main been in the forefront of its defence. 
The parliamentary delegation for broadcasting, in short, would 
seem to be a rather toothless body. It meets relatively infrequently 
for short periods of time. The majority of its members come from 
the ranks of the majorite. It lacks a permanent secretariat and 
research staff. Finally, its recommendations are not binding on 
either the Government or the broadcasting companies. 
The ' parliamentary' standing committees 
A second instrument of parliamentary control are the standing 
committees concerned with broadcasting policy, which comprise the 
finance comittee and the cultural affairs committee of both the 
National Assembly and the Senate. Membership of these four 
committees, like that of the other standing committees in both chambers, 
is based on proportional representation of all members in the Senate 
and of official party groups in the Assembly. 
21 
In theory these 
standing committees have a very large membership. The National 
20. J. Chevallier, op. cit., p. 265. 
21. See P. M. Williams, op. cit., pp. 62-63, for more general 
information on the composition and functions of the standing 
committees. 
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Assembly finance committee has over 60 members, the National 
Assembly cultural affairs committee has over 120, the Senate finance 
committee has 36 members and the cultural affairs committee of 
the upper chamber has 44 members. 
In practice, however, committee members attend meetings only 
in those policy areas which are of particular interest to them. 
Consequently, attendance at the meetings of the standing committees 
when broadcasting policy is under discussion numbers around a dozen. 
Those members who do attend, usually the party spokesmen on broad- 
casting policy on the Boor of the relevant chamber, constitute in a 
sense four small unofficial sub-committees on broadcasting policy. 
The main task of these standing committees is to produce 
an annual report which is presented to Parliament by the rapporteur 
special of each of the four committees at-the beginning 
of the budget debate on broadcasting. In these reports the 
standing committees judge the financial management-of the broadcasting 
companies during the-previous and current financial years and evaluate 
the financial position of the companies for the following financial 
year. The standing committees also evaluate the programming of the 
radio and television companies. More generally, the reports provide 
a body of evidence on the functioning of the broadcasting companies 
and on their relations with the Government. Finally, each -report contains 
a recommendation to Parliament as to whether the authorisation to the 
Government to collect the licence fee should or should not be given 
at the end of the budget debate. 
The 1974 statute maintained the investigative powers of the 
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rapporteurs speciaux. 
22 
In practice these powers have even been 
increased since the rapporteurs sp4ciaux may now contact the 
chairmen of the broadcasting companies directly without having 
to pass through the intermediary of the minister responsible for 
broadcasting. The annual reports are written by the administrateurs 
under the guidance of the rapporteur special and are then submitted to 
the committee for official approval. The*administrateur responsible 
for drafting=tom: annual report of the National Assembly finance 
committee on broadcasting commented: 
"The annual budgetary report is the only real means 
of parliamentary control. " 
"I write Le Tac's reports for him. The reports are 
Le Tac's and mine and are then approved by the finance 
committee. " 
.. 
' "The ännual"report is my major-preoccupation. Le Tac 
has me to do the spadework for him. Consequently, 
because there is a permanent staff, there is an effective 
control. Le Tac, Cluzel and Caillavet are all active 
rapporteurs sp4ciaux, vhile de Pr4aumont is much less active . 
"23 
While Cluzel reiterated the official view that-'the reports are those 
2 
of the committee as"a whole, 'Le Tac was much more forthright. 
"The report of the finance committee is my own 
personal report. An administrateur does the figures and 
then I write the conclusions. This conclusion is my own 
personal contribution. All the criticisms in the report 
come from myself. " 25 
The influence of the parliamentary standing committees in 
shaping broadcasting policy depends on the willingness of the 
Government to implement their recommendations. Certainly the annual 
22. Since 1974 the four rapporteurs sp4ciaux for broadcasting have 
been Joel Le Tac (National Assembly finance committee), 
Jean de Preaumont (National Assembly cultural affairs committee), 
Jean Cluzel (Senate finance committee) and Henri Caillavet 
(Senate cultural affairs committee. ). 
23. Interview with Antoine de Tarl4, September 8 1979. 
24. Interview with Jean Cluzel, September 11 1979. 
25. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979. 
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reports give the rapporteurs speciaux an important platform for the 
exposition of their views on current broadcasting policy. In fact, 
the publication of the reports is given nationwide coverage in the 
press, thus giving the rapporteurs speciaux excellent publicity for 
their views. 
26 This allows the rapporteur special to give the 
official stamp of the committee to his criticisms and recommendations. 
Nonetheless, if a recommendation does not meet with ministerial 
approval, the standing committee has no effective power to have its 
proposal implemented. Thus, an annual recommendation of the National 
Assembly finance committee that a federating body be established to 
co-ordinate the"running of the separate broadcasting companies has 
consequently fallen on deaf ministerial ears since it calls into 
question one of the fundamental premises of the 197+ reform. In the 
fact of ministerial intransigence the role of the standing committees 
is thus reduced to that of diffusing information to Parliament, 
the press,. the public and interested researchers. 
27 
The annual-budget debäte*on'broadcasting 
By the terms of article 19 of the 1974 broadcasting statute: 
"Each year, on'-the occasion of the voting of the 
finance act, Parliament, following the report of a 
member of each of the finance committees of the National 
Assembly and the Senate in the capacity of rapporteur 
sp4cial, authorises'the collection of the licence fee. "28 
The annual parliamentary debate on broadcasting is the principal 
26. For example, the publication of the National Assembly finance 
committee's report on broadcasting in October 1978 was given 
wide press coverage at a time when the SFP crisis was also 
hitting the headlines. 
27. The reports are frequently over 50 pages and sometimes over 
100 pages in length and often-contain useful annexes. 
28.1974 broadcasting statute, article 19. 
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regular financial check available to Parliament. The Government 
fixes the cost of the licence and then submits its decision to 
Parliament, which at the end of the budget debate votes either for 
or against the authorisation to collect the licence revenue for the 
following financial year. As the decision to fix the cost of the 
licence is not within the legislative domain but is of a regulatory 
character, Parliament does not have the power to alter the proposed 
amount of the licence fee. 
29 
Parliament's role is the more limited 
one of granting or withholding its consent to collect the licence 
revenue. In this respect the power available to Parliament is the 
same as it possessed at the time of the ORTF. 
30 
In addition, the 1971 statute extended Parliament's responsibility 
over the financial arrangements of the broadcasting companies by 
making the division of the licence revenue among the four programme 
companies subject to parliamentary approval. 
31 This new power given 
to Parliament by the statute was not included in the Government's 
original bill. In fact the Government had opposed the parliamentary 
amendments which sought to give Parliament a greater say in the 
allocation of the licence revenue. 
32 However with the inclusion of 
this clause in the 197+ statute the financial powers of Parliament in 
the broadcasting field are slightly more extensive than at the time 
of the ORTF, since previously Parliament had no control over the 
allocation of resources within the unitary structure of the Office. 
33 
29. See articles 34 and 37 of the 1958 Constitution and article 10 
of ordinance no. 59-273 of February 4 1959. See also Documents 
d'Ltudes, no. 1.08, Les articles 34,37 et 38 de la Constitution 
de 1958, Paris, La documentation frangaise, 1973. 
30. Paragraph 1 of article 19 of the 1974 broadcasting statute, 
paragraph 1 of article lk of the 1972 ORTF statute and paragraph 1 
of article 9 of the 1964 ORTF statute are all identical. 
31.197+ broadcasting statute, article 19 paragraph 2. 
32. See section on parliamentary debates and legislation for more 
details on the significance of these amendments. 
1 -Sepchanter 
nn Finnnnom 
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Finally, Parliament successfully attempted in 1974 to ensure 
that it would be better informed when it came to making its decision 
on the broadcasting budget. The Government's bill in 197+ was amended 
so as to increase the documentation available to Pabliament. Thus, 
while the original bill referred to the financial results of the 
previous year, the provisional accounts for the current year and the 
provisional budget for the following year, the 1974 statute also 
includes the financial accounts of the production company, the current 
year's chhiers'des charges and the Government's report on each company's 
adherence to the provisions of its cahier des charges. 
Thus Parliament's power to exercise a financial control over 
broadcasting was marginally strengthened by the 1971 statute. However, 
this extension of the power of Parliament in this respect should be 
viewed within the context of the far more important powers possessed 
by the Government. Is is the Government which fixes the cost of 
the licence and so decides the total amount of resources to be allocated 
to the state broadcasting services. Chevallier's conclusion that 
"Parliament, benefiting from essential sources 
of information, has the means of an effective financial 
control. " 34 
grossly underestimates the extent to which the powers of Parliament 
are still severely circumscribed by the 1958 Constitution, the 1974 
broadcasting statute, governmental stability and a lack of both 
parliamentary time and detailed information. The following analysis 
of the parliamentary debate at the end of 1975 on the broadcasting 
0 34+. J. Chevallier, op. cit., p. 261. 
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companies' 1976 budget well illustrates the strengths and 
weaknesses of Parliament's financial control in the broadcasting field. 
During 1975, their first year in operation, the broadcasting 
companies survived a series of financial crises through frequent 
recourse to the programme stocks inherited from the ORTF and by dint 
of substantial cutbacks on original expenditure provision. 
35 
By the 
end of 1975 the companies, with the notable exception of the SFP, 
had established themselves on a reasonably sound financial footing, 
though not without sacrifices in the length of viewing time and the 
quality of their programme output. 
36 
To help ease their financial 
position, the Government announced in June 1975 its intention to 
increase the cost of the licence in January 1976 from 140 to 160 francs 
for black and white and from 210 to 210 francs for colour sets. 
37 
Designed to help-the broadcasting companies balance their budgets 
in 1976, the proposed increase was debated in Parliament at the end 
of 1975 during-the annual budget -debate on broadcasting. 
As is usual prior to the budget debates, the finance committees 
and cultural affairs committees of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate published their annual reports on the performance of the 
broadcasting companies during 1975 and outlined their hopes and fears 
for 1976. Of these four standing committees only. one, the Senate 
finance committee, recommended that Parliament should refuse the 
authorisation to collect the licence fee. 
38 
The other three all 
35. See chapter on the Liquidation of the ORTF. 
36. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
37. Le Monde, June 14 1975. 
38. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1975-1976, no. 62, 
Rapport general fait au nom de la commission des finances, 
... sur le project 
de loi de finances pour 1976, Tome III, annexe no. 4E 
Radiodiffusion et t6ldvision, rapporteur sp6cial: Jean Cluzel, 
annexe au procbs-verbal de is. seance du 20 novembre 1975. 
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recommended that the authorisation be granted and that the proposed 
allocation of licence revenue among the broadcasting companies should 
proceed as announced by the Government. 
39 
Thus, while all four 
parliamentary standing committees made numerous criticisms of the 
working of the 1974 reform, only one went so far as to recommend 
that Parliament should not authorise the collection of the licence 
fee. 
The debate in the National Assembly, the first since the new 
companies began broadcasting, was a heated affair. 
4o 
The companies 
were criticised by representatives of all the parliamentary groups, 
including those of the governing coalition which had voted for the 
reform just over a year previously.. While it was to be expected 
that the Socialists and Communists would denounce once again the 
Giscardian broadcasting reform and vote against the broadcasting 
budget on principle, the opposition of the deputies of the majorite 
to certain aspects of the reform was surprisingly intense, recalling 
the opposition of large sections of the Gaullist party to the 
Chaban-Delmas reform of the ORTE between 1969 and 1972.41 
39. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1975-1976, no. 1916, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances,... sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1976, Annexe no. 1+8, Radiodiffusion et 
television, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 10 octobre 1975. 
Journal 0fficiel, Documents Assembl6e Nationale, 1975-1976, no. 1917, 
Avis presente au nom de la commission aes affaires culturelles,... 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1976, Tome XX, Radiodiffusion- 
television frangaise, par Jean de Preaumont, annexe au proces-verbal 
de lä seance du 10 octobre 1975. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1975-1976, no. 63, 
Avis present6 au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles sur 
le projet de loi de finances pour 1976, adopte par. l'Assembl(fe 
Nationale, Tome IV, Information: Radiodiffusion- t4levision, par 
Henri Caillavet, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 20 novembre 
1975. 
40. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, 
November 19 1975, pp. 8581-8602. 
41. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 
1974 reform. 
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At the end of the debate in the Assembly only five deputies 
voted for the authorisation to collect the licence fee. These 
included Le Tac, rapporteur sp4cial of the National Assembly finance 
committee on broadcasting, de Pr4aumont, rapporteur of the National 
Assembly cultural affairs committee on broadcasting, Pierre Gaussin, 
parliamentary representative on-the board of governors of TF1, and two 
others. 
42 
The Gaullist party and the Centrists abstained, while the 
Giscardians joined the Socialists and Communists in voting against. 
43 
How can this large hostile vote on the part of the deputies of 
the majorite be-explained? Chinaud, the leader of the Giscardian 
parliamentary group, -explained its opposition on the grounds that 
the new broadcasting companies had perpetuated many of the operational 
defects. of the ORTF. 
44 
However, it was clear that this was only a 
pretext and that one main source of concern was the news coverage of the 
programme companies, particularly A2. In general, the deputies of 
'heimajorite regarded the news programmes of A2 as too favourable 
to the parties of the left. Moreover, each particular component 
of the majorite (Gaullist, Giscardian and Centrist) considered that 
it was suffering from unsympathetic coverage. For example, two 
months prior to the debate Maurice Papon, a Gaullist deputy and 
rapporteur genoral of the National Assembly finance committee, had 
condemned "the scandal of A2's television news which operates to the 
detriment of the majorite. 'r 
45 
42. Mme. Aliette Crepin and M. Hanel. 
43 The result of the vote at the end of the debate was 5 deputies 
in favour of authorising the Government to collect the licence 
fee, 269 against and over 200 abstentions. 
44. Journal Officiel, DSbats Parliamentaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
November 19 1975, pp. 8 00-8601. 
I 
45. Le Monde, September 12 and 15 1975. 
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More generally A2 had been the least stable of the programme 
companies set up by the 1974 reform. Barely a week before the 
budget debate another minor storm had affected A2 when a programme 
on the problems of the army, due to be shown on November 11 in the 
Dossiers 'de 1'4cran series, had had to be cancelled when-&t the 
last moment the Minister of Defence, Yvon Bourges, withdrew his 
promised participation. Jullian's reaction in publiclr'condemning 
the minister's change of heart was scarcely designed to commend him 
to politicians of the governing coalition. 
46 
In short, from the 
very beginning A2 was the company which was most politically suspect 
in the eyes of the right-wing deputies and Jullian himself was held 
responsible by-them for the instability which had been associated 
with the comp. ny since its establishment . 
4T 
Both during the debate itself and, even more clearly, in the 
corridors before the debate the anger of the deputies of the majorite 
was apparent. For example, Georges Donnez (reformateur) condemned 
the lack of coverage given to his party by the programme companies. 
"We, reformateurs,.... complained prior to the statute 
of August 7 197 of a closed broadcasting structure.... 
which ignored us totally. We observe that we are no better 
provided for now, whether one coýiders news programmes or 
party political broadcasts.... " 
Emanuel Aubert (Gaullist) complained that the principle of a balanced 
news coverage was not always adhered to. 
49 
Another Gaullist, 
Alain Terrenoire, remarked that "... news coverage is hostile to the 
46. Le Point, no. 166, November 24 1975. 
I7. See chapter on Appointments. 
48. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, 
November 19 1975, p. 8591. 
I 
49. Ibid, p. 8601. 
-326- 
majorite. "50 Michel Debr4 (Gaullist) commented that: 
"We do not say that there is not enough coverage 
given to the UDR; we say that there is not enough 
coverage given to what in our eyes is essential for 
France. " 71 
though the distinction he was trying to make was not immediately apparent. 
Roland Boudet (r4formateur)_was even more forthright in his remarks: 
"Certainly the channels can play the opposition's 
game. But I am not so much of a masochist as to vote for 
a television licence which allows them to criticise me. " 
52 
The most outspoken deputy was Jacques Soustelle (reformateur) who 
expressed his opinion in the following succinct manner: 
"We're fed up with the hold of the lefties (la 
mainmise gauchiste) at Antenne 2. " 53 
Thus news coverage by the programme companies and particularly by A2 
was an important factor in arousing the wrath of the deputies of the 
governing coalition. 
54 
The negative vote at the end of the debate 
50. Le Figaro, November 19 1975. 
51. Le Monde, November 20 1975. See also la Croix, November 20 1975; 
le Quotidien de Paris, November 20 1975; and l'Express, 
no. 1272, November 24 1975. 
52. Le Figaro, November 19 1975. 
53. Le Nouvel Observateur, no. 576, November 24-30 1975. 
54. During the debate Robert-Andre Vivier, parliamentary representative 
on the board of governors at A2, produced the following breakdown 
of the time allocated to political parties, interest groups and 
the Government between January 6 and August 31 1975 on A2. 
Socialist party k hours 10 minutes 44 seconds 
Communist party 2 "" 1+0 'r 7" 
Left-wing radicals 13 " 22 
Gaullists 1" 39 is 5 
JJSS Radicals 1" 10 " 17 " 
Giscardians 23 It 7 
Reformateurs 16 it 17 
Other centrists 5 it 13 
President of the Republic 5 22 it 38 
Prime Minister 2 18 53 
Minsters 8" k "" 25 " 
CGT 48 it 1+7 
CFDT 20 " 39 
FO 14 26 
CNPF 24 " 8 "' 
Source: Le Monde, November 20 1975. 
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was a warning shot aimed at both the Government and the chairmen 
of the companies, especially Jullian, to impress upon them the concern 
felt by the deputies of the majorite. 
55 
How deep-seated this concern 
was may be judged from the fact that several of the deputies who voted 
against the authorisation to collect the licence at the end of the 
debate in the Assembly had voted in favour of its collection in the 
relevant debates in the finance committee and the cultubal affairs 
committee. 
-----In any case whatever the reasons for the negative vote in the 
Assembly, the Government was compelled to take note of it. The 
proposed increase in the cost of the licence was reduced by 5 francs 
from 160 to 155 francs for black and white and from 240 to 235 francs 
for colour sets. The Senate finance committee, which had rejected the 
initial proposed increase, supported the amendment introduced by 
Rossi to this effect in the Senate on the grounds that the more 
limited increase was more in keeping with the anti-inflation policy 
of the Government and that a negative vote would pose a delicate 
constitutional problem. 
56 
The Government's own amendment was 
supported, albeit reluctantly, by the Gaullists, Giscardians and 
Centrists in the Senate without a formal vote being taken. 
Because of this reduced increase in the cost of the licence 
the projected income of the broadcasting companies from licence revenue 
and advertising receipts for 1976 fell by over 100 million francs. 
57 
55. in interviews Jack Ralite (July 10 1979) and Jean de Preaumont 
(September 21 1979) explained the negative vote as reflecting 
the deputies' desire to have more control over the cost of the 
licence and its allocation among the companies. 
56. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires S4nat, December 10 1975, 
p. 4362. For the debate in full see pp. 339- 365" 
5T. Le Monde, December 10 1975. 
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As a result the broadcasting companies had to postpone indefinitely 
various planned projects. For example, A2 was forced to shelve 
plans to introduce television programmes in the morning and to extend 
its afternoon programme schedules. Its project to build a new 
headquarters at Neuilly was also postponed indefinitely. Nonetheless, 
5$ 
despite a lower level of income than had been planned for, both 
TFl and A2 made substantial profits totalling around 100 million 
francs during the 1976 financial year. 
59 
The rather irpical course of events at the end of 1975 which 
led to the Government's decision to reduce the rroposed increase in 
the cost of the licence highlights both the strengths and weaknesses 
of Parliament's control over broadcasting finance. 
6o 
By means of a 
negative vote-in the National Assembly the deputies of the majorite 
persuaded the Government to reduce the proposed increase by 5 francs. 
This allowed the Senate to vote the authorisation to collect the 
licence without loss of face, since, having made their point in the 
Assembly, the Gaullists, Giscardians and assorted Centrists could 
support in the Senate the smaller increase in the licence without 
appearing to go back on the criticisms made by their colleagues in 
the Assembly. 
On the other hand, Parliament has no power to propose a change 
in the cost of the licence on its own initiative. It can only approve 
58. Minutes of the comite d'entreprise of A2. February 4 1976, p. 11. 
59. Le Point, no. 237, April 4 1977. 
G 
60. The proposed licence fees for 1977,1978,1979 and 1980 were all 
passed in the National Assembly. 
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or reject the financial proposals made by the Government. This means 
that the financial sanction available to Parliament is a crude weapon 
which has to cover a wide variety of criticisms directed against 
the broadcasting companies, the Government or both. Thus, Parliament 
may as in 1975 use its power to refuse to - authorise the, egIlection 
of the licence on grounds other than the financial management of 
the companies, because this financial sanction, hedged as it is with 
limitations, is one of the few means available to Parliament to show 
its disapproval of the Government and/or the broadcasting companies. 
Moreover, the rejection of the authorisation to collect the licence 
is a difficult weapon because it requires a high level of widespread 
dissatisfaction among parliamentarians if it is to be successful. 
This over-dependence on the annual budget debate as a vehicle 
for criticism of governmental broadcasting policy reflects the 
changed role of Parliament with regard to the budget in general. 
"... the annual budget has lost... its decisive 
importance for policy-making. It remains the crucial 
instrument for investigating and criticising the way 
the Government uses its powers.... " 61 
The parliamentary debate on-'-. the broadcasting budget is no different 
from the budgetary debates in other policy fields in that it affords 
Parliament the opportunity to voice criticism and to ask questions 
of the responsible minister. In return it affords the minister 
the opportunity to defend government policy and to announce new 
initiatives. 
6L P. M. Williams, op. cit., p. 83. 
4 
9 
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In short, the annual budget debate on broadcasting scarcely provides 
Parliament with "the means of an effective financial control" to which 
Chevailier refers. This is not to say that Parliament has no powers 
11 
to influence the financial allocations of the broadcasting companies. 
62 
However, the Government undoubtedly retains the initiative with regard 
to the control of the financial resources allocated to the state broad- 
casting services, while Parliament can act effectively only at the margins. 
Special ad hoc parliamentary committees 
Special ad hoc committees represent an additional instrument of 
parliamentary control in the field of broadcasting. Since the 1974 
reform two committees of inquiry (cormnission d'enauetfl. ) on aspects of 
broadcasting policy have been set up, one by the Senate and the other 
by the National Assembly. The Senate report published by Jean Cluzel in the 
summer of 1979, examined the financial conditions in which the-programmes 
of the television companies were produced 
63 
The National Assembly 
report, presented by Claude Martin also in-the summer of 1979, inquired 
into the conditions of public information in France. In addition 
6 
62. For example, in 1976 the Senate passed an amendment which had been 
introduced by the Government in the-face of pressure from the-- 
Senate finance committee. This amendment reduced A2's income from 
licence revenue by 5 million francs destined to help finance its new 
headquarters and allocated it instead to Radio France to assist its 
external services broadcasts. 
Journal Officiel, Documents S4nAt, 1976-1977, no. 65, Rapport 
gen6ral fait au nom de la commission des finances.. sur le projet de 
loi de finances, pour 1977, Tome III, Annexe no. 46, Radiodiffusion 
et t&l6vision, rapporteur spdcial: Jean Cluzel, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 23 novembre 1976, p. 128, and Journal Officiel 
D bats Parlementaires Senat, December 11 1976; pp. 1+236-4237. 
63. Journal Officiel, Documents S4nat, 1978-1979, no. 373., Rapport fait en 
conclusion des travaux de la commission d'enqugte parl"ementaire 
crMe en application de la rdsolution adopt6e par le Senat le 
13 decembre 1978 sur les conditions financibres dens lesquelles sont 
produits les programmes des socidt6s nationales de television, par 
Jean Cluzel, enregistr4 au cours de la seance du 12 juin 1979. 
(Cluzel report, 1979) 
64. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemb1 e Nationale, no. 1289, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquete sur les 
conditions del'information publique, pr4sentd par Claude Martin, d6pöt publik au Journal Officiel du 18 septembre 1979. (Martin 
reuort, 1979) 
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a lengthy Senate information report (rapport d'information) on 
programme quality and creativity in French broadcasting was 
presented by Henri Caillavet in the spring of 1978.65 During the 
ORTF's ten year existence four special parliamentary committees were set 
up to examine various aspects of broadcasting policy. 
66 
Thus, since 
1964 there have been two committees of inquiry, three committees of 
65. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1977-1978, no. 291t, Rapport 
d'information fait... au nom de la commission des affaires 
culturelles sur les conditions de la qualite des programmes et 
de la creation ä la radio-television frangaise, ä la suite de 
1'institution, par cette commission, d'un groupe de travail, 
par Henri Caillavet, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 6 avril 
1978. (Caillavet report, 1978). 
66. In chronological order the reports of these committees were: 
(a) Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1967-1968, no. 118, 
Rapport fait en conclusion des travaux de la commission de 
contröle creee en vertu de la resolution adopt4 par 1e Senat 
le 1 decembre 1967 et charg4e d'examiner les problemes pos4s 
par l'accomplissement des missions propres ä 1'Office de 
radiodiffusion-tel4vision frangaise par Andr4 Diligent, 
d4pose le 13 avril 1968. (Diligent report, 1968). 
(b) Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1971-1972, no. 165, 
Rapport d'information pr4sent6 au nom de la mission commune 
d'information.... charg4e d'examiner la r4gularit4 de la 
Bestion de 1'ORTF et des relations que cet organisme 
entretient avec diverses entreprises nationales, etablissements 
publics, societ4s d'4conomie mixte ou autres, notament dens 
le domaine de la publicite, par Andr6 Diligent, annexe au 
procbs-verbal de la s4ance du 25 avril 1972. (Diligent report, 1972) 
(c) -Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1972-197'x, 
no. 2291, Rapport fait au nom de la commission de contr8le de 
la gestion de l'Office de radiodiffusion-television francaise, 
par Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du - 
28 avril 1972. (Le Tac retort, 1972). --- - 
(d) Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1973-197+, 
no-1072, Rapport fait au nom de la commission de contröle 
de la gestion financibre de l'Office de radiodiffusion et t4l4visioc 
francaise, par Roger Chinaud, annexe au proces-verbal de la 
seance du 20 juin 1974. (Ohinaud report, 197]+). 
This list excludes the independent report commissioned by the Government 
in October 1969 under the chairmanship of Lucien Paye. - The Paye report 
was published in June 1970. 
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control (commission de contr8le) and two information reports, all 
examining different facets of broadcasting. The following analysis 
of the role of these committees sheds light on their importance as 
a means of parliamentary control and also on their inherent limitations. 
The powers of these special committees were not affected by 
the 1974 broadcasting statute, which made no reference to them. Their 
powers for the most part remain those as set out in an ordinance of 
November 1958 and can be summarised as follows. 
67 
Committees of 
inquiry are established to collect information on established facts 
(faits d4termin4s), while the committees of control are formed to 
examine the administrative, financial or technical management of 
public services or national enterprises. 
68 
These committees can 
be set up by either chamber of Parliament and their members are 
appointed by majority vote in the chamber concerned. They are 
temporary bodies and are automatically disbanded once they have 
produced their reports or at the latest six months after the adoption 
in Parliament of the enabling resolution. Another committee cannot 
be established with the same terms of reference until twelve months 
have elapsed since the end of the work of the previous committee. The 
investigations of the committees are carried out in secret and members 
of the committees and witnesses are sworn to secrecy. The relevant 
chamber alone has the power to decide on the publication of all or 
part of any report which is produced by the committees. Finally, any 
breach of these regulations is punishable in law. 69 
67. Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, ordonnance no. 58-1100 
du 17 novembre 1958, article 6. 
68. Ibid, article 6, paragraphs 1,2 and 3. 
69. Ibid, article 6, paragraphs 4,5,6,7 and 8. 
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There exist, however, various constraints which can be employed, 
particularly by the"Government, to prevent a committee of inquiry or 
control from functioning effectively. These constraints have been 
very well summarised by Ruth Thomas. 
"... these commissions. have the disadvantage of being 
the products of crises, and they have no coercive power. 
... The Fifth Republic reduced the powers of parliamentary 
special commissions, limiting their duration to four months 
and excluding from their scope any question which is sub 
iudice..... For a commission of inquiry, not only must facts 
be "established" and not sub judice, but they must not form 
part of the "reserved domain" of the executive branch. Other 
possibilities of pressure exist: from government control of 
the parliamentary timetable....; from the limited time allotted 
to the work ....; and from the various forms of official 
secrecy which can be invoked - judicial, national security, 
and administrative - .... Indeed, the commission's powers are 
effectively limited to those the subjects of the inquiry 
allow them; no one is obliged to appear, and ministers can 
refuse to let their civil servants testify. The final report 
of a commission may exclude the observations of the opposition 
members, and the Assembly may refuse to allow publication 
altogether. Finally, the commission's report has only the 
force of suggestion or proposal; the government and the 
broadcasting company can thus choose to ignore its 
conclusions. " 70 
Yet in spite of these limitations the special parliamentary 
committees which have been set up since 1964 to investigate the 
state broadcasting services have attracted b lot of publicity. 
Moreover, several of them would appear to have influenced the Government's 
broadcasting policy. in important ways. For example, the 1968 Diligent 
report was highly critical of the way in which the-196k ORTF statute 
had been, or more accurately had not been, implemented. In particular, 
the report condemned the Government's interference in the financial, 
managerial and editorial operations of the Office, recommending that 
the role of the Government should be minimised so as to reinforce the 
autonomy of the ORTF. Just over one year after the publication of the 
70. R. Thomas, 'op. cit", pp. 96-97, ' 
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report, the spirit of many of the committee's recommendations was 
observed by the introduction of various reform measures by Chaban-Delmas 
in 1969.71 
The two parliamentary reports published in 1972, one by each 
chamber, were also critical of certain features in the running of the 
ORTF. The 1972 Diligent report made public the scandal of covert 
advertising at the ORTF, while the Le Tac report contained a more 
general condemnation of the Office's slack management 
J2 Three 
months after the publication of these two reports the ORTF was given a 
new statute and a new pr4sident directeur g4n4ral. Moreover, the last 
special committee to investigate the administration of the ORTF, the 
Chinaud committee, published its report in June 1974, barely a month 
before the Government introduced its bill to abolish the ORTF and 
reorganise the state broadcasting services. 
73 
It would appear, therefore, 
that the publication of these parliamentary reports was swiftly -- 
followed by important policy decisions on the part of the Government, 
usually involving new legislation. 
However, such a simple casual link between recommendations by the 
legislature and action by the executive would be an over estimation 
of the significance of these parliamentary reports. Thus, the 
Chaban-Delmas reforms of 1969 cannot be attributed solely or even 
principally to the 1968 Diligent report. The long strike at the ORTF 
in May 1968 at the time of "the events" and the accession to the 
premiership of a socially liberal Gaullist in June 1969 are much more 
71. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 1974 
reform. 
72. Ibid. 
4 
73. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
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important factors to be taken into account in any explanation of 
the 1969 reforms. 
Likewise, it is improbable that the decision to feform the 
' ORTF in 1972 can be attributed principally to the publication of 
the Diligent and Le Tac reports. Rather these served as a pretext for 
the reorganisation of the Office. The 1972 reform was more the result 
of Pompidou's growing disillusionment with the 196' ORTF reforms of 
Chaban-Delmas. 
74 Chaban-Delmas' fall from grace was confirmed 
by his enforced resignation from the premiership at the same time as 
his broadcasting reforms were being overturned by a new ORTF statute. 
Neither report specifically recommended the type of reform which was 
subsequently undertaken by the Government and neither rapporteur 
considered his report as an attack on the Chaban-Delmas reforms of 
three years previously. Andre Diligent commented: 
"The report was not out to get Chaban. The protests 
against the Desgraupes experiment pre-dated the setting up 
of the committee. Moreover, these protests were about the 
handling of news at the ORTF, not about the secret 
advertising scandal. My report was not a pretext for the 
sacking of Chaban. Juillet (one of Pompidou's personal 
advisers) was already after Chaban, wanting to get rid 
of him. " 75 
Joel Le Tac's comments were of a similar nature: 
"In 1972 there was a" bad climate surrounding Chaban. 
There was a malaise at the ORTF with de Bresson (the director 
general) incapable of running the organisation. Nobody was 
in charge. Chaban came'out worst in the affair. Pompidou's 
personal advisers, Juillet, Garaud and Guillaud, were all 
anti-Chaban. Also Poniatowski and Giscard were behind the 
publication of Chaban's tax returns. I tried to defend 
Chaban who was much criticised at the time-because of the 
Desgraupes experiment which, though positive in my opinion, 
was seen as negative by a large section of the Gaullist party. 
But Chaban and his entourage delayed too long. Sanctions 
0 
T. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 
1974 reform. 
75. Interview with Andre Diligent, June 21 1979. 
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should have been taken within the ORTF before the whole 
affair was made public. It was an error on Chaban's 
part to assume responsibility for what was happening at the 
ORTF. This ought to have been de Bresson's job. I was 
pro-Chaban and that was why I took control of the 76 
committee. The report was not a sanction of Chaban. " 
Chaban-Delmas' dismissal from the premiership and the new ORTF 
statute were, in short, the result of opposition to his policy by 
the President of ti Republic, the presidential staff and. a large, 
vociferous section of the Gaullist parliamentary group. The two 
parliamentary reports may have afforded the opportunity to introduce 
a reform of the ORTF, but the origins of the 1972 reform are to be 
found elsewhere. 
Similarly, in 1974 the findings of the Chinaud report 
constituted only one among a host of reasons for the reorganisation 
of the state broadcasting services and the abolition of the ORTF. 
As we have already argued, political considerations following 
Giscard d'Estaing's election to the presidency were more important 
in deciding the shape of the reorganisation. If Pompidou had lived 
there can be little doubt that the more modest Long reforms would 
have been adopted instead and the unitary structure of the ORTF 
would have survived. The Chinaud report itself did not recommend the 
abolition of the ORTF. Moreover, even if there had been no 
parliamentary report published at this time, some sort of reform 
of the ORTF would undoubtedly have taken place. 
7T 
The Caillavet report published in early 1978 was concerned 
with programme quality and creativity on French radio and television. 
76. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979-- 
77. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
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Among the report's seventeen recommendations to improve programme 
quality were proposals to establish a structural co-ordination of 
the programme schedules of the three television companies and to set 
up a creativity fund of 200 million francs. 
78 In addition, the 
report, without going so far as to recommend an overall structural 
reform of the broadcasting services, did suggest that the plan put 
forward by Löng in 1974 should be used as the basis of discussion in 
any future plans to reorganise the public service. 
"This project r_the_product-. of a great deal-of thought 
by a first class-expert, was a compromise of all the 
-- - advantages-and-disadvantages - ok -centralisation and 
- ---decentralisation. " 79 
Thus, the report-Balled into-question-one-of the-bas-ic-principles 
-of the 197 'eform, the absence- of=a---central- co-ordinating- body 
in-the new broadcasting structure. 
However, none of the main recommendations of the Caillavet report 
has been implemented by the Government-. - The, establsshmient of a 
structural co-ordination of programme-schedules-and the institution 
of a central co-ordinating body would have involved a fundamental 
reversal of the policy of separate companies with full responsibility 
for their operations which formed the keystone of the 1974 reform. 
The television companies have not been allowed to purchase half of 
the capital of the production company. 
8o 
Moreover, while a creativity 
fund has been set up, in its first year of operation the sum involved 
totalled 5 million francs rather than the 200 million francs 
i 
78. Caillavet report, 1978, pp. 252 and 259. ( For full reference 
of the report see footnote 65) 
79. Ibid, p. 260. 
80. Ibid, p. 256. 
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' recommended in the Caillavet report. 
81 
In fact the failure of the 
Caillavet report to have a major impact on broadcasting policy 
may be judged from the fact that less than a year after its 
publication the Senate established a committee of inquiry to 
examine much the same evidence as had been considered by the 
Caillavet report. 
The report-of this committee of inquiry, the Cluzel report, was 
published in June 1979. Set up to examine the financial conditions 
in which the programmes of the television companies were produced, 
the committee devoted a large part of the report to the financial 
crisis of the SFP and its relationship with the television companies. 
Thirty recommendations of varying significance were made at the end' 
of the report, among the most important of which was the proposal to 
establish a central public corporation with the general task of 
co-ordinating the management of the different companies. The central 
public corporation would be responsible for allocating the revenue 
from the licence and from commercial advertising among the companies, 
for co-ordinating programme schedules and for planning investment, 
particularly in new audio-visual technology. 
82 
Another recommendation 
of the Cluzel report was the the television companies TF1 and A2 
should become the main shareholders in the SFP. 
83 
The report also 
recommended that a quality fund should be set up to encourage creativity 
in French television production. 
84 
81. Journal Officiel, Documents Senat,. 1978-1979, no. 75, Avis pr6sent4 
au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1979.... Tome XI, Radiodiffusion-tdldvision, 
par Henri Caillavet, annexe au proces-verbal de la s4ance du 
21 novembre 1978, p. 18. 
82. Cluzel reps, 1979, pp. 155-157. (For full reference of the 
report see footnote 63. ) 
83. Thid, p. 153. 
84. Ibid, p. 171. 
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Some of the proposals'of the Cluzel report were, therefore, 
very similar to those made a year earlier by Senator Caillavet. 
However, the Cluzel report has been no more successful than its 
predecessor in influencing the main guidelines of the Government's 
broadcasting policy. It would require a fundamental change in this 
policy for the-Government to set up a central public corporation 
along the lines recommended by the Cluzel report. Such an innovation 
is, to say the least, highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
The third-parliamentary report which has considered aspects 
of the Government's broadcasting pricy since 197+ is the Martin 
report which was published in September 1979. The objective of 
this National-Assembly committee of inquiry was to examine the 
conditions-of<public information in France, i. e. the way in which 
news was collected, produced and disseminated through the press 
and the broadcasting media. Since the work of this committee ended 
in a political fiasco, the report as published contains no 
recommendations to the Government. Indeed there is no report as 
such, but merely an introductory statement which condemns the lack 
of independence and pluralism in the news media, followed by comments 
from the four main political groups in the Assembly: the Gaullists, 
the Giscardians, the Socialists and the Communists. It is safe to say 
that the influence of this report on news presentation in the state 
broadcasting companies will be nil. In the absence of common 
recommendations it cannot be otherwise. 
The circumstances in which the report was drafted and finally 
published, however, do reveal a lot about the role of special 
parliamentary committees and particularly about their efficacy as 
an instrument of control over governmental policy. In fact the 
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Martin report is an excellent case study of the limitations of this 
method of parliamentary control. 
The committee of inquiry was set up in March 1979 on the 
initiative of the Gaullist parliamentary group. 
85 
After the committee 
had sat for six months and heard the testimony of ninety-six witnesses, 
a report was drafted by the committee's rapporteur, Jacques Douffiagues, 
a Giscardian deputy. This very long draft report was then rejected 
by the Socialist, Communist and, most importantly, Gaullist members 
of the committee. 
86 
According to the Gaullist broadsheet, La lettre 
de la nation, the GauZist deputies: 
".... were particularly surprised to find the document 
presented by M. Douffiagues, far from highlighting the 
original evidence presented by the committee of inquiry, 
had sought to suppress this evidence in order to prove 
that as far as the information of the public was concerned 
everything was fine in France. " 87 
Since the original draft report was rejected by a majority of 
the committee-members, the committee had only two courses of action 
open to- it if it wanted any report on its investigations to be 
published: either to ask Douffiagues to draft another report or to 
elect another rapporteur. A compromise solution to satisfy both 
Giscardian and Gaullist members of the committee was found to be 
impossible, with the result that Douffiagues and the other Giscardian 
members of the committee resigned on September 13. A Gaullist 
85. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble '*e Nationale, 1978-1979, 
no. 901, Proposition de resolution tendant ä la creation dune 
commission d'enqu8te sur les conditions de 1'information 
publique, presentde par Claude Labbe et les membres du groupe 
du Rassemblement pour la Republique et apparentes. 
The Gaullists had previously called for the establishment of 
"a committee of inquiry into alleged government pressures on 
broadcasting journalists during the municipal elections of 
March 1977. See Le Monde, February 17 1977. 
86. Le Matin, September 14 1979. 
87. Quoted in Le Monde, September 15 1979. 
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rapporteur, Claude Martin, was then elected to draft another report, 
the Socialist and Communist members of the committee abstaining in 
the vote to choose a new rapporteur. Douffiagues explained his 
resignation from the committee in the following terms: 
"The committee of inquiry into public information 
carried out its work normally until this afternoon. 
Certain people wished to present as a reality what was 
only a reflection of their undoubtedly partisan 
passions. It was therefore impossible for me to 
carry out my functions as rapporteur in an objective 
manner. 
Under these conditions the UDF members of the committee 
have decided not to participate any longer in the work 
of what was up until today a committee of inquiry. " 88 
With less than two days in which to draft a new report Martin 
sought to have the testimony of the different witnesccz published in 
an annex to his report. However, not all the witnesses could be 
contacted in the time available and of those who were several were 
opposed to the publication of their testimony which had been given on 
the understanding that it would remain secret. Thus, the final report, 
as drafted by Martin, contains a statement of only sixteen lines 
followed by comments from the four main parliamentary groups. As- 
such it is a very unsatisfatory product of six months' investigation 
by a special parliamentary committee. 
89 
Yet if the report itself is disappointingly vague, the problems 
surrounding the first draft of the report and indeed the work of the 
committee in general shed much light on the role of special 
parliamentary committees. The first point to stress is the crucial 
importance of the rapporteur. Though the report of a special 
6 
88. Le Monde, September 15 1979. 
89. For the full reference of the report see footnote 64. 
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parliamentary committee is officially the work of the committee as 
a whole, the rappörteur has a large measure of independence when 
he comes to write the committee's report. The committee may, as in 
this case, choose to reject the report as drafted by the rapporteur, 
but given the limitations of time if a report is to be published, a 
negative vote is a move of the last resort. If the Gaullists, when they 
asked for a committee of inquiry to be established, had intended to 
use this device to criticise the Giscardian regime for its control 
of the news media, they made a major tactical error in allowing a 
Giscardian deputy to be the committee's rapporteur. A Gaullist 
member of the committee himself admitted this after the event: 
"Two committees of inquiry were being set up almost 
simultaneously, one on'public information and the other on 
employment. We decided that the committee on employment was 
more important. and so filled the post of rapporteur on this 
committee. Therefore, the UDF had the post of rapporteur on 
the committee on public information. 
I was opposed to this choice and wanted the RPR to take 
the post of rapporteur on the committee on public information. 
4te made a mistake. "VU 
The second point to emerge from this analysis of the work of 
the 1979 National Assembly committee of inquiry into the conditions of 
public information is that the committee has no power to compel 
witnesses to appear before it. Thus, in this case Giscard d'Estaing 
did not allow his spokesman, Pierre Hunt, to appear before the committee. 
9: 
Nor was this the first time that a special parliamentary committee 
into broadcasting policy had been frustrated in this way. The 1968 
Diligent committee had suffered from similar problems. 
"Ministers did not reply to the committee's 
invitations to appear before it; Dupont (the director 
general of the ORTF) was present at all the meetings when we 
were interviewing civil servants, obviously to find out 
what they would say to us. " 92 
90. Interview with Jean de Prdaumont, September 21 1979. 
91. L'Himºanite, September 18 1979. 
92. Interview with Andr4 Diligent, June 22 1979. 
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"Far from facilitating the work of the 
committee, the Government and management of the ORTF 
protected themselves each time they could behind the 
letter of the texts..... in order to confide to the 
committee only what they were compelled to. " 93 
With the above points in mind, it is legitimate to ask what 
functions the special parliamentary committees on broadcasting have 
fulfilled. As already stated, '-it is difficult to calculate their 
influence in shaping broadcasting policy. While the reports 
published in 1968,1972 (twice) and 197+ all preceded important 
reforms of the ORTF, other factors were also involved. In any case 
the reports published in 1978 and 1979 (twice) did not give rise to 
any major reform of the state broadcasting services. What is likely 
is that the Government may make use of a special parliamentary report 
to its own advantage. A special parliamentary committee on broadcasting 
can perform a useful substantive role in influencing policy only if 
the Government agrees with the findings of the committee. Otherwise 
the report will be ignored, though minor recommendations may be acted 
upon. As a thesis on the work of special parliamentary committees 
commented, the success of these committees depends essentially on 
the goodwill of the executive. 
94 
Apart from seeking to influence policy, the reports of the 
special parliamentary committees have other functions. One of these 
is to publicise matters of public interest. In this respect the 
special parliamentary committees on broadcasting have been very 
93. Diligent report, 1968, p. 16. See also pp. 1l-21. (For full 
reference of this report see footnote 66a) 
94. J D4sandre, Les commissions parlementaires d'enquete % 
ou de contr8le en droit francais, Paris, La documentation 
francaise, notes et dtudes documentaires no. 4262-l264,1976. 
See also Le Monde, July 21 1976. 
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successful. Wright's contention that: 
"Ad hoc commissions of enquiry or control are rarely 
established if the subject proposed is likely to prove 
politically embarrassing to the Government" 95 
certainly does not apply to the policy area of broadcasting. Almost 
without exception all seven reports on broadcasting policy which have 
been published since 196+ have been critical of current government 
policy at the time. Moreover, because of the importance of broadcasting 
the reports have been given widespread coverage in the French press. 
In addition, the reports provide an unrivalled source of information 
on broadcasting policy. Not least, they give a large amount of 
publicity to the rapporteur himself. The report is named after him 
in the press, r4sum6s of the report appear in the newspapers and 
the rapporteur"may even appear on television to defend his report. 
Both Caillavet and Cluzel produced books based almost verbatim 
on their parliamentary reports, though unsuspecting members of the 
public had to pay well over the price of the report for the dubious 
benefit of a glossy cover. 
96 
Parliamentary representation on the boards of governors of the 
broadcasting companies. 
Parliament possesses another means for exercising control over 
broadcasting through its representatives on the boards of governors 
of the broadcasting companies. There are two parliamentarians, one 
95. V Wright, op. cit., p. 118. 
96. H. Caillavet, Changer la television, Paris, Flammarion, 1978 
and J. Cluzel, L'argent de la tel4vision, Paris, Flamma. rion, 1979. 
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deputy and one senator, among the sixteen governors at TDF 
and one parliamentary representative on each of the six member 
boards of the four programme companies. However, there is no parliamentary 
representative on the governing boards of either INA or the SFP. 
At the time of the ORTF Parliament did not have its own 
representative on the Office's board of governors. At first sight, 
therefore, the 1974 statute marked in this respect a break with the 
past. 
97 However, the Government's original bill revealed the true 
extent of this innovation, since in the initial text the parliamentary 
representative was to sit on the göverning boards as a representative 
of public opinion (un'parlementaire au titre de 1'opinion publigue. )98 
At the ORTF public opinion had been represented by a member of 
the board appointed by the Government from a list drawn up by viewers' 
associations deemed to be representative. If effect this meant that 
a Gaullist sympathiser was always chosen. The 1972 statute 
increased the representation of the viewers to two members of the 
ORTF's board of governors, who were now to be appointed by Parliament. 
99 
However, it was not until the 1974 statute that parliamentarians 
themselves became members of the boards of governors of the broad- 
casting companies. 
100 
Among the six parliamentarians on the different governing 
boards a balance is preserved between the National Assembly and the 
97.1974 broadcasting statute, articles 5 and 11. 
98. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1973-197+, no. 1161i 
Projet de loi relatif a la radiodiffusion et ä la t&l6vision, 
present6 par Jacques Chirac, annexe au processverbal de la 
seance du 23 juillet 1974, articles 2 and 7. 
99.1972 ORTF statute, article 6. 
100. See section on parliamentary debates and legislation for the 
discussion on the number of parliamentary representatives to sit on 
the companies' boards of governors. 
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Senate and between the majorite and the left-wing opposition, 
though the parliamentarians of the majorite have the advantage of 
sitting on the boards of the three television companies. 
101 
The two parliamentarians on the -board of governors at T]W are chosen by 
the cultural affairs committees of the National Assembly and Senate 
respectively, while the parliamentary representatives in each of the 
four programme-companies is chosen by the same two committees sitting 
jointly. -- In practice, however, there is a tacit agreement among the 
political parties about the allocation of these posts and so there 
is no need for a formal election. 
102 
Gerard Longuet, parliamentary 
representative on TFl's board of governors, described how he was 
"elected" to the post: 
"I replaced Gaussin as parliamentary representative 
on TF1's board of governors after the 1978 elections. In 
theory I was elected by the National Assembly cultural 
affiars committee, but in practice the majoritA divide 
up channels one, two and three (sic) among them. 
Chinaud ä. §k-6d me to-represent the UDF and the National 
Assembly at TF1. I had, and still have, no particular 
competence in broadcasting matters. In a sense this 
explains my choice. Deputies like Madelin and d'Aubert 
(other UDF deputies) were too committed to a certain 
viewpoint. I wasn't. - There were about 10 UDF deputies interested in the post, largely because they over- 
estimated its importance. 
Chinaud did not want a troublemaker at TF1, another 
Vivien. (The Gaullist parliamentary representative at 
A2). Vivien thinks he is the boss of A2 and has 
, 103 assumed responsibilites far in excess of his function. 
While in theory the role of the parliamentarians on the boards 
" 101. See chapter 
on Appointments. 
102. Interviews with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979 and Jacques Carat, 
September 18 1979. 
103. Interview with Girard Longuet, September 6 1979. 
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of governors is to represent the viewers within the broadcasting 
companies, in practice there has been a marked tendency for the 
parliamentary governors to represent their companies before 
Parliament. 101 For example, Gerard Longuet commented: 
"My job is to represent the viewers on the board of 
governors, but the view that the parliamentary governor 
represents his company in Parliament is not totally false. 
There is a certain solidarity between the head of the 
company and the board of governors. In a sense the board 
represents the company and this goes for me as well. I am 
not a parliamentary ambassador but a representative of the 
company. "105 
Joel Le Tac was, as usual, more forthright: 
"It was an apparent victory of the Assembly to get 
parliamentarians on to the boards of governors of the 
companies. The Assembly thought that this would be a 
complementary instrument of parliamentary control. But 
in fact the opoosite has happened. Instead of the 
parliamentary governors representing Parliament inside 
the compänies, they tend to defend their company before 
Parliament. They present no reports to Parliament on 
the execution of their functions. ' 
The system of parliamentary governors has been a total 
failure as far as parliamentary control is concerned. "106 
Jacques Carat and Jean Cluzel both agreed with Le Tac: 
"It is tobe expected that parliamentary governors 
become spokesmen for their companies. We are not given 
any specific duties by Parliament and Parliament expects 
nothing of us. It waits for us to report back, to 
intervene if we wish. 
But the fact that there is a parliamentarian on the boards 
of governors does ive Parliament the possibility of being 
kept informed. " 101 
104. Interviews with Antoine de Tarle, September 8 1979 and 
Jack Ralite, July 10 1979. 
105. Interview with Gerard Longuet, September 6 19T9. 
" 106. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 14 1979. 
107. Interview with Jacques Carat, September 18 1979. 
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"The parliamentary governors do not report back 
to Parliament and there is no formal mechanism for them 
to-report back. Vivien. represents. A2 in Parliament, and 
the others represent their companies slightly less. " 108 
The ambivalence of the role of the parliamentary representative 
on the boards of governors of the broadcasting companies was 
particularly highlighted during the 1975 budget debate when both 
Vivien and Gaussin gave speeches which amounted to impassioned 
pleas in defence of their companies. 
"I wanted to give you these details to show you 
that the administration of TF1 is carried out seriously 
attentively, unceasingly, with respect for the public 
.... and without notion of censorship either from the 
Government or from any member of the board of governors. 
.... this company 
is prudently run by prudent people. 
Participating closely in the life... of one of these companies 
I shall simply ask you one favour... Even if you have 
criticisms-to make - and you have - even if you have the 
impression sometimes that this or that channel benefits 
your opponents too much and your friends not enough, let 
the companies live by giving them the necessary means... ýt109 
".., for the first time in thirteen years I come up 
to this tribune not as a prosecutor, but a little as 
defence counsel for one of the new television companies, 
A2, on whose board of gov rnors Parliament has sent me to 
represent the viewers. " 
1l0 
It would appear, then, that the innovation of the 1974 statute 
of having parliamentarians on the boards of governors of the 
broadcasting companies has not helped extend the scope of 
parliamentary control. There is little contact between the 
parliamentary delegation for broadcasting and the standing committees 
on the one hand and the parliamentary governors on the other. A 
108. Interview with Jean Cluzel, September 11 1979. 
109. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
" November 19 1975, PP"859 and 8595. 
110. Ibid, p. 8587. 
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1 
project put forward by Le Tac to formalise links between the 
parliamentary delegation and the parliamentary representatives on 
the boards of governors has proved stillborn. 
111 Indeed, given 
the tendency for the parliamentary governors to act as defenders of 
their companies, the system of parliamentary control now contains 
the potential for much greater internal conflict than before. 
Parliamentary debates and legislation 
The final means available to Parliament to exercise a controlling 
influence on broadcasting policy is through legislation. In this 
respect Parliament's role is confined by the limitations placed on 
its legislative powers by the 1958 Constitution: the Government's 
control of the parliamentary timetable, the restricted legislative 
domain, the priority given to government bills, the use of the 
package vote (vote bloque) and the complex procedure governing censure 
motions. 
112 
This does not mean that Parliament's legislative role has 
been totally emasculated. For example, in 1964 the Governmefit 
had originally intended to reorganise the state broadcasting services 
by means of regulations rather than through the introduction of a bill 
in Parliament. However, as the Constitutional Council ruled that five 
of the seven main parts of the proposed measure fell within the domain 
of the law, the Government decided to bring the whole issue before 
Parliament. After a full debate the Government's original bill was 
1]1. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembi4e Nationale, 1976-1977, 
no. 272 , Rapport d'information 
4tabli au nom de la d4legation 
parlementaire pour la radiodiffusion-t4l4vision francaise, 
. annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 18 decembre 1976, pp. 6-9. 
112. For a detailed discussion of the powers of Parliament in the Fifth Republic, see P. M. Williams, op. cit. 
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severely amended in both chambers and particularly in the Senate. 
However, by the use of the package vote and its power to introduce 
amendments to the bill as voted by the commission mixte paritaire, 
the Government with the support of the majorit4 in Parliament 
was able to cancel all the concessions made to the opposition. 
113 
Commenting on this debate in Parliament, Williams remarks that 
despite the fact that the Government in the end was able to impose 
its will, 
"... it would be wrong to assume that the final 
outcome would have been the same if the broadcasting 
measure had been brought into force by regulations in 
the first place, as the Government had once wished. 
The ministerwould have drafted his measure differently, 
and no doubt more restrictively, if he had had to face no 
parliamentary scrutiny. Moreover, in the debates he 
gave assurances about the Government's future use of 
its powers, -and his statements could be quoted later as 
evidence of the intentions of the legislator: the 
administrative courts can thus apply, in cases arising out 
of regulations made under the act, criteria which are 
available only because Parliament had its say. " 114 
Nevertheless, the parliamentary debate on the 1974 broadcasting 
reform bill exemplifies many of the weaknesses of Parliament when 
faced with a powerful executive. For example, the' parliamentary 
delegation for broadcasting was not consulted before the bill was 
presented in Parliament. The relevant standing committees, the 
cultural affairs committee in both the National Assembly and the 
Senate, had very little time in which to produce their reports on 
the Government's bill. The bill was introduced in a special 
legislative session which can be called only to discuss a 
113. This and the following paragraph are based on the 
section in P. M. Williams, o . cit., pp. 91-93. 
114. See P. M. Williams, op-cit., p. 92. 
I 
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specified agenda and may not last more than twelve days. 
115 
This 
particular special session lasted only six days, during which the 
Government's proposals were discussed first in'-the National Assembly, 
then in the Senate and finally by a commission mixte paritaire. The 
two chambers themselves had very little time in which to consider 
the Government'*s proposals, even though they held late night sessions 
on Saturday and sat on Sunday. Moreover, as the bill was declared 
urgent by the Government, there was only one reading in each chamber 
instead of the normal two. 
116 
Amendments to the bill in Parliament were frequently defeated 
if they met with governmental opposition. The final text as it 
emerged from the commission mixte paritaire was itself slightly 
amended by the Government before being passed in both chambers on a 
package vote whereby the parliamentarians had to vote on the whole 
text as proposed by the commission mixte paritaire and amended 
by-the Government without the opportunity of introducing their own 
amendments or having-a separate vote on any contentious clauses. 
117 
Finally, some amendments, like the creation of consultative regional 
broadcasting committees, even though passed in Parliament and 
retained in the 1974 statute, have not-been implemented more than 
115. Article 29 of the 1958 Constitution. 
116. Article 45 of the 1958 Constitution. 
117. The 1974 broadcasting statute reproduced the text of the 
commission mixte varitaire, except for four amendments introduced 
by the Government. One of these amendments was purely formal, 
two reduced the number of parliamentarians who would sit on the 
boards-of governors of TDF and the programme companies(see below) 
and the fourth amendment concerned the percentage of revenue the 
companies would be allowed to earn from commercial advertising. 
The National Assembly had adopted an amendment restricting 
advertising income to 33% of the licence revenue. In the Senate_-, 
the Government proposed its own amendment to limit advertising 
revenue to 25% of-ýthe total income of the transmission company ^r. 
and the four programme companies. The Senate adopted this 
amendment. The commission mixte paritaire reinserted the 
National Assembly amendment, but the Government in turn reinserted 
its own amendment in he final text which was passed in the package 
vote in both chambers. 
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five years after the passing of the bi11; 
118 
Moreover, despite the fact that the 1974 broadcasting statute 
was much longer than either of its predecessors, it still contained 
only the broad outlines of the reform. 
119 
The details of the 
reorganisation, frequently of crucial importance, were decided 
unilaterally by the Government and published in the form of decrees 
and ministeri8I rdinances. Thus, by November 1975 46 decrees and 
74 arr8t4s had been promulgated by the Government on a variety of 
matters concerned with the reform. The topics covered included the 
reallocation of staff, the distribution of ORTF equipment and 
progranmie stocks among the new companies, the appointment of the chairmen 
of the new companies, the'cahiers des charges and budgetary procedure. 
120 
On the other hand, it would be foolish to maintain that 
Parliament had exercised no influence on the content of the 1974 
statute. The Government's original bill was amended by Parliament 
in several important respects, frequently with the Government's 
support since it realised that its own bill was full of imperfections. 
Furthermore, some amendments were passed, particularly in the Senate, 
and retained in the statute, even though they were opposed by the 
Government. 
Among those amendments introduced in Parliament, accepted by the 
Government, passed and included in the 1974 statute, the following 
are the most noteworthy: a series of amendments in both chambers to 
118. See below. 
119. The 1974 broadcasting statute contains 34 articles compared 
with only 9 articles in the 1964 ORTP statute and 18 in the 
1972 ORTF statute. 
i 
120. The numerical total of decrees and arretes was given by Rossi 
during the 1976 budget debate in November 1975. Journal Officiel, 
Nbats Parlenmentaires tssembl4e Nationale, November 19 1975, P. 584. 
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/ 
make the obligations of the cahiers des charges more specific; 
121 
regulations governing the screening of party political broadcasts; 
122 
an amendment to give the Regie Frangaise de Publicit4 the task of 
supervising the application of the provisions concerned with 
television advertising; 
123 
and various amendments concerned with the 
reallocation of ORTF staff. 
124. 
The most notable amendment introduced in Parliament and 
accepted by the Government was the inclusion of a new article at 
the very beginning of the text which set out the public service 
objectives of the new broadcasting companies. Introduced in the 
Senate by Michel Miroudot on behalf of the cultural affairs committee, 
this amendment reproduced the terms of article 1 of the 1972 ORTF 
statute by specifying the public service obligations of French 
broadcasting in the fields of information, culture, education, 
entertainment and civilisation. To these was added a new public 
service function of communication. 
125 
The most interesting amendments, however, were those which 
though opposed by the Government were nonetheless passed in 
121. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, 
July 25 1974, pp-. 3776-3781, amendments no. 80,168,169,104,105 and 
1o6. 
Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, 
pp. 995-998, -amendments no. 55,56 and 93. 
122. Journal Officiel, D&bats Parlementaires Assemb1 e Nationale, 
July 25 1974, p. 3779, amendment no. 105. 
123-. Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale 
July 25 1974, P. 3793, amendment no. 90. 
124. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assemble Nationale, 
July 25 1974, pp. 3800-3810, amendments no. l , 170,17,109,18, 111,97 and 98. 
Journal 'Officiel D6bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
July 28 1974, pp. 1016-1027, amendments no. 66 and 166. 
125. Journal Officiel; 'Debats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1974, 
pp. 952-953, amendment no. 31. 
In the Government's bill the 1972 article had been retained by 
default in the final clause of the text. The new amendment became 
article 1 of the 197+ statute, thus emphasising the public service nature of the new broadcasting companies. 
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Parliament and included in some form in the * 1971+' statute. Five 
subject areas in particular fell into this category: the creation 
of consultative regional broadcasting committees; the establishment 
of INA; the harmonisation of programme schedules among the television 
companies; the thorny question of parl 9mentary control; and the 
fate of the ORTF orchestras. 
The creation of consultative regional broadcasting committees, 
one in each of the regional broadcasting centres, was the subject 
of two amendments in the National Assembly, one put forward by the 
Socialists and Left-wing Radicals and the other by the Centrists 
and'reformateurs. 
126 
The aim of these two amendments was to ensure 
that by encouraging the expression of regional culture in its 
programmes, FR3 (as it was`to be called later) would be a proper 
regional company. The two amendments were rejected by the National 
Assembly cultural affairs committee and by the Government. 
The rapporteur of the cultural affairs committee in the 
Assembly, de Preaumont, regarded the amendments: 
"... as a move by the opposition to try to 
acquire control of broadcasting in the regions because 
they couldn't have control at the national level. They 
were helped by some provincial deputies of the majorit4 
who also wanted to get control of the news output in 
their own region. "3-27 
Le Tac also explained the Government's defeat on this issue by 
126. Journal'Officiel Debats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
July 25 1974, PP-3763-3764, --amendments no. 40 and 102. 
127. Interview with Jean de Preaumont, September 2L 
. 
1979. 
0 
I 
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pointing out that the amendments were supported by many provincial 
deputies across party lines. 
128 
Rossi's counter proposal to create 
a working party on the regions within the Haut*Ccnseil'de'1'Audiovisuel 
failed to satisfy the deputies, with the result that the amendments 
were passed without a public vote being taken. While in the Senate 
the composition of the conmittees was the subject of a lengthy 
technical debate, the principle of setting up the consultative 
regional broadcasting committees vas not called into question. 
129 
Thus, paragraph 2 of article 10 of the 1974 broadcasting statute 
states: 
"A consultative regional broadcasting committee 
is established in each regional broadcasting centre. It 
is composed of representatives of the principal opinions 
and bodies which-make up the economic, social and cultural-. 
life of the region. The composition of these committees 
is fixed by decree following the opinion of the relevant 
regional council or councils. They include one third of 
local elected representatives chosen by the departmental 
councils amongst the mayors-and departmental councillors. " 
Yet five years later these consultative regional broadcasting 
coammittcs had still not been set up. Having been defeated in the 
National Assembly, the Government was now flouting the law by 
delaying the draft of the enabling decree. The administrateur 
at the National Assembly most intimately concerned with broadcasting 
matters, de Tarle, explained the Government's reticence as being due 
to the different political opinions of the regional. Councils 9 the 
strong opposition of FR3 tc the proposed committees and Giscard d'Estaing It 
opposition to the regional dimension in the French political system. 
130 
128. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 13 1979. 
129. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, pp. 979-981 
130. Interview with Antoine de Tarle, September 8 1979. 
I 
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In September 19T8 a spokesman for the Ministry of Culture and 
Communication affirmed that no decree was being prepared on the 
subject and that. the measure adopted by Parliament had been done 
"in the heat of the discussion" without the difficulties of its 
implementation being weighed up; 
131 
The inclusion in the 1974 statute of an article setting up the 
Institut National de l'Audiovisuel was the result of a successful 
amendment introduced in the Senate. 
132 
In the Government's original 
bill the creation of such a body was mentioned only in the introduction 
(expose des motifs) and not in the main body of the text.. Speaking in 
the Assembly, Rossi affirmed that the Institute would be set up by the 
Government in the autumn by means of a decree since the Government 
"had not yet had the time to establish its juridical status; 
An amendment introduced in the-National Assembly by Le Tac to 
give the transmission company the tasks of promoting research, 
ensuring staff training and conserving the broadcasting archive 
material was opposed by the cultural affairs committee and by the 
Government and rejected in the Assembly without a public vote being 
taken. 
134 However, in the Senate Diligent proposed an amendment similar 
to Le Tac's, except that in this amendment the various tasks were to 
be given not to the transmission company but to a separate company 
131. Le Monde, September 17-18 1978. 
132.197+ broadcasting statute, article 3. 
133. Journal Officiel, D6bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
July 25 1974, p. 3746. 
134+. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale 
July 25 1974, PP-3745-3747, amendment no. l 8. 
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especially set up for the purpose. 
135 This amendment was supported by 
the Senate cultural affairs committee but opposed by the Government. 
Nonetheless, despite the Government's opposition the amendment was 
passed without a public vote being taken. 
The person behind the creation of INA was Pierre Schaeffer, 
the head of the ORTF research service. 
136 
"I was responsible for the creation of INA. The Government's 
bill neglected the fate of the research services, the archives 
and staff training. As I was in charge of the ORTF research 
service I was obviously preoccupied by this omission. Therefore 
I grouped together in one body the functions ignored in the bill. 
In so doing I was helped by deputies and senators in both 
the majorit4 and the opposition: for example, Le Tac, Chevenement, 
Ralite, Diligent and Cluzel. The Government"did not want INA to 
be set up, but it was forced upon them by Parliament, or at 
least by the few people in Parliament who are interested in the 
problems of broadcasting. ' 
Because I was behind the establishment of INA the Government 
did not appoint me as its first PDG, even though^a$ head of the 
ORTF research service I was the obvious choice. " 13T 
It was apparent that the Government's opposition to the creation 
of INA by statute rather than by decree reflected a more general 
opposition to the establishment of any potential coordinating organism 
above the separate broadcasting companies. 
138 
For the Government this 
would have been in direct contradiction with the decentralising-' 
objectives of the 1974 reform. Consequently, not only was the 
establishment of INA vigorously opposed, but so too were the attempts 
to introduce a degree of harmonisation among the programme schedules 
of the three television companies. 
135. Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1971, 
pp. 955-95 , amendment no. 80. 
136. Interviews with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 3 1979, Jack Ralite, 
July 10 1979 and Antoine de Tarl4, September 8 1979. 
41 
137. Interview with Pierre Schaeffer, July 2 1979. 
138. See, for example, Chirac's statement in the National Assembly: 
"I warn the Assembly against any attempt to return, in one way 
or another, to a cootdinating body. " Journal Officiel, D4bats 
Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, July 25 1974, p. 3746. 
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A certain degree of harmonisation among the three television 
companies was nonetheless included in the 1974 statute as a result 
of an amendment successfully introduced by Diligent in the Senate. 
139 
By the terms of this amendment the programme schedules of television 
companies one and two (TF1 and A2) were to be complementary so that apart 
from news bulletins programmes of the same type could not be screened 
on both channels simultaneously. This amendment was itself much breaker 
than a previous one which had sought to establish a coordinating body 
above the broadcasting companies and had been successfully resisted by 
the Government. 
hl 
Though also opposed by the Government, who defended 
the principle of competition among the television companies rather than 
complementarity, the Diligent amendment was passed in the Senate by 156 
votes to 114. 
This amendment was therefore included in the text sent to the joint 
committee of both chambers of Parliament (commission mixte paritaire) 
whose task it was to draw up a common text to be submitted for a final 
reading in both chambers. In this joint committee the Diligent amendment 
was watered down and was effectively replaced' by a Senate cultural affairs 
committee amendment which had originally been withdrawn in the Senate 
after the acceptance of the Diligent amendment. 
141 
It was the cultural 
affairs committee amendment, taken up by the commission mixte paritaire, 
which became article 9 of the statute: 
"The chairmen of the television companies meet periodically to ensure 
the harmonisation of programme schedules. " 142 
139. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, , 
pp. 977-979, amendment no. 103. 
14+0. Journal Officiel, Debäts Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, 
pp. 971-973, amendment no. 122. 
11+1. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, 
P. 999, amendment no. 59. 
14+2. 1974 broadcasting statute, a, "ticle 9. 
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Even in its watered down form the amendment on harmonisation was 
not in keeping with the competitive ethos of the Government's bill. 
Thus, its inclusion in the 197+ statute marked a small victory for those 
parliamentarians who favoured a certain coordination among the new 
broadcasting companies. On the other hand, article 9 of the statute 
is more honoured in the breach than in the observance with the result 
that its effect on programming has been minimal. Proposals put forward 
since 1974 to reform the reform have in the main all stressed the need 
for greater coordination among the television companies. 
143 
The fourth subject area of amendments opposed by the Government 
but passed in Parliament and included in some form in the 197b broad- 
casting statute cövered the question of parliamentary control. In particula 
the composition and functions of the parliamentary delegation for broad- 
casting were increased and equal time was accorded the majorite and 
opposition on radio and television. Other amendments were put forward 
on the question of parliamentary representation on the boards of governors 
of the new companies and on the subject of parliamentary control of the 
broadcasting budget. 
As far as the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting was concerned 
the Government was content in its original bill to readopt the relevant 
provisions of the 1972 ORTF statute. 
144 
However, an amendment was 
introduced in the Senate by Michel Miroudot on behalf of the cultural 
affairs committee which sought to extend the powers of the delegation 
and increase its composition. 
145 
While the Government was not opposed 
4 
14ý. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
"144. See preceding section on the parliamentary delegation for 
broadcasting. 
145. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires S4nat, July 27 1971, 
PP"956-957, amendment 1no. 34. 
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to the enlarged membership of the delegation, it was not in favour 
of the proposed increase in its powers. As Rossi remarked, 
"... I wish to draw the Senate's attention to the fact that 
it must not create a sort of permanent committee of inquiry ... into a system which on the contrary is supposed to be one of 
autonomy and responsibility. ... 
" 14+6 
However, despite the Government's opposition the amendment was passed 
without a public vote being taken and became article 4 of the 1974 statute. 
Similarly, an amendment was introduced by Jean Filippi and Henri 
Caillavet in the Senate to ensure that parliamentarians of the opposition 
be accorded half the air time given to the Government and the parliament- 
arians of the majorite. 
l47 
Opposed b Rossi on the by grounds that the 
resultant calculations woUd be extremely difficult to verify, the 
amendment was nonetheless passed. In the text of the commission mixte 
paritaire the substance of the amendment was altered, though the principle 
retained. Thus paragraph k of article 16 of the 1974 statute states that: 
"Equal air time is given the parliamentary groups of the 
majorit4 and of the opposition. " 
The principle of parliamentary representation on the boards of 
governors of the new companies did not in itself give rise to any 
controversy during the broadcasting reform debate in Parliament. 
However, the number of parliamentary representatives on each board 
was the subject of a long running dispute between the Government and 
Parliament, which was only resolved when the Government forced through 
its on amendments to the text of the commission mixte paritaire by recourse 
to the device of the package vote. In the end Parliament succeeded 
a 
146. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires S6nat, July 27 1974, 
p. 95T. 
147. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Senat, July 28 1974, 
pp. 998-999, amendment no. 125. 
I 
-361- 
in increasing its representation on TDF's board, but failed to do so 
in the case of the boards of governors of the four programme companies. 
With regard to the transmission company the Government's original 
bill specified one parliamentary representative. This figure was - 
unchanged during the debate in the Assembly. In the Senate, however, 
an amendment proposed by Miroudot on behalf of the cultural affairs 
committee that parliamentary representation be increased to four members 
of the board, two deputies and two senators, was passed despite governmemt 
opposition. 
148 The Government was then prepared to compromise with two 
parliamentary representatives, one deputy and one senator. 
19 The text 
of the commission mixte paritaire, however, retained the provisions of the 
Senate amendment. The Government retaliated by introducing its own 
amendment during the final reading in both chambers to reduce the 
parliamentary representation on TDF's board to the compromise figure 
of one deputy and one senator. 
150 
The story was even more complex when it came to fixing the number 
of parliamentary representatives on the boards of governors of the four 
programme companies. In the Government's original bill there was to be 
one parliamentarian on each of the four six-member boards. Despite 
proposed amendments to this provision in the National Assembly, the 
original text remained unchanged. Once again in the Senate two 
amendments were proposed by the cultural affairs committee to increase 
the composition of the boards to seven members, including one deputy 
148. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1974, 
pp. 961-963, amendment no. 40. 
149. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Senat, July 27 1971+, 
p. 9 2, amendment no. 81. 
4 
150.1974 broadcasting statute, article 5. 
-362- 
and one senator. 
151 Both amendments were adopted against the advice 
of the Government. The commission mixte paritaire retained the Senate 
amendment that there should be two representatives from Parliament, 
one from each chamber, while it also increased the total size of the 
boards to eight. However, in the final reading of the bill the 
Government introduced its own amendment which reduced the overall 
size of each boaxd to six members and the parliamentary representation 
to one, the same figures as in its original bill. 
'52 
The opposition of the Government to the proposed increase in the 
size of the boards of governors of the four programme companies, which 
was the inevitable result if the parliamentary representation were 
enlarged, was based on its desire to personalise responsibility within 
the boards themselves. 
153 
The object of the Senate amendments was 
to ensure that the National Assembly would not dominate the choice of 
representatives to the detriment of the Senate. To allay this fear 
Chirac promised the Senate that the Government would do all in its 
power to ensure that a balance was preserved between the two chambers. 
15l 
As we have already seen, such a balance has indeed been maintained, with 
the result that the spirit of the Senate amendments, if not their 
substance, has been observed. 
155 
151. Journal Officiel Dgbats Parlementaires Senat, July 28 1974, 
pp. 985-988, amendments no. 46 and 7. 
152.19Th broadcasting statute, article 11. 
153. 'Journal Officiel, Mats Parlementaires S4nat, July 28 1974, p. 986. 
154. *Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires S4nat, July 29 19Th, P"1051. 
155. See chapter on Appointments and the section in this chapter on 
parliamentary representation on the boards of governors of the 
broadcasting companies. 
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Under this heading of amendments designed to increase 
Parliament's powers over broadcasting one should also note the 
amendment passed in the National Assembly despite opposition from 
the Government to make the allocation of the licence revenue among 
the broadcasting companies subject to parliamentary approval. In the 
- Government's original bill Parliament's role was confined to authorising 
the collection of the licence and approving the allocation to the 
transmission company. Joel Le Tac and Jacques Marette introduced 
an amendment to make the licence allocation to each programme company 
also subject to parliamentary approval and this proposal was included 
156 in the 1974 statute in a slightly amended form. 
Ii short, during the debates on the Government's broadcasting 
bill in the summer of 1974 Parliament succeeded, frequently in the 
face of government opposition, to enlarge its powers in the policy 
area of broadcasting. In particular, the role of the parliamentary 
delegation for broadcasting was increased as were Parliament's powers 
of supervision over the broadcasting budget. 
Finally, Parliament succeeded against government opposition 
in making Radio France responsible for the management and development 
of the ORTF orchestras. The Government would have preferred to resolve 
this problem by decree once the statute had been passed, but an amendment 
was introduced in the Senate by the cultural affairs committee which was 
passed without a public vote being taken. 
157 
156. 'Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, 
July 25 1974, pp. 3785-3786 and 3814-3815, amendment no. 85. 
See also Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Sdnat, July 28 
1974, pp. 1000-1003. 
1974 broadcasting statute, article 19 paragraph 2. 
157. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Senat, July 28 1974, 
pp-975-976, amendment no, 3. 
1971 broadcasting statute, article 7 paragraph 3. 
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Parliament succeeded, therefore, in making a series of amendments 
to the original text as presented before it by the Government. As several 
of these amendments received the support of the Government, their 
adoption by Parliament was scarcely surprising. However, the same cannot 
be said for those amendments which were adopted despite opposition from 
the Government. Two questions remain to be answered about the amendments 
passedlin Parliament. First, how were those amendments which were 
opposed by the Government able to obtain the required parliamentary 
support? Secondly, to what extent did these and other amendments 
succeed in altering the provisions of the 1974 reform? 
Given the domination of. the work of the legislature by the executive, 
it is at first sight surprising that amendments to the Government's bill 
were passed-in-Päiliament in the face of government opposition. Indeed 
one senator interviewed remarked that if amendments were passed even- 
though the-Government was formally opposed to them, this meant that 
in a sense the-Government had accepted the amendments. 
158 However, 
this seems to be overstating the case. If one examines these 
amendments more closely, several points become clear. 
First, amendments relating to the question of parliamentary control 
had a relatively high success rate. These included the Senate amendment 
on the composition and powers of the parliamentary delegation for broad- 
casting and the National Assembly amendment on parliamentary approval 
for the allocation of licence revenue among the companies. Not 
unnaturally parliamentarians of both the majorite and the opposition 
were not averse to increasing their own powere vis-a-vis those of the 
executive in the policy field of broadcasting. 
158. Interiiew with Jean Cluzel, September 11 1979. 
4 
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Secondly, amendments opposed by the Government had a greater 
chance of success in the Senate than in the National Assembly. 
The two main amendments made in the Assembly despite government 
opposition concerned parliamentary approval for the allocation of the 
licence revenue among the companies and the creation of consultative 
regional broadcasting committees. The latter amendment would appear 
to have been successful because of the shared interest felt by many 
provincial deputies across party lines in seeking to acquire some control 
of broadcasting in their own regions. 
It was in the Senate, however, that amendments opposed by the 
Government had more success. Thus, while amendments to establish 
INA (or its equivalent) and to provide for a coordination of the 
programme schedules of the three television companies failed to be 
passed in the Assembly, they were successfully adopted in the Senate. 
Partly this--can-be explained by the less importance attached to party 
labels in the-Senate. In the immediate aftermath of the 1974 
presidential election the Giscardian deputies in the Assembly had 
no desire to criticise the first major reform of the new President, 
while the Gaullists were in their turn reluctant not to follow the 
guidance of the Prime Minister, Chirac, who favoured the reform. 
159 
Only Le Tac among the Gaullist deputies showed much interest in amending 
the Government's bill and even he voted for the bill in its final readingý& 
In the Senate, on the other hand, party discipline was less strict. 
This helps to explain the success of the two Diligent amendments on the 
creation of INA and the coordination of programme scheduling. One 
159. Interview with Joel Le Tac, June 13 1979. 
i 
160. Ibid. Le Tac explained his vote in favour of the 197+ reform 
as follows: 
"I voted for the bill only after my amendments had been 
included in the statute. If not, I would not have voted for it. " 
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senator commented that as Diligent was a well-known spokesman 
on broadcasting, the Government could not but accept its defeat 
gracefully on these two amendments. 
161 Diligent's acknowledged 
expertise in the field meant that he could carry the Senate to 
support his amendments. Diligent himself commented: 
"The Government agreed to my two amendments to calm 
me down. 
In 1974 I was, fighting a. rearguard action. Rossi 
was in the hands of Poniatowski, a sort of prefect for Ponia. 
Chirac came and told Rossi to accept the amendments. In exchange 
I agreed to remove a more fundamental amendment criticisng the 
whole reform. It was tit for tat. Though I was chairman of the 
Christian Democrats I refused to vote for the 197+ reform, 
preferring to abstain. " 162 
Finally, those amendments passed in Parliament despite government 
opposition were either proposed by or received the support of influential 
parliamentarians of the majorite with a long-standing interest in 
broadcasting. Amendments proposed by Le Tac in the Assembly and 
Diligent in the Senate, both of whom were rapporteurs sp4ciaux on 
broadcasting for the finance committee of their respective chambers, 
were more likely to be adopted, particularly in the latter case. On 
subjects such as the establishment of INA and the coordination of 
programme schedules there was considerable agreement amongst interested 
parliamentarians on the desirability of these amendments. 
163 
The second question which must now be answered concerns the extent 
to which the amendments passed in Parliament altered the provisions of 
the 1974 reform. If one examines first those amendments passed in the 
161. Interview with-Jacques Carat, September 18 1979. 
162. Interview with Andre Diligent, June 21 1979. 
163. For example, Le Tac, Diligent, Miroudot, Caillavet and Cluzel 
were all in favour of some coordination of television programme 
schedules. 
-367- 
face of government opposition, it is clear that they have met with 
mixed success. INA has been established as a separate company and 
the composition and powers of the parliamentary delegation for broad- 
casting have indeed been increased. On the other hand, the 
consultative regional broadcasting committees have not been 
established and the harmonisation of television programme schedules 
is minimal to say the least. Amendments accepted by the Government 
have, not surprisingly, met with better fortune. Thus, Parliament 
played an important role in expanding on the provisions of the companies' 
cahiers des charges. and in securing benefits for the ORTF staff, 
particularly those not reallocated to one of the new companies. 
Yet if one compares the Government's bill as submitted to 
Parliament with the statute as promulgated, there can be no doubt 
that in many respects, including the most fundamental, the Government 
was able to have the main provisions of its reform accepted by 
Parliament. The ORTF was abolished; separate companies were 
established; there is no coordinating body in the new structure; 
the boards-of governors of the programme companies are small, highly 
personalised bodies; and the number of staff employed in the state 
broadcasting services was reduced, in the short term at least. Thus, 
it is fair to say that the major guidelines of the 1971 reorganisation 
of state broadcasting were not significantly altered in Parliament. 
0 
The 1974 parliamentary debates were not, of course, the only occasion 
during the Giscardian presidency when Parliament has debated broadcasting 
policy. Apart from the annual budget debates, Parliament has twice since 
197+ introduced new legislation on broadcasting. The first occasion was 
in 1978 when supplementary legislation was introduced to reinforce the 
state broadcasting monopoly. against the growing challenge from pirate 
radio stations. Introduced by the Government, the 1978 bill was passed 
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in both chambers with only minor amendment. 
164 
The second occasion 
was in 1979 when new legislation was passed altering the conditions in 
which the broadcasting staff could come out on strike. The 1979 bill 
was formally introduced as a private members"bill, though in fact it 
was very actively supported by the Government. Although amended in the 
Senate, the bill became law without-any-mäjor-changes- in content. 
165 
Thus' the-additional--legislation--passed in 1978=and-1979 to supplement 
or replace certain-articles of the 1974 statute reflected current 
government policy at the time. The bills were either introduced by 
the-Government or-received its overt support. Moreover, only minor 
-_. ---changes 
to the--content-of the bills-were made=during-the- parliamentary 
--debates. 
--- - --On- the other hand-, bills -proposed- by parliamentarians-have: failed 
to become law or even to be discussed in Parliament if they -do--not 
-- --conform-to-government- policy.. Thus.,... -private_ members' bills 
introduced 
by-Le-Tac to reform- the system=whereby the licence. revenue is -allocated 
among the broadcasting companies and to cede half the SFP's capital to the 
three television companies have failed to secure the Government's support 
and hence parliamentary time. 
166 
As with the recommendationsrof the 
164. See chapter on the State Monopoly. 
165. See chapter on the Broadcasting unions. 
166. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1976-1977, 
no. 2797, Proposition de loi tendant ä modifier la loi no. 74-696 
du 7 aoflt 1974 relative ä la radiodiffusion et ä la television, 
presentee par Joel Le Tac, annexe au procýs-verbal de la seance 
du 13 avril 1977. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1977-1978, 
no. 87, Proposition de loi tendant ä modifier la loi no. 71+-696 
du 7 aoüt 197+ relative ä la radiodiffusion et ä la television, 
0 present6e par Joel Le Tac, annexe au procýs-verbal de la seance 
du 18 avril 1978. 
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standing committees and special ad hoc committees, if the Government 
supports a particular bill its chances of becoming law are excellent. 
If not, it has virtually none. 
Conclusion 
The French Parliament has at its disposal a variety of means 
through which to exercise an influence on the formulation and 
implementation of broadcasting policy. In addition to those means 
of control which it already possessed at the time of the ORTF, such as 
standing committees, the annual budget debate, special ad hoc committees, 
debates and legislation, Parliament has increased its powers under the 
terms of the 1974 statute. 
First, the composition and powers of the parliamentary delegation 
for broadcasting, set up as a purely consultative body by the 1972 
ORTF statute, have been enlarged in an attempt to make the executive 
and the broadcasting companies more accountable to Parliament. 
Secondly, Parliament now has the power not onlyto authorise the 
collection of the licence revenue, but also to approve its division 
among the different broadcasting companies. Finally, an innovation 
of the 197+ statute, Parliament is now represented on the boards of 
governors of the broadcasting companies, with one representative in each 
of the four programme companies and two on the governing board of the 
transmission company. 
Nonetheless, despite the increased powers given it by the 1974 
broadcasting statute, Parliament is incapable of acting as a major 
check on the President and his government in the policy field of broad- 
casting. Parliament lacks time and information to make such a check 
possible. In many cases it also lacks the political will. Most 
I 
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importantly, unless it is prepared to overthrow the Government 
by a vote of censure, Parliament also lacks the power. The provisions 
of the 1958 Constitution and the existence since 1959 of a relatively 
stable parliamentary majority, even taking into account the divisions 
within the majorite' since 1976, have worked to the benefit of the 
President of the Republic and the executive in general. 
In broadcasting, as in other policy fields, power lies overwhelmingly 
with the executive: the President and his staff at the Elys6e, the 
Minister of Finance and the minister responsible for broadcasting. 
It is they who in practice if not always in theory make the appointments 
to the key managerial and editorial posts within the broadcasting. 
companies, fix the cost of the licence and decide on its allocation 
among the separate companies, draft the decrees which supplement the 
statute, draft the companies' cahiers des charges and the annual 
modifications to them, and, not least, draw up and present legislative 
proposals to Parliament. In comparison with the powers of the executive 
those of Parliament are of minor importance. They certainly do not 
amount to an effective counter-balance, particularly as in many cases 
Parliament depends on the goodwill of the Government if its recommendation; 
are to be heeded. 
However, this is not to say that Parliament is completely powerless. 
Though by no means the major actor in either the formulation or 
implementation of broadcasting policy, Parliament can sussessfully 
apply pressure on the Government as it did in 1974 when it passed 
amendments to the reform bill against the Government's advice and in 
1975 when the National Assembly refused to authorise the collection 
of the licence revenue. Moreover, Parliament also performs a useful 
I 
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information function through the annual reports of the parliamentary 
delegation for broadcasting and the standing committees and via the 
reports of the special ad hoc committees of inquiry and control. 
Parliament's role, in short, is that of a semi-toothless watchdog, 
operating particularly at the margins of policy formulation and 
implementation and only occasionally imposing its will on the 
Government. 
4 
0 
. /( L. 
CHAPTER 9 
Finance 
It is evident that the way in which a broadcasting organisation 
is financed is closely linked with the question of its control. The 
less dependent a broadcasting institution is on the Government for its 
revenue, the less likelihood there would appear to be of successful 
interference on the part of the Government to influence programming. 
For example, the BBC's much-vaunted claim to independence from the 
Government depends in part on its being financed from licence revenue 
paid by the viewers. 
1 
There are three main ways in which a broadcasting organisation 
may be financed: in the form of a direct grant from the Government, 
through a licence-fee system or by commercial advertising. From the 
end of the second world war up until 1968 the French state broadcasting 
services were financed overwhelmingly from licence revenue. Between 
1968 and its abolition in 1971 the ORTF received revenue from two 
principal sources, the licence-fee and commercial advertising. Since 
the break-up of the ORTF the licence-fee. and commercial advertising 
have remained the two most important financial supports of the 
broadcasting companies viewed as a whole, though the situation varies 
from company to company. 
1. The BBC's claim to independence from the Government in this respect 
is, of course, offset by the fact that the Government, not the BBC, 
fixes the cost of the licence and hence the amount of revenue the 
BBC can hope to obtain from this source. 
It would appear that the BBC is now considering the possibility or 
fixing the cost of the licence itself. See The Guardian, July 9 1980. 
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In this chapter we intend to analyse the means of finance of 
the broadcasting companies established by the 1974 reorganisation. 
In particular, the object of this chapter is to examine in detail 
the financial links between the Government on the one hand and the 
companies on the other with regard to both the latter's income and 
expenditure. Comparisons will be drawn between the system which 
operated at the time of the ORTF and the present arrangements. 
The chapter begins by examining the financial relationship 
between the ORTF and the Government. The second section concentrates 
on the financial provisions of the new broadcasting companies. A third 
section will attempt to evaluate the success of the 1974 reform with 
reference to the financial position of the broadcasting companies. 
Finally, in the concluding section the merits and demerits of the 
financial arrangements before and after the 1974 reform will be 
compared. 
Two main conclusions emerge from this chapter. First, the new 
broadcasting cor'panies are not nearly so financially independent of 
the Government as various ministerial spokesmen have implied. Indeed 
in certain respects the new companies are more tightly controlled than 
the ORTF. Secondly, while the four programme companies would seem to 
have established themselves on a fairly sound financial footing, the 
archive and research institute and, even more so, the production company 
were only a few years after the reform going through a severe financial 
crisis which seemed to threaten their very survival. 
The financial provisions of the ORTF: 1964-1974 
By the provisions of the 1964 ORTF statute the ORTF vas subject 
to the economic and financial supervision of the State, carried out 
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under the twofold responsibility of the Ministries of Information 
and Finance. The internal financial management of the Office was 
the responsibility of the director general, while the newly created 
board of governors had a supervisory role with regard to the long-term 
financial position of the Office. 
In theory the 1964 ORTF statute replaced with a system of 
a posteriori controls the .a 
priori financial controls which had 
until then been the traditional means of governmental supervision 
over the budget of the state broadcasting services. 
2 In practice, 
however, the financial arrangements of the ORTF continued to be 
closely regulated by the Ministry of Finance through their permanent 
representative at the ORTF, the state controller (contr6leur d'Etat). 
"The disappearance of the principle of a priori state 
control did not mean ... the total abolition of this control. 
.. a. priori control was retained in the case of certain 
particularly important items of expenditure such as investment 
commitments, staff recruitment, promotions to the top posts 
and general measures relating to salaries. For this purpose 
a state controller is appointed at the ORTF. ... More generally, the powers of the state controller are 
very wide. He has the general task of controlling the running 
of the corporation and supervises all operations which may have 
directly or indirectly an economic, political or financial 
repercussion. He has the task, moreover, of giving his advice (avis) 
to the director general in advance on particularly important 
financial decisions. The state controller also has the task 
of providing information to the Minister of Finance in the exercise 
of his power of tutelage. " 3 
2. C. Debbasch, Traite du Droit de la Radiodiffusion: Radio et 
T4l4vision, Paris, Librairie genorale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1967, pp. 105-112. 
Because of this system of a priori financial controls, in September 
1961 at the time of an earthquake in Chile the RTF news team left 
fully eight days after the event had taken place. 
In 1962 out of 6,505 items of expenditure only 1,904 escaped 
a priori control by the relevant ministry. Ibid, p. 106. 
3. Ibid, pp. 107-108. 
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In practice, therefore, up to 1969 the director general of the ORTF 
was severely constrained by the Ministry of Finance with regard to 
control of the Office's budget, while the board of governors, which 
had been established as a filter between the Government and the state 
broadcasting services, could take only irregular long-range glances 
at the financial arrangements it was supposed to be supervising. 
Certainly one should not overstate the case bout the financial 
constraints imposed on the ORTF by the Government in matters of 
expenditure. Thus, while the 1968 Diligent report condemned the 
excessive powers of the state controller in matters such as staff 
recruitment and promotions, it concluded that for much of the ORTF's 
operational budget there was no external a priori control. 
"Within the limits on credit set out in the budget and 
the allocation made by the director general amongst the 
different directors, the latter are responsible for their 
expenditure without any intervention from the state controller. 
In particular, the Office has total liberty when it comes to 
drawing up estimates for programmes. " 4 
A limited amount of progress had been made, therefore, in reducing 
the control of the Ministry of Finance over broadcasting expenditure. 
Nonetheless, many key expenditure decisions still remained outside 
the authority of the Office's management and in the aftermath of the 
1968 strike it was clear that the 1964 legislation did not provide the 
Office with the financial room for manoeuvre it required to function 
properly. 
The limited reorganisation of the ORTF carried out in the autumn 
of 1969 under the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister, Chaban- 
k. Diligent report, 1968, pp. 74-76. 
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Delmas, was intended to give the Office a greater degree of financial 
autonomy than it had so far enjoyed. There was, for example, a marked 
relaxation in the use of certain a priori financial controls. 
5 Moreover, 
the news departments on channels one and two were each given their own 
budgets which remained separate from the general budgets of the respective 
channels. This financial separation was in keeping with the Prime 
Minister's desire to isolate the news departments within the channels, 
so that they would not be susceptible to pressure from the channel heads. 
6 
In 1971 Chaban-Delmas sought to move further in this direction of 
giving the ORTF greater responsibility over its budget through the 
signing of a planning agreement (contrat de programme) between the 
Government and the Office. The first plänning agreement, which was due 
to run from 1972 to 1975, laid down certain objectives which the ORTF 
was to fulfil during the four year period. These included the 
completion of the transmitter network for channel two, the development 
of channel three and an increase in cultural and external services 
broadcasts. 
"To meet these obligations, the Office agreed to increase 
productivity by 2.6% per annum, while the government agreed 
to allow up to 78% of expenditure on channel three to be financed 
by a loan. The licence-fee would be gradually increased at a rate 
of about 3-5% annually, while advertising revenue ... would also increase regularly. " 7 
The agreement meant that the Office would in the future be assured 
of a guaranteed level of income and would, therefore, be able to plan 
5. Journal Officiel, Lois et d6crets, decree no. 69-1222 of December 24 
1969 and arret6 of December 24 1969. 
6. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 197+ 
reform. 
7. R. Thomas, Broadcasting and democracy in France, London, Crosby 
Lockwood Staples, 1976, p. 84. 
See ibid, pp. 84-86, for a summary of the contents of the planning 
agreement and Thomas' opinion of its merits and shortcomings. 
See also ORTF 73, Paris, Presses Pocket, 1973, pp. 539-542. 
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its investments and operational expenditure on a longer time-scale 
than had previously been possible. 
For various reasons, however, the planning agreement failed to 
make any dramatic impact on the relationship between the Government 
and the ORTF. Partly this was due to economic factors. With the onset 
of the economic recession in 1973 and concomitant increase in the rate 
of inflation, it quickly became apparent that the small annual increase 
in the licence-fee allowed for in the agreement was hopelessly inadequate. 
Moreover, with the saturation of the black and white television market 
and the slow changeover to colour sets, the Office's income was in grave 
danger of failing to keep pace with expenditure. 
Political factors, however, were also important in contributing 
to the failure of the planning agreement. The introduction of the 
agreement was the personal initiative of Chaban-Delmas. Yet just over 
six months later Chaban-Delmas was dismissed from the premiership by 
Pompidou. Moreover, the new ORTF statute which was introduced at the 
same time as Chaban-Delmas' dismissal marked a rejection of the broad- 
casting reform measures introduced by him since 1969.8 Chevallier's- 
view of the planning agreement as "... signifying the strengthening 
of the Government's hold over the Office and not the advent of the 
latter's financial emancipation, ... 
" fails to take sufficient account 
of the fact that with the sacking of Chaban-Delmas the Government's 
policy on broadcasting had changed at a stroke. 
9 
8. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 197+ 
reform. 
9. J. Chevallier, La radio-t4levision fran aise entre deux r4formes, 
Paris, Librairie g nerale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975. p. 62. 
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The ORTF had virtually no control over the size of its income. 
The Government fixed the cost of the licence, which was by far the 
main source of the Office's revenue. Moreover, since the amount of 
income which the ORTF was allowed to obtain from commercial advertising 
was limited to 25% of the total, the power to fix the cost of the 
licence-fee was in effect the power to determine the total amount 
of resources, both public and private, to be allocated to the state 
broadcasting services. 
10 
Up until 1968 the ORTF was financed almost totally from licence 
revenue. The only form of advertising allowed on the state television 
channels before that date was of the type which encouraged viewers 
to buy more of a specific type of produce without reference to a particular 
brand name. This type of advertising (la publicit4 compens6e) had been 
introduced as early as 1951 with the aim of boosting the consumption 
of agricultural produce in line with the Government's current economic 
policy. 
ll In 1968 commercial advertising on state television was 
introduced with the twin objectives of supplementing the ORTF's income 
and satisfying the demands for the establishment of a commercial 
television channel. 
To understand the reasons behind the Government's decision to 
allow brand advertising on the ORTF's television channels, one must 
first examine briefly the role of the commercial television lobby in 
10. For the role played by the Government in precipitating the financial 
crisis which affected the ORTF in the early 1970s, see the chapter 
on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
11. Diligent report, 1968, annex no. l8. 
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the late 1960s. 
12 A pressure group, la soci4te d'etudes PRO-TV, 
had been set up in late 1966 with the aim of securing the creation 
of a third television channel to be financed wholly from advertising. 
Under the group's proposals the ORTF would retain the monopoly of 
transmission, while the commercial channel would make use of the 
Office's transmitters to broadcast its own programmes, paying the 
ORTF for this service. 
13 Headed by Michel Maurice-Bokanowski, a former 
Minister of Industry in Pompidou's government, the group received 
support most notably from major advertising agencies and from the 
electronics industry which was keen to boost the sale of colour 
television sets. 
The lobbying in favour of the introduction of a commercial 
channel led to the laying down of a private members' bill in the 
National Assembly in June 1967. Proposed by Vivien, the bill was 
a restatement of the objectives of the PRO-TV group. 
14 Though the 
bill was never debated, it is reasonable to assume that the lobbying 
by this commercial television pressure group was an important factor 
in the Government's decision to introduce brand advertising on the 
state-television channels less than a year later. 
Prime Minister Pompidou was at pains to paint out in April 1968 
that the Government's decision was not merely a short-term response 
12. See R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 110-122; J. Thibau, Une t&i4vision 
pour tous les francais, Paris, Seuil, 1970, pp. 13 -137 and 1 9-153; 
Diligent report, 1968, pp. 210-256; and Le Monde, October 22-23 1967. 
13. Le Monde, January 6, May 11 and June 22 1967. 
14. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1968, no. 110, 
Proposition de loi tendant ä autoriser 1'ORTF ä disposer de son 
monopole d! 6mission et d'exploitation en vue de la creation de 
chaines suppl4mentaires de t4ldvision, pr4sent4e par Robert Andre 
Vivien et al., annexe au proces-verbal de la s6ance"du 19 juillet 
1968. 
This bill reproduces the terms of the 1967 bill. 
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to the pressure exerted by the PRO-TV group. In fact, Pompidou argued 
that the decision had been taken on principle as early as l961.15 
However, even if this were true, it seems certain that the Vivien 
bill spurred the Government t6-act in a bid to head off the commercial 
lobby, even if during the parliamentary debate Pompidou was understandably 
more inclined to point out the advantages to the ORTF of increasing its 
revenue without the Government's having to raise the cost of the licence. 
Both during the debate in April 1968 and on numerous occasions 
afterwards, the Government pointed out the strict limits which it 
intended to place on the role of commercial advertising on state 
television. Conciliatory steps were taken to placate those who feared 
that their interests would be harmed by this innovation, particularly 
the press. It was decided, therefore, that advertisers would not be 
allowed to sponsor programmes or to interfere directly in programme 
content. Advertising time was to be limited so as not to dominate 
programme schedules. Programmes were not to be interrupted to make 
way for commercial breaks. Finally, a body was set up to enforce 
these 
and other regulations regarding television advertising. The creation of 
the Regie Francaise de Publicite, independent of the ORTF, was designed 
to minimise the possibility of interference by advertising agencies in 
the running of the Office. From 1968 onwards, the proportion of the 
ORTF's total income which came from brand advertising steadily rose 
until by 1974 it was approaching the 25% ceiling fixed by the Government. 
16 
15. Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, 
April 25 1968, pp. 1305-1313. 
16. See table 9. i. 
6 
-381- 
In short, one can say that the financial arrangements of the 
ORTF up to 1974 were dominated by two factors. The first was the 
strong interventionist role played by the Ministry of Finance in 
the running of the Office. The ORTF had limited control over its 
expenditure and virtually none at all over its revenue. The second 
aspect of the ORTF's finances which has become clear in this section 
was the growing dependence of the Office during the early 1970s on 
commercial advertising as a major source of revenue. 
17 
The financial provisions of the broadcasting companies since 1974 
The 1974 broadcasting reform, according to ministerial spokesmen, 
was intended to remove the state broadcasting services from under the 
close control of the Ministry-of Finance. 
18 
In keeping with the spirit 
of the reorganisation, =the new companies were to benefit from-an---- - 
unprecedented degree of financial-autonomy. - For example, the 
expenditure decisions of the programme companies were no longer to be 
subject to-ministerial-approval. Provided that the companies remained 
within-the constraints of their budgets, the Government would be content 
to allow them to--function-unhindered. - 
In addition, - the-Government-hoped -that--the smaller-size -of-the - 
new companies would facilitate sound financial management, eliminate 
waste and-encourage a more rational use of resources. --It was thought 
17. For more detailed information on the financial arrangements of the 
ORTF, see R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 69-77,83-86 and 110-122; 
J. Chevallier, op. cit., pp. 56-76; C. Debbasch, op. cit., pp. 105-112; 
ORTF 73, pp. 539-581; A. Conte, Hommes libres, Paris, Plon, 1973; 
and the_ Chinaud report, 1974. 
18. See Chirac's speech to the National Assembly, Journal Officiel, D6bats 
Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, July 24 197+, pp. 3648-3 49, and 
Rossi's speech to the Senate, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires 
Sgnat, July 27 1974, pp"920-92 . 
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that the smaller, more efficient companies which would emerge from 
the reorganisation would present a stark contrast to the unenviable 
picture of the ORTF as portrayed in the Chinaud report. 
19 
In fact, the Government continues to play a primordial role 
in the financial arrangements of the new broadcasting companies. 
It is the Government which fixes the cost of the licence and thus 
determines the total amount of revenue which the companies as a 'Whole 
(excluding the production company) can obtain. Parliament's role, as 
we have seen, is confined to authorising the collection of the licence 
and approving its distribution among the four programme companies and 
the transmission company. Parliament cannot alter the cost of the 
licence fixed by the Government. 
20 
With the exception of the SFP, the companies as a whole are financed 
primarily from licence revenue, 'which represents around 70% of their 
total income. The amount of licence revenue to be divided up among 
the companies depends, first, on the cost of the individual-licence 
and, secondly, on the number and type (black and white or colour) of 
television sets in use. During the 1960s, as the market for television 
sets steadily expanded, the ORTF was able to, finance and even improve 
its services without recourse to large or frequent increases in the cost 
of the licence. 
21 
However, by the early 1970s the market for black and 
19. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
20. See chapter on Parliamentary control. 
The broadcasting receiving licence is not a tax but a special levy 
(taxe parafiscale). As de Tarl4 writes, 
"This distinction has important consequences. If the licence- 
fee were a tax, it would be up to Parliament, in application 
of article 34 of the Constitution, to fix both its basis and 
its rate. But as it is a special levy, Parliament only has 
the right, each year, to authorise its collection. The fixing 
of the rate is a government decision ... 
" 
A. de Tarld, "Financing French TV/Radio", Intermedia, vol. 5 no-5,1, 
October 1977, p. 29. 
See article 19 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
21. See table 9. ii. 
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white sets had apparently reached saturation point with. the result that 
any increase in the Office's income from licence revenue depended on a 
changeover to colour sets by the viewers, the introduction of a separate 
higher licence-fee for colour and the willingness of the Government 
to make annual increases in the cost of the licence. 
While a separate licence for colour was introduced in 1974, the 
changeover to colour sets is still going ahead less quickly than had 
been anticipated 
22 As a result, any increase in the licence revenue of 
the broadcasting companies depends largely on the Government's raising 
the cost of the individual licence to the viewer. Unlike the British 
government, which has been unwilling to allow the BBC's income from the 
licence to keep pace with inflation, the French government has since 1975 
made-substantial increases-in the cost of the licence, despite the 
existence of an anti-inflation plan covering prices in the public sector 
for the-period-1974-1978. As a result, the total amount of income which 
the broadcasting companies receive-from licence revenue has increased 
each year since 1975 at-en annual rate of around 15%. 
23 Despite this, 
however, it should be remembered that the amount of revenue-which the 
22. In 1977, for example, -the total amount -of 
licence revenue- to be 
distributed among the companies -was 
based -on. the -forecastthat 
the 
number of households with a colour television set would increase 
from 2.7 million to 3.9 million. 
Journal Officiel, Documents S4nat, 1976-1977, nä. 65, Rapport g4neral 
fait au-nom de la commission des-finances ... sur le pröjet 
de loi 
de finances pour 1977, Tome III, annexe no. l6, Radiodiffusion et 
television, rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 23 novembre 1976, p. 57. 
By 1979 of 17,500,000 television sets in use, only just over 
5,100,000 were colour. 
France in Figures, 1979, French Embassy Press and Information Service, 
London, July 1979. 
23. Annual budgetary reports of the parliamentary standing committees. 
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companies as a whole obtain from the licence is outside their control. 
The Government remains as before the major actor in deciding the amount 
of licence revenue which the state broadcasting services can obtain. 
The procedure for fixing the level of the licence-fee was 
variously described as follows: 
"In March each programme company presents its budgetary 
demands to the Government. Each company, therefore, tends to 
put its demands as high as possible to get more money from the 
Government. In theory by July we know our budget for the following 
year. Theoretically there is no collaboration between the Government 
and the companies in fixing the cost of the licence. Nor is there 
any cooperation among the separate companies. " 24 
"The level of the licence-fee is fixed first by the Minister 
of the Budget and then approved by the Prime Minister. The 
Minister of Culture and Communication has no role to play in this 
respect. 
There are no meetings with the companies regarding the level 
of the licence-fee. Their opinions are asked for by the ministry 
on the minimum they require to continue functioning. The rue de 
Rivoli takes an opposing stance to that of the companies, with the 
Prime Minister usually more in favour of the viewpoint of the rue 
de Rivoli. " 25 
"The role of the Service Juridi ue et Technique de l'Information 
is to prepare the broadcasting budget and calculate the level of the 
licence. We have two people working on this task. We then present 
our proposals to the Ministry of the Budget with final approval 
being given by the Prime Minister. 
We hold informal discussions with the companies and try to 
achieve a compromise. Difficulties are finally resolved at 
Prime Ministerial level. 
The budget for the following year is worked out in June or 
July and the companies are then told how much money each will 
receive. " 26 
It is clear from these descriptions that in the event of conflict 
between the companies and the Government over the desired level of the 
licence-fee, the Government invariably has the final say. 
21+. Interview with Jean Favre, June 17 1977. 
25. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 13 1979. 
26. Interview with M. Mougey, September 17 1979. 
For a description of budgetary procedure at the time of the ORTF, 
see the Chinaud report, 1971+, annexe III, pp. 34-36, and A. Conte, 
op. cit., pp. 86-87. 
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Nor does the Government's role stop there. Not only does the 
Government determine the amount of licence revenue the companies as a 
whole will receive, but it also plays a strongly interventionist role 
in the complex procedure of distributing the licence revenue among the 
separate companies. 
The sharing-out of the licence revenue is the responsibility of a 
special body, the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee (la commission 
de repartition de la redevance). However, before this body begins its 
work, the Government may allocate a proportion of the licence revenue 
in the form of direct grants (preciputs) to certain companies. These 
grants are in addition to the sum the companies receive through the 
Committee's allocation procedure and are usually awarded to finance 
specific projects which require a high level of capital investment. 
For example, in 1977 these grants totalled 11t3 million francs, compared 
with 55 million francs in 1976 and only 13 million in 1975.27 This sum 
of 143 million francs represented over 6% of the total licence revenue 
-collected in that year. 
Originally these grants were intended to aid the transmission 
company with its capital investment projects such as the extension 
of the transmission network. However, the system was then extended 
to include the programme companies and the archive and research institute. 
In 1977 83 million francs were given to the transmission company, while 
the three television companies received 60 million francs, primarily 
to encourage greater creativity'in their programme output. 
28 
27. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1976-1977, no. 2525, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1977, annexe no. 1+9, Radiodiffusion et t614- 
vision, rapporteur special: Joel LeTac, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 5 octobre 1976, p. 6- 
28. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
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This system of direct grants has been the object of a number of 
criticisms. Le Tac, for example, has condemned the increasing importance 
of the grants as a proportion of the total licence revenue. 
29 In his 
opinion it is anomalous that with the new companies fully operational 
the system of grants should continue to assume such financial significance. 
Moreover, Le Tac has argued that the system of grants diminishes the 
value of the work of the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee, since 
the Government now pre-empts the findings of the Committee. In addition, 
the Government's decision in 1976 to give 15 million francs to each of 
the three television companies in an attempt to improve their programme 
quality was regarded by-Le Tac as an implicit acceptance of the failure 
of the quality criterion used by the Committee in arriving at its decision.? 
Le Tac's criticisms were echoed within the SJTI, 
"The system of direct grants biases the procedure of 
licence revenue allocation. It falsifies everything. For 
example, if FR3 needs a new regional radio station it gets 
it through a direct grant. The system of direct grants is. 
practically fraudulent. " 31 
Only after these grants have been awarded is the remainder of 
the licence revenue shared out among the four programme companies 
by the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee. 
32 Using the previous 
29. In 1980 the companies were due to receive 24+6 million francs 
in direct grants, approximately 7% of the total licence revenue. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979-1980, 
no. 1292, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
sur le prbjet de loi de-finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture 
et communication, Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, 
annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 1979, p. 4. 
30. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1976=1977, no. 2525, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1977, annexe no. 19, Radiodiffusion et tel4- 
vision, rapporteur sp6cial: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 5 octobre 1976, p. 6. 
31. Interview with M. Mougey, September 17 1979. 
32. For the composition of the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee (. 1976) 
see table 9. iii. 
-387- 
year's budget as its base, the Committee distributes the licence 
revenue taking into account each company's audience ratings and 
the quality of its programmes. 
33 
The body responsible for the assessment of audience ratings is 
the Centre d'Etudes d'Opinion, which is the successor to the ORTF's 
audience research service .. 
34 The CEO is organisationally independent 
of the programme companies, though it carries out audience research 
on their behalf as well as working directly-for the Licence Revenue 
Allocation Committee. Once it has collected its statistical evidence 
by means of representative audience panels and questionnaires, the CEO 
passes on the results of its research to the Licence Revenue Allocation 
Committee. 
Assessment of programme quality is a more complicated task. Two 
quite separate methods are employed, with the results being then combined 
to give the overall quality mark for each programme company. One mark 
is obtained by the CEO from its audience panels who are asked to give 
an assessment of programme quality in their questionnaire. The other 
mark for programme quality is awarded by the Quality Committee 
(la com- 
mission charg4e d'appr4cier is gualit4 des Emissions de radiodiffusion 
et de t4l&vision). 
35 
The Quality Committee is composed of twenty seven people from 
different walks of life, some, but by no means all, of whom have had 
33. The relevant legislation on the licence allocation procedure is 
as follows: article 20 of the 1974 broadcasting statute; 
decree no-77-88 of January 31 1977; arrete of May 13 1975; and 
arr8t4 of July 21 1975. Note also two earlier decrees abrogated 
by the 1977 decree: decree no. 74-1106 of December 26 1974 and 
decree no. 75-1477 of June 16 1975. 
34. The organisation and functions of the CEO are described in a 
booklet entitled Centre d'Etudes d'Opinion: son organisation, 
sa mission, ses travaux, published by the CEO, Paris, 1976. 
35. For the composition of the Quality Committee (1975)rsee table 9. iv. 
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personal experience in the field of broadcasting. They are appointed 
by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Haut Conseil de 
1'Audiovisuel. The Quality Committee establishes its own criteria 
by which to evaluate the quality of the programme companies' output. 
For example, in its first year of operation, 1975-76, the committee 
concentrated on three specific aspects of programming: the overall 
balance of each company's programme schedule each evening, creative 
programmes and programmes for young people. 
36 
The role of the Quälity Committee is not a very significant one. 
The committee meets for only two days three times a year, giving its 
marks for programme quality in June. Apart from the obvious 
methodological difficulties involved in evaluating programme quality, 
the committee is well aware that the marks it awards have little impact 
on the budgets of the separate companies. The committee, therefore, 
has sought to strengthen its position by publishing an annual report 
which sets out the main criticisms and recommendations of the committee 
on programming in particular and on the Government's broadcasting policy 
in general. However, it should be stressed that the decision to publish 
an annual report was opposed by the Government who wished to confine the 
committee's role to one of awarding the programme companies marks for 
quality once a year. 
37 
36. Commission charge d'appr4cier la qualit4 des emissions de 
radiodiffusion et de television, Observations de la commission 
pour 1'annee 1975-1976, Paris, 1976. 
The Quality Committee has published an annual report every year 
since 1975-1976. However, though their main recommendations are 
frequently highlighted in certain sections of the press, these 
reports do not enjoy a wide circulation. For example, they are 
not available either at La documentation francaise or Journaux 
Officiels. 
37. Interviews with Jean-Claude Perier, September 13 1979; Pierre 
Schaeffer, July 2 1979; and Jean-Pierre Dubois-Dum4e, March 16 1977. 
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"The committee was not asked by the Government to publish 
a report. All the Government wanted from the committee was the 
annual mark for programme quality. To us this seemed futile. 
Therefore, on our own initiative we decided to publish an annual 
report. The committee had to push to get the report published 
because the Government wanted to publish as little as possible 
on the functioning of the television companies. 
In this respect the first chairman of the committee, 
Jean-Claude Perier, was very courageous, very honest. On the 
other hand, the present chairman, Narbonne, is much more in the 
mould of a conseiller d'Etat. 
The committee has made the same criticisms and recommendations 
three years in a row. But these recommendations were refused by the 
chairmen of the programme companies. When the programme companies 
replied to our reports, they just said: Merde! 
The Quality Committee has no power. We are like ghosts 
which haunt the programme companies, but in reality we can do 
nothing. " 38 
The influence of the Quality Committee is very limited at best. 
The management of the programme companies are quick to quote their 
annual marks if these are favourable. However, the committee's 
financial sanction is feeble. Moreover, its reports have so far had 
little substantive effect in influencing programming. Nor is this 
surprising given the minor role attributed the committee by the 
enabling legislation, the committee's lack of resources and the fact 
that many of the committee's recommendations have been in contradiction 
with the ethos of the 1974 reform. 
The Quality Committee's role has been further weakened by the 
fact that when added together the two marks for programme quality, 
the one given by the viewers and the other by the committee, can of 
course cancel each other out. For example, in 1975-76`the-programme 
companies rated highly by the Quality Committee were FR3 and Radio France, 
while those most appreciated by the viewers were TF1 and A2. Not 
unnaturally some critics have suggested that this negates the value of 
38. Interview with Pierre Schaeffer, July 2 1979. 
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the whole process of trying to give the programme companies a mark 
for quality. 
Government spokesmen, on the other hand, have defended the use 
of a quality mark for each programme company by pointing out its 
importance in the licence revenue allocation procedure. In the 
complicated equation which the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee 
employs to reach its decisions, the mark for programme quality is 
given three times more weight than the mark awarded for audience 
ratings. 
39 This weighting in favour of the quality mark is intended 
to discourage the companies from putting out programmes with the sole 
aim of maximising their audience. 
However, the quality mark has obviously failed to fulfil its 
function in this respect since the Government has on more than one 
occasion been compelled to introduce' supplementary measures to help 
improve programme quality. 
4o 
For example, of the 60 million francs 
given the three television companies in the form of direct grants 
in 1977,4+5 million was to be devoted to the improvement of programme 
quality, a much larger sum than that resulting from the application 
of the quality mark in the licence revenue allocation procedure. 
In other words, the Government has been compelled to intervene because 
the original mechanism was manifestly failing to have the desired effect. 
The reason for the failure of the quality/ratings formula to have 
a profound effect on the programme schedules of the companies, and this 
despite the in-built bias in favour of the quality mark, is that the 
39. For the equation in its full splendour see appendix 9. v. 
40. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
-391- 
financial rewards at stake are minute. The programme companies are 
guaranteed by far the largest proportion of their annual revenue from 
the licence on the basis of the previous year's allocation. Consequently, 
the quality/ratings formula affects only a very small percentage of the 
total share of licence revenue each programme company receives. 
In 1977, for example, on the basis of the 1976 figures A2 
ought to have received 421 million francs in licence revenue. The 
application of the quality/ratings formula by the Licence Revenue 
Allocation Committee reduced this si by 6.6 million francs to 414.4 
million. This loss of 6.6 million francs looks even more insignificant 
when compared with A2's total income from all sources in 1977 
(licence revenue, commercial advertising, programme sales and so on) 
which amounted to 835 million francs. Even though 6.6 million francs 
represented the cost of a few productions, the financial incentive was 
insufficiently strong for the programme company to strive to obtain 
this extra revenue by improving programme quality. More-'exactly, the 
programme companies try to obtain-7the-extra revenue by increasing 
their audience ratings which are more susceptible to objective 
assessment than an improvement in programme quality, even though the 
latter is more heavily weighted in the budgetary equation. 
In any case the application of the budgetary equation by the 
Licence Revenue Allocation Committee is not definitive, since the 
Government may once again intervene in the process to make adjustments 
to the totals of each programme company arrived at by the Committee. 
As with the system of direct grants, these adjustments are unilateral 
decisions taken by the Government. 
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The following table may help to clarify the principal stages 
of the licence revenue allocation procedure. It shows the 
provisional results of the 1977 allocation of licence revenue 
among the four programme companies. 
41 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
TF1 25+. 8 283.2 +21 -1.5 +20.2 322.9 
A2 378.7 1+21 +20 -6.6 -20.1 414.3 
FR3 84+4+. 7 938.9 +19 +6.9 +5.4 970.2 
RF 523.2 581.6 - +1.2 -5.5 577.3 
(Totals in millions of francs) 
(a) represents the income from licence revenue in 1976; 
(b) represents the income from licence revenue the companies could 
have hoped to expect in 1977 on'the basis of the 1976 totals; 
(c) represents the sum allocated to the programme companies by the 
Government in the form of direct grants (pr4ciputs); 
(d) represents the variation resulting from the application of the 
budgetary equation by the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee; 
(e) represents the sum allocated to the companies by the Government 
as an adju stment to the Committee's budgetary allocations; 
(f) represents the total amount of licence revenue the companies 
were to receive in 1977. 
The total amount of licence revenue to be allocated to TFl in 
1977, therefore, was 322.9 million francs, a 26% increase on the 1976 
total. A2 was to receive 414.3 million francs (+9.14%), FR3 970.2 million 
41. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemb1 e Nationale, 1976-1977. 
no. 2525, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 197T, annexe no. 49, - 
Radiodiffusion et television, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, 
annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 19T6, pp"9ý10. 
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francs (+11.8%) and Radio France 577.3 million francs (+10.3%). 
42 
The budgetary procedure set up by the Government to distribute 
the licence revenue among the programme companies is complex, relatively 
expensive and of dubious efficacy. The variations in the allocations 
to the companies resulting from the application of the quality/ratings 
formula amounted to only 13.4 million francs in 1979, only 0.4% of the 
total licence revenue. The financing of the procedure itself and of 
the various bodies involved in its application cost the programme 
companies 16.0 million francs in the same year. 
43 
Thus, the cost of 
maintaining the system in operation was greater in 1979 than the 
variations in the companies' allocations resulting from the application 
of the budgetary equation. 
44 
1+2. In fact the companies received the following amounts from licence 
revenue in 1977: TF1 - 316.9 million francs; A2 - 1+09.3 million 
francs; FR3 - 970.2 million francs; and Radio France - 583.3 million 
francs. 
Journal Officiel-, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1977-1978, 
no. 3131, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1978, annexe no. 49, 
Radiodiffusion et television francaise, rapporteur special: Joel 
Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 1977, 
pp. 6-7. 
43. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1978-1979, 
no. 570, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1979, annexe no. 12, 
Culture et communication: Radiotel4vision, rapporteiir special: 
Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 
1978, p. 6. 
iii. In 1980 it was estimated that the amount of licence revenue 
allocated to the different companies as a result of the 
application of the budgetary equation by the Licence Revenue 
Allocation Committee totalled 51 million francs. 
While this was a large improvement on the 1979 figure, it was 
still far less than the amount of licence revenue distributed 
by the Government in the form of direct grants, which in 1980 
was to total 246 million francs. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiot4l4vision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 19T9, p. 6. 
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Furthermore, the variations in the licence revenue ällocations 
to the programme companies between 1976 and 1977 were less the result 
of the application of the quality/ratings formula by the Licence 
Revenue Allocation Committee than the consequence of unilateral 
governmental decisions. This has also been the case every year 
since. Thus, the financial results of the application of the 
budgetary equation have been nullified, indeed far outweighed, 
by the budgetary transfers imposed by the Government. As Le Tac 
commented in his report on the 1977 broadcasting budget, 
"... the variations are only in a very limited sense 
the result of the application of the allocation formrla. 
Adjustments and direct grants, which are financial transfers 
decided by the Government on its authority, weigh much more 
heavily in the determination of the budgets (of the programme 
companies). " 45 
Not surprisingly in these circumstances, one member of the 
SJTI's staff described the role of the Licence Revenue Allocation 
Committee as fictitious. 
46 
Another member of the SJTI, who was 
at that time responsible for the preparation of the broadcasting 
budget, admitted that the Committee played little part in determining 
the allocation of licence revenue to each company. 
47 
In fact, apart 
from giving part-time employment to five top civil servants, it is 
difficult to see what function the Licence Revenue Allocation 
Committee does perform, apart, of course, from allowing the Government 
through the SJTI to exercise power while the Committee is left 
holding nominal responsibility. 
45. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1976-1977, no. 2525, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1977, annexe no. 49, Radiodiffusion et t616- 
vision, rapporteur spdcial: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal 
de la seance du 5 octobre 1976, p. 10. 
46. Interview with M. Mougey, September 17 1979. 
b7. Interview with Pierre Borvo, July 20 1979. 
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While licence revenue represents around 70% of the total 
income of the broadcasting companies as a whole, excluding the SFP, 
it is not the principal source of income for the two major television 
companies, TF1 and A2.48 In sharp contrast to the two BBC channels, 
48. Two points might be noted in passing with regard to the licence 
revenue of the broadcasting companies. 
First, the broadcasting companies have to pay VAT at 17.6% on the 
revenue from the licence, though some of this money can be claimed 
back. Imposed from 1970 onwards, VAT on the licence revenue cost 
the ORTF 235 million francs in 1973. (a) Despite the fact that 
the Chinaud report recommended that the VAT on licence revenue 
be abolished, it has remained at the high level of over 17% 
since the break-up of the ORTF. (b) In 1979 it was estimated 
that a reduction in the level of VAT on the licence revenue to 7% 
would save the companies around 300 million francs which could 
then be used to aid creativity in programming. (c) 
Secondly, before the licence revenue is shared out among the 
companies, the cost of collection is deducted from the total. 
Following a recommendation of the Chinaud report, the task of 
collecting the licence revenue, which had previously been performed 
by the ORTF itself, was transferred after the 1974 reorganisation 
to the Ministry of Finance. (d) The Chinaud committee hoped 
that this transfer of responsibility would lead to a net saving 
in the cost of collection. In fact, however, the proportion of 
licence revenue which is spent on its collection has remained 
relatively constant at around 5-6% of the total. If, as the 
Chinaud committee suggested, the licence collection service of 
the ORTF was inefficient, it would seem that the Ministry of 
Finance is no better equipped to deal with the task of collecting 
approximately 17 million licence-fees. 
(a) Chinaud report, 1974, p. 161k. 
(b) Ibid, pp. 52-5l and 163-165. 
(c) Cluzel report, 1979, p. 163. 
The rate of VAT at 7%, not 17%, is the standard rate for 
products and services in the fields of culture and information. 
See Le Monde, January 30-31 1977. 
(d) Chinaud report, 1974, pp. 68-76 and 165-166. 
Article 20 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
-396- 
TF1 and A2 both rely heavily on income from commercial advertising. 
The following table gives the percentage of their total income these 
two companies receive in commercial advertising revenue. 
49 
TFl A2 
1976 60 46 
1977 61.5 51 
1978 57 50 
1979 61 52 
1980 61 53 
By the provisions of the 1974 broadcasting statute, income from 
commercial advertising may not exceed 25% of the total income of the 
50 
four programme companies and the transmission company put together. 
However, since neither Radio France nor FR3 are allowed to benefit 
from commercial advertising revenue, the 25% maximum quota is in 
practice shared between'TF1 and A2.51 Consequently, the proportion 
of. their income which TF1 and A2 derive from commercial advertising 
revenue far exceeds 25%. The overall legally permitted maximum is 
respected, while at the same time TFl and A2 are heavily dependent 
on advertising revenue. 
40. -Annual-budgetary-reports on-broadcasting by the National Assembly 
finance committee, rg orteur sD cial: Joel Le Tac. 
50. Article, 22 of the. 1974 broadcasting statute. See also the 
cahiers*des'charges of the programme companies. 
51. Radio France does not receive any income from commercial 
advertising because the Government wants any money spent 
by advertisers on radio advertising to be given to the peripheral 
radio stations in which the French government has important 
shareholdings. See chapter on the State Monopoly. 
FR3. does not benefit from commercial advertising because the 
Government is sensitive to the opposition of the influential 
regional press lobby on this question. This lobby has also been 
influential in-opposing the establishment of local radio stations 
in France. See the chapter on the State Monopoly. 
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This dependence of TF1 and A2 on advertising revenue has been 
the object of much criticism. One complaint is that while in theory 
the 25% permitted maximum was intended by Parliament to be a ceiling 
figure, in practice it has become a target figure for the two major 
television companies to aim at. 
"The R4gie Frangaise de Publicit4-TFl (the boar responsible 
for organising advertising on TFl) is given a revenue target 
to achieve. If we don't achieve this figure, the channel will 
have a hole in its budget. On the other hand, we can't go above 
this figure either. We must try and hit the target figure dead 
on, which is obviously very hard to do. " 52 
"A2 fixes a maximum figure of advertising revenue which we 
aim to achieve. This figure has been decided on in negotiations. 
between the company and the Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately 
the R6gie Frangaise de Publicite-A2 is not consulted on the figure 
decided upon. 
Our aim is to achieve a certain target figure over the year. 
If we overshoot, the programme companies are in contradiction with 
the 25% ceiling imposed by the law. If we undershoot, then A2 
will have a hole in its budget for the year in question. Hitting 
the figure exactly poses enormous problems. 
When we had to cancel adverts at the end of 1976, the 
advertisers could have gone to TF1 if TF1 had been below its own 
target figure. But this was not the case and so the money was 
lost to broadcasting. Nor did the money go to the press, since 
the press was not suitable for the campaign envisaged. Therefore, 
none of the media gained in the end. 
We are the only commercial sector in the world which refuses 
business. " 53 
If TF1 and A2 fail to achieve their respective target figures, 
their income is that much reduced. Provided the demand for screen 
time by advertising agencies outweighs the capacity of the television 
companies to satisfy that demand, the two television channels concerned 
have no difficulty in achieving their target figures. This was the case, 
for example, in 1976 and 1977, with some requests for advertising time 
by the advertising agencies having to be held over to the following year. 
52. Interview with Xavier Orhand, April 27 1977. 
53. Interview with Jean Mousset, May 2 1977. 
I 
t 
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If, as happened in 1975, the supply of advertising time on television 
exceeds the advertising agencies' demands, TF1 and A2 must bear the 
resulting loss of revenue, which in that year amounted to 10 million 
francs for TF1 and 30 million francs for A2.54 
The advertising services of the two main television companies, 
RFP-TF1 and RFP-A2, compete with each other to attract advertising 
to their respective channels, just as the channels themselves compete 
for audiences. It is the task of the R4gie Frangaise de Publicit4, the 
equivalent of the British Advertising Standards Authority, to ensure 
that the competition between RFP-TFl and RFP-A2 does not infringe the 
provisions of the cahiers des charges of the two television companies 
and that the overall 25% ceiling is respected. 
55 
Because of the existence of a statutory maximum on advertising 
revenue, the broadcasting companies as a whole have no control over 
the amount of advertising income they can receive. It is the Government 
which fixes the costtof the licence-fee and in practice it is on the 
amount the companies receive from licence revenue that their income 
from advertising depends. The Government, therefore, determines the 
overall income of the broadcasting companies, with the exception of 
the SFP, given that the companies make relatively little money from 
sources other than the licence and advertising. 
514. 'Le'Monde, March 14-15 1976. 
55. Article 22 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
For a concise outline of the role of the Regie FranQaise de Publicit4 
in supervising advertising on French television and radio, see the 
booklet. published by the RFP entitled Reglement de is publicit4 
teievis4e_ et radiophonique de is Reaie Francaise de Publicitg. 
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Moreover, not only does the Government determine the overall 
income of the broadcasting companies, but it is also the prime agent 
in deciding how the income will be distributed among the separate 
companies. Working through the SJTI and the Licence Revenue Allocation 
Committee, the Government is responsible for allocating the licence 
revenue and the income from advertising among the companies. Thus, 
the control the broadcasting companies have over their income is 
to all intents and purposes non-existent. 
The companies are also severely constrained with regard to their 
expenditure. For example, the much-heralded freedom of the programme 
companies to spend their budgetary allocations as they would like is 
widely restricted by the provisions of their cahiers des charges. 
56 
Apart from laying down certain public service obligations on the 
broadcasting companies, the cahiers des charges have a specific 
budgetary function. Imposed on the companies by the Government, the 
cahiers des charges specify the amount of money each programme company 
must hand over to the other three companies of the ex-ORTF in return 
for certain services. 
Because of the lack of any central body in the new structure, 
relations among the separate companies are complex. Sometimes companies 
compete with one another, as4is most notably the case with TF1 and A2. 
Sometimes they cooperate with one another, frequently under the 
coordination of the responsible government ministry. At other times 
a company may have a contractual bi-lateral relationship with another 
company. 
56. See chapter on the Liquidation of the ORTF. 
-400- 
It is this contractual relationship which links each of the 
programme companies with each of the other three broadcasting 
companies in turn. However, it is a contractual relationship in 
which a third party, namely the Government, plays an important role. 
It is the Government, through the device of the cahiers des charges, 
which fixes the amount each programme company must pay to each of the 
other three companies. 
"The obligatory expenditure of the programme companies 
to the other three companies is fixed by the Service Juridique 
et Technique de l'Information. There are meetings between 
the minister and the different companies where views are expressed, 
but in the end it is a ministerial decision. " 57 
Thus, each of the programme companies is obliged by the Government 
to pay an annual sum to the transmission company for the use of the 
transmission networks. It is the Government which fixes the sum to be 
paid. 
58 Likewise, each programme company must pay an annual sum to 
the archive and research institute in return mainly for the use of 
the latter's staff training facilities. 
59 
In addition, the programme 
companies, particularly TF1 and A2, pay annual sums to the production 
company for the use of its equipment and in payment for programmes 
produced by the SFP. 
6o 
Finally, the programme companies pay the 
audience research service (CEO) to cover the cost of surveys and 
audience research. 
57. Interview with Jean-Loup Arnaud, July 13 1979. 
58. TDF receives very little money directly from the licence revenue; 
in effect only what is awarded it through the system of direct 
grants. The bulk of the transmission company's income from the 
licence comes indirectly via payments from the programme companies. 
59. INA receives revenue from the licence only through the system of 
direct grants. Most of its income comes indirectly through the 
mandatory payments made by the programme companies. 
60. See section on the financial position of the broadcasting companies, 
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This system of mandatory expenditure, whereby the programme 
companies are obliged by the Government to pay annual sums to the 
other companies, accounts for a large share of each programme 
company's total expenditure. This is particularly true of TF1 and 
A2 who are more dependent on the services of the SFP than either 
FR3 or Radio France. 
61 
For example, in 1976 A2's income amounted 
to 770 million francs. Out of this total, A2 was compelled to pay 
out 438 million francs, that is 57% of its total income from all sources, 
to the other companies. This figure included 195 million francs to 
TDF, 16.5 million to INA, 3 million to the CEO and 203 million to the 
SFP. 
62 
Once this expenditure has been accounted for, the two major 
television companies are left with under half of their respective 
61. As the channel with special responsibility for the cinema, FR3 
broadcasts many feature films. Moreover, FR3 has its own regional 
production centres. 
Radio France is by its very nature relatively self-sufficient-ýin 
programme production. 
One should note, however, that even TF1 and A2 are producing 
more and more of their own programmes. In 1978 TF1 produced 
55% of its own programmes, compared with under 53% in 1976. 
A2 produced over 18% compared with under 4+3% over the same--period. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 1979, p. 10. 
62. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1975-1976, no. 1916, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet e- de loi de finances pour 1976, annexe no. 1+8, Radiodiffusion et t&1 
vision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- verbal 
de la seance du 10 octobre 1975, p. 18. 
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budgets. 
63 
Moreover, a"large proportion of what remains goes to 
cover unavoidable expenses such as the payment of salaries, 
administration and equipment maintenance. Of the 332 million 
francs which A2 had left in 1976 after the payment of the company's 
mandatory expenses, over 300 million were required merely to maintain 
the company's output at its 1975 level. Comparatively little money 
was left over for programme development or for the extension of 
viewing time. When in July 1977 its provisional budget for 1978 
was announced, A2 had to postpone its plans to introduce a midday 
news and magazine programme for lack of funds once other expenditure 
had been taken into account. 
64 
The financial position of the broadcasting companies 
The break-up of the ORTF was supposed to give the broadcasting 
companies an unprecedented degree of financial autonomy from the 
Government. In this respect the reorganisation would appear not to 
have lived up to expectations. The Government'-s second objective, 
which followed on from the first, was that the dismantling of the Office 
63. In his report on the 1980 broadcasting budget Le Tac excludes 
the sums paid to the SFP which he had included in his calculations 
up to and including the report on the 1978 budget. However, even 
excluding the SFP from the calculations he still estimates that in 
1980 TF1 and A2 will each spend 27% of their budgets on mandatory 
expenditure. 
Journal Offic3el, 'Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979=1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 1979, P"9. 
61. Le Monde, July 22 and 23 1977 and August 11 1978. 
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would lead to sounder financial management within the state broad- 
casting services. It was hoped that the new smaller companies would 
be more efficient in the use of their resources than the ORTF was 
reputed to have been. In contrast to the rather one-sided picture of 
the ORTF as a top-heavy bureaucratic organisation'füll of structural 
defects, the new companies would be models of economic rationality. 
Small would not only be beautiful, it would be efficient as well. 
To what extent has the 1974 reform succeeded in remedying the 
supposed defects in the financial management of the ORTF? Before 
attempting to answer this question, we must first bear in mind'-the 
fact that the Government's picture of the ORTF as a financially inept 
organisation does not survive cibse examination. Up until 1973 the 
ORTF had never been in deficit. It had financed long-term projects 
from its budget and from loans, including the establishment of a 
second television channel in the mid 1960s end a third channel in the 
early 70s. 
In the early 1970s, however, the Office was adversely affected 
by a combination of circumstances which, -as. we have already seen, were 
not all within its control. 
65 
The financial deficit of the Office in 
1973, the forecast deficit for 1974 and the publication of the critical 
Chinaud report in June 1974 combined to produce a climate in which the 
picture of financial mismanagement of the ORTF was taken for granted. 
This is not to say that the picture was totally inaccurate. The 
1968 Diligent report, 1970 Paye report and 1972 Le Tac report had all 
criticised various aspects of the ORTF's financial management and made 
65. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
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a host of recommendations to improve financial control within the 
Office. However, there is evidence that the ORTF's financial 
record was much exaggerated in 1974 and that responsibility for 
the financial problems faced by the Office must be borne in part' 
by the Government itself. 
66 
In any case, none of the above reports 
went so far as to recommend the abolition of the ORTF and the 
establishment of separate companies. 
The 1974 reform was intended to instil a sense of financial 
responsibility in the state broadcasting services. In return for 
gaining control of their budgets, the Government argued, the new 
companies were to ensure their financial equilibrium each year. 
However, the hopes of the Government in this respect have not been 
fully realised. Despite annual increases in the cost of the licence 
and a large rise in real terms in the total amount of public resources 
allocated to the broadcasting companies, some of the companies have 
still not managed to balance their books. 
67 
In 1977, for example, 
while the television companies managed to balance 'their budgets and 
Radio France even made a small profit of 4.5 million francs, TDF made 
a loss of 9.4 million francs, INA was in the red to the time of 14 million 
francs and the SFP had a massive deficit of 46 million francs. 
68 
66. Ibid. 
67. The increase in income over the period 1975-1979 was around 79%. 
The rate of inflation over a comparable period, 1974-1978, was 
under 50%. Thus, in real terms the resources of the broadcasting 
companies from the licence, advertising and other sources have 
increased by around 30% over this period. 
Cluzel report, 1979, P. 38. 
68. 'Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1978-1979, no. 570, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... BUT 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1979, annexe no. 12, Culture et co=munication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au procbs- 
verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 1978, p. 22. 
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In general, the four programme companies have been-the most 
successful in managing to balance their books during the period 
since the reform. On the other hand, the companies with the gravest 
financial problems have been the archive and research institute and 
the production company. 
INA has since 1975 been the Cinderella of the broadcasting 
companies. Not included in the Government's original bill, set up 
by parliamentary amendment against the Government's wishes, the 
archive and research institute does not benefit directly from 
licence revenue, excluding some direct grants, and receives no income 
from commercial advertising. Thus, INA is financially dependent on 
_ 
the programane companies, each of which is obliged by the Government 
to pay an annual sum for the use of INA's services as well as 
negotiating with INA a financial contract in return for the use of 
staff training facilities. 
Though during the period 1975-1979 INA's budget doubled from 
just over 100 million francs in 1975 to just over 200 million in 1979, 
the precariousness of INA's financial position has recently become 
apparent. 
69 
In 1978 the deficit of the company was again of the order 
of 14 million francs, largely because of a reduction in the proportion 
of its income INA was deriving from the obligatory expenditure of the 
programme companies. Thus, while in 1975 this mandatory expenditure 
accounted for 70% of INA's income, in 1979 it amounted to only 52%. 
70 
The management of the company was-'forced to introduce an austerity 
69. Cluzel report, 1979, p. 88. 
70. Thid, pp. 88-89. 
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budget and at the same time, in July 1978, ask the Government for 
an additional 70 million francs to cover the cost of the company's 
operations. 
71 
During 1979 various changes were made in key managerial posts 
in the company, with Pierre Emmanuel being replaced as company chairman 
by the well-known administrator, Gabriel de Broglie, who only recently 
had been made-director general of Radio France under Baudrier. 
72 A 
new management team was established around de Broglie in a bid to 
restore the company's financial fortunes. 
73 
Moreover, in the light 
of its financial difficulties, the obligatory payments to INA by the 
progra, mne companies were increased in 1980 to 140 million francs 
compared with 106 million in 1979.74 However, by early 1980 it was 
still doubtful whether these measures would of themselves be sufficient 
to solve INA's budgetary problems, particularly following de Broglie's 
announcement that INA had made a loss of 142 million francs in 1979.75 
The financial crisis at INA during 1978-1979 pales into 
insignificance, however, when compared with the grave problems 
facing the SFP during the same period. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
say that the crisis at the production company posed the Government 
71. Le Monde, July 23-24 1978. 
72. See chapter on Appointments. 
73. De Broglie was appointed-chairman of INA in May 1979. 
Following his appointment, Jean-Noel Jeanneney became his 
programme adviser in June; Nicole Briot was appointed director 
general in July; and Pierre Borvo became general secretary in 
September. 
Le Monde, May 19,30, June 20, July 14 and September 8 1979. 
74+. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 1979, PP-8-9- 
75. Le Monde, October 13 1979. 
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the most serious problem it had faced since the establishment of 
the new companies in January 1975. Over the three year period 
1975-1977 the SFP had made a total deficit of over 120 million 
francs, while its deficit in 1978 alone came to over 113 million. 
76 
The SFP, the former production services of the ORTF, had the 
most commercially oriented administrative status of the seven 
broadcasting companies. 
77 
It receives no money from the licence 
or from advertising. Instead its income was supposed to come from 
diverse sources including the programme companies, particularly TF1 
and A2, for whom it would produce programmes which the companies 
would then buy on a strictly commercial basis. By the terms of 
their cahiersdes charges TF1 and A2 are forbidden to produce certain 
programmes themselves such as dramas and fiction series, with the 
result that the SFP appears to have a ready market for its productions. 
78 
In addition, the first chairman of the SFP, Edeline, intended that 
the company should diversify its operations by becoming a major force 
in the adjacent fields of cinema film production and audiovisual 
technology development as well as in the traditional field of television 
production. 
76. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1978-1979, no 570, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1979, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 1978, p. 17. 
Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1979-1980, no. 50, Rapport general 
fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet 
de loi 
de-'finances pour 1980, annexe no. 1L6, Radiodiffusion-television, 
rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance 
du 21 novembre 1979, pp. 15-16. 
77. Article 13 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
See appendix 4. ii. 
78. The television companies can produce programmes involving a minimum 
of technical equipment (la production l4gere). 
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This rosy view of the SFP's commercial future was not 
borne out by subsequent events. While the company was supposed 
to be run on a commercial, self-financing basis, the legacy of the 
ORTF could not be thrown off at once. Since the SFP's operational 
costs are higher than other independent production companies, 
including foreign ones, the French production company could not 
be expected to survive unaided in this highly competitive market, 
particularly in the period immediately after the reform. To protect 
the SFP from financial. collapse, therefore, the Government decided 
to compel the television companies to pay the production company 
a certain sum annually in the form of production orders, thus 
guaranteeing the SFP a source of income. These sums, calculated 
as a percentage of the production orders made in 1974, were originally 
intended to be on an annual sliding scale: 75% in 1976,60% in 197.7, 
45% in 1978,30% in 1979 and disappearing totally in 1980.79 
The Government's intention was that at the end of this five year 
breathing space the SFP would be in a position to compete in the open 
market without the need for guaranteed custom from the television 
companies. Until then, the television companies were to be compelled 
to pay the SFP for programme production and for the use of its equipment'. 
80 
This payment by the television companies to the SFP has provided one 
of the main sources of conflict among the broadcasting companies, since 
in effect the television companies, particularly TF1 and A2, were being 
required to underwrite the lack of competitiveness of an independent 
company. 
79. The percentages were to be in real terms, taking into account the 
increase in the companies' resources. 
80. For example, the use of video cameras at outside broadcasts. 
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Even with this guaranteed source of income, however, the SFP 
failed to establish itself on a sound financial footing. Edeline's 
attempt to diversify the company's operations did not succeed, with 
the result that the company's turnover remained overwhelmingly based 
on television programme production. The television companies, on the 
other hand, preferred to produce more of their programmes themselves 
with the aid of the new, light equipment or purchase programmes from 
the SFP's competitors, particularly cheap imports from the USA. Even 
when the television companies did make use of the SFP, they preferred 
to make their compulsory payments in return for the use of the 
production company's equipment rather than for the purchase of programmes. 
In short, the production company failed to establish itself as a viable 
competitor in the market place to which it had been condemned by the 
1974 statute. 
Partly this failure was the fault of the company management. 
The SFP's plight was exacerbated by the grandiose designs of Edeline, 
who overstretched the company's resources in certain dubious financial 
investments, including the purchase of the theatre l'Empire to be used 
as a television studio. Partly it was due to the fact that the programme 
companies, the customers of the SFP, were seeking to exploit advances 
in broadcasting technology by producing their own programmes. Partly 
it was the fault of the Government who failed to inject sufficient 
working capital into the company from the beginning. The basic problem, 
however, was the reform itself. In breaking up the ORTF into separate 
companies and giving the SFP a semi-commercial status in the new system, 
the Government had implicitly rejected the concept of a public service 
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broadcasting system. 
81 
By the autumn of 1978 it was clear that even with the guaranteed 
income from the television companies the SFP was in a very serious 
financial position. In October Edeline "temporarily" resigned as 
chairman of the company on the grounds of ill-health. He was replaced 
by a top civil servant and governor of the company, Bertrand Labrusse. 
82 
As interim chairman of the company Labrusse proceeded to draw up a 
plan to restore the SFP to solvency. 
83 
Labrusse formally rejected 
the need for any enforced redundancies at the company, preferring 
to base his plan on 1+50 voluntary redundancies spread over a period 
of three years. At first it'-. seemed that Labrusse's plan met with the 
support of the minister responsible for broadcasting, Lecat. However, 
with the termination of Labrusse's appointment in January 1979 it became 
apparent that his moderate proposals had not received full governmental 
accord. 
84 
81. The financial problems of the SFP and their causes are extremely 
complex. For more detailed information, see: -the Cluzel report, 
1979, pp. 35-37,4+7-54+, 57,61-82,90-108 and 120-130; the National 
Assembly finance committee's annual budgetary reports on broadcasting, 
rapporteur sp4cial: Joel Le Tac, particularly the report on the 1978 
budget, pp. 18-28, the report on the 1979 budget, pp. 12-18, and the 
report on the 1980 budget, pp. 10-15; Le Matin, May 6 1977; Le Monde, 
November 20-21 1977, July 26, October 15-16, November 12-13, 
December 3-]+ and 10-11 1978, and February 9 1979: and Le Nouvel 
Observateur, no. 729, October 30-November 5 1978. 
82: Le Monde, October 15-16 1978. 
A conseiller'referendaire ä la cour des comptes, Labrusse had been 
a member of the SFP's board of governors since 1975. 
83. The Labrusse plan is described in the Cluzel report, 1979, 
vol. Il: annexes, pp. 93-97. 
84. Compare, for example, the conciliatory statements made by Lecat 
at the time of Labrusse's appointment with the much tougher 
line taken by Barre in March 1979. 
Le'Monde, October 31 and November 12-13 1978 and March 13 1979. 
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Labrusse's successor was Clermont-Tonnerre, a leading member 
of Rossi's cabinet in 1974 and responsible for the implementation 
of the 1974 broadcasting statute. 
85 
Edeline finally resigned from 
his post at the same time as Clermont-Tonnerre's appointment, thus 
leaving the way clear for the new incumbent to establish his authority 
on his own terms as full-time chairman of the company. Clermont-Tonnerre's 
plan for bringing the production company out of the red was a much stiffer 
one than that of his predecessor. Most controversially, a key element 
in the plän was a streamlining of the company which would necessitate 
700 redundancies over the following three years. 
86 
For 1979 alone Clermont-Tonnerre called for 424 enforced redundancies 
and 130 voluntary resignations out of a total workforce of just under 
3,000.87 Later in the year this total was reduced after protracted 
negotiations with the broadcasting unions and a lengthy strike at the 
production company and a series of strikes in the other broadcasting 
companies, with about 200'being offered jobs in the other companies. 
88 
By mid-March 1979 the number for whom redundancy meant unemployment 
had been cut from 1+21 to 138.89 In addition, the Government promised 
85. See chapter on the Liquidation of the ORTF. 
86. Le Monde, February 9 1979. See also Journal Officiel, Documents 
Assembl4e Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, Rapport fait au nom de 
la commission des finances ... sur le projet de 
loi de finances 
pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: Radiot6l4vision, 
rapporteur sp4cial: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la 
stance du 2 octobre 1979, p. 12. r 
87. Le Monde, February 8 1979. 
88. See chapter on the Broadcasting unions. 
89. Le Monde, March 14 1979. In Le Monde, April 13 1979 the figure 
given is 175. Nonetheless, over 400 persons were no longer employed 
at the SFP in the same capacity as previously. 
The National Assembly finance committee report on the 1980 broad- 
casting budget gives the total of 143 redundancies, ( p. 12). 
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to give the SFP financial aid of 250 million francs on condition that 
the company put into effect Clermont-Tonnerre's plan. The programme 
companies also came to the aid of the SFP by promising to increase 
their orders in 1979 by 20% over the 1978 figure and by undertaking 
to guarantee programme orders over a longer time schedule than they 
had previously done. 
90 
The forecast deficit for the SFP in 1979 was 127 million francs, 
slightly up on the 1978 figure. 
91 
The short-term future of the 
production company seemed healthier'in the light of the Government's 
financial aid. Nonetheless, the position of the company was by no 
means assured, for at the same time as the television companies are 
tending to produce more and more of their own programmes, the SFP 
is becoming more and more dependent on the television companies for 
income. 
"Consequently, the programme companies have less and less 
need of the SFP, while it has more and more need of them. 
... the break-up of the ORTF could not but have serious 
consequences for the heavy television production which was 
already in an extremely fragile position at the time of the 
ORTF. ... the 1971 reform has placed the SFP in competition 
with the programme companies themselves, but in conditions which 
have been most unfavourable for the former. The channels still 
, 
have the choice of different sources of programme production and 
can opt for the most advantageous. The SFP is the prisoner of two 
customers and has extremely limited possibilities of finding others. " 92 
The lynchpin of the new broadcasting system has become its lame duck. 
90. Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiot4levi6ion, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la s4ance du 2 octobre 1979, pp. 13-11+. 
Le Monde, November 13 1979 and April 12 1980. 
'91. Le Monde, October 24 1979. 
92. 'Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1979-1980, no. 1292, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1980, annexe no. 12, Culture et communication: 
Radiotelevision, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces- 
verbal de la seance du 2 octobre 1979, p. `114. 
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Conclusion 
It is illuminating to compare the present financial arrangements 
with those in use at the time of the ORTF. Despite various attempts 
at reform, particularly under Chaban-Delmas' premiership, the ORTF was 
never renowned for its financial independence from the Government. 
According to government spokesmen the 1974 reform was intended to 
put an end to the strong interventionist role of the Ministry of 
Finance in the financial operations of the state broadcasting services. 
The new companies were to be given full responsibility for the 
management of their finances. 
This chapter has demonstrated, however, that though the daily 
intervention of the Ministry of Finance is no longer a feature of 
government-broadcasting relations93, it would be a severe mistake 
to assume thatthe broadcasting companies are in a state of financial 
independence vis-ä-vis the Government. 
94 It is the Government which 
fixes the cost of the licence and so determines the total amount 
of resources to be directed to the state broadcasting companies. 
Even the production company, which ought by now to be fully self- 
financing, depends on government aid for its survival. In*addition, 
a significant proportion of the programme companies' expenditure 
is under the control of the Government through the device of the 
cahiers des charges. 
The 1974 reform has, however, altered the financial relationship 
between the Government and the state broadcasting services in several 
93. A. Smith, The Shadow in the Cave, London, Allen and Unwin, 1973, 
pp. 163-161. 
91. We have no reason to doubt the denial by a member of the SJTI 
that it exercised any daily financial control over the companies. 
Interview with M. Mougey, September 17 1979. 
-414- 
important respects. First, since there is no central cöordinating 
body in the new structure, it is the Government which provides the 
necessary arbitration in the allocation of resources among the companies. 
Organisationally independent of each other, the seven broadcasting 
companies lack any common front in the budgetary process. In effect, 
the Government acts as the central body intentionally omitted in the 
reorganisation. 
This change has been accompanied by a shift of emphasis away 
from intervention at the micro level of expenditure to control at the 
macro level of the company. The former dirigiste model of financial 
control has been largely replaced by one which stresses the importance 
of cash limits. Thus, while there may be no daily intervention on 
the part of the Government or the SJTI with regard to specific items 
of expenditure, the financial procedure described in this chapter 
ensures that a company's overall freedom of manoeuvre is severely 
restricted. 
Secondly, at the ORTF re'enue from commercial advertising 
went into one central fund before being reallocated among the ORTF 
channels, with the result that it had less effect on the programme 
output. 
"At the ORTF there was one overall budget. There was none 
of the complex mechanisms which are now necessary to divide up 
the licence revenue. 
I preferred the budgetary system which operated at the ORTF, 
particularly with regard to advertising revenue which was kept to 
the 25% maximum and did not influence our programming. " 95 
In the new system the dependence of the two major television 
companies on commercial advertising revenue makes them at least 
'95. Interview with Marceau long, July 10 1979. 
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potentially more vulnerable to external pressure. Indeed it has been 
argued by many critics of the reform, including Le Tac, Cluzel, 
Caillavet, the opposition parties, the broadcasting unions, the 
Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel and the Quality Committee that the 
increased importance of advertising revenue for TF1 and A2 has 
resulted in an unwarranted emphasis being placed on audience ratings 
with the result that there has been a noticeable shift away from a 
public service broadcasting system to a commercially oriented one. 
96 
Finally, while the break-up of the ORTF has isolated certain 
financial problems, it has by no means solved them. In theory 
seven small budgets ought perhaps to be more easily managed than one 
large one. This has generally proved correct in the case of the 
programme companies. However, the splitting up of the ORTF"intb--its 
constituent parts has dramatically highlighted the financial difficulties 
of some companies, particularly INA and the SFP. Whereas in the former 
unitary structure of the ORTF the deficiencies of the production services 
were readily tolerated and even regarded as virtues, in the new system 
the SFP has to defend its product on commercial grounds. Unfortunately, 
though quite predictably, instead of acting as a tonic for the SFP, 
competition had by 1980 brought the production company to the verge of 
collapse. 
96. See chapter on Criticisms of the reform. 
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CHAPTER 10 
News programmes 
The most politically sensitive area of broadcasting in 
France has traditionally been that of news programming. In the last 
years of the Fourth Republic, when France was heavily involved in the 
war in Algeria, a practice of ministerial censorship of radio news 
programmes was established and justified by government ministers on the 
grounds of the gravity of the military situation. 
1 This practice 
was carried on into the Fifth Republic and applied to the new medium, 
television, which, as we have seen, was only just starting to reach a mass 
audience in France. 
2 
During the eleven years of de Gaulle's presidency (1958-69) 
the Minister of Information closely controlled the content of news 
programmes on radio and television. For the vast majority of the 
population whose major source of national news was the main evening 
bulletin of the (0)RTF, their news diet was regulated not by professional 
broadcasters but by ministerial officials or even the minister in person. 
The hierarchical chain of command went outside the (0)RTF to the 
Ministry of Information where the main editorial decisions were taken. 
Thus, control of key appointments was supplemented by a direct 
intervention in news programming to provide a double check on the 
material shown to the viewer. 
1. See J. Montaldo, Dossier ORTF 1944-74: Tous coupables, Paris, 
Albin Michel, 197b, pp. 80-117. 
2. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 
1974 reform. 
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The primordial role of the Minister of Information was 
described by Alain Peyrefitte who held this post for over two years 
in the early sixties and was the architect of the 1964 ORTF statute. 
".... Christian de la Malone, whom I was succeeding 
in George Pompidou's first cabinet, showed me a range 
of buttons on the desk. 
'That one is to summon the commissionaire, this 
other one is for your chef de cabinet, and those ones are 
for the head of the RTF, the director of radio and 
television news, the director of television programmes, 
the director of radio programnes..... ' 
Naive, I was surprised to be able to summon the heads 
of the RTF like a lady of old summoned her chamber maids. 
'It's like this. Every day about 5 o'clock you 
will call them to set out the main headlines of the evening 
news bulletin on radio and television. You can also give 
them instructions at any moment by internal telephone. Do 
not leave your office before half past one and half past 
eight. After the television news your colleagues will call 
you to complain about anything which they have disliked. ' "3 
Peyrefitte goes on to describe how, despite his personal antipathy 
to this practice, he was compelled by external events to assume 
responsibility for the content of news programmes up until the passing 
of the ORTF statute in 1964.4 
Moreover, there is more than sufficient evidence that, contrary 
to Peyrefitte's protestations, the 1961 ORTF statute did not put an 
end to this practice of ministerial interference in news programming. 
The 1968 Diligent report, for example, contained a lengthy critical 
analysis of the procedure by which news content was decided at daily 
meetings between top ORTF management and the Minister of Information's 
cabinet. Commenting on an article by Jacques Thibau, 'former deputy head 
of television, in which he describes how every morning at about 11 o'clock 
a dozen civil servants met to decide what must and what must not be 
covered by the television news, the Diligent report stated that while 
3. A. Peyrefitte, Le mal frangais, Paris, Plon, 1976, p. 69. 
k. Ibid, pp. 69-78. 
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it had hoped to be able to refute Thibau's allegation, in fact 
"the testimony of various witnesses..... gave us indisputable proof 
that these accusations were well founded. "5 
It is scarcely necessary to labour the point. Evidence from 
a variety of sources testifies to a close, direct ministerial control 
of news programming during de Gaulle's presidency. Some commentators 
have sought to qualify this general statement. For example, both 
Thomas and Thibau have argued that the ORTF's current affairs progra=es, 
watched by comparatively few people, tended to be more critical of the 
Government and its policies, particularly after the 1965 presidential 
elections. 
6 
Nonetheless, the general picture of direct ministerial 
control of news programmes up until 1969 can scarcely be questioned.? 
The reforms introduced by Chaban-Delmas in September 1969 
were a reaction to this practice of control via partisan appointments 
and direct intervention. The Ministry of Information was abolished 
and responsibility for news programming given to the ORTF news 
departments. Moreover, within the ORTF the two news departments, one 
for each channel, were granted a high degree of autonomy by being 
removed from under the authority of the channel heads. The two news 
5. Diligent report, 1968, p. 123. 
6. R. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, London, 
Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976, and J. Thibau, Une tel4vision pour 
tous les frangais, Paris, Seuil, 1970, pp. 273-282. 
7. For more information on the period 196+-1969 see among others: 
A. Peyrefitte, op. cit., pp. 69-78; R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 126-139; 
the Diligent report, 1968, pp. 90-133 and 361-365; C. Durieux, 
La T4l4cratie, Paris, Tema, 1976, pp. 31-37; R. Louis, L'ORTF un 
combat, Paris, Seuil, 1968; J. Ardagh, The New France, Harmondsworth, 
Pelican, 1973 (second edition), pp. 607-625; Le Syndicat National 
des Journalistes, Section ORTF, L'ORTF le Pouvoir et les Journalisten, 
Livre blanc sur l'information ä 1'ORTF, Paris, 1974; A Saldich, 
Politics and Television in France during the de Gaulle years, 
unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Paris, 1971; and the 
chapter in this thesis on Politics and broadcasing in France before 
the 1974 reform. 
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directors, Desgraupes on channel one and Baudrier on channel two, 
were made responsible for news content and, as an additional 
safeguard, they could be removed from their posts only in the event 
of serious professional misconduct. As a result, in the eyes of several 
commentators, from 1969 to 1972 news programmes were openly critical 
of government policy, much to the dislike of the President of the 
Republic and a large section of the Gaullist parliamentary party. 
8 
However, in mid 1972 Chaban-Delmas' dismissal from the premiership 
by Pompidou was accompanied by a volte face in the Governemnt's 
relationship with the ORTF. The Ministry of Information was 
re-established and given to the ultra-conservative Malaud; the 
autonomous news departments were reintegrated within the organisational 
structure of their respective channels; and the director of news on 
channel one resigned, some of his team were sacked and the remainder 
were transferred to the much less widely viewed channel two. The 
1972 ORTF statute reflected Pompidou's view of the ORTF as "the 
voice of France" which meant that because of the mass audience of 
television the broadcasting journalists had a special responsibility 
not to be excessively critical of government policy. 
9 
The 1974 broadcasting reform was intended to break with this 
view of the state broadcasting services as the official mouthpiece 
8. For more information on the period 1969-1972 see R. Kuhn, 
Government and Broadcasting in France 1969-1975, Department of 
Politics, University of Warwick, Working paper no. 8, December 1975; 
G. Martinet, Le systeme Pompidou, Paris, Seuil, 1973, pp. 120-131; 
D. Bombardier, La voix de la France, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1975; 
J. Thibau, La t levision, le pouvoir et l'argent, Paris, Calm nn Levy, 
1973; and the chapter in this thesis on Politics-and broadcasting 
in France before the 1974 reform. 
9. See chapter on Politics and broadcasting in France before the 1974 
reform. 
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of the Government. Giscard d'Estaing's avowed ambition in 
breaking up the ORTF into separate companies was to normalise relations 
between the Government and broadcasting by giving the broadcasters 
responsibility for news programme content. The aim of this chapter 
is to examine to what extent this objective has been put into practice 
since the establishment of the new companies in January 1975. 
It is important first of all to emphasise that we have already 
presented evidence in previous chapters which demonstrated that even 
before the new companies came into operation the Government had been 
responsible for establishing the framework within which decisions about 
news programming would be made. The appointment of key editorial 
staff, such as director of news and news editor, in the programme 
companies was supervised by the Minister of the Interior, Poniatowski. 
10 
In addition, the reallocation of ORTF journalists to the new companies 
was open to political abuse by both ministers and broadcasting 
management. 
11 
Thus, even before the new companies began their 
transmissions the dice were loaded against any concept of independent news 
programming, however defined. 
However, it is obviously worth examining in more detail the 
political constraints and pressures on news programming in the four 
programme companies set up by the 1974 reorganisation. 
12 First, it 
is an area of extreme political sensitivity about which traditionally 
10. See chapter on Appointments. 
U. See chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. 
12. For our purposes news programming covers not only news bulletins but 
also current affairs programmes, party political broadcasts, 
election campaign broadcasts and political access programmes. 
there has been much heated controversy. Secondly, it is an obvious 
field in which to judge the claims to independence of the companies 
from government intervention. Finally, the views of Giscard d'Estaing 
on the role of the journalists in the state broadcasting services 
differ explicitly from those of his predecessors at the Elysge. 
One might reasonably expect, therefore, that the relationship between 
the Government and the broadcasting companies since 1975 would neither 
duplicate the overt interventionist model which characterised the period 
of de Gaulle's presidency, nor reflect Pompidou's view of the state 
broadcasting services as "the voice of France. " 
The subject matter of this chapter is, therefore, an analysis 
of the partisan political constraints and pressures, internal or external, 
overt or covert, which are habitually and successfully exercised to 
regulate communication performance in news programming. This 
statement itself requires clarification. 
First, we are concerned in this chapter principally with partisan 
political constraints. There are, of course, other constraints 
which affect the content and quality of news programming: technical 
limitations, time restrictions, considerations of news value and other 
constraints imposed by the nature of the broadcasting medium itself. 
However, we are interested in these only if there is some evidence that 
13 they are employed for partisan political ends. 
Secondly, we are concerned with constraints and pressures which 
13. See Richard Hoggart's introduction to the Glasgow University 
media group, Bad News, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976, p. x, 
and P. Schlesinger, Putting'realitytogether, London, Constable, 1978. 
We do not deny the existence of such constraints, but their 
study does not form part of this thesis. 
originate from within the broadcasting organisations as well as 
those which come from external sources. 
Thirdly, the pressures and constraints must be regular and enjoy 
a high rate of success. For example, ad hoc complaints from the 
Communist party about bias in news presentation, though a source of 
pressure on the news departments, do not appear to affect news content 
with any noticeable degree of success. They are, therefore, much less 
important than systematic pressures which do influence news content and 
presentation. 
Finally, we have restricted our study to programmes which have an 
obvious political content: news bulletins, current affairs programmes, 
party political broadcasts and political access programmes. We are 
not here concerned with the possible ideological role of non- 
news programmes such as films, serials and drama programmes in a 
capitalist economic system, even though if these programmes do have 
an ideological content they are also obviously of political importance. 
14 
Our task is the more limited one of examining partisan political 
constraints and pressures which systematically secure partisan political 
advantage on programmes with a self-evident political content. 
11+. In his book ' The' Production' of Political Television, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, M. Tracey, for example, studies 
the organisation and methods of production of what he calls " 
"political television", including not only news broadcasts and 
current affairs programmes but also programmes "involved with 
the policy-making process in Britain. " See the preface to his 
book, p. ix. 
Other writers have gone even further than Tracey in what they 
would regard as "political television". 
See, for example, J. Marceau, Class and status in France, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1977, pp. 172-173 and particularly the following 
quotation: "Examination of both the content and the form of one of 
the major parts of this entertainment, the serial (Feuilleton) 
shows some of the ideological biases involved. "(p. 172) 
Marceau's views are largely based on an article by J. M.. Piemme, 
"Le tissu idSologique dans le feuilleton tel4vise", poilt_ 
Aujourd'hui, October - December 1971+. 
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We begin by looking at the main provisions of the 1974 reform 
with regard to news programming. In the second section we go on to examine 
the concept of balance and its methodological shortcomings. The role 
of the news departments of the programme companies is then analysed 
with reference to four aspects: editorial control, recruitment of 
journalists, political pressures and corporate ethos. Next we look 
briefly at the functioning of the news departments during two politically 
sensitive periods: the 1977 municipal and 1978 legislative elections. 
Finally, a separate section is devoted to each of the following 
particular topics: party political broadcasts, the right of reply for 
opposition parties and the political access programme, Tribune libre. 
The 1974 reform 
Article 1 of the 1974 broadcasting statute assigns to the 
state broadcasting companies the task of "responding to the needs 
and aspirations of the population with regard to information ........ 
This general prescription is expanded upon in the cahiers des charges 
of the programme companies. 
"The company must fulfil the task-of informing the 
public about French and international news in the most 
complete, balanced and objective manner. 
This task of informätion consists, on the one hand, 
of presenting news events and, on the other hand, of giving 
comments and providing debates about them. The company must 
ensure that there is no possible confusion in the minds of the 
public between news, comment and debate. 
The company is obliged to ensure that, in the time 
available, all possible precautions are taken to check the 
accuracy of news stories and their presentation; that the 
choice of news stories is not guided by an ideological, 
political or doctrinal preferences that, in the presentation 
of facts, the journalists disregard their personal political 
opinions; that in any commentary on a same body of events, the 
principal viewpoints be equitably represented. " 15 
15. * Journal Officiel, Lois et d6crets, arret6s du 25 avril 1975 
fixant les cahiers des charges des soci4t4s nationales de 
tel6vision et de radiodiffusion, article 3. 
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The programme companies, therefore, are under an explicit obligation to 
present news in an objective, balanced and fair manner. 
Furthermore, in the pursuit of this task the programme companies 
are deemed to have been granted full responsibility for the formulation 
and presentation of news. The abolition of the Ministry of Information 
symbolised Giscard d'Estaing's rejection of the direct interventionist 
model, which was later confirmed in a letter sent to each programme 
company chairman. 
"The authorities do not intend to run X (name of the 
company) through you. They delegate to you this role 
entirely until the end of your term of office. That is why 
they must establish their relationship with your company 
as they do with the other large independent press and 
information media, i. e. by discussing periodically with 
you, on their initiative or yours, the most important 
problems in the life of X, but without ever interfering 
in your managerial and editorial responsibilities. If 
you witness an infringement of this principle which I 
regard as fundamental, I ask you to communicate it to 
me personally. " 16 
The new model for government-broadcasting relations was thus 
clearly established. On the one hand, each programme company was to 
channel a plurality of political views, without favouring any one in 
particular. Each-company was to present balanced and objective news. 
To safeguard this organisational pluralism each company would be 
independent of the Government and the political parties. Responsibility 
for news content was to be given to the companies themselves. The 
key normative concepts underpinning this relationship, therefore, 
were balance' and objectivity on the one hand and responsibility and 
independence on the other. The theoretical relationship between 
government and broadcasting was based on the traditional "fourth 
estate" model, best exemplified by the broadcasting organisation 
traditionally most admired by the French, the BBC. 17 
16. Le Monde, January 1975. 
17. The question of whether this model accurately describes the 
relationship between the BBC and the State does not concern us here. 
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Balance: an unattainable coal? 
There are several conceptual and methodological difficulties 
involved in the study of how this ideal-type model actually functions 
in practice. Like beauty, objectivity tends to lie in the eye of 
the beholder. It is certainly not clear what objectivity in news 
presentation entails or whether it is an attainable goal. Nor is the 
concept of balance any more straightforward: balance among whom? 
over what time period (within each programme or over a series of 
programmes)? How is balance to be measured? 
Within the context of French politics these questions cannot 
remain at the purely abstract, philosophical level. For example, 
if one seeks to measure balance in terms of time allocation one is faced 
with a problem of classification. When Giscard d'Estaing appears 
on radio and television is he doing so in his role as Head of State 
above party politics or in the more partisan role of de facto leader 
of the majorite? Are the two roles separable? The ambiguity of the 
role of the President of the Republic was highlighted by Giscard d"Estaing's 
television speech during the 1978 elections after the end of the official 
campaign before the first ballot. 
18 
Of course, this problem can 
be overcome, though not resolved, by simply lumping together all 
appearances by the President of the Republic and treating them as 
18. See section on the 1978 legislative elections. 
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partisan political appearances. 
19 
A second problem regarding the notion of balance results from 
the nature of the French party system. Since France does not 
possess a two-party system, balance ought to be preserved not only 
between the governing parties and the parties of the opposition but 
also within each of these heterogeneous blocs. At present one 
can discern four major tendencies in the French party system, two 
in the majorit4 (UDF and Gaullist) and two in the ranks of the 
opposition (Socialist and Communist). However, not only does this 
four tendency classification exclude minor parties such as the 
ecologists, it also concea]s frequent splits within each of these 
tendencies. For example, during 1980 the Socialist party was 
divided on the choice of a suitable candidate for the 1981 
presidential elections between supporters of Mitterrand and 
supporters of Rocard. Under these conditions it becomes very 
difficult to apply the concept of balance to the satisfaction of all 
political groups. 
19. Presidential appearances on the state broadcasting services 
have included programmes on his book Dgmocratie franCaise in 
late 1976 (Le Monde, October 2 and 16, November 3 1976, and 
April 30 1977; L'Humanitg, October 26 1976; and Le Canard Enchaine, 
October 27 197 ; an appearance on Dossiers de 1'4cran in February 
1977 (Le Monde, January 21 and February 6-7 1977) and in the magazine 
programme 1' venement at the end of January 1977 (Le Monde, January 
23-24 1977y, both only a few weeks before the 1977 municipal 
elections, a discussion with twentyfive school children in the 
programme Question de temps in June 1977 (Le Monde, May 26 and 
June 8 1977); and the series of one hour interviews every two 
months in the programme Une heure avec le President de la 
R4publique which began in April 1979, The President of the 
Republic is also featured live during presidential press 
conferences and Giscard d'Estaing has also made various short 
appearances at peak viewing time to defend aspects of governemht 
policy. See, for example, his speech of June 15 1977 on TFI and 
A2 at 8.00 p. m. concerning measures taken in favour of the elderly 
in France and his speech on June 30 1977 on TFl and A2 at 8.00 p. m. 
regarding direct elections to the European Assembly. 
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A third difficulty lies in assessing what constitutes a 
reasonable balance between the different political actors. It does 
not seem unreasonable that the President of the Republic and the 
Government should receive more coverage than the opposition leaders 
precisely because the former are the elected leaders of the nation. 
While the President and the Government have to make authoritative 
decisions about the allocation of scarce resources, the role of the 
opposition is largely confined to criticism which, no matter how 
constructive, cannot by its very nature assume such political 
significance. Yet if one accepts this distinction then one is 
again faced with the problem of what constitutes balance in news 
presentation and political coverage. 
A final point to bear in mind regarding the applicability of 
the concept of balance, when measured in terms of time allocation, 
is that any meaningful assessment must take account not only of the 
actual length of time allowed during a particular programme but also 
of the potential and actual audience of the programme. It is 
obvious that two minutes' time allocation in a party political 
broadcast is not equivalent to two minutes during the main evening 
news bulletin at 8.00 p. m. 
The broadcasting companies themselves, who keep records of 
time allocation among the major political actors, are aware of some 
of these problems. As can be seen from the following table, which 
gives the allocation of time among different political actors for 
1977 in all programmes (news bulletins, current affairs programmes, etc. ), 
the notion of balance is not interpreted'in terms of strict equality 
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of broadcasting time. 
20 
Actual time Time/audience 
President of the Republic 211' 32" 211' 44" 
Government 58' 25" 52' 18" 
Majoritg parties 45' 40" 38' 33" 
Opposition parties 65' 11" 57' 54" 
Trade unions 35' 37" 25' 14" 
During 1977 the opposition parties had about hslf as much 
time again as the parties of the governing coalition. However, they 
had only half the time allocated to the President of the Republic, 
the Government and the parties of the majorit4 added together. The 
above categories are not as precise as one might w. ish since they 
do not allow one to differentiate, for example, between the amounts 
of time allocated to the Socialist and Communist parties respectively. 
However, taken at face value, the figures do not appear to reflect 
a distortion in time allocation of any major significance. This was even 
admitted by the Socialist party spökesman, Laurent Fabius, who 
affirmed that "the problem is no longer one of the equitable division 
of time between the parties, which has been resolved except for the 
case of the President of the Republic. " 21 
The greatest problem in attempting to measure balance in 
terms of time allocation alone, however, is that such a method fails to 
take account of the context and quality of the coverage given the 
political actors involved. Extensive coverage by the broadcasting 
media does not necessarily correlate with political advantage, nor 
does it necessarily have the securing of political advantage as its 
objective. For example, the break-up of the Union of the Left in 
20. Source: Pierre Borvo, SJTI. 
21. Interview with Laurent Fabius, July 19 1979. 
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September 1977, only six months prior to the crucial 1978 
legislative elections, was given saturation coverage by the state 
programme companies. However, while in terms of time allocation 
the parties of the left benefited greatly, it can hardly be 
maintained that this coverage was to their political benefit or 
designed to be so, unless one makes the unwarranted assumption that 
any publicity is good publicity. 
22 
Moreover, as the official time allocation figures take account 
only of appearances by the actors themselves, the comments made by 
newscasters and correspondents are naturally not included. Yet 
remarks made by a journalist on the screen or over the air may, more 
or less subtly, favour, one political option or group rather than 
another. This type of bias will not be demonstrated by an emphs. sis 
on the quantitative criterion of time allocation among the actors 
themselves. Nor, of course, will bias in terms of the non-coverage 
of news items show up in such a narrowly conceived methodological 
framework. 
A stopwatch approach to the concept of balance is, therefore, 
not only difficult to apply. More importantly, it is deficient 
because it fails to take account of qualitative as well as quantitative 
distortions in political coverage. At best it can give only an 
indication of the presence of bias in the system, unless the bias is 
22. " On the break-up of the Union of the Left see J. R. Frears and 
J. L. Parodi, War will not take place, London, Hurst and Co., 1979, 
pp. 18-23 
Francoise Giroud, La comedie du pouvoir, Paris, Fayard, 1977, 
commented: 
"In September 1977, when the polemics between Francois Mitterrand 
and Georges Marchais were growing and invading the small screen, 
from which they never ceased to be present, the intellectuals of 
the opposition reproached the Government for having 'attracted the 
left on to the ambushed ground of the television! ' (Regis D'ebray 
in Lei e") Which, one will agree, is exceedingly ironic . 
"(p. 173) 
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self-evident as was the case in the early 1960s when opposition 
politicians were quite blatantly refused access to the state broadcasting 
media in France. However, it certainly cannot be maintained that 
political coverage by the present state programme companies is biased in 
such a crude manner. 
This has not, however, prevented attempts by interested parties 
and others to measure the presence or absence of balance in terms of 
quantitative criteria. For example, in June 1975 the three parties 
of the Union of the Left (Communists, Socialists and Left-wing 
Radicals) set up a committee to monitor political coverage in selected 
news bulletins of the state programme companies and the peripheral 
radio stations. Le comite pdur-le respect du droit ä 1'information 
rädio-televis4e published its first and only report at the end of 
June 1976.23 A short document of only a few pages, the report 
predictably condemned the low --quality of information provided to 
the electorate by the broadcasting media in all areas of the social, 
economic and political life of the country. Furthermore, in an 
appendix covering the first four months of 1976 the report found that 
the majjorite (President of the Republic, government ministers and 
Gaullist, Giscardian, CDS, Radical and Social Democratic spokesmen) 
had appeared three times as often as the opposition (Communist, 
Socialist and Left-wing Radical spokesmen). Interestingly, 
if one excluded February 1976, during which the Communist party 
held its 22nd party congress, the Socialists and Left-wing Radicals 
appeared more than twice as often as the Communist party during the 
period studied. 
23. du droit 
See also Le'Monde, July 1976, Le Figaro, July 1 1976 and 
Le'QLiotidien de Paris, July 1 and 2 1976. 
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However, the report made no claims to scientific accuracy 
and the source of the report has to be borne in mind in weighing 
up the validity of its findings. 
24 
In any case the work of the committee 
exemplified many of the difficulties of the type of approach outlined 
above. It was even rumoured that the committee was disbanded in 
1977 because it was found that by merely counting appearances of 
representatives of the majorite and the opposition, the latter appeared 
to be benefiting from greater coverage. 
25 
Other attempts of limited scope have been made to quantify the 
concept of balance. In the Senate cultural affairs committee report 
on the broadcasting budget for 1977, for example, the rapporteur, 
Henri Caillavet, outlined the following time allocation covering 
the first fortnight of October 1967 (sic) on the four state 
26 
programme companies. 
Actual time Time/audience 
President of the Republic 3' 5" 2' 9" 
Government 5' 20" 3' 37" 
-Majority 14' 22" 2' 18" 
Opposition 5r 24" 2' 28" 
24. The committee examined the news broadcasts of Europe 1 (1 pm. and 7 pm. ) 
RTL (1 pm and 6.30 pm), France Inter (1 pm and 7 pm), 
TFl (1 pm and 8 pm), and A2 (8 pm). Neither the early morning 
radio news nor the FR3 regional news broadcasts were included. 
25. This was denied by the spokesman of the Socialist party 
responsible for the project. His reasons for abandoning the work 
were, first, that it was both scrappy and expensive and, secondly, 
that there was a growing difference of opinion between the Socialist 
party and Communist party over the role of the mass media. 
Interview with Gerard Cole, September 7 1979. 
26. ' Journal-Officiel, Documents Senat, 1976-1977, no. 66, 
Avis pr4sent6 au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1977, Tome IX, Information- 
Radiodiffusion-Tel6vision, 2e partie, par Henri Caillavet, annexe 
au proces - verbal de la seance du 23 novembre 1976, pp. 21-25. 
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As Caillavet pointed out, the balance between opposition and 
majorite spokesmen was adequately preserved, though there was an 
obvious imbalance when one included the coverage given the 
President and government ministers alongside that given the ma3orit4. 
Nonetheless, though Caillavet recommended that this distortion be 
remedied by the heads of the programme companies, in general he 
concluded that political coverage on the different channels "was now 
approaching a satisfactory balance., 
27 
A more detailed, though equally limited, attempt to quantify 
political balance has been made by Michel Jouet in a study of A2's 
coverage of the conflict in the steel industry at Thionville during 
the period April 5-20 1977.28 From his analysis Jouet concluded 
that "the equality. of time allocation among the various protagonists 
is manifestly not respected. "29 Moreover, the quantitative imbalance 
is exacerbated by a more pronounced qualitative distortion. 
"On no single occasion-throughout the conflict did 
the trade unions or the opposition parties have the 
opportunity of presenting their case in depth and their 
proposals. " 30 
On the contrary, only the convergent views of the Government and 
the management were systematically presented. Moreover, Jouet 
27. ibid, p"21. 
28. M. Jouet, "Le conflit de Thionville sur Antenne 2", Projet, no. 138, 
September-October 1979, pp. 958-969. 
Jouet concentrated on the spoken (not visual)aspects of A2's 
presentation. 
29. Thid, p. 959. 
30. Ibid, p. 960. 
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perceived a 'worrying similarity between the statements of 
the television journalists and those of the Government and the 
management. 
31 As a result, Jouet concluded that: 
"All the information provided by Antenne 2 was 
placed within the framework of the inevitability of the 
crisis, the gravity of its consequences and the necessity 
for reciprocal efforts to mitigate its effects. " 32 
Unfortunately, however, there has been no attempt in France 
to replicate the work of the Glasgow University media group in 
Great Britain with their comprehensive study of news content in all 
news bulletins on all three television channels over a protracted 
period of time, five months in the case of their first research 
project. 
33 As a result of this lamentable gap in French media research 
the following evaluation of polticial coverage by the state programme 
companies lays no claim to scientific rigour. 
However, as wide a variety as possible of evidence and sources 
has been utilised in arriving at our conclusions, including both 
published material and interviews which reflect the views of the 
political parties, company management, journalists, broadcasting 
unions, the'Haut'Conseil de l'Audiovisuel and the viewers themselves. 
In this way an assessment of the political coverage of the state 
programme companies in news bulletins. and related programmes will be 
attempted and the claims to independence and balance evaluated. 
31. Ibid, p. 961. 
32. Thid, p. 965. 
33. Glasgow University media group, op. cit. 
INA would appear to be well qualified to carry out just such 
a research project. 
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The news departments: editorial control 
The lack of research on the content of news programmes in 
France is accompanied by a dearth of academic material on the 
functioning of the news departments. Observation studies on the 
process by which news is produced in the state programme companies are 
not nearly as common in France as in Great Britain. 
34 Partly this 
may be due to a reluctance on the part of French academics to adopt 
this type of approach to media studies, partly to the reserve of the 
companies themselves to welcome outsiders as witnesses to a complex 
ritual. Two French observers who did produce a short observation study 
of the workings of the news departments of the two main television 
channels were allowed to spend only three days at TF1, though they 
were given a full month at A2.35 Yet in an examination of the way 
in which news is processed and presented by the programme companies, 
it is necessary to have some knowledge of the structure and functioning 
of the news departments. 
Each programme company has its own separate news department, 
1 
while FR3 is also responsible for managing 23 regional television 
news centres in metropolitan France. Together they employ over 
a thousand journalists, with over 500 working at FR3 alone. 
36- The 
34+. For a recent observation study of the BBC see P. Schlesinger, op. cit. 
The news department on channel one of the ORTF was the object 
of an observation study by R. Cayrol during the 1973 legislative 
elections. See R. Cayrol, L'ORTF face aux elections de mars 1973, 
paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research 
congress in Strasbourg, 1974. 
35. A. Baron and I. Veyrat-Masson, "Quelques journees clans la vie de 
deux redactions, TF1 et A2", in Le Monde, May 7-8,14-15,21-22 and 
28-29 1978. 
36. In 197$ T employed 202 journalists, A2 - 175, FR3 - 531 and 
Radio France - 208. 
Journal Official, Documents Assemb1 e Nationale, 1978-1979, no. 570 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances.... sur le 
projet de loi. de finances pour 1979, annexe no. 12, Culture at communic- 
ation, Radio-tWvision, rapporteur sp4cial: Joel Le Tac, annexeaü- 
proces-verbal de la seance du 5 octobre 1978, p. 9. 
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process by which the news bulletins are composed is collective 
in the sense that the finished product depends on the participation 
of a wide variety of journalists. However, evidence suggests that 
the internal organisation of the different news departments is of 
a strongly hierarchical nature, with any controversial decisions 
being made at the top. 
37 
"In the final analysis it is the news editor 
(redacteur en chef) who decides what will and what will 
not be shown on the screen during the news bulletin. " 38 
"At A2 it is the news editor, Louis Beriot, who decides 
what is put into the news broadcasts. At first, after 
Elkabbach's appointment as director of news, he himself 
made the decisions regarding the content of news broadcasts 
and even took upon himself the role of news-caster for a 
couple of months. 
Elkabbach is no longer responsible for presenting the 
news, but he is responsible for the current affairs output 
and for the general guidelines of the news broadcasts. 
At TFl the news editor, Christian Bernadac, and the 
newscaster, Roger Gicquel, work together to select topics 
for the news bulletins. Gicquel has acquired this status 
because of his popularity with the-public and his 
authority built up over the two and a half years he has 
been presenting the news at TFl. " 39 
"Control within the news department is very 
hierarchical. Bernadac constructs the news bulletin, 
while Gicquel and Mourousi write their own texts. 
Power is concentrated at the top. " 40 
"The director of news and news editor play a 
determinant role in deciding the content of the news 
bulletins. Everybody can speak during the daily news 
department conference, but in the end Elkabbach and 
Beriot have the last word. " 41 
37. A. Baron and I Veyrat-Masson, op. cit., in Le Monde, May 7-8 1978. 
38. Interview with Christian Guy, May 5 1977. 
39. Interview with Christian Dutoit, April 25 1977. 
40. Interview with Rene Caron, July 18 1979. 
4+1. Interview with Pierre-Henri Arnstam, September 17 1979. 
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"The work of the news department is perhaps 
less hierarchical than many outside-observers imagine. 
There is a daily conference of the news department. 
However, Elkabbach and Bgriot keep the decision-making 
power and if there is disagreement it is they who make 
the final decision. (qui tranchent). " 42 
This decision-making procedure is not confined to TF1 and 
A2. A survey of journalists belonging to the SNJ at Radio France 
produced the following responses. 
"The organisation is hierarchical, vertical and 
closed in military fashion, functioning in one direction only 
from the top towards the bottom. " 13 
"An idea which does not come from the head of a desk 
(un chef) has little chance of being accepted. "h4 
The survey report concluded that: 
" all the replies... denounce structures in which 
decisions belong to one man alone or his representative .... 
an organisation which is authoritarian and hierarchical, 
and which never looks for the least consensus among the 
news team since it is based on a dominant-dominated 
relationship. "45 
At FR3 the SNJ, by far the most representative union of 
broadcasting journalists in the regions, condemned a similar 
pyramidal decision-making procedure whereby the 24 news editors 
in the regional stations referred controversial decisions upwards 
to the director of the regions in Paris, Claude Lemoine. 
46 
Roland Cayrol, on the other hand, argued that as regards the 
42. Interview with Noel Copin, July 23 1979. 
43. Syndicat National des Journalistes, section Radio-France, 
Radio France: L'Information en miettes Synthese et analyse 
des re ponses a un questionnaire du SNJ, June 1979, p. 2. 
104. Ibid, p. 4. 
15. Ibid, PP-5-6. 
4+6. Syndicat National des Journalistes, section syndicale de 
FR3, FR3 1'inforration baillonn4e supplement au Journaliste 
no. 162, February 1978, p. 2 
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daily news bulletin in each region the regional directors and their 
news editors were largely independent of central control from 
Paris. However, he did not deny that within each regional news 
centre decision-making is functionally centralised. 
47 
There would appear to be general agreement, therefore, about 
the hierarchical distribution of power within the different regional 
and national news departments. The daily conferences within the news 
departments at which the structure of the bulletins is discussed do 
not reflect a democratic decision-making procedure since on any 
matter of controversy policy is decided at the top. 
48 
The key 
decision-making posts are those of director of news and news editor, 
appointments to both of which are, as we have seen, subject to close 
political scrutiny. 
The news departmnents: recruitment 
It would be misleading to assume that all or even a majority 
of the journalists working in the state programme companies necessarily 
support the Government or the parties of the majorit4. Certainly 
they do not represent a sociological cross-section of French society. 
On the basis of a sample survey of broadcasting journalists employed 
in the state programme companies and the peripheral radio stations, 
Cayrol asserts that they are predominantly male, youngish, Parisian 
47. R. Cayrol, "Le cas de la France: en attendant la d4centralisation", 
paper presented to a conference on "T41evision et d4centralisation", 
September 1978,. p. 10. 
48. Syndicat National des Journalistes section Radio France, op. cit., 
p. 3. 
The daily conferences at A2 would seem to be the liveliest among 
the four programme-companies. See A. Baron and I. Veyrat-Masson, 
-op. cit., in Le*Monde, May 7-8 1978. 
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and middle-class. 
49 
Moreover, trade union membership among 
broadcasting journalists is higher than the national average, 
since 58% of those interviewed belong to a trade union, usually 
either the SNJ or the CFDT. 
50 
The political opinions of those interviewed covered the whole 
of the political spectrum. Asked to place themselves on a 
left-right continuum, the journalists replied as follows: 
51 
Refusal to classify themselves 17% 
Extreme-left 2% 
Left 37% 
Centre 32% 
Right 12% 
Extreme-right 0% 
53% of the journalists interviewd at Radio France saw themselves 
as favouring the Left, while at TFl only 18% gave this reply with 
24+% favouring the Right. Generally the balance was distinctly 
tilted towards the Left, thus contradicting any simplistic thesis 
which would argue that the French government via the broadcasting 
management controls political output on the state programme 
companies through a discriminatory recruitment of broadcasting 
journalists. 
The political opinions of the broadcasting journalists were 
further elucidated by a question in which they were asked to give 
their voting intention in the case of legislative elections. The 
49... R- Cayrol, "A la recherche des journalistes de radio-tdl4vision", 
Etudes*de*radio-t&lgvision, no. 2l, November 1977. 
In this survey 120 journalists from the four state programme 
companies and three peripheral radio stations (Europe 1, RTL 
and Radio Monte-Carlo) were interviewed. 
50. 'Ibid, p. 100. 
88% of the journalists at A2 belonged to a trade union. 
5i. 'rbia, p. '°°. 
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replies were as follows: 
52 
Refusal to reply 37% 
PSU/Extreme left 1% 
Communist party 2% 17% 
Socialist party/MRG 38% 
Left/Union of the Left 6% 
(no specific party mentioned) 
Radical party/CDS 2% 
Independent Republican 2% 16% 
Gaullist 8% 
Majorite (no specific party 4% 
mentioned) 
From the above replies it is clear that supporters of the 
governing coalition are relatively few in number and those of 
the Communist party almost non-existent. The Socialist party, 
on the other hand, emerges as by far the most popular party among 
the journalists interviewed. 
In short, the composition of the news departments does not 
reflect a simple political bias in favour of the majorite, far less 
the Giscardian component of the majorit4. However, there would 
appear to be an objective bias against journalists who support 
the views of the Communist party. The political dividing line 
therefore, passes not, as one might expect, between the majorit4 and 
the opposition, but rather between the majoritg and the non-Communist 
left on the one hand and the communist left on the other. 
The relative absence of Communist journalists in broadcasting 
raises various questions. First, can balance, however defined, 
52. 'Ibid, pp. 101-102. 
One should note, however, a high non-response rate in the cases 
of TF1 (65%) and A2(59%). 
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in political coverage be achieved if there are almost no 
journalists supporting the views of a political party which regularly 
commands the support of around 20% of the French electorate? 
Secondly, ought the imbalance to be redressed by the imposition 
of political quotas on the employment of journalists in the 
programme companies? Finally, is there any evidence of a deliberate 
policy to exclude journalists with Communist sympathies from the 
news departments of the state broadcasting companies? 
We have been able to obtain little evidence of any deliberate 
policy on the part of the management of the programme companies 
to exclude Communist journalists from the news departments, with 
the possible exception of the case of Patrick Duval whose contract 
with FR3-Alsace was not renewed in early 1977 after a decision 
taken by the national management in Paris. Duval was later taken 
back on by the company, but was not employed in an important 
journalistic capacity. 
53 
On the other hand, it is very unlikely 
that the objective bias against Communist journalists in the state 
programme companies is purely fortuitous. 
Certainly the Communist party itself does not believe this 
to be the case. On several occasions the virtual absence of 
Communist journalists in the state programme companies has been 
condemned by the party itself. When the matter was raised at a 
presidential press conference, Giscard d'Estaing was at first 
content to absolve himself from all responsibility. 
53. L'Humanitg, January 24+, February 8 and April 27 1977; 
Le Monde, January 25, February 9 and 15 and April*29 1977; 
Humanit4 Dimanche, no. 53, February 2-8 1977; 
Le Journaliste, no. 158, January-February 1977. 
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"I tell you frankly that I know nothing 
about it. I do not know the political views of the 
television or radio journalists; I do not exclude the 
possibility that some of them vote for the Communist 
party, as I do not exclude the possibility that some 
of them vote for me ..... 
" 
"In any case the television companies have their 
own boards of management, boards of governors and 
chairmen. " 
"I do not think that any text exists concerning 
political party membership and television journalists. "5 
".... I do not know if such and such a television 
journalist belongs to such and such a political party... 
I do not know and I do not think it is desirable for the 
journalistic profession that one can give each journalist 
a political label. Therefore, if there are rules of this 
nature (to exclude Communist journalists from the state 
programme companies) they do not originate from me. " 55 
However, in June 1978 Giscard d'Estaing implicitly admitted 
that there were in fact few, if any, Communist journalists employed 
in the state programme companies and declared himself preoccupied 
with this state of affairs. 
"I have had the opportunity to discuss this 
problem with the heads of news programming. I consider 
that in fact there is no reason why there should not be 
journalists who belong to-the Communist party in the 
important news media. Of course, the journalists do not go 
into the mass media with their party card saying 'I am a 
communist' ...... but I consider, that if one knows that 
someone belongs to the Communist party, this does not 
constitute an a priori motive for keeping him away from the 
important news media, and I have asked that, in the 
different recruitments in the future, it is ensured that 
this does not constitute an obstacle in principle. I have 
asked the heads of news that this problem be resolved. "56 
514. Le Monde, April 21+ 1976 and L'Humanit4, April 24+ 1976. 
55. Le Monde, Januaryl9-20 1977. 
56. Le Monde, June 16 1978 and November 23 1978. 
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Giscard d'Estaing's position on the question of the 
recruitment of Communist journalists to the state programme companies 
has thus evolved quite dramatically. While his initial reaction 
in early 1976 was that he was unaware that this problem existed 
and that if indeed it did exist, then it was an internal matter 
for the companies themselves to resolve, by mid-1978 the President 
was admitting that a problem did exist and was even asking the 
companies to do something towards solving it. 
However, at the time of writing the problem is far from 
being resolved. Candidacies put forward by Communist journalists, 
with the backing of the Communist party, have been turned down by 
the programme companies on grounds of lack of merit. While there 
was no political obstacle to the employment of Communist journalists, 
the companies argued, neither were they going to benefit from any 
positive discrimination in their favour. 
57 
Indeed the programme 
companies would seem to be in a dilemma. Without Communist 
journalists how can the concept of political balance be meaningfully 
defended? On the other hand, how can one expect ideologically 
committed journalists to subscribe to the doctrines of objectivity and 
impartiality? A political quota on recruitment might help 
guarantee a pluralistic broadcasting organisation, but a conflict 
between political views and professional merit might well arise in 
the choice of candidates. In any case, it is presumably in the 
interests of Giscard d'Estaing and the Government to defend the 
official thesis of a pluralist broadcasting organisation without 
having to reap the disadvantage of employing Communist journalists 
in the state programme companies. 
57. L'Humanite, April 15 1979. 
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Giscard d'Estaing's altered line on the recruitment of 
Communist journalists in the state programme companies is at first 
sight surprising. It would seem that his original view that 
he did not know the political views of the journalists and that 
there was no official bar to the employment of Communist 
journalists was the President's best option in the circumstances. 
To admit that the problem did exist and ought to be resolved 
laid Giscard d"Estaing open to the charge that in the past there 
had been a policy of discrimination against the employment of 
Communists in the news departments. Moreover, to admit the 
existence of the problem meant 
inevitably that a solution had 
to be-found. 
On the surface, therefore, the Communist party would appear 
to have made some progress on this matter, since Giscard d'Estaing 
has been forced to admit to a deficiency in the news broadcasting 
system. However, 
it may well be the case that the President 
has merely introduced a useful safety valve into the system. 
If the programme companies were to employ some Communist journalists 
in relatively unimportant posts, the Communist party would have to 
modify its criticisms of 
the companies' recruitment policy. At 
the same time, by marginalising the Communist journalists 'within 
news departments, 
the companies can ensure that the status quo 
is to all intents and purposes preserved. It is as yet not 
clear whether 
Giscard d'Estaing's tactical retreat signifies a 
notable achievement 
for the Communist party or a pyrrhic victory. 
I 
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The news departments: political pressures 
It is tempting to imagine the work of the news departments 
being directly controlled by the responsible minister and his 
personal staff with directives being passed on to the journalists 
as to what can and what cannot be shown during the various news 
bulletins of the state programme companies. However, there is 
no doubt that this direct interventionist model is no longer 
a fitting description of the relationship between the Government 
and the state broadcasting services in the field of news programming: 
Direct, overt censorship on the part of government ministers is 
virtually non-existent. 
This is not to say, however, that the news departments of 
the state programme companies are isolated from political pressures. 
Given the nature of their work, the broadcasting journalists cannot 
work in a political vacuum cut off from a major source of information. 
They depend on politicians for news, while the politicians depend on 
the journalists for publicity. Both depend on each other for the 
satisfactory fulfilment 'of their functions in a developed political 
system. 
In such a relationship there is the constant risk of the 
politician seeking to exert pressure on the broadcasting journalists 
in the pursuit of his own self-interested objectives. If this 
happens, the journalists' ability and willingness to resist these 
pressures become crucial if the mutually dependent relationship is 
not to degenerate into one where one side constantly succumbs to 
an exercise of power by the other. Moreover, if the journalists 
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are unable and/or unwilling to resist political pressures and 
constraints exerted systematically, then one can legitimately argue 
that partisan political constraints are being habitually and 
successfully exercised to regulate news content. 
There is no consensus among members of the news departments 
regarding the existence of such pressures. 
"I have always been able to do what I want, I 
have been subjected to no pressure, nor to any sort of 
external interference, even attempted. " 58 
"I consider myself perfectly free to decide the 
content of the news bulletin. " 59 
"...... Perfectly free. I would even say that in 
a national television or radio company one feels at 
present much freer than in the private companies. " 60 
"I vas subject to no pressures during my stay 
at A2. When in January 1976 a member of the Elysee 
staff asked me to give him a list of those ministries 
which had applied pressure, there was not one I could 
name, not even over the Claustre affair. " 61 
"bur papers are not censored. I have no personal 
examples of censorship. There is no systematic a priori 
checking of papers which are then shown in the news 
bulletin. " 62 
"Have you ever been subjected to pressure from 
the authorities? Never. " 63 
For other journalists there was no doubt that pressures from 
politicians*do"exist. 
"I have never been controlled by anybody. There is 
no external control, no censorship of news content. Of 
course, there are pressures from outside, but we ignore 
them completely, even though this is not always easy. " 64 
58. Jean-Pierre Elkabbach quoted in A. Baron and I. Veyrat-Masson, 
"Quelques journees dans la vie de deux redactions, TF1 et A2", 
Le Monde, May 14-15 1978. 
59. Roger Gicquel, Presse Actualite, no. 105, December 1975, p. 34. 
60. Jean-Marie Cavada, Presse Actualitg, no. 110, May 1976, pp. 24-25. 
61. Interview with Georges Leroy, February 11 1977. 
62. Interview with Daniel Estýve, September 20 1979. 
63. Jean-Pierre Allesandri, Presse Actualit4, no. 124, January 1978, p"lt6" 
64. Interview with Rena Caron, July 18 1979. 
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"Personally I feel free in my work. I 
have not personally experienced any direct 
interventions on the part of the Government. Only 
the directors of news receive phone calls and they 
come from all sides of the political spectrum. The 
pressures come from all sides and the real question is 
to decide what pressures to resist. " 65 
"There are (pressures) first of all from the 
authorities or, more exactly, the political machine 
which has always considered that television belonged to 
it. The letter sent in January 1975 by the President 
of the Republic to the comnanv heads. telling them in 
essence 'Ybu are free, you are not the voice of France. ' 
Well, this letter has been ineffectual. The whole 
political machine has retained the habits and traditions 
of the ex-ORTF. " 66 
"After my appointment in 1975 Chirac wanted me out 
because of the stance I took vis-a-vis his requests. For 
example, when Chirac went on tour he wanted the same group 
of journalists to go with him all the time. I refused this 
request. Chirac retaliated'by putting pressure on Leroy to 
get me to send a journalist Chirac liked. But I always 
managed to find a reason for refusing Leroy's demands. 
Pressure is also exerted to ignore certain topics, 
especially in the industrial field, such as strikes and 
unemployment figures. This pressure rarely takes the 
form of an overt act of censorship, but other means are 
easily found to justify the decision. " 67 
"Pressure does not always take the form of a 
restriction. It could be an invitation to lunch, a 
suggestion made to show a certain minister on television or 
to drop a certain topic. It is very hard to pin down 
and prove that such pressures are exercised. Pressures 
come from various sources; management, the Government, 
parliamentarians, ..... But government pressure is the 
hardest to resist. "68 
"Before 1968 the relations between television and the 
authorities were very close. Now it is much more subtle. 
Often people do not even recognise that pressure is being 
exerted. 
Personally I have never been directly censored. I do 
65. Interview with Pierre-Henri Arnstam, September 17 1979. 
66. Charles Baudinat, Paris Normandie, June 22 1976. 
67. Interview with Christian Guy, May 5 1977. 
68. Interview with Christian Dutoit, April 25 1977. 
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two or three commentaries per week in the news 
bulletin. Usually Elkabbach and Beriot do not read 
my paper before I give it on the air. At La Croix in 
contrast my articles were always read by the editor 
before being included in the newspaper. 
Let me give you an example of how things work. 
Recently I presented a paper about the Socialist party's 
pirate radio -station. I gave it in the midday news 
bulletin and then more or less the same piece in the 
main evening news. My comments were critical of the 
Government's over-reaction to the Socialist party's 
pirate station. Afterwards, Elkabbach told me that my 
paper had been too hard on the Government. I did not 
agree and neither did B6riot. Afterwards I was on the 
phone twice with Alexandre at Matignon, but he did not 
mention the matter at all. He scrupulously avoided 
mentioning it. On the other hand, I found out through 
the grapevine that the Government was not at all 
pleased with my comments. 
Pressure also comes from the opposition, but it is 
more direct. " 69 
Support for the view that pressures are indeed exerted on the 
news departments comes from Cayrol's sample survey. Questioned 
about the existence of external pressures, the journalists 
mentioned in order of importance pressures from the following: 
70 
The business world 43% 
Government ministers 1+0% 
Political parties 39% 
Trade unions 38% 
The administration 35% 
Presidency of the Republic 30% 
Police 27% 
Ambassadors 22% 
Army 18% 
69. Interview with Noel Copin, July 23 1979. 
70. R Cayrol, op. cit., p. 110 
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The journalists of A2 interviewed by Cayrol were more 
inclined than the others to mention all the categories of pressure, 
82% of them specifically mentioning pressures from Government 
ministers. Moreover, 21% of all the journalists interviewed spoke 
of a priori controls exercised within the news department by their 
superiors (50% in the case of Radio France) and 81% referred to 
criticisms being made after the material had been broadcast, though 
from the survey one does not know whether these criticisms were 
directed at the content or the style of the reports. 
71 
At this stage of the analysis several points are worthy of 
note. First, direct overt censorship by the President of the 
Republic, government ministers or their personal staffs does 
not appear to exist to any marked extent. On the other hand, there 
is more than adequate evidence of pressures being exerted from 
sources outside the news departments. These external sources 
include not only the Government but the opposition parties and the. 
trade unions. Secondly, external pressures tend to be exerted at 
the level of news director and news editor rather than on the 
journalists themselves:. This would help explain why several 
journalists interviewed were able to deny that they personally 
" had ever been subject to pressure from outside, while at the 
same time assert confidently that such pressure did indeed exist. 
Thirdly, the directors of news and the news editors tend to 
deny that any such external pressures do in fact exist. 
The role of the directors of news and the news editors is 
obviously crucial in this respect. We have already shown that 
71. Ibid, pp. 109-110. 
See also F. Giroud, OP-cit., p. 166 regarding pressures 
exercised by Matignon on the programme companies during 
Chirac's premiership. 
I 
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appointments to these posts are subject to close political 
scrutiny by the Government. 
72 
It is not unreasonable to expect 
that, since their careers are so dependent on the goodwill of the 
Government, the holders of these key posts will be unlikely to 
admit to external pressure from this source if and when it exists. In 
addition, they will be even less likely to regard it as pressure 
themselves. Furthermore, even if they admit to themselves that 
they are subject to external pressure from ministerial sources, they 
would still be unlikely to admit to the existence of such pressures 
before their peers or outsiders for fear of lessening their own 
professional authority and of weakening their career ambitions. Thus, 
the. concept of balanced and objective political coverage has to be 
maintained in public by the directors of news and news editors if 
they are not to lose the esteem of the public and of their colleagues 
ähd at the same time prejudice their own career ambitions which 
depend, in large part, on keeping their political noses clean. 
The need for external pressure from government ministers is also 
much reduced. 
73 
The political sympathies and, perhaps more 
72. See chapter on Appointments. 
73. Note however,. Barre's intervention in November 1978 reminding the 
chairmen of the programme companies "to be vigilant about their 
presentation of history" on radio and television. 
This intervention, following the-publication of an anti-Semitic 
article in°l'Express,. was designed to warn the programme companies 
against favourable treatment of Nazism in programmes about the 
second world war. However laudable its intentions, Barrels 
letter nonetheless: explicity infringed the principle of non- 
intervention set out in Giscard d'Estaing's letter to the chairmen 
of the programme companies on January 16 1975. 
See Le Monde, November 4+ and 19-20 1978, and M Jullian, 
Courte supp que au roi pour le bon usage des 4narques, Paris, 
Mazarine, 1979, pp. 29-31. 
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importantly, career ambitions of the holders of the key posts 
in the news departments will usually prevent them from engaging 
in conflict with the Government in any case. External pressure 
becomes less necessary because the key news staff are only too well 
aware of the political constraints on their freedom of manoeuvre. This 
is not to say that the key news posts are all held by supporters 
of the Giscardian regime (though in fact many of them are). It 
is enough that the holders of these posts are conscious of who has 
the power to hire and fire, to make or break their professional 
careers. Thus, part of the present role of the directors of news 
and news editors is to act as honest brokers between the Government 
and the news departments, turning political pressures into 
7 
professional directives. 
The news' departments: corpörate ethos 
With the internalisation of controls within the news 
departments, political decisions come to be defended on professional 
grounds. 
"If the director of news does not want anything 
to go on the air, then professional reasons are 
always given, not political ones: 'It is too long, not 
interesting enough.... ' It is unthinkable for 
Elkabbach or Beriot to censor journalists overtly for 
political reasons. " 75 
71+. This does not mean that external pressures no longer exist. 
As. we: have shown; many journalists are still subject to 
pressures from outside the news departments. For particular 
examples, see Syndicat National des Journalistes section 
syndicale de FR3, 'o . cit. 
Note also F. Giroud, op. cit., pp. 172-173, "The interventions of 
the Elysee - rare - or from Matignon - more frequent - with 
the channel heads almost always take place-a'posteriori to deplore 
the `irresponsible' character of such and such a progra mne or 
untimely programme scheduling. 
75. Interview'with Noel'Copin, July 23 1979. 
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"Professional objections are always raised to p1event 
journalists from-covering a topic such as the crisis 
in the steel industry: lack of time, too specialised, 
rather boring. " 76 
"Although the news heads are appointed by the authorities 
they want to be seen applying professional criteria. 
They obviously don't want to-look as if they are merely 
'yes` men. Therefore, any pressure must be justified on 
professional grounds if the head of news is to keep 
face. " 77 
The mass of journalists in the news departments is unable 
to resist these internal constraints, even if it wished to do so. 
As we have already seen, the hierarchical structure of decision- 
making within the news departments does not facilitate resistance 
by the journalists. Other factors also combine to make opposition 
within the news departments a hazardous course of action. 
The high level of unemployment among journalists generally 
dces not create a climate in which opposition can flourish. With 
the Government as a major employer- in the broadcasting field, indeed 
the sole employer for television, there is an understandable 
reluctance on the part of some journalists to compromise their 
position. Moreover, the memory of the redundancies and sackings 
which took place in 1968,1972 and'197l reinforces the relatively 
fragile position of the broadcasting journalists. 
79 Finally 
divided trade union loyalties and the existence of separate 
companies further increase the difficulties of successful 
opposition within the news departments. 
80 
76. Interview with Richard Someritis, May 20 19,77 . 
77. Interview with Christian Guy, May 5 1977. 
78. The broadcasting journalists benefit from a certain degree of 
employment protection, but of course they can easily be 
marginalised within the news departments even if they retain their 
posts. 
79. See Le Monde, August 3,5,6,7 and 14 1968, and the chapters in 
this thesis on Politics and broadcasting in -France -before the 197+ 
reform and the Reä1l. ocation of ORTF staff. 
80. See chapter on the Broadcasting unions 
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This is not to say that professional directives from the 
directors of news and news editors always disguise decisions made 
on political grounds; nor that dissension is never expressed by the 
main body of journalists; nor that the journalists themselves are 
always agreed as to whether a decision from the top reflects 
81 
professional judgement or political bias. 
However, there is evidence of systematic imbalance in political 
coverage which can scarcely be justified on professional or news 
value grounds. For example, the formation of the UDF was considered 
byfiF1 to be "the most important 82 political event in ten years, 
which is at the very least a highly contentious evaluation. Another 
example was provided by the head of the politics desk at A2. 
"The four main lists all held one major meeting 
during the campaign (for the 1979 elections to the 
European Assembly). The RPR meeting at Bagatelle on 
June 2 was their major meeting. I thought that this 
should be the main story that evening. But Beriot 
asked us 'to balance' it with coverage of a small UDF 
meeting in the provinces. Beriot was very conscious 
of the need to publicise the Veil list. " 83 
In a situation where control witbin the news departments is 
exercised from the top and Where the demands of professional 
responsibility and political acceptability frequently conflict, it 
is scarcely surprising that rather than face the problems engendered 
by such a conflict many journalists prefer to maintain a low profile. 
In reply to a question on self-censorship posed in Cayrol's survey, 
38% of the sample admitted to practising self-censorship either 
81. 'See article entitled "Naissance et wort d'un Sujet" by 
A. Baron and I. Veyrat-Masson in Le Monde, May 21-22 1978. 
82. ' Ibid. 
83. Interview with Noel Copin, July 23 1979. 
For many other examples see Syndicat National des Journalistes 
section syndicale de FR3, op. cit. The latter document reveals that during the period April 15 - May 15 1979 the'majörite received four times the coverage of the opposition parties, while within the ma'orite the Giscardians and their allies received four times the coverage of the Chiracian Gaullists. (p. 13) 
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"frequently" or "very frequently". 
84 
Only 16% of those 
interviewed said that they "never" or "almost never" had 
recourse to such a practice. 
85 
"Censorship has become unnecessary.... 
Everybody knows what he must do or accept to keep 
his post. " 86 
"I censor nyself, otherwise my subject is not 
accepted. " 87 
"I am afraid to make trouble as I don't want to 
find myself out of a job. " 88 
The knowledge that broadcasting has always been a political 
weapon in France also helps to create an atmosphere which does 
not encourage non-conformity or investigative reporting. 
"An important majority of journalists who are 
today holding responsible posts at FR3 have only known 
a television conceived by and for the authorities. 
When, for more than twenty years, watchful scrutiny 
has accustomed. the news departments to a regime of 
very constricted liberty, a lot of habits are picked up ... 
Not a-few journalists are now accustomed to the idea that 
the authorities cannot but be interested in what is shown 
on television. "89 
In this atmosphere there is the obvious risk that journalists 
will quickly become socialised into an awareness of the limits of 
their role. 
84. R. Cayrol, op. cit.., p. 111. 
85. Ibid. Journalists of all political views, not just those 
sympathetic to the opposition, admitted to censoring their 
reports themselves. - 
86. Syndicat National des Journalistes section Radio France, oop. cit., p. l0. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Syndicat National des Journalistes section syndicale de FR3, 
op. cit., p. 68. 
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"I interviewed Giscard along with Patrice Duhamel 
of TF1. I-pushed Giscard hard and asked him embarrassing 
questions. The other A2 journalists congratulated me on 
my interview- but they also recognised that I had gone as 
Tar as'I'could go. In other words, we are conscious 
of the constraints on our capacity for criticism and of 
the need to be circumspect in this area. " 90 
The news departments: conclusion 
The news departments of the four state programme companies 
have in common the following features. The key decision-raking 
posts are subject to close political supervision with regard to 
appointments. The work of the news departments is so structured that 
decisions are made at the top if there is any risk of political 
controversy. For both professional and political reasons the 
holders of the key posts are unlikely to want to embarrass the 
President of the Republic or the Government. Though the mass of 
journalists in the news departments is not necessarily favourable 
to the Government or the majorit4 it has very limited possibilities 
of making its voice heard. The decision-making structure, the 
level of unemployment in-the profession, the experience of journalists 
sacked or marginalised on previous occasions and the historical 
weight of political interference in broadcasting all tend to reduce 
the likelihood of journalists contesting the-decisions of their 
superiors or, a fortiori, of opposing them. successfully. 
90. Interview with Noel Copin, July 23 1979. 
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These general remarks are illustrated in the following 
two sections which examine the coverage by the state programme 
companies of the 1977 municipal elections campaign and the 
1978 legislative elections campaign respectively. These two periods 
have been chosen because it is at these times that the broadcasting 
services are most acutely posed the problems of balance and 
objectivity in their political coverage. This is especially true 
of the 1978 campaign when the parties of the left were widely 
tipped as favourites to win , 
the election and form the first left- 
wing. government of the Fifth Republic. 
The 1977 municipal elections 
The municipal elections held in March 1977 were important 
for a variety of reasons. Municipal councils all over France were 
being elected for the first time since 1971, before the signing 
of the common programme of government by the parties of the left. 
Apart from the 1976 cantonal elections, these elections were the 
first major test for the Giscardian regime since Giscard d'Estaing's 
election to the presidency three years earlier. Moreover, as 
legislative elections were due to be held in a year's time, the 
results of the 1977 elections were regarded as a pointer to the 
governing coalition's hopes of retaining power in 1978. In 
addition, it was noticeable that while the left was reasonably 
united in presenting a common list of candidates in most towns, an 
important division within the right had come to the fore in Paris 
where Chirac decided to challenge Giscard d'Estaing's candidate for 
the mayorship, 'Michel d'Ornano, by placing himself at the head of a 
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list of RPR candidates in competition with the d'Ornano list. 
. 
"The Gaullist-leader's decision to reject the 
President's nominee for. the mayor of Paris in the elections 
of March-1977-and his defiant gesture in presenting 
himself-as a candidate for the post was only the most 
spectacular manifestation of the discord which reigned 91 
between the Gaullists and the President of the Republic. " 
While before legislative and presidential elections there 
is an official campaign on the state broadcasting services governed 
by specific regulations, this is not the case with municipal elections. 
According to Guillaud, director general of TFL at the time, there was 
no official television campaign because of the sheer number of 
communes and the local interest of many campaign issues. 
92 However, 
the elections were obviously a major political, and therefore media, 
event and the campaign was given wide coverage in news bulletins. 
The first public indication of the governmental pressure being 
exerted on the news departments was provided by Yves GuSna, one of 
Chirac's leading supporters in the RPR, who condemned:: 
"... the incredible pressures being directed against 
the journalists of the press, radio and television to 
highlight the minority of the majorite. " 93 
As such this condemnation could be regarded as merely an integral 
part of electoral debate. However, the issue assumed greater 
importance when the RPR parliamentary group named Poniatowski and 
Lecanuet as the ministers responsible for seeking to manipulate 
91. V. Wright; ' The'Gövernment and Politics of France, London 
Hutchinson, 1978, p. l 5. 
92. Giiillaud interviewed by Roger Gicquel during the main evening 
news bulletin on TF1 on March 1 1977. 
See'Le'Quötidien'de'Paris, March 7 1977. 
93. '*Le'Monde, February 8 1977 and L'Huinanit4, February 8 1977. 
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the news departments with the aim of discrediting the RPR. 
The usual sleight of hand, from which the parties of the left 
had suffered throughout most of the Fifth Republic, was now being 
condemned by the single most important parliamentary group in the 
governing coalition. 
While Poniatowski predictably denied the charges made against 
him, the president of the Giscardian parliamentary group, Chinaud, 
implicitly admitted the veracity of the complaints by remarking 
that they resembled those of a thief whose house has just been 
robbed. 
9 In other words, instead of attempting to refute the 
allegations, Chinaud contented himself by implying that control 
of broadcasting was an accepted governmental weapon which the 
Gaullists themselves had used at the time of the ORTF. 
Gaullist criticisms were echoed by Francois Mitterrand, 
leader of the Socialist party, who affirmed that: 
"... one has rarely witnessed such a domination of 
the media by the authorities.... there exists in France 
a ministry of propaganda. Scarcely visible but very 
audible...... At the other end of the telephone line is 
most often the minister of the Interior. Everywhere he 
can exert pressure, i. e. almost everywhere, either he 
gives his orders directly to the men in whom he has 
confidence and whom he has judiciously placed in the key 
posts, or indirectly..... " 95 
Indeed the surrounding controversy rose to such a pitch that 
Guillaud appeared during the main evening news bulletin in early 
March to defend his company's treatment of the campaign against 
the criticisms of the RPR and the parties of the left regarding the 
glt. Le Monde, February 18 1977. 
95. L'Unite, no. 240, March 4-10 19T7. 
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partiality of certain-news items. 
96 
Despite Guillaud's 
protestations, however, the dispute between the parties of the 
governing coalition marked a public acknowledgement of the fact that 
during the campaign the news departments of the state programme 
companies had been subjected to considerable pressure to play down 
the campaign of the left and more especially to give only minimal 
coverage to Chirac's candidacy for the mayorship of Paris. 
97 
The"1978 legislative elections 
The 1978 legislative elections have undoubtedly been the 
most important of Giscard d'Estaing's presidency so far. Following 
the victory of the Union of the Left in the municipal elections the 
previous year, the Socialist-Communist alliance was widely tipped to 
form the first left-wing government of the Fifth Republic. Even 
the much publicised breakdown in the talks to bring the 1972 
common programme up to date, which were abandoned with much 
acrimony on all sides in September 1977, did not appear to damage 
the left's hopes of victory in the eyes of the electorate. Not 
surprisingly the campaign for the 1978 legislative elections was a 
lengthy one, dating at least from the cantonal elections held in 
March 1976. The question which dominated the run-up to the elections 
centred on the capacity of the political system to resolve the 
inevitable conflict which would arise between a left-wing dominated 
Assembly and a conservative President, both claiming legitimacy 
through election by universal suffrage: the problem of i'alternance. 
96. For text of interview see Le Quotidien de Paris, March 7 1977. 
97. For specific examples of internäl and. external pressures in the 
regional stations see Syndicat National des Journalistes, section 
syndicale de FR3, o . cit. ; -Le-Monde, March 20-21 and 27-28 1977; 
and Le_Journaliste, no. 159, car - prril 1977. 
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There is no doubt that the broadcasting media, especially 
television, constituted a primordial source of information for 
the electorate in the 1978 campaign. 47% of those interviewed in an 
opinion poll regarded television as one of the most important aids 
in helping them decide how to vote. 
98 The official campaign 
broadcasts were watched by an average of 13 million people, while 
the face to face confrontations between politicians and interviews 
with broadcasting journalists attracted an average of around 5 million 
viewers. 
99 
Moreover, while newspapers tend to appeal mostly to 
partisan voters, television, according to Cayrol: 
. 
"..... because it. presents a real political 
'spectacle'. constitutes the best means of reaching 
not only one's partisan supporters,. but also potential 
supporters of the other side. " 100. 
In examining the role of the state broadcasting services in 
the 1978 campaign, we shall look first at the official campaign, 
which started two weeks before the first ballot and included the 
week between the two ballots, and then at the unofficial campaign, 
that is to say political coverage outside the official campaign 
broadcasts. 
(a) The offici I campaign 
The regulations governing the official campaign broadcasts 
98. R. Cayrol, "'Les*mass 'media'dans la cam ae £lectorale de mars 1978' 
in H. Penniman ed. ; 'France *at the 'polls II, Washington, AEI, 1979. 
99. N. Casile, "Les telespectateurs et les 4lections de mars 1978, 
-Revue *frangaise de communication, no. 1, Autumn 1978. 
100. R. Cayrol; 'OP cit., p. 33. 
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are laid down in the code electoral and accompanying legislation. 
101 
These regulations may be summarised as follows with reference 
to the 1978 election. Campaign broadcasts were to take place during 
the fortnight before the first ballot and the week between the 
two ballots. The programmes were to be shown simultaneously on 
TFl, A2 and FR3 and broadcast on France-Inter at'peak viewing 
time, usually just after the main evening news bulletins. 
Those political parties represented in the National Assembly 
by a parliamentary group were given the following time 
allocation: 
Parties 'of 'the ma, iorite: Minutes 
90 minutes before the first ballot : RPR 51 
PR 20 
reformateurs and centristes 16 
45 minutes before the second ballot: RPR 27 
PR 10 
reformateurs and centristes 8 
Parties of the on-Dosition: 
90 minutes. before the first ballot: PS/MRG 52 
PC 38 
45 minutes before the second ballot: PS/MRG 26 
PC 19 
The allocation of broadcasting time to individual parties 
within the majorite and the opposition reflected the proportional 
101. Code electoral, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1978, article 
L 167-1, pp. 60-61. 
See also, Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, law no. 77-1446 of 
December 28 1977; decree no-78-21 of January 9 1978; and 
avis relatif au reglement concernant l'usage des antennes de 
la radiodiffusion-t4levision francaise par les partis et 
groupements pour la campagne en vue des elections legislatives 
des 12 et 19 mars 1978, in Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, 
dated February 18 1978. 
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strength of their parliamentary groups in the outgoing Assembly. 
However, formal equity was maintained between the two blocs. Those 
political parties who were not represented in the previous Assembly 
were each given 7 minutes before the first ballot and 5 minutes 
before the second ballot, provided that they presented at least 
75 candidates at the first ballot. 
102 
Eleven political formations satisfied these requirements in 
1978. The supervision of the time allocations and of the other 
regulations surrounding the official campaign broadcasts was entrusted 
to an ad hoc committee consisting of three top civil servants. 
103 
The parties were not allowed to use film material in their campaign 
broadcasts, which consisted, therefore, of declarations, discussions 
or replies to questions posed by sympathetic journalists. While the 
result of this restriction made for very old-fashioned television, 
the broadcasts were nonetheless watched by about 4+0% of the potential 
audience, no doubt due to the fact that they were shown on the three 
television channels and transmitted on France-Inter simultaneously. 
Little can be said about the official campaign, except that it 
represented a limited and very ostentatious attempt at balance in 
political coverage. 
(b) The unofficial campaign 
The balance preserved in the official campaign broadcasts did 
not extend, however, to the coverage of the campaign in news bulletins 
102. See table on following page. 
103... The members of this supervisory committee were Marc Barbet, 
coriseiller'd'Etat (chairman), Georges Barnicaud, conseiller 
"lidriöraire a*la*cour*de'cassation and Paul Therre, conseillet 
maitre la'cour des-comptes. 
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Allocation of time in the official campaign broadcasts 
Parties represented in the National Assembly 
ITDF 
RPR P CDS d. PS/MRG PC 
February 27 5 4 9 
February 28 9 9 
March 1 9 9 
March 2 9 9 
March 3 9 9 
March 6 9 3 6 
March 7 4 5 9 
March 8 4 5 9 
March 9 9 9 
March 10 5 4 4 5 
March 14 7 4 6 5 
March 15 6 5 7 4 
March 16 7 4 6 5 
March 17 7, 5 7 5 
Parties not represented in the National Assembly 
Feb. 27/March 14 Christian Democratic Movement 7 minutef/5 minutes 
Feb. 28/March 14 Front autogestionnaire 7 
March ]/March 14 L'Union ouvriere et paysanne 
pour la d&mocratie proletarienne 7 
March 2/March 15 Lutte ouvriýre 7 
/March 15 Ligue communiste et revolutionnaire 7 
March 3/March 15 L'Action republicaine indgpendante 
et liberale 7 It It 
/March 16 Centre national des independants 
paysans 7 1ý It 
March 6/March 16 Le rassemblement des usagers des 
services publics, des contribuables 
it groupements de defense 
March 7/March 16 Le mouvement des democrates 7 
March 8/March 17 Le collectif Ecologie ?8 7 
March 9/March 17 Le parti des forces nouvelles 7 'ý II 
I 
-464- 
and current affairs programmes. 
lo4 On France-Inter, for example, 
which is the most popular channel of Radio France, there was a 
pronounced bias in favour of candidates of the maiorite, as is 
shown by the following table. 
105 
Programme 
Petits d&jeuners politiques 
Parlons clair 
Inter-midi 
Debats de France-Inter 
Le tglephone sonne 
Appearances 
Majoritg Opposition 
63 
13 10 
21 13 
21 19 
98 
The current affairs coverage of TF1 and A2 was better balanced 
than that of France-Inter, with TF1 having 7 representatives of the 
majoritg and 7 representatives of the opposition, and A2 8 and 6 
respectively. 
lo6 
However, the news coverage of the two main 
television channels again reflected a distinct bias in favour of 
the majorit4. This was particularly true of the coverage given to 
Giscard d'Estaing personally on numerous occasions during the run-up 
to the elections. 
For example, on January 27 Giscard d'Estaing's long-awaited 
speech at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs, in which he revealed what he regarded 
104. We are here concerned with balance between the four main 
-, political formations: Gaullist, UDF, Socialist and Communist. 
Coverage of the campaigns of the minor parties was minimal. 
105. R. Cayrol, OP-cit., p. 31. 
106. lbid, p. 32. 
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as "the correct choice for France", was given extensive coverage 
by the state broadcasting media, being shown live by all three 
television channels and then uncritically mulled over in the main 
evening news bulletins. 
"One looked in vain that evening or the next day for a 
notable reaction on the part of the opposition: did it have 
nothing to say about the speech? But there was not in fact 
any real reply to the presidential proclamation on the "correct 
choice"; the coverage had been organised in such a way that the 
President's commitment appeared without any reply ... 
" 107 
"Imagine the stupor of foreign broadcasting correspondents 
in Paris when they see' la rue Cognacq-Jay' (the news studios 
of both TF1 and A2) become one month away from the legislative 
elections an annex of Matignon and the Elys4e. 
This invasion in force, this occupation of our screens 
by the Government and the members of the majorite was particularly 
shocking on Friday, the day of the speech by M. Giscard d'Estaing 
at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs. Transmitted in full on all radio and 
television channels at 7 p. m., the news bulletins tt 8 P. M. then 
devoted more than a quarter of an hour to it in extracts, 
explanations and the reaction of ... M. Barre. It is not enough to say that the leaders of the opposition 
are invited more often ... after 8.30 p. m., in fierce competition 
with a film or a quiz, by our current affairs programmes. 
What counts in fact is the amount of coverage given to them 
in the news bulletins, whose audience ratings are still 
considerable. " 108. 
Various other examples of beneficial coverage of the campaign 
of the maiorite. particularly featuring Giscard d'Estaing himself, 
could be mentioned, including presidential interviews on February 9 
and February 27. Taken together, they reflect a willingness of those 
in authority within thle programme companies (director general, 
director of news and news editor) to infringe even the most 
rudimentary norms regarding balance in political coverage. 
"Imagine a BBC TV news next October - four days into the 
general election campaign - which begins with Mr. Roy Hattersley 
announcing another round of splendid price statistics. Not merely 
announcing those statistics either: after his first few words 
107. Temoignag e chr, 6tien, February 9 I. M. 
108. Le Monde, January 31 1978. 
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we move to a slice of voice-over film which shows smiling shoppers 
revelling in the supermarket splendour of Hattersley's achievement. 
That is the start of the news. The next item involves Mr. Callag- 
han: he has been meeting some star footballers at Downing Street 
and he has had his picture taken with them. There follows - 
third item -a short BBC 'election special' in which a shuffling 
journalist shuffles large coloured cards explaining the 
superiority the social service benefits a returned Labour 
Goverment-will offer. Mr. Denis Healey shows his face for a 
few ebullient moments. 
And then, fifth in line, we get some mention of Mrs. Thatcher. 
She, it transpires, has been having another bad day. Peter Walker 
has attacked her again. Long interview with Peter Walker. Short, 
embarrassed defensive interview with Mrs. Thatcher at which point 
the BBC forgets about the election. 
Such a TV news in Britain, in an election or at any other 
time, is-hard to imagine: it would cause a riot: it would lead 
the Conservative press ... to prophecies of the end of democracy. 
Yet, changing a few characters, like Giscard for Callaghan and 
Barre for Healey, that is the precise and typical formulation 
of Fridays main television news in France. To any observer 
from Britain,. it stands sorely alone as manipulation of the mass 
media by those who have the power to the detriment and if possible 
damnation of those who do not. ... " 109 
The most blatant manipulative television appearance by Giscard 
d'Estaing during the run-up to the elections was a speech made on the 
eve of the first ballot at peak viewing time after the campaign had 
officially closed, with the result that the opposition parties did 
not have the opportunity to reply to his intervention. In speaking 
on the very eve of the election itself, Giscard d'Estaing was merely 
continuing a tradition of the Fifth Republic. 
110 Moreover, the 
decision to make a broadcast speech after the campaign was over was 
defended by the Prime Minister, who argued tongue in cheek that; 
"... it is normal that in important circumstances the 
President of the Republic, aside from any partisan feeling, 
indicates to the French people what are the problems posed 
and what is his point of view, a long-term opinion, on the 
way in which one's vote should be cast in the forthcoming election. 
109. Editorial in the Guardian, February 27 1978. 
110. During the 1967 legislative election-campaign de Gaulle had 
addressed the nation on the eve of the first ballot. In 1968 
he had done the same on the eve of the second ballot. 
In the 1973 legislative elections Pompidou had made a strong 
anti-communist speech immediately prior to the second ballot. 
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The President of the Republic is not the leader of a party, 
he is not the leader of a faction; he is the representative of 
all French people and it is, I think, with the long-term 
interests of the country in mind that he will address the 
French people. " 111 
Yet the President's decision to make an eve of poll declaration 
was nonetheless surprising. Despite its relative moder8. tion, the 
speech was obviously designed to encourage last minute waverers 
to vote in favour of the majoritut. 
112 
The President had, however, 
already made his own personal preference plain on numerous occasions 
both before and during the official election campaign. Thus, it 
could hardly be argued that he was making a non-partisan declaration 
in his role as arbiter above party squabbles. 
On the other hand, unlike his predecessors in the presidential 
office, Giscard d'Estaing had consistently maintained that in the 
event of a left-wing victory he would not stand down from the presidency. 
His own presidential career was not at stake in the legislative elections. 
The President was, therefore, trying to have it both ways: to seek to 
influence the result of the legislative contest, while at the same 
time refusing to be bound personally by the decision of the sovereign 
people. The ambivalent role of the French President of the Republic 
had rarely been so acutely revealed. 
It is obviously difficult to quantify the impact of Giscard 
d'Estaing's eve of poll speech. Even if the impact were non-existent, 
however, the intention would still have been to gain an advantage for 
the majoritg. In any case, there is some evidence that the speech did 
111. Raymond Barre interviewed on Radio Europe 1. See Le Monde, 
March 11 1978. 
112. It is surprising that Frears and Parodi claim that "it was not 
a partisan speech. " 
J. Frears and J. -L. Parodi, War will not take place, London, Hurst, 1979, p. 61. 
The speech was not crudely partisan, but its objective was clear. 
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have a measurable impact. The Sofres post-election poll suggested 
that 
"... about 2% of electors changed their vote to the majorite 
at the last moment and about one quarter of these specifically 
claim to have made the decision after the President's broadcast. " 
113 
The second major broadcasting incident of the campaign involved 
a refusal by the director of news at A2 to show a report on the internal 
divisions within the'majorite after a similar report on the divisions 
within the left had already been screened. This incident flared up 
in the week between the first and second ballots when in the Tuesday 
evening news bulletin following the reconciliation of the Socialist 
and Communist parties, -an item was included on the division of the 
left over the previous six months. A2's news team immediately asked 
for a similar report on the divisions between the Gaullists and the 
UDF in the months prior to the election to be shown. 
"At first. Elkabbach agreed to show an item on the split 
within the right. Then he postponed the preparation of this 
report and kept on postponing it until the Friday before the 
second ballot. When it was not shown on the Friday evening news, 
the-news. team gave the statutory notice of a strike which took 
place the next week. This incident was the major problem at A2 
during the legislative election campaign. " 114 
On the Friday evening itself, the newscaster, Patrick Poivre 
d'Arvor appeared late on screen, explaining that there had been a 
conflict between the management and the news team. In a communique 
published the same day, the news team condemned the failure -to 
broadcast several film reports " whose only defect was that they 
113. Ibid. 
llk. Interview with Pierre-Henri Arnstam, September 17 1979. 
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gave an unbiased view of the problems posed by the second ballot. "115 
In the light of this conflict within A2, it is illuminating to read 
the comments by A2's management on the company's observation of the 
electoral regulätions contained in its cahier des charges. 
"In general, during this electoral period, A2 took, 
with the authority of its board of governors, all necessary 
steps to ensure; '-with increaased respect, that the rules of 
objectivity and pluralism in programming ... be observed. 
" 116 
(c) 1978 elections: conclusion 
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this short section 
on the 1978 election campaign as covered by the state programme 
companies is that while in the official campaign broadcasts 
balance was rigorously preserved, in the other programmes covering 
the campaign, and particularly in the news bulletins, there was a 
distinct quantitative and qualitative imbalance in favour of the 
candidates of the majorite, particularly the UDF component of the 
majorite. The special treatment accorded to Giscard d'Estaing 
personally was syptomatic of electoral coverage designed to further 
the interests of the Giscardian candidates above all others. 
Party political broadcasts. 
Under the terms of arti? le 15 of the 1974 broadcasting statute, 
the programme companies cahiers des charges allocate a specific amount 
115. Le Monde, March 19-20,22,23 and 24+ 1978; Rouge, March 18 1978; 
and L'Humanite, March 22 1978. 
See also, J. Forbes and R. Nice, "Pandora's box: television and 
the 1978 French general elections", Media, Culture and Society, 
vol. 1 no. 1,1979, pp. )+0-1+1, footnote 18. 
116. 'Rapport d'execution du cahier des charges, A2,1978, p. 19" 
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of time to political groups and representative professional organisations 
in which "to express their views freely. " Access to these programmes 
is accorded to those political parties which are represented in the 
National Assembly and in the Senate by at least twenty parliamentarians 
and to those professional organisations which are deemed representative 
at the national level. 
117 These broadcasts are paid for by the 
programme company concerned and are shown once every fortnight in 
the case of TF1 and A2.118 The provisions of the 1971+ statute with 
respect to these programmes are a distinct improvement on the terms 
of the 1972 ORTF statute, which had been noticeably vague on this 
matter. 
119 
After an initial delay in implementing the provisions of 
the cahiers des charges, it was decided by the Government that there 
should be 28 programmes per year on TF1 and A2 together, divided 
equally between parties of the majorite and the opposition. In addition, 
12 programmes were to be allocated annually to cover the role and 
functions of the two chambers of Parliament. The allocation of 
programme time to professional and trade union organisations was 
temporarily postponed because of difficulties in ascertaining the 
representative nature of the groups involved. 
120 
Carrying on a practice already well established at the ORTF, 
the party political broadcasts on TF1 and A2 are conducted-with due 
respect for the concept of balance between majoritg and opposition. 
121 
117. 'Cahiers des'charizes, TF1 and A2, article 16. 
118. ''Ibid, article 17. 
119. See. R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 143-14+4+ and J. Chevallier La radio- " 'television'franicaise entre deux r4formes, Paris, Librairie gn reTale 
de droit et de jurisprudence, 1975, pp. 26-27 and 131-135. 
120. -Le Monde, February 6 1976. 
121. See appendix 10. i. 
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The viewing figures for these broadcasts are, however, very low and 
their importance, compared with political coverage during news 
bulletins, is therefore minimal. 
Right of reply for the opposition parties 
While party political broadcasts were already shown at the 
ORTF, the right of reply granted the parties of the opposition is 
an innovation of the 1974 broadcasting reform, though it was not 
included in the 1974 statute and was introduced only after the 1978 
legislative elections were over. The demand for a right of reply 
(droit de reponse) to presidential and ministerial broadcasts vas 
voiced by the opposition parties on several occasions. 
122 After all, 
they argued, if the Government had the statutory right to broadcast 
any declaration which it judged to be necessary, provided that it was 
announced as being shown at the request of the Government, why should 
the opposition parties not have the right of reply to these and 
similar broadcasts? 
123 
As part of his policy to tone down the stringency of political 
debate in France (la decrispation) and to improve working relations 
between the maiorite and the opposition, President Giscard d'Estaing 
decided in the flush of electoral victory in 1978 to make a limited 
124 
concession to the opposition's demands. This concession was 
122. See Le Monde, October 20, December k and 6/7/8 1975; L'Humanite, 
October 31 1975; Le Quotidien de Paris, December 3 1975; L'Unit6, 
no. 187, January 9-15 1976; and Le Monde, January 10 and February 
24 1976. 
123. Article 16 of the 1974 broadcasting statute and article 11 of the 
--c'ahiers des charges of TF1 and A2. 
, 124. *Le *Monde, March 30 and 31 1978. 
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announced during the presidential press conference of June 14 
1978.125 
"The question of the right of reply has been raised and 
we have looked at how to put into practice this right of reply. 
... What can be done 
is to introduce ... what exists at present in. the British broadcasting system. 
The right of reply exists in Great Britain for a particular 
reason: there are two main political parties, one in power and 
the other in opposition. It is thus normal that there exists 
a certain dialogue between them. We know that the situation 
is not the same in France. Nonetheless, we are going to propose 
the introduction in our system of the same regulation, which, 
I should stress, will undoubtedly not change the present system 
(les prätiques actuelles) fundamentally. 
But the principle of the right of reply must be introduced. 
... when the Prime Minister or a member of the Government makes 
a declaration using the means which the texts give the Government 
to address the country over the mass media, and when the topic 
is not at the same time the subject of a debate in Parliament, 
... the opposition will then be allocated, on the same media 
at the same viewing time and before forty eight hours have 
elapsed, an equal amount of time in which to reply to the 
original broadcast. This time allocation will be shared out 
among the leaders of the opposition by the board of governors 
of the medium concerned. This reply will then be followed by a 
debate between an equal number of representatives of the 
opposition and of the majorite or the Government on the same 
subject. " 126 
These provisions were later made more specific so that they 
covered only those opposition parties represented in the National 
Assembly by a parliamentary group. Moreover, the time allocated to 
each spokesman of the opposition was to be in proportion to the 
number of seats his group held in the Assembly. 
127 
The first occasion on which this formula was put into practice 
took place in early September 1978. On the 6th of the month the 
Minister of Employment, Robert Boulin, gave a speech broadcast on A2. 
125. ' Le Monde, June 16 1978. 
It was also at this press conference that the President announced 
that he was "preoccupied" with the lack of Communist journalists 
in the news departments of the state programme companies. 
126. ' Ibid. 
12T. 'Leitsonde, September 7 1978. 
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Two days later Francois Mitterrand and Charles Fiterman replied 
on behalf of the Socialist and Communist parties respectively. 
Finally, on September 11 a televised debate was held on A2, featuring 
the minister, and a representative of the Gaullist, UDF, Socialist and 
Communist parliamentary groups. 
128 
Though a concession to a perennial demand of the opposition 
parties, the right of reply is hedged with various important 
limitations. Since it cannot cover a topic being debated in 
Parliament at the same time, there is the danger that important 
topical areas of concern may be prohibited as subject matter of the 
right of reply. Secondly, the right of reply specifically does not 
apply to broadcasts made by the President of the Republic. Once again 
the ambivalent role of the President as Head of State and de facto 
leader of the majorite allows him to escape inclusion in the official 
calculations of what constitutes balance. Finally, and most importantly,, 
the right of reply applies only to broadcast ministerial speeches which 
are officially announced as such and which the broadcasting companies 
are statutorily obliged to show. Appearances by government ministers 
and the Prime Minister himself during news bulletins and other political 
programmes are excluded from the official formula, despite, or rather 
because of, the fact that it is in this context that imbalance in 
political coverage is most noticeable 
'FR3: 'Tribune libre 
The access programme, Tribune libre, also constitutes an 
innovation of the 1974 broadcasting reform. By the terms of article 10 
128. ' Le'Monde, September 13 1978 and L'Humanite, September 6 1978. 
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of the 1974 statute FR3 reserves "a privileged place ... for the 
organisation of programmes dealing with the direct expression of 
different tendencies of creed and thought. " FR31s cahier des charges 
lays down the guidelines for the screening of these access programmes. 
The company is to devote five programmes per week each lasting a 
quarter of an hour to access broadcasts. The board of governors, 
on the advice of a special consultative committee set up by the 
Government, draws up the list of group representatives who are to 
participate in the programmes. 
129 
This list must include those- 
political formations which have twenty parliamentarians in the National 
Assembly and the Senate and the representative trade union organisations. 
The chairman of the company cannot stop the showing of an access 
programme unless the content is likely to lead to criminal proceedings. 
The financing of the access programmes is undertaken by FR3 itself. 
Finally, these access programmes are not shown during the period of 
official election campaigns so as to preserve balance in political 
coverage. 
130 
Hailed by ministerial spokesmen`"as an exciting innovation in 
French broadcasting, the access programme, Tribune Libre, is 
nonetheless subject to severe constraints in practice. First of all 
one might note the restrictions on the nature of the groups allowed to 
participate. 
"Obviously we had to guard against two opposing excesses. 
Too great a liberty in admitting candidates would quickly have 
lowered the appeal of the programme. ... to make of this programme 
129. The composition of this consultative committee as set out in 
an arrgt4 of March 12 1975 was as follows: Michel Morizot, ' 
maitre des requ&tes au Conseil d'Etat; Maurice Vienois, 
conseiller a in. cour d'appel de Paris; Huguette le Foyer de Costil, 
5uge au tribunal de Paris: Jean Chariot, maitre de recherches a 
la fondation nationale des sciences politigues; and Jean Cahen- 
Salvador, conseiller d'Etat, chairman. 
130. Cahier des charges, FR3, articles 15-19. 
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the 'Hyde-Park corner' of broadcasting would have been to 
restrict unduly its scope and would have been contrary to 
the spirit of the law. On the other hand, too rigorous a selection 
procedure ... would have given too great a share to the 
large 
organisations of a quasi-institutional character which already 
enjoy regular and easy access to the important mass media. " 131 
The following conditions of access were thus laid down by the FR3 
management and the board of governors. 
"Are- admitted by right ... the political parties who have 
at least twenty representatives in Parliament, as well as 
representative trade union organisations. Also are admitted 
without dispute the principal religions practised in France 
and those political organisations which were allowed access to 
the official campaign broadcasts during the recent legislative 
elections. 
Are excluded, with reservations, organisations which are 
principally devoted to the defence of economic, social, regional 
or professional interests and which can in no way be considered 
as a tendency of creed and thought (famille de croyance et de 
ensee). Exceptions are possible when their views constitute 
a contribution to a debate of national interest. " 132 
Thus, certain minority groups may find themselves excluded from the 
possibility of participating in a Tribune libre because of the 
wording of the 1974 statute. 
133 
Secondly, the timing of the programme obviously affects the size 
of its potential and actual audience. At first the programme was 
shown at 7.40 p. m., peak viewing time prior to the main evening news 
bulletins on TF1 and A2. However, the programme was competing against 
two very popular programmes on the two main national channels at the 
same time. Its audience was, therefore, very small. Moreover, in the 
summer of 1978 the time of the programme was changed from 7. I0 p. m. to 
6.55 p. m., a move scarcely designed to enhance its audience appeal. 
134 
131. FR3 handbook, 1978, pp. 18-19. 
132. Ibid. 
133. See table 10. ii for a'-list of participants during 1978. 
13k. The company originally wanted to change the time to 6.30 P. M. 
Le Monde, July 19, August 2,4 and 16 1978. 
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Lasting only a quarter of an hour, the Tribune libre has a 
minute audience rating of around 1%, which represents about 
375,000 viewers. 
135 
Thirdly, the programme has a very limited budget of around 
100,000 francs per week. The participants are not allowed to use 
pre-recorded film or video material with the result that the 
programmes are of the familiar "talking heads" formula. This 
provision was included to prevent the better off organisations 
from producing amore attractive programmes than the less well off, 
but the resultant equality of misery hardly makes for exciting 
136 
viewing. 
Finally, and most importantly, while the participants are 
supposed to have full editorial control over the content of their 
programme, the FR3 management has not always been content to watch 
from the sidelines. For example, in June 1977 a Tribune libre in 
which the writer and philosopher Andre Glucksmann was intending to 
interview three East European dissidents was postponed when it was 
discovered that the programme, subtitled Bonsoir M. Brejnev, coincided 
with the arrival of the Soviet leader in Paris 
137. It was rumoured 
that the programme had been previewed at the Hotel Matignon, though 
the FR3 management refused to make any comment regarding the reasons 
IE 
l3$ 
for the postponement. In any event, whether the decision 
135. Telecine, no. 204, January 1976. 
136. Le Quotidien de Paris, October 31 1975. 
137. Le Monde, June 21 1977. 
138. Liberation, June 20 and 21 1977; Le Monde, June 22 1977: 
Le canard enchaine, June 22 1977. 
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to postpone the showing of the programme came from inside or outside 
the company, the decision itself revealed that the freedom of the 
participants to edit the content of their own programme was limited 
not only by the company's legitimate fear of criminal proceedings 
but also by obvious though ill-defined political criteria. 
139 
It would appear, therefore, that for a variety of reasons 
the impact of Tribune Libre has been nowhere near as significant 
as forecast by ministerial spokesmen. While the number of 
participants is impressive, as is the frequency of the programme, 
the nature of the groups allowed to appear and the timing and formula 
of the programme itself do not encourage large audiences. Only 
acceptable minority groups are given access to what must be regarded 
as a safety valve of dubious value for the political system and 
the broadcasting companies. While the existence of Tribune libre 
allows ministerial spokesmen and the FR3 management to boast of 
Irl7 
this innovation in access programming, in reality the programm 
is of more propaganda value to the Government as an example of the 
"liberal" nature of the 1974 reform than it is to the participants 
to whom it gives limited and marginal access. 
14o 
rnn e. l nc -In" 
In this chapter on the news output of the state programme 
companies, we have argued that the relationship between the 
139. In February 1980 a Tribune libre of the CGT was not 
screened in similar circumstances. 
Le Monde, February 22,23,24+-25 and 26 1980. 
140. FR3 handbook, 1978, p. 20. 
T. 
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Government and the broadcasting services is no longer the 
same as it was during either de Gaulle's presidency or the 
last two years of Pompidou's following the Chaban-Delmas experiment. 
Since 1971+ cases of overt ministerial censorship have virtually 
ceased to exist. There is no longer a Ministry of Information 
and its successor, the Ministry of Culture and Communication, 
exercises no influence on news programming; nor do the civil 
servants employed in the Service Juridique et Technique de 
l'Information. Representatives of the Socialist and Communist 
parties appear frequently on television and radio. Thus, Michel 
Rocard's standing with the electorate has been improved by his 
appearances on television, while Georges Marchais has become a 
television personality in his own right. In addition, there are 
many journalists with Socialist sympathies employed in the programme 
companies, some in relatively senior posts. Since Giscard d'Estaing's 
declaration in 1978 it is even possible that some journalists with 
Communist leanings will be employed in the news departments of the ' 
state programme companies. 
Other improvements have also been made since 1974. A right of 
reply for the opposition has been established. Party political 
broadcasts are programmed on the basis of strict equality of time 
between the majoritg and the opposition. Moreover, if one excludes 
the time given to the President of the Republic, there is a rough 
equality of time allocation for government ministers and spokesmen 
of the majority on the one hand and representatives of the opposition 
on the other. " 
1 1. 
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In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that, 
apart from the Government and the different sets of company 
management, some disinterested observers have made favourable 
comments regarding the quality and impartiality of the political 
coverage of the state programme companies. For example, in its 
1976 report on the companies' observation of the regulations 
contained in their cahiers des charges, the Haut Conseil de 
1'Audiovisuel remarked: 
"As far as news (1'information) is concerned at the 
national level, the Haut Conseil considers that the effort 
to ensure political objectivity is real and that the companies 
respect ... the obligations contained in their cahiers des 
charges. " 141 
In addition, an opinion poll published in June 1976 revealed that 
45% of the viewing public considered that the television news 
bulletins since 1974 were more objective than in the two years 
prior to the reform, against only 11% who thought the opposite. 
142 
There can be no doubt that the crude interventionism which 
marked the early years of the ORTF no longer exists. However, 
the political coverage of the state programme companies is neither 
balanced nor impartial. Nor, given the links which exist between 
the Government and the companies, could it reasonably be expected 
to be so. Some aspects of this imbalance are readily apparent. 
They include, for example, the unduly favourable coverage, both 
quantitative and qualitative, given to speeches and interviews of 
141. Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, Ra ort sur la wise en oeuvre 
des cahiers des charges des socidt s de radio et de t levision, 
1976, Paris, La documentation francaise, 1977, p. 11" 
142. T416-7-jours, no. 8I0, June 19-25 1976. 
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the President of the Republic. Other aspects, perhaps less 
readily apparent, include the ceaseless pro-Giscardian stance 
adopted by such leading television journalists as Patrice Duhamel, 
head of the politics desk at TF1. In the post-197+ broadcasting 
system external pressures, such as those from government ministers 
and their staffs, seem less significant than the systemic constraints 
imposed by the close nature of the relationship between the broad- 
casting companies and the Government. The most evident symptom of 
this close relationship is the fact that the top decision-making 
posts within the news departments are generally held by persons 
appointed at the instigation or at least with the tacit agreement 
of the Government. For political and/or career reasons these 
persons tend to be sympathetic to the Giscardian regime. Indeed, 
the directors of news and news editors have replaced the Minister 
of Information as the key figures in the news production process. 
They, we would argue, are largely responsible for the partisan 
political coverage which operates overwhelmingly in favour of 
the Giscardian component of the majorite. 
In short, the change in the relationship between the Government 
and the state broadcasting services since 1974 has been more formal 
{ 
than substantive. The imbalance in political coverage is qualitative . '! 
rather than quantitative and so less crude than previously. Moreover, 
the source of the partisan coverage has been internalised within 
the companies and is thus less immediately visible to the observer 
than before. The former model whereby control was mainly overt and 
external has given way to one in which control. is largely covert and 
internal. 
-! ý 
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ruepmFR 11 
Criticisms of the reform 
One of the explicitly declared objectives of the 1974 broadcasting 
reform was an improvement in the quality of programmes. 
' An evaluation 
of the reorganisation in terms of the product, the programmes presented 
to the viewing public, ought therefore to form an integral part of any 
assessment of the success or failure of the 1974 reform. However, since 
an assessment of programme quality poses insuperable definitional and 
methodological problems, we have confined ourselves in this chapter to 
a more limited and hence more readily attainable objective. 
2 
The aim of this chapter is to examine certain aspects of the 1974 
reform with regard to programming. 
3 Particular emphasis will be given 
to what have proved to be the main areas of controversy and to proposals 
to amend the reform. The first two sections on televised feature films 
and French television production look at certain criticisms of the reform 
made by interested parties such as-the cinema industry, television producers 
and actors' unions. A third section is devoted to measures introduced 
by the Government in an attempt to accommodate these criticisms. Following 
1. See the article entitled "Prioritd a la qualit6" by Andr4 Rossi, the 
minister in charge of implementing the reform, in Le Monde, November 9 
1974. 
See also the speech by Jacques Chirac, introducing the reform bill in 
the National Assembly. 
Journal Officiel, D4bats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, July 24 
1-974, p. 3648. 
2. Whatever anyone else thinks of programme quality since the reform, it 
would appear that the viewing public at any rate are not satisfied. 
In an opinion poll conducted in November 1979 4+5% of those interviewed 
considered that the programmes were of less good quality than before, 
36% of identical quality and only 7% thought that they were of better 
quality. Le Monde, November 2 1979. 
3. We do not consider news programming in this chapter. See separate 
chapter on News programmes. 
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a section on the importance of the audience ratings in the broad- 
casting system, a separate section analyses the variety of reform 
proposals which have been made since 1974 to reorganise the state 
broadcasting services. The final section of this chapter seeks to 
place this debate on programming since the reform within a comparative 
perspective, using material from the experience of other national 
broadcasting systems. We conclude that the malaise in French television 
programming and production perceived by some commentators is not unique 
to France; nor does it date from 1974. It would appear, therefore, that 
the 1974 reform exacerbated rather than caused what various critics have 
seen as a decline in the programme standards of French broadcasting. 
Feature films on television 
One major area of controversy surrounding the prograTme schedules 
of the three state television companies concerns the screening of feature 
iN, 
films on television. Even before the new companies began their transmissions, 
fears were being publicly expressed by representatives of the cinema industry 
that the programme schedules would include an excessively high proportion 
of feature films. 
4 
In particular, it was argued that an increase in the 
quantity of films shown on television would have further adverse effects 
on the size of cinema audiences which had already spectacularly declined 
from 411 million in 1957 to 178 million in 1974.5 
4. Le Figaro, November 26 1974. See also the article by the general 
secretary of the Societe des real ispte -s de films, Jean Chapot, 
in Le Monde, November 21 1974. 
5. "Dans les coulisses du cinema franraise" by Dominique Pouchin in 
Le Monde, May 15 1979. 
.ý 
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While FR3 was officially designated by the 1974 statute as the 
company given the special task of fostering knowledge and appreciation 
of the cinema, it was expected that TF1 and A2, given their budgetary 
constraints, would also rely heavily on feature films, especially as 
these were less expensive than original television material. 
6 
In a 
half-hearted bid to protect the cinema industry the Government included 
a series of provisions relating to the screening of films on television 
in the cahiers des charges of the three television companies. 
FR3 was restricted to 208 films per year, while TF1 and A2 were 
permitted to screen an annual maximum of 150 films each in 1976.7 
Restrictions were placed on the showing of films over the weekend when 
the cinemas do a large share of their business. Moreover, all three 
television companies had to pay the cinema industry a sum of money 
in the form of aid. In 1976 the total included a fixed sum of 2.45 million 
francs for TF1 and A2 and 3.27 million francs for FR3, plus 13,500 francs 
for each film screened. In addition, at least half of the films shown 
had to be French productions or coproductions with majority French 
participation. In the event of foreign productions accounting for over 
half of any of the three companies' film output, the company concerned 
had to pay an additional sum to the cinema industry in compensation. 
In 1976 this sum represented 11,000 francs per film in excess of the 
50% ceiling. 
6.1974 broadcasting statute, article 10. See also, article 31 of FR3's 
cahier des charges. 
7. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arre%4s of March 3 1976, modifications 
to the cahiers des charges of the broadcasting companies. 
8. Ibid. 
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All three television companies promised to remain within the limits 
imposed by their cahiers des charges. In fact, in the face of pressure 
from the cinema industry and the state production company, TF1 and A2 
agreed to a voluntary reduction in the number of feature films screened 
on their channels. A2 accepted a progressive decrease in its feature film 
output: 130 films in 1975,110 in 1976 and 100 in 1977.9 TF1, on the 
other hand, agreed to maintain its output at a maximum of 125 films 
10 
per annum. 
However, these agreements entered into with the Union syndicale 
des artistes (non-affiliated) were observed by neither company, with 
TF1 showing 150 feature films in 1976 and 135 in 1977 and A2 127 and 
114 respectively. 
11 While these figures did not transgress the official 
limits imposed bythe"caliers des charges, they did exceed the self-imposed 
quotas of the two programme companies, which were then successfully sued 
by the Union syndicale des artistes at the end of 1977 for breach of 
contract. 
Other interested parties have also sought to bring pressure to bear 
on the television companies and the Government. For example, at the 
beginning of 1978 the Bureau de liaison des industries cin4matographiques 
mounted a publicity campaign to have the relevant provisions of the 
companies' cahiers des charges modified so as to reduce the number of 
feature films screened on television and increase the rather derisory 
payments made by the television companies to the cinema industry. 
12 
9. Le Monde, January 23 and 27 1975. 
10. Le Monde, August 15 1975. 
11. Le Monde, November 26, December 22 and 23 1977 and February 3 1978. 
12. Le Monde, January 12,13,19 and 25 1978. 
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The cinema industry's self-interested preoccupation with the 
competition provided by television in the showing of feature films 
has been echoed by the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel. According to 
the HCA the plethora of feature films shown on television has had adverse 
effects on demand for original television production. In its 1976 report 
the HCA criticised the television companies for screening at peak viewing 
times films which were already guaranteed a large audience, proposing 
that minority interest films should also be shown at these times. In 
addition, to encourage the programming of French films, it was recommended 
that the amount of compensation paid to the cinema industry be substantially 
increased in the event of the 50% maximum on foreign films being infringed. 
13 
During 1976 517 feature films were shown by the three television 
companies in toto. 
14 Not surprisingly, therefore, the 1977 report of the 
Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel was even more damning than the previous year's. 
While the HCA recognised that the companies were operating within the limits 
of their cahiers des charges, it proposed that the system be tightened up. 
15 
The total maximum of 500 films should be rigorously enforced, as should 
the weekend restrictions. on the showing of feature films on television. 
13. Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, Rapport sur la mise en oeuvre 
des cahiers des charges des soci4tds de radio et de t levision, 1976, 
Paris, La documentation francaise, 1977, p. 18. 
14. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1977-1978, no. 3131, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1978, annexe no. l9, Radiodiffusion et television 
francaise, rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de 
la seance du 5 octobre 1977, p. 25. 
15. Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, 
Paris, La documentat 
sur la mise en oeuvre et le 
9 P. iv. 
9 
-7 
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As the 50% maximum quota on the screening of foreign films was not being 
strictly adhered to, the HCA recommended that the compensation to the 
cinema industry be raised from 13,000 to 50,000 francs per film in 
excess of the permitted limit. Foreign telefilms should not be allowed 
to prejudice the screening of French productions. Moreover, the television 
companies ought to be encouraged to provide greater financial aid to the 
cinema industry. In addition, the HCA proposed that films should not be 
shown on television until 30 months after their general release in the 
cinema. Finally, the Haut Conseil warned that if its proposals were not 
put into effect, then the overall number of feature films shown on 
television would have to be drastically reduced. 
16 
Since the publication of these two critical reports the French 
government has introduced various measures designed to relieve the tension 
between the cinema industry and the television companies. Its first 
response to the criticisms voiced by the Bureau de *liaison des industries 
cinematoErathiaues was to reduce the rate of VAT on cinema tickets from 
17.6 to 7%. 
17 
In addition, in the broadcasting companies' cahiers des charges 
for 1980 the provisions regarding the showing of feature films on television 
were tightened up. 
The maximum number of films to be shown by TF1 and A2 during 1980 
was 130 each, compared with 150 each in 1979. For films coproduced between 
one of the programme companies and the cinema industry the period of time 
which had to elapse before they could be shown on television was increased 
16. Ibid, pp. 15-18. 
17. Le Monde, July 29 1978. 
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from 18 to. 21& months. Finally, restrictions on the times at which 
18 
feature ¬ilms could be shown on-television were also reinforced. 
Nevertheless, whether these palliative measures will be sufficient 
in themselves to satisfy the demands of the cinema industry remains 
doubtful. If not, the conflict of interests between the cinema industry 
and the television companies seems likely to continue unabated. 
French television production 
In its 1976 report the Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel pointed out 
that while in 1973 the three channels of the ORTF had shown 140 French 
produced series and dramas, in 1976 the three television companies showed 
only 60. 
i9 This decline was emphasised by the marked preference 
demonstrated by the companies for foreign produced series which cost 
up to five times less than a French production. Obviously the crisis 
of the SFP which came to a head in 1978-1979 was closely related to the 
shift by the television companies towards both foreign series and the 
production of their own programmes internally. While this change in 
programming trends concerned all broadcasting staff, it particularly 
affected two specific categories: television producers (r4alisateurs) 
pretes), both of which have been vociferous and actors (artistes-inter 
critics of the 1974 reorganisation. 
The position of the television producers in the new broadcasting 
companies, as at the ORTF, differs from that of most of the staff. 
18. Le Monde, May 9 1980. 
19. Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, Rapport sur la wise en oeuvre des 
cahiers des charges des societes de radio et de t1 vision, 1976, 
Paris, La documentation francaise, 1977, P-14-- 
See table 11. i on dramatic fiction on P ench television. 
ýý 
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Since they are not considered as full-time employees of the coiupanies, 
they are not covered by a staff statute or a collective staff agreement. 
20 
Rather the producer in the French system is 
"... outside the main institution, working in a manner which 
we in Britain would describe as short-term contract or freelance. 
Despite the enormous changes which have occurred during the Fifth 
Republic to the institutional structure of the ORTF, despite the 
total reorganisation which has taken place in 1974-1975, the role 
of the r4alisateur has remained much the same ... operating under 
agreements between the union representing the r4alisateurs and the 
broadcasting institution, which have survived several successive 
waves of reorganisation. " 21 
Because of this system of employment on short-term contracts, the 
realisateurs are more than most of the other categories of broadcasting 
staff subject to the vicissitudes of the market. It is scarcely surprising, 
therefore, that the realisateurs, witnessing a noticeable worsening in 
their employment prospects since the 1974 reform, should be critical of 
the programming and production policy of the television companies. 
In a report published only a few months after the break-up of the 
ORTF, the Syndicat Francais'dos 'RMalisatetrs'de'T&levision (CGT), the most 
representative union in the profession, drew up a critique of the 
consequences of the reform for television production. 
22 The report 
pointed out that despite an overall increase in the length of viewing 
time, unemployment among television producers had dramatically increased. 
The realisateurs have echoed the criticisms made by other critics: 
the decline of television documentaries and drama programmes, the increase 
in serials and the plethora of inexpensive studio debates and "talking heads" 
programmes. In addition, the realisateurs have stressed other symptoms of 
20. See chapter on the Broadcasting Unions. 
21. Report of the committee on the future of'bröadcästing, Appendices E-I, 
Appendix 1, "The relationship of management with creative staff" by 
A. Smith, London, HMSO, command no. 6753-1,1977, p. 130. 
22. Syndicat Francais des Realisateurs de Television, La fin des 
saltimbangues?. Paris, 1975. 
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what they regard as a reduction in production standards such as the decrease 
in the number of technical staff assigned to a production and the 
imposition of more stringent timetables on production. 
Since the publication of this report in the immediate aftermath of 
the reorganisation, the r4alisateurs have on several occasions reiterated 
their criticisms. Moreover, their complaints have been backed up by 
action. 
23 Thus, in January 1977 the r4alisateurs decided to come out 
on strike in support of the action being taken at that time by television 
actors. The realisateurs demanded guarantees regarding the programming 
of a minimum amount of original television material by the state television 
companies. They also wanted their own conditions of employment to be 
improved. 24 However, though supported for part of its duration by other 
unions in the profession, the strike called by the Syndicat FranQais 
des Realisateurs de Television ended without any agreement being reached 
on the question of a guaranteed quota of home-produced television programmes. 
The strike by the television actors during the winter of 1976-1977 
was much longer than that held by the realisateurs, lasting from 
mid-November 1976 to mid-February 1977. Like the realisateurs, the actors 
are not salaried staff of the broadcasting companies, but are paid only 
when they are actually working on a programme, which also makes them 
especially vulnerable to any cutbacks in production. 
23. See'Le Monde, November 13-14 1977 and January 1-2 and November 19-20 
1978. 
24. See Le Monde, January 6,12,14,21,25,26,27 and 30-31 1977 and 
L'Humanit4, February 22 1977. 
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Two actors' unions were involved in the dispute: the Syndicat 
Francais des artistes-internretes (CGT) and the Union syndicale des 
artistes (autonomous). The actors' demands covered three related issues: 
to improve their financial position with respect to repeated showings 
of programmes, to standardise their conditions of employment and payment 
and, lastly, to obtain a guaranteed increase in the amount of French 
produced television material. 
25 
While the actors gained satisfaction of their first two demands 
soon after the start of their strike, their third demand met with stiffer 
opposition from the television companies. It was not until mid-January 
1977 that the dispute was partially resolved when the Union syndicale 
des artistes accepted proposals by the television companies to increase 
the screening of original television material (creation originale) over 
the following three years. 
26 
For its part the Government promised that 
over this period the budgets of the television companies would be increased 
in real terms to take account of the new costs. 
The agreement of January 14 marked a breakdown in the united front 
put up by the two unions concerned since November 1976. While the 
USDA accepted the proposals, the SFA decided to carry on with the 
strike action in an attempt to outbid the USDA and gain more concessions 
for the television actors. In this the SFA was partly successful, 
obtaining guarantees regarding the production as well as the programming 
of more original television material. However, the ending of ttrike 
action by the USDA had weakened the actors' bargaining position, 
25. Le Quotidien de Paris, January 6 1977; L'Humanite, November 17 1976; 
Le Monde, December 2,9,11,19-20 and 26-27 1976 and January 1,5 
and 6 1977. 
26. Le Monde, January 15 1977. 
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with the result that the SFA strike came to an end in mid-February 
with some demands still not satisfied. 
27 
The strike by the television actors, which at the time was the 
longest running dispute in the state broadcasting services since the 
break-up of the ORTF, highlighted the failure of the reform to generate 
demand for home-produced television drama and fiction. In retrospect 
the dispute was a dress rehearsal for the crisis which was to hit the 
SFP in 1978-1979, during which many of the same issues were to be 
raised once again. 
28 
The Government's response 
Since the establishment of the broadcasting companies in January 
1975 the Government has introduced various measures in response to the 
criticisms outlined above. For example, in 1976 the Government was under 
pressure from various sources to boost French television production, with 
the issue being highlighted in a much publicised meeting between a well-known 
television producer, Jean-Christophe Averty, and President Giscard d'Estaing 
29 
at the Elyscfe. 
Barely a week after this tete-ä-te"te, Giscard d'Estaing declared 
his concern about the decline in programme quality since the break-up of 
the ORTF. 
27. Politique Hebdo, no. 256, February 7-13 1977 and T&ecine, no. 217, 
April 1977. 
28. See chapter on Finance. 
29. For Averty's account of this meeting see J. Siclier, Un homme averty, 
Paris, Jean-Claude Simoen, 1976, pp. 192-201. 
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"As far as programme quality is concerned, we have indeed 
witnessed a certain number of features, and notably a reduction 
in creative programming on television. In the same way, it seems 
to me, one has witnessed a quite perceptible increase in the number 
of productions bought from outside and naturally from abroad. 
I think that we have to reintroduce into the working of the 
television companies this concern for creativity and for quality. 
... I am going to ask the Government to look at the possibility 
of introducing in the cahiers des charges regulations designed 
to improve television quality. ... " 30 
Remarkable for its frankness, this statement amounted to a grave 
indictment by the President of his own reform. Since programme quality 
was supposed to be encouraged by the licence revenue allocation 
procedure and safeguarded by the companies' cahiers des charges, the 
President's remarks clearly revealed that these devices were failing 
to fulfil their function satisfactorily. 
Following the presidential declaration, therefore, a series of 
measures were announced by the Government in an attempt to encourage 
more creative television. For example, the Government prescribed that 
there should be an increase in the number of programmes shown which 
had been produced specifically for television. Between them TF1 and A2 
were to screen 260 hours of original fictional material in 1977 compared 
with 197 hours in 1976. In addition, the two channels were set an annual 
target quota of 150 hours minimum of "creative documentaries". In response 
to the President's expressed desire that young producers and writers 
should be given greater encouragement, the Government recommended that 
10% of fiction production and 10% of documentary production should be set 
aside for new talent. Finally, in an attempt to prevent certain established 
30. Le Monde, April 24 1976. 
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producers from monopolising television production, a set of regulations 
was to be drawn up by the programme companies to ensure that this practice 
was discontinued. 
31 
These measures were to be financed from direct grants awarded to 
the prograane companies by the Government before the formal allocation 
of the licence revenue. 
32 
Thus, no extra expenditure was to be incurred 
by the Government. Moreover, anxious to observe the spirit of the reform, 
the Government left it up to each company's board of governors to decide 
how the measures should be put into effect. The recommendations were not, 
however, specifically included in the cahiers des charges, an omission 
which was viewed by some commentators as severely diminishing their 
significance. 
33 Furthermore, as the term "creativity" was never 
explicitly defined, some company chairman appeared to consider that they 
were already operating within the norms set by the Government. 
In any event despite the measures announced in 1976, criticisms 
of the consequences of the 1974 reform for programming have not abated. 
Recommendations have been put forward from a wide variety of sources 
to remedy what is perceived as a grave crisis in French television. 
Some are mere palliative measures, designed to alleviate some of the 
worst excesses of the reorganisation. Frequently the Government has been 
31. Le Monde, July 22 and 23 1976. 
32. See chapter on Finance. 
33. A. Suffert, M. Souchon and G. Meyer, "Deux ans apAs la reforme 
de 1'ORTF". Projet, no. 112, February 1977. 
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sympathetic to these proposals and has acted upon them. 
34 Other 
proposals, however, have taken a more fundamental approach to the 
problem and have recommended structural changes in the organisation 
34. For example, following the publication of the 1978 Caillavet report 
and the 1979 Cluzel report, the Government sought to direct funds 
towards the development of French television production at the very 
time when the SFP was suffering from a crippling financial crisis. 
In 1979 a fonds de'cr4ation audiovisuelle was established by the 
Ministry of Culture and Communication to aid production and research 
in the field of documentaries, particularly by new authors. The 
budget of this special fund, however, was extremely small, with 
only 5 million francs being set aside for its first year. of operation. 
At the end of 1979 Lecat announced the creation of another special 
fund, entitled le fonds de la gualite, which was designed to encourage 
creative programming by the television companies. While this fund 
was allocated greater financial resources, around 50 million francs 
in 1980, the money was to come from the total of licence revenue 
collected and was then to be given to the television companies in 
the form of direct grants. Thus, in this case no additional resources 
were being made available by the Government. 
Other measures were also announced by the minister at the same time. 
The proportion of French produced drama and fiction shown by the 
television companies was to be increased from 56% to 60% of the 
total. The objective that 60% of drama and fiction shown on television 
should be home produced had been included in the original cahiers des 
charges in 1975. However, it was only in 1980 that this objective 
was to be realised. 
Greater harmonisation of programme schedules was to be asked of the 
television company chairmen and the Quality Committee was given the 
task of monitoring the execution of this directive. Finally, the 
licence revenue allocation equation was to be modified to exclude 
quantitative criteria. 
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of the broadcasting services. In other words, they have sought to 
reform the reform. The following two sections examine some of the 
main points raised by the principal critics of the 1974 reorganisation, 
their reform proposals and the Government's reaction to them. 
Audience ratings 
The importance attached to audience ratings by the programme 
companies is a feature of the 1974 reform. However, the role accorded 
audience ratings in the new broadcasting system has been criticised 
because, it is argued, the television companies tend to pursue the 
largest possible audience and so are forced to cater for the lowest 
common denominator in taste. One of the most ardent critics of the 
audience ratings system was the then chairman of A2, Jullian, who 
argued that they discouraged creative programmes and rewarded a 
conservative approach to programme scheduling and content. 
35 
Jullian's 
antipathy towards the audience ratings system has been echoed by other 
critics including the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel and interested 
parliamentarians such as Le Tac, Caillavet and Cluzel. 
36 
The Government, however, was slow to react to these criticisms and when 
it eventually did react, it was not to attack the problem at source. 
35. T414-7-fours, no. 858, November 6-12 1976 and Trois questions pose es 
ä, Monsieur Henri Caillavet, Antenne 2 vous repond, num&ro sp6cial, 
autumn 1976. 
36. Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, 
cahiers des charges des soci4t 
Paris, La documentation franca 
Rapport sur la wise en oeuvre des 
As de radio et de t61evision, 1979 
se, 1977, P. 9. 
Interview with Joel Le Tac, January 25 1977. 
s 
; 9ý 
Caillavet report, 1978. 
Cluzel report, 1979. 
11 
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For example, in late 1976 the role of audience ratings in charting 
public reaction to the programme output of the television companies 
was being stoutly defended by government ministers. 
"The truth is that a modern television service cannot 
function without audience ratings, which allow it to learn 
the reactions of its public. 
A television service without ratings would be blind to 
and ignorant of the preoccupations of the population. " 37 
It is certainly true that audience ratings if properly used 
constitute an important element of information for any developed 
broadcasting service. If employed in conjunction with more specialised 
surveys on viewer motivation and satisfaction, ratings can be a highly 
useful piece of information for programme planners. On the other hand, 
though they may effectively reflect the current state of public interest 
in a given programme or set of programmes, ratings cannot indicate 
which new options ought to be tried. They have, therefore, an in-built 
conservative bias, particularly if the television channels are 
competing for the same mass audience. 
Moreover, despite government protestations to the contrary, it was 
apparent from an early stage that though the marks given for programme 
quality were weighted three times more highly than audience ratings in 
the licence revenue allocation procedure, the companies were more interested 
in amassing as large an audience for their programmes as possible. Only 
in late 1979 did the Government admit that the quantitative criterion 
of the ratings would be downgraded in the procedure to allocate the 
38 
broadcasting budget for 1981 among the programme companies. 
37. Journal Officiel Mbats Parlementaires Assemblge Nationale, 
November 17 1976, P-8069, speech by Robert Boulin, minister 
responsible for relations with Parliament. 
38. This announcement was made by Lecat as part of the Government's 
response to the publication of the Cluzel report, 1979. 
Le Monde, October 21-22 1979. 
rrnT "" 
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Though this governmental initiative was undoubtedly welcome to 
the critics of the audience ratings system, it was scarcely sufficient 
to satisfy them entirely. The importance attached to audience ratings 
by the programme companies since 1974 derives as much from the 
dependence of the two main television companies on commercial advertising 
as from the role they play in the licence revenue allocation procedure. 
As we have seen, TF1 and A2 both rely heavily on commercial advertising 
and are obliged to achieve their annual advertising targets if they are 
not to lose out financially. According to the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel 
the logic of this dependence on advertising has led the two main television 
companies to adopt a commercial approach to programming whereby they 
are excessively attentive to capturing as large an audience as possible. 
39 
To mitigate the competition for advertising revenue between TF1 and 
A2, the HCA recommended that the separate advertising services of the 
two television companies, RFP-TF1 and RFP-A2, should be abolished. 
4o 
The revenue obtained from advertising would be added to the licence revenue 
to form a single body of funds which would then be shared out among the 
programme companies by a procedure which accorded greater weight to the 
criterion of programme quality. In this way no single company would depend 
overwhelmingly on advertising revenue with the result that the companies 
could afford to experiment with programme schedules if they so desired1 
39. Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel, Ra ort sur la wise en oeuvre des 
cahiers des charges des soci6tds de radio et de tl vision, 1976, 
Paris, La documentation franjaise, 1977, p. 8. 
ho. Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
41. This proposal has also been put forward by Le Tac, Caillavet and 
the Quality Committee. 
See the annual budgetary reports on broadcasting by the National 
Assembly finance committee; the Caillavet re-nor., 1978; and the 
first report of the Quality Committee, 1975-1976, p. 22. 
ý'I 
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Commercial advertising on French television is now a fact of life with 
which even the Socialist and Communist parties have been forced to come to 
terms. While in 1972 the parties of the left called for the abolition of 
advertising on the state television channels, by 1977 they regarded its 
maintenance as inevitable and were demanding only its strict control. 
42 
This volte face in the policy of the left towards television advertising 
is perhaps not surprising, given the important role it now plays in the 
finances of the state television companies. It was estimated by one. 
government minister that the abolition of commercial advertising on 
television would lead either to the loss of one of the television 
channels or to a 4+0% increase in the cost of the licence-fee. 
43 
The problem, therefore, is no longer whether to have advertising 
on television or not, but rather how best to control it and minimise 
its effects on programming. The parties of the left, along with other 
critics of the 197+ reform, called for the creation of a single pool of 
funds divided up among the channels by a central authority. The Government, 
however, has steadfastly refused to make this kind of structural reform. 
Thus, the separate advertising services of TF1 and A2 remain in existence, 
competing with each other for advertising and seeking to achieve their 
target figures while still respecting the overall 25% statutory maximum 
on revenue from commercial advertising. 
42. Programme communde gouvernement, Paris, Flammarion, 1973, p. 80. 
See the debate between Gaston Defferre and Francois R4gis-Bastide 
which took place within the Socialist party in 1977, the former 
calling for the abolition of television advertising if a left-wing 
government came to power and the latter reluctantly accepting the 
necessity of advertising revenue. Le Matin de Paris, May 3 and 4 1977 
and Le Monde, May 4+ and 5 1977. 
For the change of policy by the Communist party on this question see 
L'Humanite, May 14 and 23 1977. 
43. Le Monde, May 6 1977. i»i 
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Reform proposals 
The Government's rejection of the demands to abolish the separate 
advertising services at TF1 and A2 forms part of a wider strategy to 
resist calls for greater centralisation within the new broadcasting 
system. As we have already seen, the 197+ broadcasting reform eschewed 
the establishment of a central body to coordinate the running of the 
separate companies and regulate the competition between the two main 
television channels. The Government argued that competition between 
TF1 and A2 would result in an improved service for the viewer. On-the 
other hand, any attempt to introduce complementary programme scheduling 
would, according to ministerial spokesmen, be an unwarranted interference 
in the management of the companies and contrary to the spirit of the 
reform. 
44 
In the face of parliamentary pressure, however, the Government was 
compelled to compromise slightly on this view, with an amendment to the 
Government's bill being passed in the Senate and included in the 1974 
ý ý; ý^w 
statute proposing that the chairmen of the television companies should 
meet periodically to ensure the harmonisation of programme schedules. 
45 
In practice, however, this article of the 1974 statute has proved 
remarkably ineffective. TF1 and A2 frequently broadcast the same type 
of programme simultaneously. Moreover, in the first couple of years 
of their existence the two companies even went so far as to screen exactly 
6 
the same programme simultaneously, particularly a popular sporting event 
44. See, for example, the speech made by Christian Poncelet in Journal 
Offioiel' Dhats Parlementaires Assemble Nationale, June 25 1977, 
pp. 217- 219. 
45. Article 9 of the 1974 broadcasting statute. See chapter on Parliamentary 
control. 
46. Le Quotidien de Paris, March 20-21 and 24 1976. This practice of the 
same programme being shown simultaneously by both main television 
companies is now less prevalent. See, for example, the agremment between 
the two companies on programming for the 1978 world cup. Le Monde, May 
23.1978. 
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Not surprisingly, many of the critics of the Giscardian broadcasting 
structure regard the creation of some sort of central federating body 
as a key element in their proposals to remedy what they regard as the 
undesirable face of competition within the present system. Le Tac, 
for example, has proposed the creation of a central authority, half of 
whose members would be appointed by the Government and half by Parliament 
and the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel. This body would coordinate the 
management of the different companies and ensure complementary programme 
schedules. It would also perform certain specific functions at present 
carried out by a variety of agencies. For instance, it would be 
responsible for the running of those services common to the companies, 
such as the audience research service. It would also take over the 
work of the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee, sharing out the licence 
revenue and advertising receipts among the companies on the basis of the 
quality and cultural merit of their programmes and their fulfilment of the 
obligations laid down in their cahiers des charges. The Licence Revenue 
Allocation Committee, would be abolished, as would the Quality Committee. 
Finally, the Government's role would be confined to fixing the cost of 
the licence-fee and thereby determining the amount of resources to be 
allocated in toto to the state broadcasting services. 
47 
The Socialist and Communist parties in their policy statements 
prior to the 1978 legislative elections also favoured the creation of 
a central coordinating body to allocate the licence revenue, manage the 
47. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1977-1978, 
no. 87, Proposition de loi tendant ä modifier la loi no. 71-696 
du 7 aoüt 197+ relative ä la radiodiffusion et a la television, 
presentee par Joel Le Tac, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance 
du 18 avril 1978. 
See also Le Figaro, April 18 1977 and the annual budgetary reports 
on broadcasting of the National Assembly finance committee, particularly 
Journal Officiei - 
Dn currents Assembl4e Nationale, 1976-1977, no. 2525, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission ded finances ... sur le projet 
de 
loi de finances. pour 1977, annexe no. 19, Radiodiffusion et television, 
rapporteur special: Joel Le Tac, annexe au proc's-verbal de la 
seance du 5 octobre 1976, pp. 27-29. 
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production services and generally deal with those problems common to 
the separate companies. 
48 
The most explicit statement of future 
intentions was provided by the Socialist party in a report published 
in December 1978.49 This report called for the creation of a national 
broadcasting council (Conseil national de la radio-t4levision) which 
would exercise various functions common to the different companies: 
supervision of the regulations contained in the statute and cahiers 
des charges, allocation of revenue among the companies, coordination 
of staff policy and research into broadcasting technology. The national 
broadcasting council would not, however, be directly involved in the 
production, programming and transmission of broadcasts. There was no 
question of reconstituting the ORTF. 
50 
The most recent proposal to reorganise the broadcasting companies 
was set out in the 1979 Cluzel report. 
51 
This special parliamentary 
committee of inquiry called for the creation of a central public 
corporation with a general overlord function. As we have seen, this 
corporation would be responsible for monitoring technological development 
in the broadcasting field, controlling investment policy, allocating the 
revenue from the licence and commercial advertising and coordinating 
52 
the programme schedules of the companies. 
48. Le Monde, September 6 1977. 
49. '$apport du parti socialiste sur la radio-television", published as 
a supplement to Le poing et la rose, no. 77, December 1978. 
50. zbid, pp. 12-16. 
51. See chapter on Parliamentary control. 
52. Cluzel report, 1979, pp. 155-157. 
s 
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Criticisms of the lack of harmonisation in the new broadcasting 
structure have also been made by the Quality Committee, the Haut 
Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, the broadcasting unions and the parliamentary 
delegation for broadcasting. 
53 
It would appear that the viewers also 
would like greater coordination in programme scheduling among the 
television companies. 
54 However, any proposal to introduce a greater 
level of coordination in the present system by the establishment of 
a central, federating body necessarily calls into question the very 
basis of the 1974 reform. 
With the defeat of the left in the 1978 legislative elctions, 
any major structural reorganisation of the state broadcasting services 
along the lines of the introduction of a central body was effectively 
postponed until after the 1981 presidential elections at the earliest. 
Though measures were announced in late 1979 to encourage harmonisation 
of programme schedules through regular meetings of the company chairmen, 
structural reform is not even on the agenda for discussion as far as the 
Government is concerned. 
55 
53. 
"I experience some astonishment when I hear certain people, 
moved by a strange strategy of regrouping, desire a return to the 
organisation of the ORTF. This is out of the question. The reform 
is irreversible. " 56 
See the third annual report of the Quality Committee, 1977-1978, 
pp. l0-114. 
Haut Conseil de 1'Audiovisuel, Rapport sur la mise eh oeuvre des 
des cahiers des charges des socidt&s de radio et de teldvision, 6, 
Paris, La documentation frangaise, 1977, p. 10. 
For criticisms made by the broadcasting unions see Journal Officiel, 
Documents Senat, 1976-1977, no. 65, Rapport g4neral fait au nom de la 
commission des finances ... sur le projet de loi de finances pour 
1977, 
Tome III, annexe no. 1+6, Radiodiffusion et t4l4vision, rapporteur sp4cial: 
Jean Cluzel, annexe au procýs-verbal de la seance du 23 novembre 1976, 
pp. 132-11+3. 
For the view of the parliamentary delegation for broadcasting see 
Journal Officiel, Documents Assembl4e Nationale, 1976-1977, no. 2721, 
Rapport d'information dtabli au nom de la d4legation parlementaire 
pour la radiodiffusion-t4l4vision franqaise ... par 
Jacques Blanc, 
Georges Fillioud et Jack Ralite, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance 
du 18 decembre 1976, PP. 3-14. 
5I. L'Humanitdf, April 8 1977.88% of those interviewed in a public 
opinion poll favoured a greater degree of harmonisation than at present. 
55. Le Monde, October 21-22 1979. 
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A comparative perspective 
The Government's determination not to make any substantial 
reorganisation of the broadcasting structure established in 197+ 
may be due to sheer obstinacy on its part. After all, it has nothing 
to gain from yet another broadcasting reform. However, it is by no 
means certain that the kind of reorganisation called for by the critics 
would in any case markedly improve the range, not to mention the quality, 
of programmes afforded the viewer. The creation of a central federating 
body would allow for the coordination of programme schedules and so 
apparently provide a wider choice for the viewer. However, it is open 
to doubt whether the benefits of such a reorganisation on programming 
would be as far-reaching as the critics imply. 
The reason for this is that the structure of the broadcasting 
services is only one-factor, not necessarily the most important either, 
affecting programme output. By attributing the decline in home-produced 
drama and fiction to the 1974 reform, many critics may be underestimating 
the importance of other factors which affect broadcasting services other 
than the French, in particular the dominance of the international 
television programme market by the American networks 
?7 In other words, 
what the critics have perceived as a crisis in French production may 
not be due solely to the 1974 reorganisation. 
One of the principal spokesmen in favour of adopting a wider 
perspective is Jacques Thibau, former deputy head of television in 
the mid-1960s. Thibau's thesis may be summarised as follows- 
58 
57. See J. Tunstall, 'The media are American, London, Constable, 1977. 
58. Le Figaro, November 10 1975 and Le Monde, January 11-12 1976. 
Also, interview with Jacques Thibau, June 21 1977. 
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Three tendencies are apparent in French television programming: 
the importance of commercial advertising, the trivialisation of 
programme content and the preponderance of American films and 
series. All three features, according to Thibau, are symptomatic 
of the crisis affecting all western European broadcasting systems. 
Thus, if the 1960s can be regarded as the high water mark of European 
broadcasting, the 1970s have witnessed a remarkable decline. On the 
one hand the national television services have been hit by serious 
financial difficulties following the saturation of the television 
market, while at the same time production costs have escalated. 
The introduction of commercial advertising to supplement income, 
far from solving the problem, has merely given it another dimension. 
To fill out their programme schedules the European television organisations 
are obliged to import low cost American series and films. As a result, 
the programmes no longer reflect the culture of each particular nation, 
but become "the vehicle of the dominant American ideology., 
59 In short, 
in the international broadcasting market the USA is in an overriding 
position of strength. For Thibau, the 1974 broadcasting reform in France 
must be viewed in this context of the American dominance of the western 
European broadcasting media. 
One does not have to accept the whole of Thibau's thesis to appreciate 
that an assessment of the 1974 reform with regard to programming would 
benefit from a comparative perspective. If Thibau's thesis has any validity, 
one might expect the broadcasting organisations of other western European 
countries to show signs of the same problems which are affecting the 
state broadcasting companies in France. 
59. J. Thibau, "La tdlevision: une question pour demain", Temoi 'g nage 64; x; 
chrdtien, January 27 1977. 
; ýi 
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There is some evidence that this is in fact the case. For example, 
in 1974 Belgian television broadcast 50 original television dramas 
compared with 78 in 1965.60 The drama services of Norwegian television 
saw its budget reduced from 17% of the total budget in 1965 to 14% 
in 1975.61 Thus, the decline in French production of drama series 
since 1974 may be seen as part of a wider phenomenon. 
Another symptom of the decline in programme quality, according 
to the critics, is the increase in the number of foreign programmes, 
particularly American series and telefilms, shown by the French 
television companies. 
62 
Once again, however, this phenomenon is not 
confined to France. For example, the Danish television organisation 
has estimated that the cost of an original dramatic production amounts 
to about 40,000 dollars per hour, compared with 3,000 dollars for an 
American film. It is hardly surprising then that in 1976-1977 55% 
of programmes broadcast on Danish television were foreign productions. 
63 
Even the BBC imported over 12% of its total programne output in 1974-1975.64 
In a study published in 1974 on the international flow of television 
programmes, it was discovered that on average western European countries 
imported annually 30-40% of their programmes. 
65 
The countries which 
60. Le Monde, October 24-25 1976. 
61. M. Berg, "The organisation and structure. of fiction production in the 
Norwegian broadcasting corporation", paper presented to the'Prix Italia 
conference, 1976, p. 5. 
62.156 hours of American telefilms and series were shown during the first 
six months of 1977 compared with 96 hours during the first six months 
of 1974 
M. Souchon, La television'et son public; ' 19714/1977, Paris, La document- 
ation francaise, 1978, p. 17. 
63. Le Monde, October 24-25 1976. 
64+. Report of the committee on the future of broadcasting, London, HMSO, 
command no. 6753,1977, p-336. (The Annnn report) 
65. K. Nordenstreng and T. Varis, Television traffic: a one-way street?, 
Paris, UNESCO, 1974, p. 12. 
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depended least on foreign purchases were France, Great Britain and 
Italy, who imported respectively 9%, 12% and 13% of their programmes, 
mainly from the USA. In the case of France half of the feature films 
shown were imported, while just over half of the series broadcast 
were produced abroad. 
66 
As for the BBC, two thirds of its feature 
films were imported as were over half the series 
67 
The ORTF was, in 
short, much better off than the majority or its European counterparts 
and slightly better off than the BBC in terms of dependence on imported 
programmes. 
However, it can be seen that even before the 1974 reform the 
French state broadcasting services were not impervious to foreign, 
ýý 
and especially American, penetration. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
to find criticisms of the American influence on French television 
programming long before the 1974 reform. For example, the Paye report 
published in 1970 commented that, 
"The massive broadcasting of American films to a mass 
whose way of life and daily problems are profoundly foreign 
to the pictures they receive, but which tends to see in them 
fashions or models to copy, creates a form of cultural 'colonialism' 
contrary to the educative vocation of the national public service. 
" 68 
Likewise, in a book published in 1973 Thibau condemned what he regarded 
as the trivialisation of programme content at the ORTF during the early 
1970s, one criterion of which was the increasing recourse to American 
series and telefilms. 
69 
66. Ibid, p. 22. 
67. Ibid. i 
68. 
-Paye report, 1970, P" 159. 
69. J. Thibau, La television, le pouvoir et l'argent, Paris, 
Calmann-Levy, :! 
1973. - -- - --- ýý: ý'ý 
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The following table shows the number of feature films screened 
by the French state television channels before and after the 1974 
reform. 
1969 327 films, of which 63% were foreign; 
1971 392 films; 
1973 463 films, of which 57% were foreign; 
1976 517 films, of which 51% were foreign. 
While there has been an overall increase in the number of feature films 
shown on French television since 1969, this increase has not been 
dramatic, nor does it date from 1974. In fact, as a percentage of 
the total viewing time the proportion of feature films has actually 
declined between 1974 and 1977.70 Moreover, in percentage terms 
there has also been a decline in the proportion of foreign films 
broadcast. If one looks solely at American feature films, they have 
declined in both real terms and as a percentage of the total viewing 
time: 202 hours in the first six months of 1974 (5.9%) compared with 
174 hours in the first six months of 1977 (3.8%). 
7i While there has 
been an increase, therefore, in the proportion of viewing time devoted 
to American telefilms and series from 1974 to 1977, there has been a 
corresponding decrease in the proportion of viewing time given to 
American feature films. 
It would appear, therefore, that the argument which seeks to lay 
the blame for the crisis in French television production solely on the 1974 
reform-is not borne out by all the evidence. The 1974 reform certainly 
70. M. Souchon, op. cit., p. 17. 
71. Ibid. 
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highlighted many of the problems of the production services which 
had perhaps been less evident at the ORTF. The 1974 reorganisation 
probably exacerbated these problems by giving the production services 
separate company status in the new broadcasting system. However, it 
is highly debatable whether the 1974 reform was itself the cause of 
what have been regarded by various critics as the twin programming 
evils in French broadcasting: the crisis in French television production 
and the increasingly commercial ethos of the state programme companies. 
Conclusion 
The 1974 broadcasting reform has come under attack from various 
quarters. The cinema industry is displeased with the number of feature 
films shown by the television companies. Television producers and 
actors are only two of the interested parties whose livelihood is 
threatened by the decline in French television production. Interested 
parliamentarians such as Le Tac, Caillavet and Cluzel have all severely 
criticised the effects of the 1974 reform on programming. Indeed both 
Caillavet and Cluzel have been rapporteurs of special parliamentary 
committees of inquiry on the subject of French television production. 
Other critics have included the Quality Committee and the Haut Conseil 
de l'Audiovisuel. The viewers themselves do not appear to be particularly 
content. Even the Government has been forced to introduce supplementary 
measures to encourage "creativity" among producers and programme planners. 
Neither the cahiers des charges nor the licence revenue allocation 
procedure would appear to have been sufficieii safeguards to protect 
ý; ý- 
i 
the television companies from the desire to pursue the largest audience 
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possible. In these circumstances various critics, including the 
parties of the left, have called for the establishment of a central 
federating body to coordinate the activities of the various companies. 
In their opinion many of the defects of the present system could be 
abolished if such a central body were set up. 
However, a comparison of programming at the ORTF with the programme 
output of the present companies does not lead easily to a belief in 
the efficacy of such a structural reorganisation. Some improvement 
in the amount of home-produced programmes might be made, though even 
this is not certain. Any reformed broadcasting organisation would still 
require revenue from commercial advertising, introduced well before the 
1974 reform, to maintain services as at present. Moreover, there would 
always be the danger of reconstituting the bureaucratic structure of the 
ORTF by default. 
By concentrating their attention on the 1974 reform itself, 
many of the critics may well be overestimating the importance of the 
structure of the broadcasting services. Low budget programmes, cheap 
imports and feature films have become commonplace in all western 
European broadcasting_ systems at a time of spiralling production costs. 
France is no exception to that rule. In these circumstances tinkering 
about once again with the structure of the state broadcasting services 
may well divert attention from a consideration of more basic questions, 
such as whether continual extensions of viewing time or the existence of 
three state television channels are necessarily. -in --the, 
interests of the 
72 
viewing public. 
72. In 197+ the three ORTF television channels broadcast around 6,800 
hours of programmes. In 1977 the three state television companies 
broadcast over 9,000 hours of programmes. 
To our knowledge France is the only country in the world to have 
three state television channels. 
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Section 4 
Challenges to the state broadcasting monopoly 
-511- 
CHAPTER 12 
The State Monopoly 
The 1974 broadcasting statute reaffirmed the state monopoly in 
transmission and programming which has been in existence since the wartime 
Vichy regime. 
1 Prior to the outbreak of the second world war the State 
was guaranteed a monopoly "in the transmission and reception (sic) of 
electronic signals of any kind", but in fact during the 1930s revocable 
licences were granted to several private radio stations giving them per- 
mission to broadcast. 
2 Thus, on the eve of the second world war eleven 
private radio stations were operating on French territory, financed from 
advertising. 
3 
Following the occupation of France in 1940 the country was split into 
two zones. 
"In the north, the Germans requisitioned all radio installations 
whether public or private, while in the south, the Vichy government 
created a public organisation, National Broadcasting, which exercised 
a monopoly in that zone and which formed a vital part of its 
propaganda services. " 4 
After the liberation all private station licences were cancelled and the 
Vichy laws on broadcasting were reinstalled after temporary repeal. The 
private radio stations were compelled either to cease broadcasting 
altogether or to transmit from outside French territory, an option which 
1. Article 2 of the 1974 broadcasting statute confirmed the state broadcast- 
ing monopoly. 
The production monopoly was finally abandoned in 1964 to allow the state 
broadcasting services to purchase programmes from external production 
companies. 
On the organisation of broadcasting under Vichy, see P. Amaury, Les 
deux premieres e &riences d'un ministere de 11information en France, 
Paris, Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1969, pp. 396- 22. 
2. See appendix 12. i on the chronology of legislation on broadcasting: 
1923-1974. 
3. P. Amaury, op. cit., P. 397. 
See also F. 
'TenTot, Radios privees, radios pirates, Paris, Denoel, 1977, 
pp. 11 and 43-52. T6not gives a total of 15 stations broadcasting at 
some time during the period 1922-1944. 
4. B. Thomas, Broadcasting and Democracy in France, London, Crosby 
Lockwood Staples, 7b, p. 3. 
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the peripheral stations were to choose after the war. From 1945 onwards, 
therefore, broadcasting in France has been organised within the legal 
framework of the state monopoly. 
This monopoly status of the state broadcasting services has not, how- 
ever, gone unchallenged. For example, various abortive attempts have been 
made during the Fifth Republic to establish a commercial television 
channel, including one made at the discussion stage of the 1974 reform. 
5 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the present condition of the state 
broadcasting monopoly and in particular to analyse certain challenges 
which it has had to face since 1974. A separate section is devoted to 
each of the following topics: peripheral radio, cable television and 
local radio. In the conclusion to this chapter we consider whether the 
state monopoly can continue to remain the legal framework for French 
broadcasting in the 1980s. 
Peripheral radio 
With regard to television the state monopoly of transmission and 
programming has so far proved to be very effective. 
6 
However, the same 
cannot be said about the provision of radio services. The state 
programme companies Radio France and FR3 broadcast national and regional 
programmes respectively within the framework of the state monopoly. They 
face strong competition, however, from the peripheral radio stations such 
as Radio Europe 1, Radio Luxembourg, Radio-Monte-Carlo and Sud-Radio. 
These peripheral stations transmit quite freely from just outside French 
5. See chapter on the Origins of the 1974 reform. 
See R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 110-123 for a survey of the different 
schemes to establish a commercial television channel prior to 1974. 
6. See section on cable television and the conclusion to this chapter. 
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territory to audiences in France. Producing their programmes in 
their headquarters and studios inside France, frequently in Paris, they 
then relay them to their transmitters on the French border without any 
interference from the state transmission company, TDF, which is the lega] 
custodian of the monopoly. These peripheral stations have acquired a 
reputation for providing more reliable political news than the state 
radio services, a legacy from their role in reporting the events which 
took place in the Latin Quarter in May 1968. 
8 
Their infringement of the state broadcasting monopoly, however, is 
more apparent than real. Despite their dependence on advertising revenue, 
their commercial orientation and their supposedly less partisan news 
reporting, the peripheral stations are by no means independent of the 
French state. Through a holding company, Sofirad, the State owns important 
and frequently majority shareholdings in all the peripheral radio stations, 
with the exception of Radio Luxembourg. 
9 As a result while these stations 
provide strong competition for Radio France, their finances are closely 
controlled by the State via Sofirad. 
7. In fact in the early 1970s one of the peripheral stations, Radio- 
Monte-Carlo, was allowed to construct a transmitter on French soil 
at Roumoules in the Alpes de Haute Provence department. 
See C. Durieux, La telecratie, Paris, Tema, 1976, p. 45. 
8. On the peripheral radio stations see R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 102-107; 
B. Voyenne, L'Information en France, London, McGraw-Hill, 1972, 
pp. 131-134; and J. E. and M. Ray, Corsaires des Ondes, Paris, Cerf, 
1978. See also Presse Actualite, no. 1419 December 1979, pp. 42-50. 
On Radio Luxembourg see Presse Actualite, no. 95, November 1974, pp. 
2-17, and no. 1089 March 1976, pp.. 36-43. 
On Radio-Monte-Carlo see Presse Actualit4, no. 107, February 1976, pp. 
44-51. 
On Sud-Radio see Presse Actualite, no. 114, December 1976, pp. 14-20. 
On Radio Europe 1 see Presse Actualit4, no. 96, December 1974, pp. 
15-19- 
However the State has a controlling interest in Radio Luxembourg 
through the Havas advertising agency. 
9. For an analysis of the role of Sofirad see Presse Actualite, no. 116, 
February 1977, PP- 38-45. 
See Table 12. ii for a list of the French state's shareholdings in 
peripheral radio and television. 
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Of the twelve members of Sofirad's board of governors ten, including 
the chairman, are appointed by the Government. The post of chairman 
is of course a political appointment of considerable importance. 
Pierre Lefranc, a former member of de Gaulle's cabinet, held the post 
until 1973 when he was replaced by Denis Baudouin, one of Pompidou's 
personal advisors on media policy and the head of the President's 
press service. In 1977 Baudouin left Sofirad to become head of 
communications in the entourage of the former Prime Minister, Chirac, 
who had just been successfully elected mayor of Paris. Baudouin's 
departure left the way open for Giscard d'Estaing to appoint a new 
chairman loyal to him personally. As we have seen, the President chose 
a close collaborator, Gouyou-Beauchamps, former head of the Elysee 
10 
press service. 
¶ 
Through Sofirad the French government retains the power of appointment 
to the key managerial and editorial posts in the peripheral radio stations* 
One of the clearest examples of governmental intervention in the running 
of peripheral radio occurred in October 1974 when Maurice Siegel was 
dismissed from his post as director general of Radio Europe 1. Apart 
from Siegel himself, the main protagonists in the affair were Chirac, 
who at that time was still at Matignon, and the chairman of Sofirad, 
Baudouin. It was Chirac who took the initiative, reacting angrily after 
an interview with a 
, 
Europe 1 journalist, Gerard Carreyrou, during which 
he had refused to answer certain questions, was played back in full in 
the station's news bulletin. The Prime Minister considered this a per- 
sonal affront and condemned Europe l's "slack reporting" and "frivolous 
tone. " 
Through Sofirad the Government owns 35% of the shares and controls 
just under half the votes in Europe i. As a result, when Baudouin was 
10. See chapter on Appointments. 
11. The Government exercises a similar though more constrained power 
through Havas in the case of Radio Luxembourg. 
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instructed by Chirac to secure Siegel's dismissal, the director general 
of the station had little alternative but to leave. His position was 
made even less tenable because the other major shareholder in the station, 
the Floirat group, was unwilling to make an issue out of the matter. 
12 
It was clear that the reasons behind the Government's decision were 
political and not commercial. It was rumoured that Europe 1 had taken 
a pro-Chaban-Delmas line during the recent presidential election campaign. 
13 
The station's listening figures were high and its income from advertising 
compared favourably with that of the other peripheral radio stations. 
Moreover, Siegel's successor, Jean-Luc Lagardere, could be relied on to 
adopt a more favourable stance towards the new regime. A successful 
industrialist, Lagardere was accustomed to working in close liaison with 
the Government in his capacity as director of Matra engines, a firm 
which benefits greatly from government contract work. 
Though undoubtedly the most spectacular, Siegel's dismissal was only 
the first in a process by which the holders of key posts in all the 
peripheral radio stations have been changed during Giscard d'Estaing's 
presidency. The President has placed personal supporters at the head of 
Sofirad, the Havas advertising agency, Radio-Monte-Carlo, Radio Luxembourg 
and through Sofirad, SudRadio. 
14 In short, though not a part of the State's 
broadcasting monopoly in law, the peripheral radio stations can still be 
legitimately regarded as an integral part of the State's broadcasting 
monopoly in fact. 
12. See Siegel's own account of his dismissal in M. Siegel, Vingt ans 
ca suffit, Paris, Plon, 1975, PP. 11-33. 
See also 1'Express, no. 1217, November 4-10 1974 and le Nouvel 
Observateur, no. 521, November 4-10 1974. 
13. L'Annee Politique, 1974, p. 174. 
In an interview with the author Si4gel denied having any pro-Chaban- 
Delmas leanings. Interview with Maurice Siegel, March 15 1977. 
14. See chapter on Appointments. 
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Cable television 
In the early 1970s cable television was widely regarded as an 
exciting new development in broadcasting technology which would 
revolutionise communications. No longer would broadcasting have to 
be organised on centralist lines with large national broadcasting 
organisations transmitting to vast mass audiences. The advent of cable 
television would provide the opportunity for the development of local 
community television. 
Prior to Giscard d'Estaing's election to the presidency the French 
government had been prepared to give a cautious go-ahead to cable televis- 
ion. Originally the Government was in favour of regulating the development 
of cable television in an a priori manner. However, due partly to the 
intervention of Jean d'Arcy, a leading member of the Haut Conseil 
de l'Audiovisuel, the Government was persuaded to set up cable television 
projects in an experimental fashion before introducing any legislation. 
15 
In July 1973, therefore, the Government authorised cable television 
15. On cable television in France before the Giscardian presidency see: 
R. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 162-168 
Press Actualite, nos. 81-82, March-April 1973, pp. 46-57, and no. 90, 
March 1974, pp. 40-47. 
J. P. Dubois-Dumee, Cable television in France: a new medium, Stras- 
bourg, Council of Europe, CCC/DC (73) -9-4-9-1973- 
A. Holleaux, "La teledistribution: vers une television communautaire, " 
Revue politigue et parlementaire, vol. 75 no. 842, May 1973" 
Communications, no. 21,1974. 
F. R. Barbry, La television par cables, Paris, Cerf, 1975 
Teledistribution et video-animation: la situation franca 
197 Paris, La documentation frangaise, 1974. 
e Janvier 
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experiments in seven French towns: Cergy-Pontoise, Chamonix, Cr6teil, 
Grenoble, Metz, Nice and Rennes. In fact, however, only the experiment 
at Grenoble transmitted programmes on a regular basis, consisting mainly 
of a video news magazine shown every fortnight. 
16 
At the same time as it authorised these experiments the Government 
established the Societe Francaise de Teledistribution (SFT) under the 
joint ownership of the ORTF and the Ministry of Posts. 
167 This company 
was given overall responsibility for the development of cable television 
in France. Its main role was to coordinate any local initiatives in the 
field of cable television and also to monitor the experimental projects 
allowed by the Government. 
Since 1974, however, the role of cable television as a potential 
alternative to the national state networks has waned quite dramatically. 
In April 1975 the Government formally decided not to develop cable 
television as a local medium of communication. 
18 In the summer of 1976 
the Grenoble experiment ground to a halt after the Government had 
refused to continue its subsidy to the scheme. 
19 Lacking any positive 
contribution to make, the SFT was, in the words of one of its staff, 
"put to sleep", though it still remains in existence. 
20 
16. Teledistribution et video-animation: la situation franCaise Janvier 
1974, P. 55 
17. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 72-160 of March 1 1972. 
See also Societe Franqaise de Teledistribution, Pour une teledistrib- 
ution francaise, Paris, 1974. 
18. Le Monde, June 25-26 1978. 
19. Le Journaliste, No. 156, June-July-August 1976. 
20. Jean-Claude Alt4resco, charge d'4tudes at the SIT. 
See also International Institute of Communications, The financing of 
community and public access channels on cable television networks in 
member countries of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Council of 
Europe, CCC/DC (76) 97-E, 1977, p. 16. 
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In September 1977 the Government published two decrees regulating the 
use of cable television. 
21 Under the terms of the first decree a national 
committee for cable networks was set up. This committee, which was due 
to meet at least once a year, has the purely technical task of ensuring 
that the choices made by TDF and the Ministry of Posts with regard to cable 
equipment are compatible. 
22 The committee has no mandate to encourage the 
development of cable television. The s'cond decree concerned the use to be 
made of the local cable networks. The major provision of this decree was 
that these networks should be used exclusively for the distribution of 
programmes transmitted by the state broadcasting companies or "in due 
course by foreign broadcasting stations". Thus, the decree reinforces the 
control of TDF over the cable networks to the exclusion of any local 
participation. Moreover, the cable networks are to be used purely as a 
technical aid to the broadcasting of the programmes of the state tele- 
vision companies and foreign stations in areas of poor reception. 
This limited role assigned to the cable networks reflected the 
President's lack of support for any local initiatives. Thus, in an 
interview published in Telg-7-jours in early 1976 the President affirmed: 
"I think that at the moment we should think about whether we 
have to keep on multiplying ad infinitum the range of mass media. 
The risk in fact is that the organs of information destroy each 
other, as we can see happening with the present difficulties of the 
press. The three state television channels have not yet reached 
a stage of full development. Therefore, we have to wait for the full 
use of the present media before asking the question about the future 
role of alternative media. 
Questioner: Nonetheless, can cable television not be used 
immediately in those regions where geographical conditions prevent 
the comfortable reception of the hertzian waves? 
President: Of course. The technique of cable television may 
be used in this case. But cable television understood as a 
supplementary local medium of communication is not a major priority. " 
23 
21. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decrees no. 77-1097 and 77-1098 of 
September 2 1977. 
22. Since in January 1980 TDF was placed under the tutelage of the Ministry 
of Posts, Telegraphs and Telecommunications, the function of this 
committee already seems redundant. 
23. T614-7-jours, no. 821, February 7-13 1976. 
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Giscard d'Estaing's opposition to the development of cable 
television as a local medium was based partly on the difficulties 
such a measure would create for the regional press and the competition 
it would generate for the state television channels. Both of these 
media stood to lose as disseminators of information and beneficiaries 
of advertising revenue. The opposition of the regional press to cable 
television certainly seemed to play an important role in preventing the 
latter's development. 24 Moreover, the Government had no desire to 
encourage the production and programming of local television programmes 
which might prove politically embarrassing. This was particularly 
the case in the period leading up to the 1978 legislative elections 
with candidates of the majorite under strong attack in many 
constituencies. In any case, however, cable television was unable 
to find sufficient financial resources to take off without the need for 
subsidies from either central government or the local authorities. 
Lacking adequate commercial appeal and in the absence of any encouragement 
from the Government, therefore, the proclaimed cable television revolution 
fizzled out in France, as it was also to do in other Western European 
countries. 
Local radio 
With the complete halt on the development of cable television as a 
local medium, the challenge to the state broadcasting monopoly and to the 
centralist state networks moved to the field of radio. This challenge 
has come not from the peripheral radio stations, but from small pirate 
stations transmitting from within French territory on a local basis. 
24. On the attitude of the regional press towards cable television see 
P. Caffin, "Teledistribution et presse regionale, " in Communications 
no. 21,1974. 
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These pirate stations sprung up during 1977-78 at a time when 
technological advances had made the transmission equipment cheap to buy 
and easy to operate. Moreover, the example of the Citizens' Band 
in the United States and of the private radio stations in Italy provided 
models of decentralised broadcasting for the French to emulate. Largely 
excluded from access to the state broadcasting services, small highly 
motivate political groups among others retaliated by setting up their own 
alternative media. 
The examples of Great Britain and Italy contrasted sharply with 
the situation in France. At that time there was no local radio in France. 
Regional radio, which comes under the responsibility of FR3, covers a 
much wider geographical area than would local radio stations. In any 
event the contribution of regional radio to the total broadcast output 
is quite limited. While at first sight the figure of 25,000 hours per 
year broadcast by regional radio seems impressive, it should be re- 
membered that this represents only around 1,500 hours a year per regional 
radio station, or approximately four hours a day. 
25 Regional radio as 
presently conceived in France is, in short, a supplementary service for 
national radio rather than a fully fledged competitor. 
26 
Reacting against this centralised control of broadcasting, various 
groups and individuals established their own pirate radio stations in 
1977" The total number of pirate stations probably exceeded 100 
by early 1978 though it is impossible, given the rapidity with which 
some stations were set up and then disbanded, to estimate their numbers 
accurately. The Paris region alone had about 20 stations, while in the 
rest of France the pirates were concentrated mainly though not exclusively 
25. Le Monde, May 14-15 1978. 
26. On the limited role of FR3 as a regional radio and television channel 
see R. Cayrol, "Le cas de la France: en attendant is. decentralisatioXV, 
unpublished paper, September 1978, D. Descollines, "Propos sur 
la 
television regionale", Prolet, no. 112, February 1977; and Presse 
Actualite, no. 118, April 1977, pp. 36-39" 
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in major urban centres. 
27 
The first pirate station to begin broadcasting was Radio Verte which 
was set up in Paris in spring 1977 as one of the mouthpieces of the ecolog- 
ical movement. 
28 Other ecological stations were set up soon afterwards in 
other parts of France including Radio Verte Fessenheim (Alsace), Radio 
Soleil (Montpellier) and Radio Polyphýbme (Lyon). The example set by the 
ecologists was soon copied by other groups including feminists (Les 
radiotteuses), homosexuals (Radio Fil Rose) and commercial interests 
(Genration 2000). 
This overt challenge to the state broadcasting monopoly compelled 
the Government and the traditional political forces to clarify publicly 
their positions on the legal framework for broadcasting. Prior to the 
1978 legislative elections the Government reacted fairly circumspectly, 
jamming the broadcasts of the pirate stations without in the main taking 
those responsible for the illegal broadcasts to court. Though wishing 
to enforce the monopoly the Government did not wish to alienate 
potentially crucial sectors of the electorate such as the ecologists in 
what all polls forecast would be a closely contested election. Moreover, 
in case of defeat the parties of the governing coalition might wish to 
make use of radio outside the state broadcasting services, since the 
latter would be in the hands of the left. 
However, following the victory of the governing coalition these 
electoral considerations quickly evaporated. Just one week after the 
second ballot the Government published a decree, which had been in 
preparation well over a year, specifying the few limited exceptions 
27. See appendix 12. iv. 
28. On Radio Verte see Lib4ration March 18,19-20,22,29, May 11+-15, 
16,17 and 1F1977. See also S. Crossman, "The Greens", 
Co-Evolution Quarterly, 1977-78 
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allowed to the state monopoly of transmission and programming. 
29 These 
exceptions included broadcasts to a predetermined audience such as at 
conferences, close circuit television and broadcasts made for the purposes 
of scientific research or in the interests of national security. Since 
they were not explicity included in the list of permitted exceptions, the 
pirate radio stations found their illegality confirmed. 
The mainstream political parties had, as one might expect, differing 
reactions to the phenomenon of the pirate stations. Moreover, they were 
frequently internally divided regarding their views on the state monopoly. 
For example, the Gaullist party had traditionally been a resolute defender 
of the state broadcasting monopoly and had favoured its maintenance during 
the 1974 reform debate. Faced with the challenge of the pirates, however, 
the Gaullists were disunited. For example, Le Tac among others continued 
to defend the principle of the state monopoly as the best means of 
guaranteeing a public service broadcasting system. Le Tac favoured the 
creation of local radios within the framework of the state monopoly to be 
administered by a holding company in each region made up of representatives 
of Radio France, FR3 and TDF. 
30 
Officially, however, the policy of the Gaullist party on local radio 
was put forward by Vivien in the debate in the National Assembly in June 
1978 on the enforcement of the monopoly. Vivien's proposal was that 
the State should retain the monopoly of transmission, which meant control 
of technical infrastructure and allocation of frequencies. The monopoly 
of programming, however, should be abolished. An authority should be set 
up to allocate licences to local radio stations. These transmitting 
licences would be accompanied by a cahier des charges and would be revoked 
29. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree no. 78-379 of March 20 
1978. 
30. Le Figaro, May 29 1978. 
See also Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1978-1979, 
no. 999, Proposition de loi relative ä l'organisation des radios 
locales, presentee par Joel Le Tac et al, annexe au proces-verbal de 
la seance du 24 avril 1979. 
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in the event of the station not respecting the public service obligations 
set out in its cahier des charges. The stations would not own their 
transmitters but would hire them from the state transmission company who 
would be responsible for the actual transmission of the broadcasts. The 
stations would be financed from advertising revenue and controlled by 
representatives of the local authorities and the press. 
31 
This proposal of the Gaullist party indicated a significant move away 
from support of the state broadcasting monopoly towards a more flexible 
policy which would allow outside bodies such as the regional press to gain 
a foothold in the broadcasting field. It was accompanied by recommendaticns 
to allow the peripheral radio stations to establish transmitters on French 
soil and to give one of the state television channels a status not unlike 
that of ITV in Great Britain. 
32 
In contrast to the Gaullists the Giscardians have traditionally 
favoured the establishment of a commercial television channel to compete 
against the state channels. Moreover, prior to the 1978 elections various 
members of the Giscardian Republican party explicitly demonstrated their 
support for the abolition of the monopoly and the creation of independent 
local radio stations. 
33 In Montpellier local Giscardians event went so far 
as to set up their own pirate station, Radio Fil Bleu, in July 1977. The 
31. Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, June 8 
1978, pp. 2617-2619. 
32. See articles entitled "Pour une nouvelle politique" by Jean-Claude 
Servan-Schreiber, RPR spokesman on broadcasting, in Le Monde, 
August 21 and 22 1979. 
33. Le Monde, May 21-22 1978 
See also Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale 1977-1978, no. 
431. Proposition de loi tendant a modifier les lois no. 72-553 du 
3 juillet 1972 et 74-696 du 7 aout 1974, pr4sentee par Alain Madelin- 
et al, annexe au proces-verbal de la seance du 22 juin 1978. 
This private member's bill favoured the creation of local radio stat ns 
with public service obligations, financed from advertising revenue and 
open to the financial participation of the regional press. This 
proposal if adopted would have allowed the creation of local radios 
along the lines of independent local radio in Great Britain. 
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honorary president of the station was Francois Delmas, a member of the 
Republican party's national council and a former mayor of Montpellier 
before his defeat by the left in the 1977 municipal elections. 
A supporter of commercial broadcasting, Delmas wanted to use Radio 
Fil Bleu to help in his campaign, which proved successful, to capture the 
parliamentary seat from the left in the 1978 legislative elections. More 
generally, it is likely that Radio Fil Bleu was a trial balloon to pave the 
way for the introduction of independent radio in the event of a left-wing 
victory in the 1978 elections and the transfer of the state broadcasting 
services to Socialist-Communist control. Whether Giscard d'Estaing tacitly 
supported the initiative or not, it was noticeable that following the 
victory of the governing coalition in 1978 Delmas was brought into the 
Government as Secretary of State for the Environment. 
34 
The natural tendency of the Giscardians to exploit the situation 
created by the pirates to push for the privatisation of at least part of 
the state broadcasting services was offset by their loyalty to the President 
who in 1978, as in 1974, favoured the maintenance of the state monopoly. 
The President was naturally unwilling to disown his own broadcasting reform 
of only four years' standing and be seen to be reacting to events rather 
than controlling them, particularly as the challenge to the monopoly came 
largely from political outsiders. With no major elections due until 1981, 
Giscard d'Estaing could afford to clamp down on the pirate stations as a 
short-term response while preparing in his own time any future reorganisat- 
ion of broadcasting. 
Moreover, though certain commercial interests as well as the peripheral 
radio stations would have benefited from a relaxation of the monopoly, other 
powerful interests were campaigning for its retention. Foremost among this 
34. On Radio Fil Bleu see Le Monde, July 8, 10-11, 13 1977; Liberation, 
July 22 1977; and Le Quotidien de Paris, July 27 1977" 
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latter group was the management of the regional press who have consistently 
opposed the establishment of any independent radio on French soil for fear 
that this would adversely affect circulation figures and advertising 
revenue. Though the regional press has shown itself willing to participate 
financially in the establishment and control of local radio if necessary, 
it has consistently preferred that local radio stations should not be set 
up at all. 
35 If they were to be set up, the monopolistic position held by 
press groups in diverse regions of France would come under threat. 
Giscard d'Estaing himself appeared particularly aware of the opposition 
of the regional press to the abolition of the monopoly and the creation of 
some form of independent local radio. Thus, in early 1976, admittedly 
before the advent of the pirates, the President declared that he was op- 
posed to the establishment of local radio on the grounds that such a step 
would have serious consequences for the regional press which in contrast 
to the national press was in a financially healthy condition. 
36 
The divisions within the two main parties of the right were reflected 
in 1978 by shifting and often inconsistent policy stances adopted by the 
parties of the left. - Traditionally both the Socialist and Communist 
parties had been ardent supporters of the state broadcasting monopoly, 
favouring its retention in both 1972 and 1974. However, since 1974 the 
commitment of both parties to the state monopoly has been weakening, with 
the result that in 1978 neither appeared as committed to the principle as 
they had done in the past. 
35. Le Monde, June 16 and 17 1978. 
In 1980 the regional press was also opposed to the Government's plan 
to introduce local radio on an experimental basis within the framework 
of the state monopoly. Le Monde, January 26 1980. 
36. T614-7-fours, no. 821, February 7-13 1976. 
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In the case of the Socialist party one can trace the increasing dis- 
enchantment with the concept of the state monopoly back to the 1974 pres- 
idential elections. Disgruntled with the way in which a face-to-face inter- 
view between the two rival candidates, Mitterrand and Giscard d'Estaing, 
had been conducted on Radio Europe 1 on the eve of the second ballot, 
Maurice Seveno, the Socialist party's spokesman on broadcasting policy, drew 
up a plan for the establishment of a radio station in the Paris region under 
the control of the Socialist party. 
37 In defence of their project, which 
if it had come to fruition would have been a blatant infringement of the 
monopoly, the Socialists pointed out that the Government had itself breached 
the principle of the state monopoly by permitting the construction within 
French territory of a transmitter for the use of Radio-Monte-Carlo. 
The Socialist party project was in an advanced stage when, bowing 
to governmental pressure, it was postponed indefinitely. 
38 In any case 
the Socialists were by no means united in their attitude towards the 
establishment of their own radio station. Some members of the national 
executive remained attached to the concept of the monopoly as the best 
means of ensuring a public service broadcasting system. Others feared 
that the creation of such a radio station would lead to retaliation by 
other political parties, not least the Communists, and the start of a 
propaganda war over the airwaves. It was also feared that this breach in 
the monopoly would open broadcasting to commercial interests which naturally 
the Socialist party wished to avoid. 
39 
Following the defeat of the left in the 1978 elections the policy of 
37. Le Monde, January 23, March 13 and 28 and August 8 1975;, 
Temoignage Chr4tien, August 14 1975; and Presse Actualite, no. 99, 
March 1975, pp. 2-3. 
38. Le Monde, November 7 1975 
39. Interview with Jean-Pierre Locatelli, January 14 1977. 
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the Socialist party on the issue of the state broadcasting monopoly had to 
take account of the fact that the party's hopes of governmental office were 
now postponed until the 1981 presidential elections at the earliest. In 
the National Assembly debate in June 1978, however, the policy of the 
Socialist party was rather vague. The Socialists opposed three possible 
options: the establishment of local radio under the control of commercial 
interests, the State or the relevant municipal authority. They favoured 
the creation of local radio stations within the framework of the public 
service to be financed from public funds. Each radio station would have a 
cahier des charges which would define its public service obligations. The 
stations would be placed under the overall supervision of a tripartite body 
composed of representatives of the State, the local collectivity and the 
listeners. However, the Socialists recognised that their proposals were 
by no means finalised, since they proposed that their policy recommendations 
be put into operation on an experimental basis for a period of two to three 
years to allow for further research on the subject. 
40 
The Communist party, on the other hand, was more specific. It too 
favoured the maintenance of a public service broadcasting system though 
not necessarily within the framework of the state monopoly. In the June 
1978 debate the Communists proposed that local radios be established under 
the overall control of the relevant municpal authority, a policy option 
which was particularly favourable to the Communists after their victories 
along with the Socialists in the 1977 municipal elections. Each radio 
station would have its own board of governors composed of representatives 
of the local authority, the staff and the listeners. The radios would be 
40. Journal Officiel Debats Parlementaires Assemblge Nationale, June 8 
1978, pp. 2616-2617. 
By late 1978 the policy of the Socialist party had altered somewhat 
to allow advertising on any local radio stations set up. These 
stations would still have to conform to public service obligations. 
"Rapport du parti socialiste sur la radio-television" published as a 
supplement to Le going et la rose, no. 77, December 1978, pp. 17-19. 
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financed from public funds. 
41 
It would appear that the mainstream political parties were caught 
unawares by the advent of pirate radio, with the result that their 
responses were frequently vague and fluid. The rapidity of development 
in broadcasting technology had not been matched by the relevant policy- 
makers within the parties. The Government too was caught out by this 
challenge to the state monopoly. In a controversial test case at the 
end of 1977 Radio Fil Bleu was found not guilty of infringing the 
42 
monopoly legislation, a decision upheld in the appeal court in May 1978. 
As a direct result of the verdict in the Radio Fil Bleu case the 
Government decided to introduce supplementary legislation to plug the 
loophole in the 1974 statute. The Government's bill was introduced in 
Parliament in June 1978. It contained a single article which stated 
that any person who in violation of the state broadcasting monopoly 
transmitted a radio or television programme would be subject to a term 
of imprisonment of between one and twelve months and/or a fine of 
between 10,000 and 100,000 francs. In addition, the transmission 
equipment would be impounded by the authorities. The Gaullists and 
Giscardians supported the Government's bill, though neither did so 
wholeheartedly. The Socialist and Communist parties opposed it. A 
Senate amendment declaring an amnesty on all offences committed under 
41. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale 1977-1978, no. 
21, Proposition de loi tendant a mettre en place des radios 
locales dans le cadre du service public, presentee par Jack 
Ralite et al., annexe au proces-verbal de la s6ance du 22 
juin 1978. 
42. For the text of the judgements see M. Fansten, Le debat sur 
les radios locales, Paris, La documentation frangaise, 1979, 
pp. 21-22 
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the previous legislation before July 1 1978 was accepted by the 
Government and included in the statute which was published on July 
28 1978.43 
The future of the pirate stations in the summer of 1978 looked, 
therefore, to be very bleak. In their attempt to persuade the Government 
and Parliament to allow the creation of local radio stations outside 
the structure of the state broadcasting services the pirate stations 
were hampered by their lack of unity. At least three separate groups 
of pirate stations were discernible, frequently directing their fire 
against each other rather than concentrating all their efforts on 
persuading the Government to accede to their demands. 
These three groups consisted of an organisation which favoured 
the creation of commercial stations, Consensus liberte radio; a federation 
of pirate stations which eschewed any concession to commercial interests 
and was particularly opposed to the use of advertising revenue to 
finance local radio, la federation des radios libres non commerciales; 
and an association which adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards the 
question of the role of local radio and which while not opposed to 
revenue from advertising was not committed to the commercialisation of 
local radio, l'Association pour la Liberation des Ondes (AID). 
In an attempt to strengthen the case in favour of independent local 
radio, Consensus liberte radio and ALO united forces in the period prior 
to the parliamentary debate on the broadcasting monopoly. A liaison 
body was established which produced a manifesto outlining the main 
policy options favoured by the two pressure groups. This manifesto 
proposed the maintenance of the state monopoly at the national level 
only. Local independent radio stations would be allowed. Frequencies 
43. See appendix 12. v. 
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would be allocated by an independent committee composed of representatives 
of the regional council, the trade unions, the listeners, the transmission 
company, the postal ministry and the radio stations themselves. The 
independent radio stations would have limited transmission power and would 
be bound by public service obligations. Each controlling group would be 
limited to one transmitter so as to prevent private companies from 
establishing their own commercial monopolies in a region. Finance would 
come from a combination of listeners' subscriptions, donations, subsidies 
and local advertising revenue. 
44 
The federation nationale des radios libres non commerciales grouped 
together about thirty radio stations, in general the most socially and 
politically committed of the pirates. 
45 
Prior to the introduction of the 
supplementary legislation in 1978 this federation proposed a moratorium 
lasting two years during which the pirate stations would be allowed to 
operate under the following conditions: the power of any transmitter was 
not to exceed 200 watts; no commercial advertising was to be allowed; and 
a technical charter was to be drawn up to establish a fair distribution 
of frequencies. 
46 
The main bones of contention between the federation nationale on the 
one hand and AIA and Consensus liberte radio on the other centred on the 
political role of the radio stations and their means of finance. The 
federation nationale wanted the pirate stations to play an active 
political role, while the other two groups eschewed such overt political 
! 
44. Bureau de liaison ALO et Consensus Radios locales et independantes 
dossier d'information destine ä Mesdames et Messieurs les Senateurs 
et D4put s, Paris, 1978. 
45. See table 12. vi.;. 
ý 
tr: 46. Bulletin of the Federation nationale des radios libres non 
commerciales. :;. 
" 
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commitment. On the question of finance the fedgration nationale 
was opposed to commercial advertising, while AID and Consensus liberte 
radio were both willing to allow advertising, albeit with certain 
restrictions. 
The pressure groups for the pirate stations were not only divided 
among themselves. They also failed to build any links with the well- 
established broadcasting trade unions. For example, while the SURT- 
CFDT was a strong critic of the Government's perceived abuse of the 
state monopoly for its own political ends, it nonetheless showed 
extreme scepticism towards the pirate stations. In particular, it 
feared that if the pirates were legalised then commercial interests 
would immediately step in to fill the breach made by the abolition of 
the state monopoly. The SURT-CFDT supported the concept of a public 
service broadcasting system, decentralised so as to allow the 
effective expression of as many groups as Possible. 
47 
The SNRT-CGT 
also adopted a sceptical attitude towards the pirate stations, fearing 
the intervention of commercial interests if the state monopoly were 
abolished. It sought to place more emphasis on the need to democratise 
the state services rather than setting up independent stations in 
competition with the state services. 
48 
Weakened by disunity among themselves and lacking any organic links 
with either the main broadcasting unions or the parties of the left, 
the pressure groups for the pirate stations were in a hopeless position 
to seek to influence the Government in the drafting of its proposed 
legislation. However, the passing of the supplementary legislation in 
47. Le Monde, June 6 1978. However in 1979 the SIIRT-CFDT was more 
sympathetic to the demands of the pirate stations and regarded 
them as a means of breaking what it regarded as the State's 
stranglehold over broadcasting. 
48. Le Monde, July 27 1977. 
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the summer of 1978 did not resolve the problem of the future of the 
state broadcasting monopoly. Nor could it realistically have been 
expected to do so, since the new law was a short-term punitive response 
to the immediate problem posed by the pirates. 
Pirate radio stations have not disappeared because of the new 
legislation. While some stations ceased broadcasting in 1978, others 
carried on in defiance of the law. Moreover, during 1979 the appearance 
of two pirate stations in particular showed that the debate on altern- 
atives to the state and peripheral radio stations was by no means at an 
end. 
The first of these two stations was set up by the local branch of 
the CGT in Longwy, a Lorraine steel town badly affected by the recession 
in the world steel industry. This pirate radio, baptised Lorraine 
Coeur d'Acier, transmitted regularly throughout 1979 and successfully 
resisted attempts by the authorities to close the station down. In fact, 
mindful of the political sensitivity of the steel issue, the authorities 
appeared to be dragging their feet on the question of enforcing the law 
against what by all accounts was a very popular radio station in the 
locality. 
49 
Encouraged by the success of Lorraine Coeur d'Acier the 
CGT set up other pirate stations in different regions of France, some 
of which were raided by the authorities in 1980.50 
The second pirate station to receive maximum publicity during 
1979 was Radio-Riposte, which was set up by the Socialist party in 
49. Le Monde, May 19, June 3-4 and 16, and November 7 1979; 
L'Humanite, June 14,15 and 25 1979; Liberation, August 15 1979; 
and Presse Actualite, no. 142, January 198b, pp. 25-29. 
Lorraine Coeur d'Acier was reputed to have an audience rating of 
45% during 1979. Le Monde, January 27 1980. 
The local branch of the CFDT had already established their own 
private radio in Longwy, Radio SOS Emploi. See Claude Collin, 
Ecoutez la vraie difference:, Claix, la pensee sauvage, 1979- 
50. The other CGT radio stations set up in late 1979 included Radio 
in uin, Radio 2, Radio 93, Radio Action CGT Radio 6 Radio SAM 
and Radio Paris The transmission equipment of RadioQuinguin and 
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protest against "government interference" in the state broadcasting 
media. Though transmitting only infrequently, Radio-Riposte became 
front page news in the French press in the summer of 1979 when the 
Socialist party headquarters in Paris were forcibly invaded by 
police searching for the transmission equipment. Several prominent 
members of the Socialist party, including its leader Mitterrand, 
were summoned to appear in court for infringement of the state monopoly. 
51 
Despite the 1978 legislation, therefore the state broadcasting 
monopoly is still under attack. Having failed to prop it up with 
purely repressive measures, the Government decided at the end of 1979 
to establish experimental local radio stations under the control of 
the state radio company, Radio France. Thus, the Government is 
attempting in a very limited fashion to accommodate the demand for 
local broadcasting within the framework of the state monopoly while 
at the same time enforcing the 1978 legislation wherever feasible. 
This mixture of repression and accommodation would appear to be a 
similar strategy to that followed in the 1960s by the BBC when, after 
the commercial pirate stations had been banned, the BBC's radio 
services were reorganised to fill the pop music gap left by the 
disappearance of the pirates. 
52 
50. Lorraine Coeur d'Acier at Nancy was seized by the authorities 
(cont. ) in early June 19 0. Le Monde, June 8-9,1980. 
51. Le Monde June 30, July 1-2, August 16 and 25 and November 16 
1979; 
Le Mating June 29, August 10 and 25 1979; 
Liberation, June 29, August 24 and 27 1979; and 
Le Point, no. 363, September 3-9 1979. 
52. On the new local radio experiments see Le Monde December 5 and 
15 1979, February 29, March 25, April 20-21, May 16,21 and 
24 1980. 
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Radio France is obviously very keen to have local radio establ- 
ished under its control. Not only would this extend its range of 
services, but it would also help correct the Parisian bias in the 
company's organisational structure. The allocation of the regional 
radio services in 1974 to FR3 rather than to Radio France has been a 
source of conflict between the two programme companies ever since, with 
Radio France claiming that its lack of radio services below the national 
level seriously hampered its ambition to provide a comprehensive radio 
service. 
53 If the Government were to give the go-ahead to a policy 
of local radio within the framework of the state monopoly, and this 
seems the likeliest development in the short term, Radio France would 
be the major beneficiary, while the opposition of the regional press 
to independent local radio could also be accommodated. 
Conclusion 
The state broadcasting monopoly, though challenged throughout 
the 1970s, still remained in existence at the end of the decade. 
In the field of television the state television companies have 
remained more or less immune to external competition. There is 
no commercial television channel operating within French territory, 
53. See interview with Jacqueline Baudrier in Press Actualite, 
no. 127, April 1978, p. 52. 
54. On the question of local radio in France there is little 
secondary source material. Le Monde and Libgration are the 
best newspapers on the subject. 
See also M. Fansten, op. cit., for a useful documentary 
summary of the issues involved; P. Flichy and M. Sauvage, 
"Les radios locales", paper presented to a conference on new 
developments in the (French) press, radio and television, 
Paris, 1978; Press Actualit4, no. 112, September-October 1976 
and no. 142, January 1980; and Collectif radios libres 
populaires, Les radios libres, Paris, Maspero, 1978. 
-535- 
despite various attempts to have one established. Another potential 
threat to the predominance of the state television companies, cable 
television, has not fulfilled its early promise. Therefore, only in 
certain frontier regions can French viewers watch programmes from 
a source other than the three state companies. In these regions, 
which cover about 30 departments, programmes can be received from 
different foreign television channels. 
55 In addition, some French 
viewers can receive programmes from the peripheral television companies 
Tele Luxembourg and Tele-Monte-Carlo, both of which transmit from just 
outside French territory. 
56 Nonetheless, for the majority of the 
French population the present choice in television viewing lies 
between TF1, A2 and FR3. 
In the field of radio French listeners can receive national 
programmes from the state radio company, Radio France, and regional 
broadcasts from the state programme company, FR3. The State's 
legal monopoly in radio transmission and programming is infringed 
by the peripheral stations, which have, however, become a de facto 
part of that monopoly. Recently this monopoly has come under attack 
from pirate stations, with the Government reacting, first, by 
introducing repressive measures to shore up the monopoly, and secondly, 
by trying to accommodate the demands for local radio through the 
establishment of experimental stations under the control of Radio France 
The future of the state broadcasting monopoly, however, is 
uncertain. The recent transfer of the transmission company to the 
55. In Alsace, for example, viewers can receive up to 11 different 
television channels. 
Paris-Match, no. 1551, February 16 1979. 
56. See table 12. ii for the shareholdings of the French state in 
peripheral television. 
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tutelage of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telecommunications 
reinforces the view that the State has no intention of giving up its 
monopoly of transmission. 
57 The overall control of the technical 
infrastructure, whether in the form of land transmitters or broad- 
casting satellites, will remain firmly in the hands of the State via 
TDF. 
On the other hand, the monopoly of programming has now become an 
area of contention with none of the four main political formations 
favouring its retention. Instead they have all embraced the much 
vaguer concept of the public service, which is open to a wide variety 
of interpretation. 
58 This change of emphasis reflects disillusionment 
on the part of some with the way in which the state monopoly has been 
controlled, and the belief shared by most that with the advent of 
new technology the monopoly has now become an outmoded concept in any 
case. 
At present the monopoly of programming is threatened on two 
fronts. The first, as we have seen, is reflected in the demand for 
some form of local radio outside the state services. There is no evid- 
ence that the Government has any intention of giving way to these 
demands in the near future. On the contrary, public statements by 
government ministers point to the enforcement of the state monopoly 
and at most a possible extension of the services provided by Radio 
France. 59 
57. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, decree of January 16 1980. 
58. While "state monopoly" refers to the organisation of broadcasting, 
"public service" refers to its goals and ethos. For example, 
Great Britain has a public service broadcasting system organised 
in the duopoly of the BBC and IBA. 
59. See statements by Jean Lecat, Christian Bonnet and Raymond Barre 
in Le Monde, September 5,6 and 9-10 1979 
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The second threat to the programming monopoly, this time in 
the provision of television services, may come with the arrival of 
satellite broadcasting. The French and German governments have al- 
ready agreed to combine forces on the construction of direct broad- 
casting satellites. 
60 
At present it is intended that the French 
satellite will be in operation by the mid-1980s. While this satellite 
would obviate the need for the construction of more land transmitters, 
it would also provide an extra channel for the transmission of 
television programmes. 
Of the three channels available two will be used by TF1 and A2, 
FR3's regional vocation making transmission by satellite impossible. 
61 
The Government has not yet decided who, if anyone, will benefit from 
the vacant channel, though at one stage Radio Television Luxembourg 
was reputed to be interested. 
62 
However, though the channel will 
probably be financed from advertising, it is too early to say what 
effect it will have on the State's monopoly of programming. Technical 
and financial considerations apart, the presidential elections of 1981 
and legislative elections of 1983 may well have led to another re- 
organisation of state broadcasting before satellite broadcasting 
even gets off the ground. 
60. Le Monde, October 4 1979. 
61. A de Tarle, "France struggles to control the new technologies", 
Intermedia, vol. 8 no. 3, May 1980. 
62. Le Monde, March 4-5 1979. See also T4legual, no. 6., April 1979" 
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CONCLUSION 
The objectives of this thesis were to examine critically the 1974-75 
reorganisation of the state broadcasting services in France and to 
evaluate the consequences of this reform for the relationship between 
the Government and broadcasting during the early years of the Giscardian 
presidency. We have intentionally viewed this reorganisation from a 
political rather than historical, sociological or jurisprudential 
perspective, by placing the reform within the context of the election 
of the first non-Gaullist President of the Fifth Republic and the 
ensuing conflict within the governing Gaullist-Giscardian coalition. 
With regard to government-broadcasting relations a major conclusion 
to emerge from our research is that controls over the political output 
of the state broadcasting services since 1974 have been to a large extent 
internalised within the broadcasting companies. The crude direct 
interventionism of the Ministry of Information, which characterised the 
period of de Gaulle's presidency, is no longer a feature of this 
relationship. Instead there is an increasing reliance on indirect controls, 
particularly via partisan appointments to the key managerial and editorial 
posts in the new companies. - 
The results of our research cast grave doubt on the terms in which 
the debate on government-broadcasting relations in liberal democracies is 
usually conducted. Neither of the two antithetical models frequently 
employed in this debate, the"fourth estate" and "state control" models, 
seems a satisfactory description when applied to government broadcasting 
relations in France during the Fifth Republic. 
The fourth estate model, underpinned by the twin concepts of the 
Fi 
t 
ý1 
independence of the broadcasters on the one hand and the impartiality of 
>J7 
the political output on the other, has never been applicable to 
government-broadcasting relations in France since 1958. Various 
studies have shown this for the period up to 197+. 
1 
While according 
to government spokesmen and the President of the Republic himself the 
197+ reform was intended to establish a fourth estate type relationship 
between the Government and broadcasting, and the terminology of the 
companies' cahiers des charges reflects this apparent desire, our research 
has demonstrated that this goal is very far from being achieved. We have 
shown in this thesis the multiplicity of the links between the Government 
and the new broadcasting companies, whose interdependence is not based 
on anything resembling a balance of power relationship. 
The Government has at its disposal a variety of means through which 
to control those aspects of broadcasting in which it has an interest. 
This thesis has studied in detail those areas of control where the 
Government plays a primordial role, from determining the legal framework 
for broadcasting to ensuring that political sympathisers are appointed 
to key posts in company news departments. 
The other actors involved in the contribution of the state broadcasting 
companies to the political communications process are subject to a variety 
of constraints. For example, the Haut Conseil de l'Audiovisuel and the 
Quality Committee are not directly involved in the running of the companies. 
The broadcasting unions have been weakened, first, by the reorganisation 
itself and, secondly, by specific measures designed to reduce their capacity 
for effective corporate action. The radio and television journalists 
have been the victims of successive purges in 1968,1972 and 1974. In the 
light of these experiences and with a-high rate of unemployment in their 
1. See among others R. Thomas, broadcasting and Democracy in France, 
London, Crosby Lockwood Staples, 1976; J. Thibau, La television, 
le touvoir et 1'argent, Paris, Calmann Levy, 1973; and the Diligent 
report, 1968. 
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profession, the journalists, even if they wished to do so, could 
scarcely be expected to present an effective counter-balance to the 
Government and the broadcasting management. In any case the hierarchical 
structure of the news departments militates against the possible 
effectiveness of opposition within the companies. The civil servants of 
the Service Juridique et Technique de l'Information have very little 
to do with the running of the broadcasting companies. The boards of 
governors exercise very little power in practice and are in any case 
dominated by persons appointed directly or indirectly by the Government. 
Parliament has neither the power, the time, nor the information to challenge 
the dominance of the executive in this policy area. Finally, the 
broadcasting management are tied to the Government through the system 
of partisan appointments, which tends to ensure a convergence of interests 
between the two bodies. In any case if for some reason their performance 
is deemed to be unsatisfactory, the chairman, news director and other 
holders of key posts can be dismissed with a minimum of fuss "pour 
encourager les autres. " The example of Jullian is a case in point. 
In short, the broadcasting management lack the independent power base 
necessary for the fourth estate model even to begin to work in practice. 
In rejecting the applicability of the fourth estate model, however, 
we cannot accept as satisfactory the alternative model of state control, 
which is too static and monolithic for our purposes, unable to allow 
for change except of a totally radical kind. Our empirical examination 
of broadcasting in France has highlighted certain deficiencies of this 
model, particularly its imprecision since as it stands it could be 
applied to government-broadcasting relations during the whole of the 
Fifth Republic. Yet this thesis has shown that this relationship has 
altered greatly in form and to a limited extent in substance over this 
period. In particular, the state control model underestimates or ignores 
the importance of the following three features of government-broadcasting 
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relations which have emerged from our research. 
First, the state control model tends to present the governing 
coalition in France as a more homogeneous entity than in fact it is. 
One main theme running through this thesis has been the conflict between 
the Giscardian and Gaullist components of this coalition, especially 
highlighted in the chapters on the origins of the 197+ reform, appointments 
and news programmes. This thesis has provided a case-study of the 
change in the balance of power within the governing coalition following 
the victory of Giscard d'Estaing in the 197+ presidential elections. 
In fact, we have argued that the break-up of the ORTF was itself 
primarily a political act best understood within this context. Since the 
ORTF was a powerful symbol of the so-called Gaullist state, its abolition 
marked the end of the Gaullist domination of ministerial, administrative 
and para-administrative posts which had lasted since 1958 and the advent 
to power of a different, not to say antagonistic, tendency within the 
French right. 
2 It might even be contended that the nature of the 
reform, a mixture of liberalism and dirigisme, was an accurate reflection 
of the new President's ideological stance. 
Secondly, the state control model fails to take account of changes 
in the areas and degrees of control exercised. Yet as we have argued 
the type of overt, external control exerted over news programming during 
de Gaulle's presidency has no parallel in the present government-broadcasting 
relationship. Moreover, if one examines the financial arrangements of 
the state broadcasting services one can see a similar shift of emphasis 
away from the micro level of individual programme budgets to the macro 
level of the company. Therefore, there have been changes in the nature 
of the government-broadcasting relationship during the Fifth Republic, 
and particularly since the 1974 reform, which are glossed over by the 
state control model. 
2. On the right in France see R. Remond, La droite en France Paris, 
Montaigne, 1968 and M. Anderson, Conservative politics in France, 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1974. 
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Finally, the state control model has little to say about the 
source of control. While we have argued that the Government working 
through a largely dependent broadcasting management is usually able 
to exercise control in those areas in which it has an interest, it is 
also clear that within the political executive the source of policy-making 
on the main decisions connected with the running of the state broadcasting 
companies is the President of the Republic. There has, therefore, been 
a transfer of power within the executive during the Fifth Republic from 
the Ministry of Information (1958-1969) to the Prime Minister's office 
(1969-1972) and finally to the Presidency of the Republic (1972 onwards) 
which has been consolidated by the 1974 reform. 
While the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the 
Minister of Culture and Communication have all played some role since 
1974 in supervising the drafting and implementation of particular 
decisions with regard to the running of the broadcasting companies, 
the source of the major policy decisions is the Elys4e. The content 
of the 1974 reform, appointments to key managerial and editorial posts 
within the state-companies and peripheral radio stations and the Government's 
continuing support for the principle of the state monopoly, all reflect 
the views of Giscard d'Estaing. 
This thesis, therefore, supports the view that the Fifth Republic 
has become increasingly presidential in character. De Gaulle's reserved 
domain of policy-making (covering foreign affairs, defence, and, of course, 
Algeria), which was enlarged under Pompidou, has become so all-encompassing 
under Giscard d'Estaing that it has now been dropped as a concept from 
political discourse in France. The present President of the Fifth Republic 
dominates the executive and the Giscardian component of the governing 
coalition, both in Parliament and in the country. Thus, within the 
executive there is no room for strong, independent ministers either at 
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Matignon, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence or the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time the Giscardian party, 
le Marti Republicain, remains a loose cadre party lacking a mass 
following. As such it cannot afford its general secretary, Jean-Pierre 
Soisson, who is in any case a close political friend of the President, 
a potential independent power base in the political system. 
The 1974 reform can be placed quite easily within this context 
of presidential dominance since the break-up of the ORTF itself removed 
one possible power base in French politics, the combined position of 
chairman and director general of a large state broadcasting organisation. 
Unlike Conte, for example, the chairmen of the seven separate companies 
established in 1974 lack the authority necessary to consider a challenge 
to the Presidency of the Republic, even if Conte's challenge in 1973 
ended in disaster. Moreover, it is noticeable that increasingly 
the state broadcasting media and peripheral radio stations have been 
colonised by close supporters of the President, including various former 
members of the Elysee staff. 
This thesis has demonstrated, therefore, the inadequacies of the 
fourth estate and state control models as descriptions of government- 
broadcasting relations in France since 1971. Our research has also 
shown the failure of the 1974 reform to resolve many of the problems 
which led to the break-up of the ORTF. For example, the Government 
hoped that the smaller units. created by the reorganisation would be 
more. efficient than the ORTF. While this has generally proved correct 
with regard to the programme companies, the production company has 
been a major victim of the reform; failing to establish a commercially 
viable position in the new broadcasting structure. Secondly, the 
Government maintained that the new companies would require fewer staff 
than the ORTF. Yet by 1979 the number of staff employed in the new 
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companies was greater than that working at the ORTF. Finally, with the 
strikes in the broadcasting companies in 1978-79 at the time of the SFP 
crisis, the level of strike activity in the new companies exceeded that 
which had triggered the decision to break up the ORTF. 
In addition, the reform was intended by the Government to encourage 
competition between the two major television companies in the belief that 
this would improve the quality of the output. In fact, not only has the 
supposed low level of programme quality been attacked from a variety of 
interested and disinterested sources, but the Government has been compelled 
to intervene to encourage greater creativity in programming and to protect 
interested parties such as television producers and actors from what 
they regard as unfair and excessive foreign competition. 
Finally, another objective of the reform was to open up broadcasting 
to a wider section of the population through, for example, the access 
programme, Tribune Libre, and a decentralisation of power to the regions. 
However, the concessions made to regional broadcasting are minimal. One 
response to the centralised nature of the state broadcasting companies 
has been the creation of pirate radio stations outside the state networks 
by groups who consider that they have been denied access on the official 
channels. Although hit by the supplementary legislation introduced in 
1978, these pirate stations have demonstrated that there exists a demand 
for communication at the local level to which the Government was in 1980 
finally forced to make an albeit limited response. 
The 1974 statute has not, therefore, removed broadcasing as an area 
of political contention in France. Debates about the most suitable 
organisational structure for the state broadcasting services were as 
prevalent at the end of the decade as they were at the beginning. In fact 
by the end of the 1970s the wheel had virtually turned full circle with 
the 1979 Cluzel report calling for the establishment of a central 
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body to coordinate the running of the separate companies as compared 
with the 1970 Paye report which recommended a greater degree of functional 
decentralisation within the ORTF under the overall control of a central 
organism. 
However, this sense of deiä vu can also be misleading, since the 
continuing debate about the organisational structure of broadcasting 
cannot merely replough the same ground. Thus, while at the beginning 
of the decade there was a large degree of consensus regarding the 
desirability of preserving the legal framework of the state monopoly, 
with the advent of new broadcasting technology the very existence of the 
state monopoly has been increasingly called into question. In these 
circumstances it remains to be seen to what extent the 1971+ statute 
will prove flexible enough to deal with the problems French broadcasting 
will have to face in the 1980s. 
Future research 
This thesis has concentrated on one particular aspect of the 
political communications process in France. Although we have tried 
to be as comprehensive as possible in our research, our study of the 
197+ broadcasting reform cannot be totally self-contained. Therefore, 
we have thought it useful to suggest possible future lines of inquiry 
which would complement our own research. Two in particular seem highly 
relevant. 
The first area of research would concentrate on the internal 
organisation of the separate broadcasting companies. If our thesis 
is correct that controls over broadcasting output, particularly news 
programmes, have been largely internalised within the companies, then 
there is an obvious need for a study of role allocation and patterns 
of behaviour within the companies. In particular, a lengthy observation 
study inside the news department of one or more of the programme companies 
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would be a useful complement to our research. There is already a 
tradition of inquiry in Great Britain on the sociology of broadcasting 
institutions which could be usefully employed as a basis for any research 
into the French companies. 
3 
A second line of research which would fit in with our own would be 
a content analysis of programming, particularly news programmes. A 
methodical analysis of radio and television news content over a specific 
time period might then be used to exemplify, or even falsify, some of the 
necessarily impressionistic conclusions about news content contained 
in this thesis. Once again there is a recent example of this tradition 
of inquiry in Great Britain with the publication of the findings of the 
Glasgow University Media Group 
! 
An observation study of the work of the news departments and a 
content analysis of their output pose problems of access, methodology 
and finance. If they were undertaken, however, they should make an 
important contribution to what has remained until now a largely 
unresearched area in France. Our research has, we hope, made its own 
contribution to our knowledge of government-broadcasting relations 
in France and more generally to our understanding of the Giscardian 
presidency. 
3. See T. Burns, The BBC: Public Institution and Private World, 
London, Macmillan, 1977; P. Schlesinger, rutting 'reality'together, 
London, Constable, 1978; and M. Tracey, The production of political 
television, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 
4+. Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News, London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1976 and More Bad News, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1980. 
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Appendix 1. 
Law no. 74-696 of August 7 1974 on the subject of radio and television1 
The National Assembly and the Senate have adopted, 
The President of the Republic promulgates the law the provisions 
of which follow: 
Article I: The national public service of French broadcasting 
assumes, within the limits of its competence, the 
task of fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the 
population, with regard to information, communication, 
culture, education, entertainment and the values of 
civilisation generally. It has as its objective in this re- 
gard to ensure that the exclusive pursuit of the general 
interests of the community prevails. 
It affords equal access to the expression of the 
principal trends of thought and major currents of 
opinion. Broadcasting time is placed regularly at 
their disposal. 
It participates in the spreading of French culture 
in the world. 
These responsibilities give it a duty to safeguard 
the quality and renown of the French language. 
Article 2: The Office de radiodiffusion-television francaise 
is abolished. 
The execution of the public service obligations and of 
the radio and television monopoly set out in article 1 
above and in article 2 of law no. 72-553 of July 3 1972, 
are entrusted to a state public corporation of an 
industrial and commercial character (4tablissement 
public de l'Etat a caractere industriel et commercial) 
and to national companies (socites nationales) in 
conditions fixed by the present law. 
Article 3: There is created an audiovisual institute with particular 
responsibilities for the conservation of archives, 
research in broadcasting creativity and professional 
training. 
This institute constitutes a public corporation of an 
industrial and commercial character. 
Article 4: I There is established a parliamentary delegation for 
French broadcasting. 
1. Journal Officiel, Lois et D9crets, Loi no. 74-696 du 7 aoüt 1974 
relative ä la radiodiffusion et ä la television. 
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This delegation carries out in particular the functions 
set out in article 164, paragraph IV, of ordinance 
no. 58-1374 of December 30 1958 and receives the special 
reports of the committee verifying the accounts of 
public companies (la commission de verification des 
comptes des entreprises publiques . 
It has as its function to give opinions (avis) to 
the Government in the following conditions: 
a) The delegation is compulsorily consulted on 
permitted exceptions (derogations) to the monopoly 
provided for in article 3 paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of 
law no. 72-553 of July 3 1972, on agreements reached 
by the public corporation and the companies created 
by the present law concerning the production, transmission 
and reproduction of programmes and in the other cases 
provided for by the present law; 
b) The delegation may be consulted or give its 
opinion on its own initiative in the areas covered 
by the present law. 
II. The parliamentary delegation is composed of: 
The general rapporteurs (rapporteurs generaux) of the 
finance committees of the two Assemblies, the special 
rapporteurs of the same committees and the rapporteurs 
of the cultural affairs committees concerned with 
broadcasting; 
Five deputies and three senators chosen in such a way 
as to ensure a balanced representation of the political 
groups. 
III. The delegation draws up its own internal rules. 
It gives account of its activities to the parliamentary 
assemblies and drafts an annual report which is laid 
before the assemblies at the opening of the first 
ordinary session. 
Chapter I 
The Public Transmission Corporation (L'etablissement 
public de diffusion) 
Article 5: A public corporation of an industrial and commercial 
character, benefiting from administrative and financial 
autonomy, has the tasks of ensuring the transmission of 
radio and television programmes in France and abroad and 
of organising, developing and maintaining the transmission 
networks and installations. 
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It has in particular the task of providing the necessary 
equipment to cover those areas which cannot yet receive 
the programmes of all the national companies. 
It undertakes research and cooperates in the setting of 
standards with regard to broadcasting equipment and 
material. 
Half of the board of governors is composed of persons 
representing the State. In addition the board includes 
two parliamentarians chosen respectively by the 
competent permanent committees of the National Assembly 
and the Senate as well as representatives of the national 
programme companies and two staff representatives of the 
corporation appointed from lists drawn up by the 
representative trade union organisations. 
The members of the board of governors exercise their 
mandate for three years. The term of office of the 
state representatives can be ended at any time. 
The chairman (president), chosen from among the members 
of the board of governors, and the director general 
are appointed for three years by decree in the council of 
ministers. 
Article 6: The resources of the Public Transmission Corporation 
include: 
1. The sum paid by the national programme companies 
to cover the cost of the transmission of their programmes 
and the money paid for services rendered whatever they 
may be, as well as capital assistance; 
2. A percentage of the licence revenue, calculated 
in such a way as to permit progressively the transmission 
of programmes over the whole of the territory of the 
Republic and abroad; 
3. The product of loans; 
4. The revenue from investments and authorised share- 
holdings; 
5. State subsidies; 
6. The product of gifts and legacies. 
The budget of the corporation is subject to approval. 
Chapter II 
The National Programme Companies (Les soci_tes nationales 
de programme) 
Section 1 
The national radio company. 
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Article 7: A national company is given the task of producing and 
programming radio programmes. 
It produces programmes and can hand over to a third party 
the rights which it possesses over these programmes. 
It manages and ensures the development of the orchestras 
both in Paris and in the provinces. 
Section 2 
The national television companies 
Article 8: Three national companies are given the task of the 
conception and programming of television programmes. 
They produce programmes and can hand over to a third 
party the rights which they possess over these programmes. 
Article 9: The chairmen (presidents) of the national television 
companies meet periodically to ensure the harmonisation 
of programmes. 
Article 10: One of the national companies reserves a privileged place 
for the programming of cinema films and for the organis- 
ation of programmes given over to the direct expression 
of different tendencies of creed and thought. It is given 
the task of managing and developing the regional radio 
and television centres. 
A consultative regional broadcasting committee is set up 
attached to each regional broadcasting centre. It is 
composed of personalities representative of the principal 
tendencies of thought and of the main groups which con- 
tribute to the economic, social and cultural life of 
the region. The composition of these committees is 
fixed by decree after the opinion (avis) has been given 
of the regional council or councils concerned. They 
include one third of locally elected politicians chosen 
by the departmental councils (conseils g6neraux) from 
among the mayors and departmental councillors (conseillers 
generaux). 
The body given the task of organising radio and television 
in the overseas departments and territories is attached 
to the national company mentioned in clause 1 according 
to provisions fixed by decree and by charter 
(cahier 
des charges), with the specific needs of these departments 
and territories taken into account. 
A consultative programme committee for the overseas 
departments and territories assists the chairman of 
the board of governors (le president du conseil 
d'ad ministration). It is made up of two members chosen 
by each of the departmental councils or territorial 
assemblies, of two persons appointed by ministerial 
decision (arrete) and of two parliamentarians chosen 
by their assembly. 
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Section 3 
Provisions common to the national programme companies 
Article 11: The board of governors of each company is composed of six 
governors: two representatives of the State, one parliament- 
arian, one representative of the press, one representative 
of the staff and a leading figure from the cultural world 
For the company mentioned in article 10, this person must 
come from the cinema industry. 
The members of the board of governors exercise their 
mandate for three years. 
The representative of the staff is appointed from a list 
drawn up by the trade union organisations representative 
of the staff. 
The chairman, chosen from among the members of the board 
of governors, is appointed for three years by decree in 
the council of ministers. He organises the management 
and appoints its members. 
Article 12: The State is the sole shareholder in the national programme 
companies. These companies are subject to the legislation 
on limited companies (societes anonymes), with the except- 
ion of any provisions of this legislation incompatible 
with the particular structure of the companies and the 
demands of their public service role. 
The powers of the general assembly of shareholders are 
exercised by the board of governors. It draws up the 
statutes which are approved by decree. 
Chapter III 
The Production Company 
Article 13: A production company, subject to the legislation on 
limited companies, without any exception other than those 
which result from the present law, makes film and video 
productions which it sells on a commercial basis notably 
to the programme companies. 
The shares of this company are registered. They can be 
held only by the State, other persons of public law 
(droit public), national companies or mixed economy 
companies societes d'economie mixte), the public capital 
being always over 50%. 
The statutes of the company are approved by decree. 
The appointment of the chairman and, if necessary, of 
the director general, as well as any increase or decrease 
in capital and any transfer of shares are submitted for 
approval to the Prime Minister or to a member of the 
Government appointed by him for this purpose. 
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Chapter IV 
Common provisions 
Section 1 
Role of the State 
Article 14: The Prime Minister or a member of the Government appointed 
by him for this purpose ensures the respect of the monopoly, 
supervises the observation by the public corporation and 
the national companies of their charters and, in general, 
of their public service obligations. 
Article 15: A charter (cahier des charges) drawn up by the Prime 
Minister or the minister appointed by him lays down, after 
the opinion (avis) of the parliamentary delegation for 
broadcasting has been given, for the public corporation 
and for each national company, to the exclusion of any 
pressure by private economic interests, the goals to be 
attained for the accomplishment of the public service 
obligations, especially the development of the networks 
and the minimum amount of programmes. 
The national company which manages the regional radio 
and television centres will broadcast its programmes 
either on the network of the former first channel or on 
that of the former second channel. 
The charter sets out their obligations in the fields 
of news and culture which must conform with the 
tasks laid down in article 1, especially through the 
transmission of lyrical, dramatic or musical works, 
produced by subsidised theatres, festivals or cultural 
bodies. It fixes their obligations with regard to 
external services and cooperation. 
In addition, it obliges the national television companies 
to favour by any means they judge appropriate inventiveness 
creativity and originality in programming. 
The charter includes minimum air time for political 
formations and representative professional organisations 
to express themselves freely. 
It determines the rules to which advertising is subject, 
respecting the limits laid down by article 22 and fixing 
the maximum amount of advertising revenue which can come 
from the same advertiser. 
The charter fixes the amount and the control of 
advertising in the overseas departments and territories. 
Article 16: The Government may at anytime require the programming 
and transmission of any declaration or communication 
which it considers necessary. These programmes are 
announced as being broadcast by order of the Government. 
The national companies are obliged to produce and to 
programme and the public corporation to transmit election 
campaign broadcasts. The facilities provided by the 
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national companies in this regard will be the subject 
of provisions contained in their charters. 
The coverage by radio or television of parliamentary 
debates is carried out under the control of the bureaux 
of each of these assemblies. 
Equality of air time is accorded the parliamentary groups 
of the majority (majorite) and the opposition. 
Section 2 
The tasks of the boards of governors 
Article 17: The boards of governors of the public transmission 
corporation and of the programme companies lay down 
the general guidelines of the activity of the corporation 
or the company within the confines of their charters. 
They vote the budget or the provisional account of 
income and expenditure which must be in balance; they 
supervise its execution. 
The boards of governors of the national radio and televis- 
ion companies guarantee the quality and morality of their 
programmes. They supervise the objectivity and accuracy 
of news broadcasts as well as guaranteeing access to the 
main tendencies of thought and major currents of opinion. 
Section 3 
Financial provisions 
Article 18: The provisional account of income and expenditure of 
each national programme company is passed to the 
Government for comment. 
Article 19: Each year, on the occasion of the voting of the finance 
act, Parliament, following the report of a member of 
each of the finance committees of the National Assembly 
and the Senate having the powers of special reporter 
(rapporteur special), authorises the collection of the 
broadcasting licence. 
The allocation of the licence revenue among the public 
corporation and the national companies, which results 
from the application of the provisions of article 20, 
is submitted to approval by Parliament. 
The financial results of the preceding year, *the 
provisional accounts of the public corporation and of 
each of the national programme companies for the current 
year as well as the budget and the provisional statement 
of income and expenditure for the following year, 
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accompanied by any observations on the part of the 
Government, are attached to the finance bill. 
The charters for the current year, additional clauses 
which possibly modify their content for the following 
year, comments from the Prime Minister or the minister 
appointed by him to ensure the respect by each company 
of the provisions of its charter, are also included 
as an appendix to the finance bill. 
Also included are the operational accounts, the statement 
of profit and loss and the balance-sheet of the production 
company. 
Article 20: The licence fee is collected by the State; the amount 
collected is provisionally set out in a special Treasury 
account (compte special du Tresor). 
The revenue from the licence is shared out annually 
among the national programme companies and the public 
corporation on the basis of criteria laid down by 
decree in the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) after 
the opinion of the parliamentary delegation for French 
broadcasting has been given. In particular, account 
has to be taken, on the one hand, of the provisions of 
the charters, of programme quality and cultural value, 
and, on the other hand, of the audience ratings and the 
company's own income. A committee chaired by a magistrate 
of the Accounts Court (Cour des comptes) supervises this 
distribution of the licence revenue. 
Article 21: Categories of person benefiting from licence fee exemption 
or from special tariffs are fixed by decree in the Council 
of State. These exemptions or special tariffs are 
reimbursed by the State. 
Article 22: The length and distribution of advertising slots and 
the corresponding volume of revenue must remain compatible 
with the tasks laid down in article 1 above; the proport- 
ion of revenue derived from commercial advertising must 
not exceed altogether 25 per cent of the total revenue 
of the companies listed in article 2 of the present 
statute. The charters set out the conditions for the 
application of this provision and in particular the 
proportion of screen time which can be filled by 
advertisements. 
The French advertising board (La Regie francaise de 
publicite) ensures the control and execution of these 
provisions. 
Article 23: When the construction of a building of a great height 
or a group of buildings adversely affects television 
reception by the inhabitants of the surrounding area, 
the constructors must have installed at their expense 
a television transmission aerial or ensured by some 
other technical means the normal reception of television 
programmes by said inhabitants. 
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Article 24: The control of the commission verifying the accounts 
of public companies (la commission de verification 
des comptes des entreprises publiques applies to the 
public corporation and companies created by the present 
law as well as to their subsidiaries. 
Chapter V 
Provisions relating to staff 
Section 1 
Permanent provisions 
Article 25: The staff of the public transmission corporation are 
governed by a statute laid down by decree in the Council 
of State. 
The staff of each of the companies are governed by 
collective agreements (conventions collectives). 
The statute of the public corporation and the collective 
agreements drawn up by management and trade unions 
cannot adversely affect the guaranteed rights of the 
workers with regard to salary, sickness and accident 
at work. The length of service acquired by staff of 
the ORTF will be recognised in the public corporation 
and the companies, in particular with regard to 
redundancy. 
The public corporation and the companies will take the 
necessary steps to affiliate staff allocated to them to 
superannuation schemes (des regimes de retraite 
complementaire). 
The provisions of this article are applicable to staff 
working in the overseas departments and territories. 
Article 26: In the case of concerted industrial action, the 
continuity of those parts of the service necessary for 
the accomplishment of the tasks laid down in article 1 
must be ensured by the public transmission corporation 
and by the national programme companies. The chairman 
of each company selects those categories of staff who 
must remain at work. 
Section 2 
Temporary provisions 
Article 27: Subject to the provisions of article 29, staff employed 
at the ORTF on December 31 1974 who are governed by the 
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general statute covering civil servants (statut gengral 
des fonctionnaires) are reclassified in comparable 
agencies of State (corps homologues de 1'Etat), in 
conditions fixed by decree in the Council of State. 
Article 28: Former state civil servants who are now covered by the 
Office's staff statute (integres comme agents statutaires 
de l'Office), under sixty years of age, may, up to 
December 31 1974, ask for their reclassification in their 
original corps or in comparable state corps in conditions 
fixed by decree in the Council of State. 
This reclassification is guaranteed by law. 
Article 29: The civil servants and, subject to the provisions 
of article 30, the statutory staff (agents statutaires) 
working full time in the licence collection service, 
employed as at December 31 1974, are from that date 
employed by the State. They preserve the benefits of 
their statute up to a date fixed by decree. This decree 
lays down the conditions in which they will be integrated 
into state civil service corps or into other public 
corporations or agencies, with the proviso that their 
acquired rights with regard to length of service cannot 
be adversely affected, both within metropolitan France 
and in the overseas departments and territories. 
Article 30: Staff subject to the statutes of the Office aged sixty 
and over on December 31 1974 are placed from that date 
in early retirement (en position speciale). This status 
guarantees them remuneration comparable to a salary and 
revalued to keep pace with salary increases, equivalent 
to the total of their pension and, where applicable, the 
superannuation to which they would have been entitled if 
they had pursued their career up to the age limit set 
down in the texts which are applicable to them at present. 
Under the same conditions, statutory staff of the Office, 
aged fifty five and above on December 31 1974 can, at. 
their request, be granted early retirement (mis en posit- 
ion speciale). 
The provisions of the first paragraph are not applicable 
either to staff having dependent relatives or to staff 
having dependent children as defined in article L. 527 
of the social security code or by the income tax regulat- 
ions. These staff will, at their request, be maintained 
in employment as long as they have dependent children and,;; 
at the latest, until they reach the age limit laid down 
in the texts which are applicable to them at present. 
Article 31: The reallocation of staff taken on by the different 
corporation and companies is carried out, account being 
taken of the requirements of these bodies, by decision 
of the president director general (president directeur 
general) of the Office, following the opinion of a 
committee presided over by a member of the administrative 
judiciary and comprising representatives of the public 
s. i° 
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corporation and of the companies, of the ORTF and of 
the staff, the latter being appointed by the representative 
trade union organisations. 
Subject to the provisions of articles 27 to 30, those staff 
not allocated to one of these commanies may, if they so 
request before December 31 1974, be reclassified in an 
administrative department of the State, of another 
public body, of public corporations or companies. 
If they do not make this request, a redundancy payment 
is automatically granted them on December 31 1974. This 
payment equals that which is laid down by the statutes 
applicable to them. For those staff who have at least 
five years' service by December 31 1974, this payment 
is not less than one year's salary. 
Those staff who make a request for reclassification will 
continue to receive their salary up until the date at 
which they are reclassified and, at the latest, up to 
June 30 1975. 
Proposals for reclassification will be made to them, taking 
into account their professional qualifications. Those 
staff who refuse three such proposals will be made 
redundant and will automatically receive the redundancy 
payment. 
Those staff, who having made such a request have not been 
reclassified by July 1 1975, will automatically be given 
a redundancy payment conforming to the provisions of 
paragraph 3 of the present article, less the payments 
made in application of paragraph 4. 
The provisions of articles 27,29,30 and 31 do not apply, 
unless specifically requested by those affected, to staff 
deported and interned during the Resistance (aux agents 
de ortes et internes de la Resistance), to staff deported 
and interned for political reasons aux agents deportes 
et internes politigues), to staff who hold the voluntary 
combat card of the Resistance, to staff whose services 
in the Resistance have been validated by law no. 51-1124 
of September 26 1951, to staff who have belonged to the 
Free French Forces, to ex-servicement holders of the 
Croix de guerre and to the seriously war wounded. 
Article 32: Staff taken on by the corporation or the companies remain 
up to the drafting of the statutes or contracts laid down 
in article 25 and, at the latest up until December 31 
1975, subject to the provisions which are applicable to 
them at present. The company to which they are allocated 
is substituted for the Office with regard to the rights 
and duties of these staff. 
Chapter VI 
Final provisions it 
; lä 
Article 33: The patrimony and the rights and duties of the Office j+ý 
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are transferred to the public corporation and to the 
companies created in application of the present law, by 
the joint decision (arrete) of the Prime Minister or a 
minister appointed by him and the Minister of the 
Economy and Finance. 
The property, rights and duties which, at the date the 
law starts being applied, have not been the object of 
such a transfer are taken over by the State. They 
may be transferred thereafter under conditions fixed by 
decree in the Council of State. 
The regulations according to which the liquidation service 
or services will ensure the payment of salaries or 
redundancy payments as laid down in articles 27 to 29 
above as well as the payment of national insurance 
contributions (cotisations sociales) corresponding to 
the period during which these staff have been placed in 
temporary retirement (dans la position speciale) are 
fixed by decree in the Council of State. 
The transfer of property, rights and duties as laid down 
in the present law does not give the right either to any 
indemnity or to the collection of fees or taxes or to the 
payment of salaries or honoraria. 
Article 34: Decrees in the Council of State determine the conditions 
of application of the present law. 
The date from which article 2 will be applied and the 
date of the transfer of staff and property, rights and 
duties are the first of January 1975. However, the 
ORTF may retain responsibility for programmes until the 
first Monday of January 1975. 
Articles 3,4,8 and 10, paragraph 1, of the ordinance 
no. 59-273 of February 4 1959 and articles 2,3,8 and 
16 law no. 72-553 of July 3 1972 are maintained in 
operation. The other-provisions of these texts are 
abrogated as from January 1 1975. 
The present law will be executed as a law of the State. 
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Daily newspapers in France : number of titles and circulation 
figures since the Liberation. 
Paris 
Date Titles Circulation 
Provinces 
Titles Circulation 
Total 
Titles Circulation 
1945 26 4606 153 7532 179 12138 
1946 28 5959 175 9165 203 15123 
1947 19 4702 161 8165 180 12867 
1948 18 4450 142 7859 160 12309 
1949 16 3792 139 7417 155 11209 
1950 16 3678 126 7256 142 10934 
1951 15 3607 122 6634 137 10241 
1952 14 3412 117 6188 131 9599 
1953 12 3514 116 6458 128 9973 
1954 12 3618 116 6559 128 10177 
1955 13 3779 116 6823 129 10603 
1956 14 4411 111 6958 125 11369 
1957 13 4226 110 7254 123 11480 
1958 13 4373 110 7294 123 11667 
1959 13 3980 103 6930 116 10911 
1960 13 4185 98 7170 111 11355 
1961 13 4239 96 7087 109 11326 
1962 13 4207 96 7198 109 11405 
1963 14 4121 94 7434 108 11556 
1964 14 4107 93 7617 107 11725 
1965 13 4211 92 7857 105 12068 
1966 14 4391 91 7831 105 12172 
1967 12 4624 86 8005 98 12629 
1968 13 5034 85 8039 98 13073 
1969 13 4596 81 7572 94 12168 
1970 13 4278 81 7587 94 11865 
1971 12 4244 81 7750 93 11994 
1972 11 3877 78 7498 89 11375 
1973 11 3677 75 75o6 86 11183 
1974 13 3831 73 7509 86 11340 
1975 12 3195 71 7411 83 10606 
1976 14 3111 72 7269 86 10380 
1977 15 3184 72 7391 87 10575 
1978 14 3189 72 7265 86 10504 
Table 2. i. 
Source: P. Albert, La Presse Fran aise, Paris, La documentation 
frangaise, Notes et tudes documentaires no. 4469,1979, 
p. 94 and 158. 
Circulation figures are given in thousands. 
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Total circulation of daily newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants 
Date Circulation per 1,000 inhabitants 
1946 379 
1965 248 
1972 233 
1974 231 
1975 214 
Table 2. ii 
Sources: Cahiers frangais, La presse uotidienne, Paris 
La documentation francaise, no. 17 , 1976, notice 
no. 2 table 4 and p. 7. 
P. Albert, La Presse Francaise, Paris, La documentation 
francaise, Notes et etudes documentaires no. 4469,1979, 
p. 26. 
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Number of copies of daily newspapers produced per 1,000 inhabitants 
1972 1965 
1) Japan 529 451 (3) 
2) Sweden 515 505 (1) 
3) Luxembourg 451 
4) Iceland 439 435 (4) 
5) Great Britain 437 479 (2) 
6) East Germany 425 400 (5) 
7) Norway 391 384 (7) 
8) Switzerland 390 376 (8) 
9) New Zealand 367 399 (6) 
10) Denmark 364 347 (10) 
11) U. S. S. R. 333 264 117) 
12) West Germany 330 326 (11) 
13) Austria 328 249 (18) 
14) Australia 321 373 (9) 
15) U. S. A. 314 310 (13) 
16) Holland 307 293 (14) 
17) Czechoslovakia 280 280 (16) 
18) Uruguay 269 314 (12) 
19) Canada 234 227 (21) 
20) France 233 248 (19) 
21) Ireland 233 246 (20) 
22) Poland 231 167 (22) 
23) Mexico 200 116 (26) 
24) Israel 183 143 (25) 
25) Argentine 180 148 (24) 
26) Roumania 173 157 (23) 
27) Italy 142 113 (27) 
Table 2.111 
Source: Cahiers frangais, La presse guotidienne, Paris, 
La documentation frangaise, no. 178,1976, notice 
no. 2 table 4. 
1 
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Growth of television : 1955 - 1979 
Date 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
--- Fifth Republic --- 
Number of T. V. sets. 
125,087 
260,508 
442,433 
683,229 
984,394 
1,368,965 
1,902,000 
2,555, E 
3,426,000 
4,400,000 
5,414,000 
6,489,000 
7,471,000 
8,336,000 
9,277, E 
99900,000 
10,600,000 
11,500,600 
12,200,000 
12,900,000 
13.700 , 000 
14,400,000 
14,800,000 
15,000,000 
17,500, x" 
This represents a figure of just under 90% of French housholds. 
Of these 17.5 million sets, however, only 5.8 million were colour. 
(Le Matin, Sept. 6 1979) 
Table 2. iv. 
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Number of television sets per 1,000 inhabitants 
Iocc io4n 1Q c 1Q72 
United States of America 
Great Britain 
West Germany 
France 
170 310 362 474 
95 211 248 305 
5 83 193 293 
3 41 133 237 
Source: P. Albert, La Presse Frangaise, Paris, Ia documentation 
francaise, Notes et etudes documentaires no. 4469,1979, 
P. 25. 
Table 2 v. 
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Composition of the National Assembly in July 1974 
Majorite 
U. D. R. 181 
Independent Republicans 55 
Union Centristes 30 
Reformateurs democrates sociaux 34 
Opposition 
Socialists and left-wing Radicals 
Communists 
Non-inscrits 
TOTAL 
103 
74 
13 
490 deputies. 
Table 3. i. 
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1974 Broadcasting Statute: Timetable 
June 29 
July 2 
July 3 
July 13 
July 17 
Conseil interministgriel 
Conseil interministeriel 
Conseil des ministres 
Conseil interministeriel restreint 
Conseil des ministres 
July 20 Government bill published. (Journal Officiel Documents 
Assemblee Nationale, no. 1161. ) 
July 22 Rapport de Jean de Preaumont au nom de la commission 
des affaires culturelles. (Journal Officiel Documents 
Assemble Nationale, no. 1162. 
July 23,24 Debate in the National Assembly. Bill adopted with amend- 
ments by 290 to 183 votes. (Journal Officiel Debats Parle- 
mentaires Assemblee Nationale July 24 and 25 1974. ) 
July 25 
July 25 
Amended bill goes to Senate. (Journal Officiel Documents 
Senat, no. 287. ) 
affaires culturelles. (Journal 0 
2 
iel Documents Senat, no. 
July 26,27 Debate in the Senate. Bill adopted with amendments by 178 
to 88 votes. (Journal Officiel De bats Parlementaires Senat, 
July 27 and 28 1974. ) 
July 27 Amended bill goes to the Commission mixte paritaire. 
(Journal Officiel Documents Assembl6e Nationale, no. 1165) 
July 28 Commission mixte paritaire draws up a common text by 10 
votes to (Journal Officiel Documents Assemblee Nationale, 
no. 1166 and Documents S4nat, no. 290. 
July 28 Debate in the Senate. Common text with four Government 
amendments adopted by vote bloqu6: 178 to 88 votes. 
(Journal Officiel Debets -Parlementaires Senat, July 21 
1974. ) 
July 28 Debate in the National Assembly. Common text with four 
Government amendments adopted by vote bloque: 289 to 186 
votes. (Journal Officiel Dgbats Parlementaires Assemblee 
Nationale, July 29 1974. ) 
August 8 Law no. 74-696 of August 7 1974. (Journal Officiel, Lois 
et Decrets, August 8 1974. ) 
Table 3. ii. 
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Minister with responsibility for broadcasting: 1958-1979 
Andre Malraux June 1958 
Jacques Soustelle July 1958 
Roger Frey January 1959 
Louis Terrenoire February 1960 
Christian de la Malene August 1961 
Alain Peyrefitte April 1962 
Christian Fouchet September 1962 
Alain Peyrefitte November 1962 
Yvon Bourges January 1966 
Georges Gorse April 1967 
Yves Guena May 1968 
Joel le Theule July 1968 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas June 1969 
Philippe Malaud July 1972 
Jean-Philippe Lecat October 1973 
Andre Rossi May 1974 
Raymond Barre/Francoise Giroud August 1976 
Raymond Barre/Michel d'Ornano April 1977 
Jean-Philippe Lecat April 1978 
Table 4. i 
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Appendix 4. ii 
Administrative status of the broadcasting companies' 
After 1959 the state broadcasting services were accorded the status 
of etablissement public a caractere industriel et commercial which was 
intended to mark a change from the previous administrative status of 
broadcasting as a civil service department. 
2 The change of status 
in 1959 was designed to reflect the growing independence of the RTF 
from the Government, though the practical effect was minimal. The 
1964 and 1972 ORTF statutes reaffirmed the status of the state broad- 
casting services conferred by the 1959 ordinance. 
3 
The 1974 broadcasting statute accorded the new companies different 
administrative statuses depending on the role they were to play in the 
reorganised broadcasting structure. For example, the transmission 
company, TDF, and the archive and research institute, INA, were 
both given the status of etablissement public ä caractere industriel et 
commercial which meant that they remained governed by the domain of 
public law. As TDF is the custodian of the state transmission monopoly 
and responsible for the development and maintenance of the technical 
infrastructure of the broadcasting networks, its administrative 
status is not surprising. Control of the transmission facilities, 
vitally necessary in times of political upheaval, remains firmly in 
the hands of the State. 
4 
1. See also, J. Chevallier, La radio-television fran aise entre deux 
reformes, Paris, Librairie g nerale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1975, pp. 168-198, for a detailed account of the importance of the 
different administrative statuses of the separate broadcasting 
companies set up by the 1974 reorganisation. 
2. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, ordinance no. 59-273 of February 
1959" 
3.1964 ORTF statute, article 1 and 1972 ORTF statute, article 
4. 
4.1974 broadcasting statute, article 5. 
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The four programme companies, on the other hand, were accorded 
the status of societ4 nationale. This meant that they were to be 
subject to the rules governing the operation of commercial enterprises 
in the domain of private law, even though they remained public companies 
with public service goals and with the State as sole shareholder. 
5 
Finally, the production company, the SFP, was given the status 
of societe anonyme. This too placed the production company firmly 
in the domain of private law. Unlike the programme companies, shares 
in the production company could in theory be owned by agents other 
than the State, such as public companies (soci4t4s nationales) 
including the programme companies or mixed economy companies 
(soci4t4s d'kconomie mixte). The Government willingly accepted an 
amendment put forward by the Centrists in the National Assembly that 
the majority of the SFP's shares should remain in public hands, and in 
fact, since 1974 the State has owned over 99% of the SFP's capital. 
6 
The administrative status of the SFP, however, places it closest to 
that of a private company.? 
5.1974 broadcasting statute, article 12 and decrees of December 
30 1974. 
6. Journal Officiel. Nbats Parlementaires -Assemb]e Nationale, 
July 25 1974, amendment no. 153, P-3774, and 1974 broadcasting 
statute, article 13. 
JournalOfficiel, Lois et d4crets, decree of December 30 1974. 
7. For more information on the SFP see chapter on Finance. 
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Appendix 4. iii 
The reallocation of ORTF shares among the new broadcasting companies 
The transfer of shares held by the ORTF in companies operating 
in the broadcasting field was done by government decree and the 
transfer was usually dictated by the nature of the company involved. 
The ORTF's 33,3% capital stake in the Societe Auxiliaire de 
Radiodiffusion, which was responsible for the installation and 
financing of relay transmitters in areas of under 1,000 inhabitants, 
was transferred to the transmission company, TDF. 
1 
The ORTF's 50% capital stake in the Soci6te Francaise de 
T4ledistribution, which was responsible for the development and 
exploitation of cable television in France, was also given to the 
transmission company. 
2 
The ORTF's 50% share in the Socigte Francaise de Vidgogrammes, 
which was responsible for the development of video-cassettes and 
3 
video-records, was transferred to the production company, the SFP. 
The 51% capital stake held by the ORTF in the Societe Frangaise 
d'gtudes et de realisation d'eguipetent de radiodiffusion et de 
television (SOFRATEV), which was concerned with the technical 
development of foreign and particularly third world broadcasting 
services, was transferred to TDF. 
4 
In 1977 both INA and the SF? 
1. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arre"tg of February 14 1975. 
2. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arr9te of June 24 1975. 
3. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, 1975-1976, no. 1916, 
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... sur 
le projet 
de loi de finances pour 1976, annexe no. 48, Radiodiffusion et 
t4l4vision, rapporteur sp(cial - Joel Le Tac, p. 45" 
4. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arr6te of February 14 1975. ii 
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each acquired an additional 7.5% stake in SOFRATEV. 
S 
The ORTF's 45% stake in the Soci4te mon4gasque d'exploitatic-i 
et d'-etudes de radiodiffusion (SOMERA), which was responsible 
notably for the installation of a relay transmitter on the 
island of Cyprus to transmit programmes in Arabic to the Middle 
East on behalf of Radio-Monte-Carlo, was transferred to Radio France 
(30°, 6) and to TDF (15%). 
6 
In 1978 TDF acquired the shares of Radio 
France with the result that the transmission company held all of 
the ORTF's former 45% stake in SOMERA. 
7 
The ORTF's 35% share in Tele Europe, which was responsible for 
the production, purchase and sale of radio and television programmes, 
was divided up equally among TF1, A2, FR3 and the SFP. 
8 
The ORTF's 35% stake in Technisonor, which was responsible for 
the commercialisation of the Office's musical works as well as the 
coproduction of telefilms and series with the ORTF, was divided up 
among Radio France (5.5%), TFl (6.5%), A2 (6.5%), FR3 (6.5%) and 
the SFP (10%). 
9 
Finally, the ORTF's 51% majority shareholding in the Regie 
Frangaise de Publicite (RFP), which was set up in 1969 to administer 
the ORTF's advertising by acting as the middle-man between the Office 
and the advertising agencies, was taken over by the State. 
10 Two 
5. Journal Officiel, Lois et d4crets, decree of April 19 1977- 
6. Le Monde, February 8-9 1976. 
7. Le Monde, March 2 1978. '4 
8. Journal Officiel, Documents Assemble Nationale, 1975-1976, 
no. 1916, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des finances ... 
ý 
sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1976, annexe no. 
48, 
Radiodiffusion et television, rapporteur special - Joel Le Tac, 
p. 45. 
9. Journal Officiel, Lois et decrets, arrete of April 22 1975- 
10. Journal Officiel. Lois et decrets, decree of December 
30 1974. 
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subsidiaries of the RFP were then created, one for each of the 
two television companies allowed to benefit from advertising revenue, 
to fulfil the same role as the RFP had done for the ORTF. The 
distribution of the shares in these two subsidiaries was as follows: 
RFP-TF1 subsidiary was jointly owned by the RFP (49.5%) and TF1 (48`ö) 
and the RFP-A2 subsidiary was also jointly owned in the same proportions 
by the RFP and A2.11 
a 
1ýk 
11. Journel Officiel, Lois et decrets, arr9te of May 15 1975. i; ý I 
' ýý 
ý. `ý . 
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Heads of the state broadcasting services during the Fifth Republic 
RTF 1958 Christian Chavanon 
1960 Raymond Janot 
1962 Robert Bordaz 
ORTF 1964 Jacques Bernard Dupont 
1968 Jean-Jacques de Bresso n 
1972 Arthur Conte 
1973 Marceau Long 
New companies 1975 Jean Cazeneuve (TF1) 
Marcel Jullian (A2) 
Claude Contamine (FR3) 
Jacqueline Baudrier (Radio France) 
Jean Autin (TDF) 
Jean-Charles Edeline (SFP) 
Pierre Emmanuel (INA) 
1979 Jean-Louis Guillaud1 (TFl) 
Maurice Ulrich2 (A2) 
Claude Contamine (FR3) 
Jacqueline Baudrier (Radio France) 
Jean Autin (TDF) 
Antoine de Clermont- 
Tonnerre 3 (SFP) 
Gabriel de Broglie4 (INA) 
Table 5. i. 
1. Jean-Louis Guillaud replaced Jean Cazeneuve at the head of TF1 
at the beginning of 1978. 
2. Maurice Ulrich replaced Marcel Jullian at the head of A2 at the 
beginning of 1978. 
3. Antoine de Clermont-Tonnerre replaced Jean-Charles Edeline at 
the head of the SFP at the beginning of 1979. 
4. Gabriel de Broglie replaced Pierre Emmanuel at the head of INA 
in the summer of 1979. 
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Viewing figures for the main evening news programme: TF1 and A2: 1975 
TF1 A2 
January: 30 26 
February: 26 24 
March: 27 21 
April: 27 20 
May: 28 20 
June: 23 19 
July: 25 17 
August 24 14 
September: 31 20 
October: 27 24 
November: 28.5 25 
December: 26 22 
Average: 
Table 5. ii 
26.9 21 
Official figures expressed as a percentage of the possible total 
viewing population. 1% = approx. 375,000 viewers. 
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Viewing figures for the main evening news programme: TFl and A2: 1976 
TF1 A2 FR3 
(quiz game) 
January: 31 22.5 - 
February: 33 22 - 
March: 29 22.5 4 
April: 28 17.5 5 
May : 25 16 6 
June: 21.5 13.5 6 
July: 19.5 12.5 5.5 
August: 19 10.5 5.5 
September: 25.5 12.5 8 
October: 34 13 11 
November: 31.5 15.5 11 
December: 30.5 15 11 
Average 27.3 16.1 7.3 
Table 5-iii 
Official figures expressed as a percentage of the possible total 
viewing population. 1% = approx. 375,000 viewers. 
-578- 
Board of governors: (numerical composition): ORTF 1964-1974 
1964-1968: 16 governors 
8 representatives of the State 
If "qualified" persons, appointed by the Government 
2 representatives of the staff 
1 representative of the press 
1 representative of the viewers 
1968-1972: 24 governors 
12 representatives of the State 
5 representatives of the staff 
4 "qualified" persons, appointed by the Government 
2 representatives of the press 
1 representative of the viewers 
1972-1974: 14 governors 
7 representatives of the State, including the PDG, 
4 representatives of the staff 
2 representatives of the viewers 
1 representative of the press t_, 
Table 5. iv 
n 
11 ý ill 
, 
d (' 
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Boards of governors: (numerical composition): post-1974 broadcasting system 
TDF: 16 governors 
8 representatives of the State, 
4 representatives of the programme companies 
2 representatives of Parliament 
2 representatives of the staff 
INA: 22 governors 
10 representatives of the State 
6 representatives of the other broadcasting companies 
4'kiualified" persons, 2 of whom are chosen by the Haut Conseil 
de 1'Audiovisuel 
2 representatives of the staff 
SNP: 6 governors each (TF1, A2, FR3 and Radio France) 
2 representatives of the State, including the chairman 
1 representative of Parliament 
1 representative of the press 
1 representative of the staff 
1 representative of the world of culture. In the case of 
FR3 this governor must be a member of the cinema industry. 
1, 
Table 5. v 
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Membership of the boards of governors of the programme companies: 1975-77 
TFl 
Representatives of the State: Jean Cazeneuve 
Andre Neurisse 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Pierre-Roger Gaussin (reform- 
Daisy De Galard 
1ateur) 
Maurice Billy (CFDT) 
Maurice Le Roux 
A2 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Marcel Jullian 
Michele Legras 
Robert-Andre Vivien (Gaullist) 
Roland Faure 
Jacques Rousseau (SCORT) 
Claude L4vi-Strauss 2 
FR3 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Claude Contamine 
Michel Rougevin-Baville 
Michel Miroudot (Giscardian) 
Jacques Kielholz 
Gaetan Capuccio 
Michble Morgan 
Radio France 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Jacqueline Baudrier 
Jean-Marc Delettrez 
Jacques Carat (Socialist) 
Roger Bouzinac 
Jacques Alexandre (FO) 
Rena R6mond 
1. Daisy de Galard was replaced by Marguerite Puhl-Demange in August 1975 
2. Claude L vi-Strauss was replaced by Andre Roussin in February 1976. 
. hý 
Table 5. vi 
if 
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Membership of the boards of governors of the programme companies: 1978-80 
TF1 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
A2 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
FR3 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Radio France 
Representatives of the State: 
Representative of Parliament: 
Representative of the press: 
Representative of the staff: 
Representative of the world of culture: 
Jean-Louis Guillaud 
Guy Verdeil 
Pierre-Roger Gaussin 
(reformateur)1 
Marguerite Puhl-Demange 
Maurice Billy (CFDT) 
Georges Duby 2 
Maurice Ulrich 
Claude Lasry 
Robert-Andre Vivien (Gaullist) 
Roland Faure 3 
Jean Favre (Inter-union list) 
Silvia Monfort 
Claude Contamine 
Charles Debbasch k 
Michel Miroudot (Giscardian) 
Jacques Kielholz 
Jean-Pierre Courbet (SCORT) 
Michele Morgan 
Jacqueline Baudrier 
Renaud Denoix de Saint Marc 
Jacques Carat (Socialist) 
Roger Bouzinac 
Jacques Alexandre (FO) 
Jean Dorst 
1. Pierre-Roger Gaussin was replaced by Gerard Longuet (UDF) after 
the 1978 legislative elections. 
2. Georges Duby was replaced by Francoise Mallet-Joris in April 1980. 
3. Roland Faure was replaced by Pierre Sainderichin in October 1979. 
4. Charles Debbasch was replaced by Marie-Therese Rougerie in October 
1979. 
Table 5-vii 
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TF1 Management 
1975 - 1977 
Chairman of the board of governors 
andtitular head of the company: Jean Cazeneuve 
Director general: Jean-Louis Guillaud 
Director of administration and finance: Georges Riou 
Head of the programmes department: Jacques Zbinden 
Director of news: Henri Marque 
News editor: Christian Bernadac 
Head of the politics desk: Jean Idier 
1 
1978-1980 
Chairman of the board of governors 
and director general: Jean-Louis Guillaud 
Deputy director general: Georges Riou 
Director of production: Jean Leclerc 
General secretary for programmes: Monique Trnka 
Director of news: Henri Marque 
News editor: Christian Bernadac2 
Head of the politics desk: Patrice Duhamel 
1. Jean Idier was replaced by Patrice Duhamel in the autumn of 1976. 
2. Christian Bernadac was replaced by Andre Celarie in November 1979. 
Table 5-viii 
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A2 Management 
1975-1977 
Chairman of the board of governors 
and director general: 
Director: 
Adviser to the company head: 
Programme committee: 
Marcel Jullian 
Xavier Iarere 1 
Jacques Chancel 
Charles Baudinat 
2 
Armand Jammot 
3 
Claude Barma 
Pierre Tchernia 
Director of news: Jacques Sallebert4 
News editor: Georges Leroy 
5 
Head of the politics desk: Patrick Poivre d'Arvor6 
1. Larere was appointed director general of A2 in January 1977. 
2. Baudinat was appointed directeur de 1'actualitS (news, current affairs 
and magazine programmes) in the summer of 1976. 
3. Jammot was appointed directeur des spectacles in the summer of 1976. 
Between them, Baudinat and Jammot covered the whole range of A2's 
programming. Baudinat lost his post at the end of 1976 and Jammot 
lost his at the beginning*of 1978 immediately after the appointment 
of Ulrich as chairman of the company. 
4. Sallebert remained director of news until his resignation in early 
1976. He was replaced by Leroy who resigned in the autumn of 1976. 
Elkabbach became director of news in January 1977. 
5. When Leroy became director of news in early 1976, he was replaced as 
news editor by Cavada. After Elkabbach's appointment as director 
of news, Cavada was replaced by Beriot as news editor. 
6. Poivre d'Arvor was replaced by Copin as head of the politics desk 
following Elkabbach's appointment as news director. He then became 
A2's main newscaster. 
Table 5. ix 
°' s 
-; 
1 
ýý 
ýý 
ýý 
ý, 
`ý 
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A2 Management 
1978 - 1980 
Chairman of the board of governors 
and head of the company: 
Director general: 
Programme committee: 
Director of news: 
News editor: 
Head of the politics desk 
Maurice Ulrich 
Xavier Larere 
Jacques Chancel 
Armand Jammot 
Claude Barma 
Bernard Pivot 
Jean-Pierre Richard 
Martine Lefevre 
Jean-Pierre Elkabbach 
Louis Beriot 
Noel Copin 
Table 5. x 
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FR3 Management 
1975 - 1977 
Chairman of the board of governors 
and director general: Claude Contamine 
Director of the national channel: Maurice Cazeneuve 
Director of the regions: Claude Lemoine 
Director of the DOM-TOM: Rene Han 
Director of administration and finance: Noel Sanviti 
Director of news on the national channel: Claude Lefevre 
1978 - 1980 
Chairman of the board of governors 
and head of the company Claude Contamine 
Director general: Claude Lemoine 
Director of the DOM-TOM: Rene Han 
Director of administration and finance: Noel Sanviti 
Director of news on the national channel: Jean-Marie Cavada 
1 
1. Cavada replaced Claude Lefevre in September 1978 
Table 5-xi 
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Radio France management 
1975 - 1977 
Chairman of the board of governors and 
director general: Jacqueline Baudrier 
Director of administration and finance: Gabriel de Broglie 
Director of France-Inter: Pierre Wiehn 
Director of France Culture: Yves Jaigu 
Director of France Musique: Pierre Vozlinsky 
Director of news: Michel Pericard 
1 
1978 - 1980 
Chairman of the board of governors and 
head of the company: Jacqueline Baudrier 
Director general: Gabriel de Broglie 
2 
Director of France-Inter: Pierre Wiehn 
Director of France Culture: Yves Jaigu 
Director of France Musique: Pierre Vozlinsky 
Director of news: Jean LefZvre 
3 
1. Pericard was replaced by Jean Lefevre in the summer of 1977. 
2. De Broglie was appointed company head of INA in the summer of 1979" 
Jean Izard, former deputy director in charge of general administrat- 
ion and then director of administrative, professional and social 
affairs, was appointed deputy director general following de Brogli& s 
departure to INA. 
3. Lefevre was replaced by Roland Faure in the summer of 1979. 
Table 5. xii 
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Composition of the Commission de reclassement des fonctionnaires 
et anciens fonctionnaires de 1'ORTF 
Chairman: 
Representative of the minister with 
responsibility for broadcasting: 
Representatives of the ORTF staff 
department: 
Representatives of the ORTF 
civil servants: 
Representatives of the civil 
service trade unions: 
General secretary: 
Table 6. i. 
Perier, Jean-Claude 
Dumurgier, Patrick 
Vincent, Jean-Francois 
Izard, Jean 
Geneix, Bernard 
Winckelmuller, Pierre 
Gavalda, Germain 
Panier, Roger 
Tourneau, Guy 
Perrault, Claude 
Guerder, Pierre 
Source: Report by Jean-Claude Perier to the Prime Minister 
dated June 28 1975, Annex pp. 1 and 2. 
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Composition of the committee to reallocate the ORTF's general statutory 
staff 
Chairman: Guldner, Erwin 
Conseiller d'Etat 
Vice-chairman: Perier, Jean-Claude 
Conseiller d'Etat 
Representatives of the ORTF: Vincent, Jean-Frangois 
Gilles, Pierre 
Representatives of TDF: Autin, Jean 
Remy, Maurice 
Representatives of the SFP: Edeline, Jean-Charles 
Oudin, Michel 
Representatives of FR3: Contamine, Claude 
Sanviti, Noel 
Representative of Radio France: Baudrier, Jacqueline 
Representative of TFl: Cazeneuve, Jean 
Representative of A2: Jullian, Marcel 
Representatives of the staff: Guertault, Jean (FO) 
(In theory there ought to have Jarrige, Jean (SCORT) been five staff representatives) 
Table 6. ii 
Source: Official minutes of the Staff Reallocation Committee. 
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Composition of the committee to reallocate the statutory journalists 
of the ORTF 
Chairman: 
Vice-chairman: 
Representative of the ORTF: 
Two representatives of Radio 
France : 
Representative of FR3: 
Representative of TF1: 
Representative of A2: 
Guldner, Erwin 
Conseiller d'Etat 
Perier, Jean-Claude 
Conseiller d'Etat 
Chauveau, Jean 
Baudrier, Jacqueline 
Aycard, Albert 
Contamine, Claude2 
Cazeneuve, Jean3 
Jullian, Marcelo 
Representatives of the staff: Michaud, Roger (FO) 
(In theory there ought to have 
been three staff representatives) 
Table 6. iii 
1. Baudrier was in fact represented by the director of news at Radio 
France, Michel Pericard. 
2. Contamine was in fact represented by the director of the regional 
broadcasting stations at FR3, Claude Lemoine. 
3. Cazeneuve was in fact represented by the director general of TF1, 
Jean-Louis Guillaud. 
4. Jullian was in fact represented by the director of news at A2, 
Jacques Sallebert. 
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Number of ORTF journalists not employed in the new companies 
External services 
Channel one 
Channel two 
Channel three 
Radio 
Sports and 
miscellaneous 
Contract/ Permanent Retirement 
Statutory Freelance (article 30) TOTAL 
44 
8 
5 
20 
6 
34 
16 
6 
44 
6 
1 
14 
11 
84 
24 
12 
78 
22 
23 
5 
TOTAL 106 105 
Table 6. iv 
Source: Le Journaliste no. 150, March-April 1975- 
8 
40 
31 
251 
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Letter sent by the SURT-CFDT to the Minister of Labour, M. Durafour, 
regarding the negotiation of the conventions collectives at TF1, A2, 
FR3, Radio France and the SFP, autumn 1975. 
Monsieur le Min istre. 
La loi du 7aodt 1974. qui a supprbne I'O. RT. F. 'et conle les missions de Service Public 
de la Radio et de la Television ä cinq Societes et deux Etablissements Publics, prevoit daps son article 25 que 
"! es personnels de chacune des societes sont regis par des conventions collectives" 
L article 32 de cette loi impose aux partenaires sociaux la conclusion des negociationt 
le 31 decembre 1975 au plus Lard 
Nous attirons votre attention zur le fait, qu'ä ce jour, les Directions des Societes n ont 
fait parvenb aux organisations syndicales aucune proposition concernant les dispositions les plus delicates d 
negocier Bans une convention (systeme de remuneration, classification et definition des fonctions, conditions 
de travail, consultation des representants du personnel pour les emplois vacants, ete. ... 
Compte tenu des delais relativement courts qui noes separent du 31 decembre, nous 
tenons ä prendre date afin de fiter, le cas echeant, les responsabilites d iun desaccord persistant au-delh de 
I'echeance prime par la loi. 
Mais. surtout, nous nous etonnons qu aucune initiative n ait ete prise pour explorer la 
nossibilite d'elaborer une convention nationale applicable Q taus les orranismes nationaux de Radio et dc 
Titivisionäl'exceptiondesEfablissementsPublies. ' 
L'origine commune des agents des grandes familles professionnelles repartfs daps ces 
organismes, les modalites semblables de recrutement, la formation commune effectuee en priorite par 
! 'Institut National de ! 'Audio-visuel, les qualifications necessaires h 1'exercice de metiers identiques Bans le 
cadre de travaux dont les finalites sont identiques, constituent des elements qui devraient conduire les par- 
tenaires socfaux h rechercher des regles communes. 
Ceux-ci pourmient, bien entendu, negocier dans un second temps ks adaptations spc 
cifrques ä chacune des societes. 
Deans cet esprit. en application des dispositions des articles L 133 -1, L 133 -7 et 
L 133 - 8, chapitre III. titre III, Livre Premier du Code du 7)-avail, sous avons 17ronneur de vows prier de 
bien vouloirprovoquer la reunion dune commission mixte reunissant les representants : 
- des societes nationales de television : 
Television Finncaise 1 
Antenne 2 
France Regions 3, 
- de /a societe nationale de Radiodiffusion, 
- de !a societe fiuncaise de production, 
- du G. LPLA. T. E. V.. 
- des organisations syndicates representatives des salaries de ces societes. 
dons le but d'engager la negottion dune convention collective nationale applicable aux personnels de ces 
orgenismes non rattaches ä lc convention collective de la Presse. 
En noes tenant ä votre entiere disposition, nous vous prions, Monsieur le Ministre, 
d'accepter "expression de notre respectueuse consideTntion. 
Appendix ? "i" 
Source: SURT-CFDT document, 6 conventions collectives: Pourquoi?, October 1975, p-17. 
-593 
Debate in the National Assembly. (Journal Off iciel. Dgbats 
Parlementaires Assembl6e Nationale, June 27 1979") 
1979 legislation on the maintenance of the broadcasting service 
during strike action 
April 10 Vivien-Madelin bill published. (Journal Officiel, Documents 
Assemblee Nationale, no. 941. ) 
April 19 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
... par Francis ue Perrut. (Journal Officiel, Documents 
Assemblde Nationale, no. 990. ) 
April 26 Debate in the National Assembly. (Journal Officiel, Debats 
Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, April 27 1979. ) 
April 27 Bill goes to the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 
no. 305. ) 
June 6 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
... par Henri Caillavet. (Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 
no. 367. ) 
June 12 Avis r6sent4 au nom de la commission des affaires sociales 
... par Robert Schwint. Journal Officiel, Documents 
S6nat, 
no. 375. ) 
June 12 Debate in the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Debats Parlement- 
aires Senat, June 13 1979. ) 
June 20 Avis su lementaire resente au nom de la commission des 
affaires sociales ... par Robert Schwint. 
Journal Officiel, 
Documents Senat, no. 07. 
June 21 Debate in the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Debats Parlement- 
aires Senat, June 22 1979. ) 
June 22 Bill returns to the National Assembly. (Journal Officiel, 
Documents Assembl4e Nationale, no. 1187. ) 
June 25 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
... par Francis ue Perrut. (Journal Officiel, 
Documents 
Assemblee Nationale, no. 11 
June 26 
June 27 
June 27 
July 25 
July 26 
Sept. 5 
Bill returns to the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Documents 
Senat, no. 435. ) 
Debate in the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Debats Parlement- 
aires Senat, June 28 1979. ) 
Decision of the Constitutional Council. 
Law no. 79-634 of July 26 1979. 
Decree no. 79-747 of September 5 1979" 
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Table 7-iii 
Source: Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 1979-1980, no. 50, Rapport 
general fait au nom de la commission des finances, ..., sur le 
projet de loi de finances pour 1980, Tome III annexe no. 46, 
Radiodiffusion-television, 
rapporteur special: Jean Cluzel, 
annexe au proc*6s-verbal de la seance du 21 novembre 1979, p. 17. I 
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Composition of the Parliamentary Delegation for broadcasting 1975 
Deputies as of right: Joel Le Tac Gaullist' 
Maurice Papon Gaullist2 
Jean de Prdaumont Gaullist3 
Deputies elected: Jacques Blanc Giscardian 
Jean Boinvilliers Gaullist 4 
Georges Donnez Reformateur 
Georges Fillioud Socialist 
Jack Ralite Communist 
Senators as of right: Henri Caillavet Democratic left5 
Jean Cluzel Non-inscrit6 
Rene Monory Centrist Union 
7 
Senators elected: Felix Ciccolini Socialist 
Maurice Fleury Gaullist 
Dominique Pado Centrist Union 
1. Joel Le Tac was a member in his capacity as rapporteur special 
of the National Assembly finance committee's annual budgetary 
report on broadcasting. 
2. Maurice Papon was a member in his capacity as rapporteur general 
of the National Assembly finance committee. 
3. Jean de Pr4aumont was a member in his capacity as rapporteur 
of the National Assembly cultural affairs committee's annual 
budgetary report on broadcasting. 
4. Jean Boinvilliers was chairman of the delegation in 1975- 
5. Henri Caillavet was a member in his capacity as rapporteur of 
the Senate cultural affairs committee's annual budgetary 
report on broadcasting. 
6. Jean Cluzel was a member in his capacity as rapporteur special 
of the Senate finance committee's annual budgetary report on 
broadcasting. 
7. Rene Monory was a member in his capacity as rapporteur general 
of the Senate finance committee. 
Table 8. i 
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Composition of the Parliamentary Delegation for broadcasting 1978 
Deputies as of right: Fernand Icart Giscardianl 
Joel Le Tac Gaullist 2 
Jean de Pr6aumont Gaullist 3 
Deputies elected: Jean Boinvilliers Gaullist 
Georges Fillioud Socialist 
Louise Moreau Giscardian 
Jack Ralite Communist 
Bernard Stasi Giscardian 
Senators as of right: Maurice Blin Centrist union4 
Henri Caillavet Democratic lefts 
Jean Cluzel Centrist union 6 
Senators elected: Felix Ciccolini Socialist 
Dominique Pado Centrist union? 
Charles Pasqua Gaullist 
1. Fernand Icart was a member in his capacity as rapporteur general 
of the National Assembly finance committee. 
2. Joel Le Tac was a member in his capacity as rapporteur special 
of the National Assembly finance committee's annual budgetary 
report on broadcasting. 
3. Jean de Preaumont was a member in his capacity as rapporteur 
of the National Assembly cultural affairs committee's annual 
budgetary report on broadcasting. 
4. Maurice Blin was a member in his capacity as rapporteur gengral 
of the Senate finance committee. 
5. Henri Caillavet was a member in his capacity as rapporteur of 
the Senate cultural affairs committee's annual budgetary report 
on broadcasting. 
6. Jean Cluzel was a member in his capacity as rapporteur special 
of the Senate finance committee's annual budgetary report on 
broadcasting. 
ý. Dominque Pado was chairman of the delegation in 1978. 
Table 8. ii 
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Parliamentary representation on the boards of governors 
of the broadcasting companies 
1975-77 TF1 Pierre-Roger Gaussin Deputy Reformateur 
A2 Robert-Andre Vivien Deputy Gaullist 
FR3 Michel Miroudot Senator Giscardian 
Radio France Jacques Carat Senator Socialist 
TDF Roger Gouhier Deputy Communist 
TDF Georges Lamousse Senator Socialist 
1978-80 TF1 Gerard Longuet Deputy Giscardian 
A2 Robert-Andre Vivien Deputy Gaullist 
FR3 Michel Miroudot Senator Giscardian 
Radio France Jacques Carat Senator Socialist 
TDF Guy Ducolon4 Deputy Communist 
TDF Claude Fuzier Senator Socialist 
Table 8. iii 
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Growth of advertising revenue on French television (1968-1979) 
Year Amount (in millions of francs) Amount (as percent 
age of total revenue) 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
26 
195 
348 
387.6 
435.1 
497.5 
569 
690 
820 
940.3 
1,065.2 
1,255 
Table 9.1 
1.9 
14.8 
21 
20.9 
21.4 
22.6 
24 
24.6 
25 
25 
25 
25 
Source: Le Monde, December 15 1978. 
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Cost of broadcasting licence 
Year Radio Black and White TV Colour TV 
1964 
1965 
1966 30 100 
1967 30 100 
1968 30 100 
1969 30 100 
1970 30 100 
1971 30 120 
1972 30 120 
1973 30 130 
1974 30 140 210 
1975 30 140 210 
1976 30 155 235 
1977 30 162 243 
1978 Abolished 176 264 
1979 - 207 310 
(Cost given in French francs) 
Table 9. ii 
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Composition of the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee 1976 
Bernard Beck 
Conseiller maitre ä la Cour des Comptes 
Henri Tessier du Cros 
Maitre des requetes au Conseil d'Etat 
Guilbert Guillaume 
Maitre des requetes au Conseil d'Etat 
Jean Massiani 
Conseiller ref6rendaire ä la Cour des Comptes 
Pierre Lafaye 
Conseiller referendaire a la Cour des Comptes 
Table 9. iii 
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Composition of the Quality Committee June 1975 
Jules Antonini Honorary general secretary of the SNCF and former 
member of the Constitutional Council 
Jean-Pierre Dubois-Director 
general of Telerama Dumee 
Lazare Iglesis Producer 
Marcel Landowski Inspector general of music 
Roland Sadoun Business consultant 
Pierre Schaeffer Former head of the research service at the ORTF 
Mme. Simone 
Servais Diplomatic envoy 
Mlle. Catherine 
Tasca Head of the Youth and Cultural Centre at Grenoble 
Maurice Toesca Writer 
Maurice Allain Group leader at the arsenal at Cherbourg 
Robert Boschetti Pediatrician 
Mlle. Monique 
Dine General secretary of the country-house club 
Mile. Paulette 
Ferrier Teacher 
Louis Gallien Member of the Academy of Sciences 
Mme. Michelle 
Mariette Deputy mayor of Beauvais 
Mme. Simone 
Martin Farmer 
Charles Nugue Director of the Cultural Animation Centre at Aix- 
en-Provence 
Jean Rosselot Assistant at the Law Faculty at Besancon 
Francis Balle Lecturer at the University of Paris 11 
Mlle. Isabelle 
Campion Student 
Marceau Crespin Member of the Economic and Social Council 
R. Fromilhiague Teacher at the University of Toulouse 
Bertrand Golds- 
chmidt Director at the Atomic Energy Commission 
Thierry Hatt Teacher of History 
Mme. Eliane 
Perasso Town councillor in Marseilles 
Mme. Simone 
Vedrenne Journalist 
Jean-Claude 
Perier Conseiller dlEtat* 
Table 9. iv 
* Perier was appointed President of the Quality Committee for three years 
from June 1975. In late 1974 Perier had been one of the two con- 
seillers d'Etat appointed to head the committee in charge of the re- 
allocation of ORTF staff among the new broadcasting companies. 
(See 
chapter on the Reallocation of ORTF staff. ) 
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The budgetary equation used by the Licence Revenue Allocation Committee 
Votre Bapporteur a juge utile de publier en annexe la clef de repartition de 
la redevance dont la simplicite le digpensc de tout commentairc. 
i0'A'n = (0,20 .f0,60 Q+0,20 V) An -1 
oü 
An -1 est I'attribution constatee I'annee n-1, 
A'n est 1'attribution theorique de I'annee n, 
Q est I'indice de qualite, 
V est l'indice d'ecoute. 
2° An = A'n x AN 
¬A'n 
oii 
Mn eat la masse ä repartir definie ä Particle 5 du decret, 
EA'n'Cst' la , summe des attributions thf oriques aux socit tt s, 
A'n represente le pourcentage de droits de, la societe concernee. 
EA'n 
20 Q=i -}- " gg x1"xR 
-' -50. iO .r1 
oll 
'q'est"ia note* attribuee'ä lei Societe, 
q' eat la'moyenne des qua re' notes attribuees aux eocietes de programme, 
.q --S 
, pst' le rapport *de I'ecart q -, q ä la note mediane 50, 
" 50 ý.,,. 
1 eat un coefficient destine ä ramener la variation de I'indice 4 une inci- 
10 dente acceptable sur lea ressources de la Societe, ' 
R eat le 'montant des recettes totales de la aociete, 
r eat le montant des recettea de, recevance de la societk. 
4° V= f+ (v - i) XixR 
5r 
oil 
v -eat la variation du volume d'deoute, 
1 eat un coefficient prgvu par Particle 8 du decret, 
T' 
R eat le montant des recettes totales de la societk, 
r eat le montant des recettes de recevance de la societe. 
Appendix 9. v.. 
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Party political broadcasts on TF1 and A2 during 1978 
Articles 16 ä 18 : LIBRE EXPRESSION DES ASSEMBLEES PARLEMENTAIRES 
ET DES FORMATIONS POLITIQUES. 
CALENDRIER DES EMISSIONS DIFFUSEES PAR T. F. 1 EN 1978 
19 janvier Assemblee Nationale 
2 Wrier Majorite (Parti Radical 6'- Centre des D6mocrates Sociaux 9'1 
16 fevrier Dppö on : Parti Communiste 
(Interruption pendant la campagne electorale des elections legislatives) 
6 avril Majorite " Centre des Oemocrates Sociaux 
20 avril Opposition : Parti Socialiste - 
2 mai Majorite : Parti Republicain 
" 18 mai Senat 
1°' juin Opposition : Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche 
15 juin - 'Majoritd " Rassemblement Pourla Reptblique 
29 juin - Assemblee Nationale 
11 juillet Opposition': Parti Communiste 
27 juillet Majorite : Rassemblement Pour la Republique 
14 septembre Opposition : Parti Socialiste 
28 septembre Majorite : Parti Republicain 
12 octobre Senat 
26 octobre Opposition: Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche 
9 novembre Assemblee Nationale 
23 novembre Majorite (Centre National dies Independants 10'" Parti Radical 5') 
7 decembre Opposition: Parti Communiste 
21 decembre Senat 
Appendix 10. i. 
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CALE`%DRIER DES EMISSIONS CONSACREES A LA LIBRE EXPRESSION CES --ES 
PARLEMENIAIRES ET DES FORMATIONS POLITIQIJ S 
1978 
n 
T. F. 1 AN7EN\E 2 
12 janvier h+a j or it_ 
19 janvier Assemblee Nationale 
26 janvier Oppositicfl 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2 Teeries tiajorite 
9 fevrier FSajorit: 
16 favrier Opposition 
CAMPAGNE ELECIORALE 
ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES 
---------------------------------------- 
6 avri1 t"fa jorite 
20 avril Opposition' 
------------------------------------- 
4 mai Majorite 
is rbai Senat 
----------------------------------------- 
1 juin Opposition 
15 juin Ia jorite 
29 juin lissemblee Nationale 
30 mars Oppositi-Dn 
--------------------------------------- 
13 avril S&nat 
27 avril i"7a joritp 
. --------------------------------------- 
11 mai Oppositia: 
25 mai fla jorite 
- - -------------- 
8 juin 
- ------- 
Assenb: i-e !,: zio-ale 
22 juin Senat 
---------- ----------------------- ---- 
0 
s 
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"CALENDRIER DES EMISSIONS CONSACRELS A LA LIBRE EXPRESSION DES ASSEVOLEES 
FARLEMENTAIRES El DES FORMATIONS POLIIIQUES 
1978 
T. F. 1 ANTENNE 2 
13 juillet 
27 juillet 
--------------- 
6 juillet Opposition 
Opposition 
20 juillet Majorite 
Majorite 
---------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
AOUT 
------------- ----------------------ý---? 
septembre----Opposition 
14 septembre Opposition 
21 septembre Majorit6 
28 septembre Majorit6 
----- ------------ -------------------------- ----- 
5 
----------- 
octobre 
------------------------- 
Assemblee Nationale 
12 octobre Senat 
19 octobre Opposition 
26 octobre Opposition 
------------ ----- ------------ -------------------------- ----- 
2 
----------- 
novembre 
------------- 
Senat 
9 novembre Assembles Nationale 
16 novembre Majorit6 
23 novembre Majorit6 
30 novembre Assemblee (Rationale 
-------------- - --- 
7 
------------- 
d6cembre 
-------------------------- 
Senat 
--- ------------ -- -------- 
14 decembre Opposition 
21 decembre Opposition 
r 
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TRIBUNE LIBRE 
-- 1978 J 
PROGRAMMATION DU 1°' JANVIER AU 31 DECEMBRE 1978 
2 janvier Eglise catholique 
3 janvier Club de I'Horloge 
4 janvier Lutte Ouvriere 
5 janvier Presence Socialiste 
6 janvier F. E. N. 
9 janvier M. D. S. F. 
10 janvier F. O. 
11 janvier Federation des Republicains de Progres 
12 janvier Front National 
13 janvier P. S. U. 
16 janvier Clubs Democratie Nouvelle 
17 janvier C. F. D. T. 
18 janvier Club Perspectives et Realites 
19 janvier Federation Anarchiste 
20 janvier Nouvelle Action Francaise 
23 janvier Club pour le Nouveau Contrat Social 
24 janvier C. G. T. 
25 janvier Parti Socialiste Democrate 
26 janvier C. G. C. 
27 janvier Ligue Communiste 
30 janvier Union Travailliste 
31 janvier S. O. S. Environnement 
1 fevrier Association D6mocratie Francaise 
2 Wrier Mouvement des Democrates 
3 fevrier C. F. T. C. 
6 Wrier C. N. P. F. 
7 fevrier Union des Francais de bon sens 
8 fevrier Centre des Democrates Sociaux 
9 Wrier P. S. 
10 fevrier R. P. R. 
j 
i 
i 
Table- 10. ii 
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13 fevrier Pfirti Radical Socialiste 
1.4 fevrier Parti Republicain 
15 fevrier P. C. F. 
16 Wrier Centre National des Independants 
17 Wrier Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche 
Diffusion des Tribunes libres interrompue 
du 20 Wrier au 17 mars 1978 
20 mars Michel Crozier 
21 mars Amities Judeo-Chretiennes 
22 mars Comite International contre la Repression 
23 mars Mouvement National des Elus Locaux 
24 mars Federation Francaise des Equipes St Vincent 
27 mars Jean-Francois Lyotard 
28 mars L'Islam 
29 mars U. N. A. P. E. I. 
30 mars F. E. N. 
31 mars Association Francaise d'Amitie et de Solida- 
rite avec les peuples-d'Afrique- -- 
3 avril Jean Bousquet 
4 avril -. Fed6ration . 'S6pharädie- ====-- 
5 avril - S. O. S. Amities 
6 avril F. O. _- £ 
7 avril -- Grande -Loge -Nationale Frangaise 
10 avril Annie Kriegel =_=- 
11 avril Conseil -National Diu- Mouvement. -cle-la-Paix=- 
12 avril - ' C. D. S. " -- - 
13 avril C. F. D T, - .. 
14 avril Centre =National -des -Jeunes- is-ans-- 
17 avril Vladimir Jandelevitch 
18 avril_ Ligue Nation alecantredailivisectiOn -. - 
19 C. F. T. C. -= _- 
20 avril R. P. R. 
21 avril Eglise Armenienne 
24 avril Clement Rosset 
25 avril Mouvement Solidariste Francais 
26 avril C. G. T. 
27 avril P. S. 
28 avril Present 
f1 
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1 mai Pas de Tribune libre 
2 mai Union des Fefnmes Frangaises 
3 mai C. G. C. 
4 mai Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche 
5 mai Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et 
I'Antisemitisme 
:8 mai 
Sommet pour la Paix d'Anciens Combattants 
de I'Europe des Neuf 
9 mäi Catacombes - Eglise du Silence 
10 mai Humanite Rouge 
11 mai P. R. 
12 mai Federation Sportive et Gymnique du Travail 
15 mai Rene Major 
16 mai Citoyens du Monde 
17 mai C. N. P. F. 
18 mai P. C. F. 
19 mai Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d'Entreprise 
22 mai Jean Charron 
23 mai Mouvement des Cadres Ingenieurs et Diri- 
geants Chretiens 
24 mai F. E. N. 
25 mäi Centre des Democrates Sociaux 
26 mai Fondation pour ('Innovation Sociale 
29 mal Pierre Moustiers 
30 mai 'Combat pour ('Homme 
31 mai Centre National des Independants 
1 juin C. F. D. T. 
2 juin Federation Francaise de Cremation 
5 juin Michel Guerin 
6 juin . Mouvement pour le Desarmement, la Paix et la Liberte 
7 juin C. F. T. C. 
8 juin P. S. 
9 juin " ". Academie Mondiale pour la Paix 
12 juin Michel Le Bris 
13 juin Les Eglises Adventistes 
14 juin F. O. 
15 juin P. R. 
16 juin Genevieve- de Gaulle - 
1 
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19 juin Pierre Daix (grove) 
20 juin Les Mormons 
21 juin C. G. T. 
22 juin R. P. R. 
23 juin Mouvement contre le Racisme, I'Antisemi- 
tisme et pour la Paix 
26 juin Jules Roy 
27 juin S. P. A. 
28 juin C. N. P. F. 
29 juin M. R. G. 
30 juin . Association Francophone d'Accueil et de Liai- 
son 
3 juillet Mouvement Federaliste 
4 juillet Jeunes D6mocrates Sociaux 
5 juillet Mouvement pour une Alternative non Violente 
6 juillet Union Rationaliste 
7 juillet Alliage 
10 juillet Front Libertaire 
11 juillet Association Francaise du Fonds Mondial pour 
---la Nature 
12 juillet Alcooliques Anonymes 
13 juillet Union Nationale des Associations Familiales 
14 juillet Pas de Tribune libre 
4 septembre Eglise- Catholique 
5 septembre : Centre Feminin d'Etudes et d'information 
6 septembre - Temps nouveaux 
7 septembre Mouvement d'Action et de Reflexion -pour les -- Reformes Socialistes 
8 septembre * Jeune Chambre Economique 
11 septembre Union des Athees 
12 septembre Le Club des Quatre 
13 'septembre , Association des Chretiens Temoins dans leur 
Entreprise 
114 septembre Comite de Liaison pour 1'Action Locale et 
Regionale 
-15 septembre CIMADE (Comite Intermouvement aupres des Evacues) 
18 septembre Pierre Daix 
. ." 19 septembre J. O. C. 
20 septembre F. O. .. 
21 septembre Mouvement d'Action Ecopolitique 
22 septembre Libre . Pens6e 
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25 septembre Marc Julia 
26 septembre Eglise Reformee de France 
27 septembre P. C. F. 
28 septembre C. G. C. 
29 septembre Les Guides de France 
2 octobre Jacques Ellul 
3 octobre Mouvement de Defense des Exploitants 
- Agricoles 
4 octobre C. D. S. 
5 octobre Choisir 
6 octobre Action Catholique des Enfants 
9 octobre Jeanne Favret Saada 
10 octobre Le Boudhisme 
11 octobre C. N. I. 
12 octobre F. E. N. 
13 octobre Combat Solidariste 
16 octobre Rene Girard 
17 octobre La Croix d'Or Francaise 
18 octobre P. S. 
19 octobre F. N. S. E. A. 
20 octobre Mouvement Federaliste Europeen 
23 octobre . 
Evelyne. Sullerot 
24 octobre . Rassemblement pour une Renaissance 
Demo- 
graphique (grove) 
25 octobre Alfred Fabre Luce 
26 octobre . Planning Familial 
27 octobre Alliance Nationale pour la Vitalite Francaise 
30 octobre 
31 octobre 
1 novembre 
2 novembre 
3 novembre 
6 novembre 
7 novembre 
8 novembre 
9 novembre 
10 novembre 
Claire Salomon Bayet (greve) 
Association Progres_ (greve) -- 
Equipes Autonomes-d'Entreprises (greve) 
R. P. R. (grove) 
Confederation des Syndicats Libres 
Jean-Pierre Vernant 
Assemblee - Consistoriale Israelite de Paris 
P. R. 
U. N. C. 
U. F. A. C. 
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13 novembre Remy Chauvin 
14 novembre Autrement 
15 novembre C. F. D. T. 
16 novembre Mouvement des Democrates 
17 novembre Mouvement Missionnaire Interieur Laique 
20 novembre Pierre Racine 
21 novembre Robert Laffont 
22 novembre Philippe Lamour 
23 novembre Michel Crozier 
24 novembre Georges Chavannes 
27 novembre R. P. R. 
28 novembre C. N. P. F. 
29 novembre P. C. F. 
30 novembre Democratie Chretienne 
1 decembre Fasti 
4 decembre 
5 decembre 
6 decembre 
7 decembre 
8 decembre 
Equipes Autonomes d'Entreprises 
Association Francaise pour la Communaute 
Atlantique 
Le Nouveau Procope 
M. R. G. 
C. F. T. C. 
11 decembre Croix Rouge 
12 decembre Rassemblement pour une Renaissance Demo- 
graphique 
13 decembre Espaces pour Demain 
14 decembre C. N. I. 
15 decembre C. G. T. 
18 decembre Federation Nationale de la Mutualite Fran- 
paise 
19 decembre C. G. C. 
20 decembre Centre Chretien des Patrons et Dirigeants 
d'Entreprises Frangais 
21 decembre Fraternite d'Abraharn 
22 decembre Esperance et Vie 
25 decembre 
26 decembre 
27 decembre 
28 decembre 
29 decembre 
Secours Catholique 
Federation des Aveugles 
Secours Populaire 
Federation Nationale des Associations 
d'Accueil et de Readaptation Sociale 
Fondation de France 
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Dramatic fiction on French television 
Year 123 
1970 5,229 433 253 
1971 5,422 484 260 
1972 5,671 437 249 
1973 5,700 390 18o 
1974 (Figures not given) 
1975 6,000 225 175 
1976 7,000 249 128 
1977 7,000 260 121 
Column 1 refers to the total viewing time of ORTF channels one 
and two / TF1 and A2. 
Column 2 refers to the total amount of dramatic fiction broad- 
cast. 
Column 3 refers to the total amount of dramatic fiction produced 
by the ORTF/SFP. 
AU figures are in hours. 
Table 11. i 
Source: Le Monde, January 1-2 1978. 
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Appendix 12. i 
Chronology of major legislation on broadcasting: 1923-1974 
1923 Legislation made explicit the monopoly of the State "with 
regard to the transmission and reception (sic) of radio- 
electric signals of any kind. " 
1926 Decree allowed the functioning of private radio stations, 
with derogations extending over a period of six years granted 
to certain private stations. In fact private stations 
continued to operate until 1945 when an ordinance of March 
23 withdrew the authorisation granted by the decree of 
December 28 1926. 
Establishment of the Service de la radiodiffusion which grouped 
together the various bodies concerned with the state radio 
stations. 
1927 State radio became an external service of the Ministry of 
Posts. 
1933 A broadcasting licence-fee was introduced and in return the 
state radio stations renounced all commercial activity. 
1939 The state broadcasting service became a separate administrative 
department. Removed from the control of the Ministry of Posts 
it was now attached to the office of the Prime Minister. 
1941- Two pieces of legislation on the function and organisation of 
1942 the state broadcasting service. 
The broadcasting service was given a theoretical measure of 
administrative autonomy via the establishment of a semi- 
independent Higher Council and a General Board of Management. 
Both these bodies were abolished by ordinance in 1959" 
Since during the Fourth Republic, there was no legislation 
passed on the organisation of broadcasting, the 1941-42 
texts provided the relevant legal framework up to the beginning 
of the Fifth Republic 
1945 State broadcasting monopoly reaffirmed. 
Establishment of the RTF as a state monopoly public service 
financed by block grant and attached to the office of the 
Prime Minister/Ministry of Information. The RTF's administrat- 
ive status was that of a civil service department. 
1959 State monopoly and public service reaffirmed. RTF now 
given the status of a public corporation of an industrial and 
commercial character with an independent budget and placed under 
the authority of the Minister of Information. 
1964 Establishment of the ORTF. The two main innovations of this 
legislation were, first, the creation of a board of governors 
with general administrative functions, and, secondly the 
transfer of the state broadcasting services from under the 
ailtiioritx of the Minister of Information to under his super- vll°n (tut_ elle). 
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1972 Reorganisation of the ORTF. Creation of the post of 
President Directeur Gen6ral combining the previously 
separate functions of director general and chairman of 
the board of governors. Provision was now made for 
functional decentralisation within the overall unitary 
structure of the Office. 
1974 Break-up of the ORTF. Creation of seven separate companies 
of different administrative status with no central coordinating 
body. Abolition of the Ministry of Information. 
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Shareholdings of the French state in peripheral radio and television 
Radio-Monte-Carlo 
Sofirad 
Principality of Monaco 
Radio Europe 1 
Sofirad 
Floirat group 
Principality of Monaco 
Thomson-Brandt 
Other groups 
Diverse 
Sud Radio 
Sofirad 
Radio T616 Luxembourg 
Audiofina (including l'agence Havas with 
a right of veto within Audiofina) 
OPFI Paribas 
Compagnie-des Compteurs 
Hachette 
Diverse 
Television-Monte-Carlo 
83% 
17% 
35.2% (46.89ä of the votes) 
33.6% (29.3% of the votes) 
5.5% 
1.1% 
14.2% 
10.4% 
99.9% 
54.6% 
10.4% 
12.5% 
16. o% 
6.5% 
Europe 1-Images et Son 54% 
(French state via Sofirad has 35.2% of the shares 
and 46.8% of the votes in Europe 1) 
Publicis-Regie-Presse 20% 
Principality of Monaco 18.5% 
Others 7.5% 
Tele-Luxembourg 
Distribution of shares the same as for RTL. 
Figures given as at February 1977. 
Table 12. ii 
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FR3 
TIGLIGVISION REGIONALE' 
DIRECTIONS REGIONALES 
Appendix 12-iii 
Regional broadcasting stations 
0 CENTRE D'ACTUAUTES TEL EVIStES 
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Pirate Radios (summer 1978) 
Paris and Paris region Radio Verte 
Radio Bastille 
Radio Abesses Echo 
Radio 100 
Radio Onz'debrouille 
Radio Generation 2000 
Radio Fil rose 
Radio Libre Paris 
Radio Dedalus 
Radio Noctiluque 
Radio Goyave 
Les Radiotteuses 
Radio Roquette 
Radio Squatt 
Radio Lezard 
Radio Evangile 
Radio 93 
Radio Aventure 
Action Banlieue Sud 
Radio Alternative 78 
Radio BF 15 
Radio Zone 
Radio Corbeil 
Radio Star 
Lille Radio Beau Delire 
Radio Libre Sortie de Secours 
Qu'e11e-etait-werte ma radio 
Radio Libre 59 
Nord Radio Campus 
Radio Calamine 
Radio Detrakes 
Radio Uylenspiegel 
Seine Maritime 
Nantes 
France Radio Club 
Radio Libre 44 
Table 12. iv 
V1V 
Pirate Radios (summer 1978) (continued) 
Cotes-du-Nord Radio Tregor 
Brest Radio Frankle 
Finistere Radio Cornouailles 101 
Haute Saone Radio Horizon 
Haut et Bas Rhin Radio Verte Fessenheim 
Haut Rhin La voix des travailleurs immigres 
Strasbourg Radio Berenice 
Belfort Radio Ondes Rouges 
Bezancon Radio Charly 
Radio 25 
Grenoble Radio Active 
Savoie Alpes Radio 
Lyon Radio Polypheme 
Radio Canut 
Radio Guignol 
Radio Joufflu 
Radio Croix Rousse 
Clermont-Ferrand Radio Babylone 
Alternatives 63 
Drome Stereo 26 
Valence Radio La Meduse 
Nimes Radio Nimes 
Gard Radio Fil ä Soie 
Radio Circus 
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Pirate Radios (summer 1978) (continued) 
Montpellier Radio Fil Bleu 
Radio Mediterrannee 2000 
Radio Soleil 
L'Echo des Garrigues 
Beziers Radio Verte Beziers 
Radio Pomarede 
Herault Herault Tribune 
Marseille Radio Vous 
Radio Printemps 
Cassis Cassis Musique 
Cannes Radio Riviera 
Landes Radio Adour Navarre 
Bayonne Radio Gascogne 
Radio Basque 
Lourdes L'Essor Bigourdan 
Perpignan Radio Par La Racine 
Radio 66 
Hautes Pyren&es Coop4rative Nature et Vie 
Toulouse Radio Occitania 
Radio Libre Toulouse 
Radio Barbe Rouge 
Agen Radio 47 
Tarn-et-Garonne Radio Steward 
Bordeaux Radio Oxygene 
-620- 
Pirate Radios (summer 1978) (continued) 
Gironde 
Toulon 
Nancy 
Jura 
Corsica 
La Mayenne 
Essone 
Radio Bordeaux 
Radio Atol 103 
Radio Mirabelle 
Radio Lacuson 
Radio Corsica Una 
Radiogene 53 
Radio Massipal 
Radio Village 
Val d'Oise Radio 95 
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1978 legislation to enforce the state monopoly 
May 18 Government bill published. (Journal Officiel, Documents 
Assembl4e Nationale, no. 250. 
June 1 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
... par Michel P6ricard. (Journal Officiel Documents 
Assemblee Nationale, no. 315. ) 
June 7 Debate in the National Assembly. (Journal Officiel, 
Deebats Parlementaires Assembl4e Nationale, June 8 1978. ) 
June 13 Bill goes to the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Documents S4nat, 
no. 404. ) 
June 21 Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles 
... par Henri Caillavet. (Journal Officiel, Documents Senat, 
no. 460. ) 
June 23 Debate in the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Debats Parlement- 
aires S4nat, June 24 1978. ) 
June 23 Bill goes to the Commission mixte paritaire. (Journal 
Officiel, Documents Assemblee Nationale, no. 62. 
June 27 Report of the Commission mixte 
and 
June 27 
June 27 
July 27 
July 28 
Documents S4nat, no. 
Debate in the National Assembly. (Journal Officiel 
Debats Parlementaires Assemblee Nationale, June 28 1978. ) 
Debate in the Senate. (Journal Officiel, Dgbats Parlement- 
aires Sdnat, June 28 1978. ) 
Decision of the Constitutional Council. 
Iaw no. 78-787 of July 28 1978. 
Table 12. v 
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Radio stations belonging to the Federation nationale des radios 
libres non commerciales 1978 
Paris and Paris region 
Abbesse Echo 
Radio Aventure 
Radio Cortizone 
Radio Dedalus 
Radio Fil qui chante 
Radio Flip 
Radio Gennevilliers 
Radio Libre Banlieue Sud 
Radio 93 
Radio Rocket 
Radioteuses 
Viking 99 
Radio Libre Paris 
Radio les Raduzes 
Provinces 
Radio Sortie de Secours (Lille) 
Radio Soleil (Montpellier) 
Radio Quimper 
Radio Oxygene (Bordeaux) 
Radio Fil ä Soi (Ales) 
Radio Clapas (Montpellier) 
Radio Canut Guignol (Villeurbane) 
Radio Canut Guignol (Venissieux) 
Radio Canut Guignol (1buest Lyonnais) 
Radio Barbe Rouge (Toulouse) 
Radio 25 (Besangon) 
Source: Undated bulletin of the Federation des radio libres 
non commerciales. 
Table 12. v. 
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Interviews 
(in chronological order) 
Cayrol, Roland Lecturer at the Institut 14/10/1976 
d'Etudes Politiques and writer and 
on the French mass media. 12/7/1979 
Souchon, Michel Member of the. research staff at 
INA 27/10/1976 
Lemerle, Michel President of the Union Nationale des 
syndicats de journalistes 28/10/1976 
Bdraud, Didier Technical adviser to the director 
of the regions, FR3 29/11/1976 
Durand, Jacques Deputy director of the CEO 30/11/1976 
D'Arcy, Jean Member of the Haut Conseil de 3/12/1976 
l'Audiovisuel and former director and 
of television at the RTF. 19/9/1979 
Demaison, Michel Audience research service, A2 8/12/1976 
27/4/1977 and 
21/5/1977 
Lefhbvre, Bruno Consultant and writer on the 11/1/1977 
mass media. 
Locatelli, Jean-Pierre Assistant to Maurice Sgveno, 
Socialist party spokesman for 14/1/1977 
broadcasting 
Cazile, Nicole Audience research service, TF1 19/1/1977 
Pigeat, Henri Deputy director general of Agence 
2ýýý977 France-Presse 
Le Tac, Joel Deputy, member of the Parliamentary 
(25/1/1977 
Delegation for broadcasting, (27/1/1977 
rapporteur sp4cial of the National (13/6/1979 
Assembly finance committee's annual (14/6/1979 
budgetary report on broadcasting 
and rapporteur of the Le Tac report, 
1972. 
Baudouin, Denis Chairman of SOFIRAD 25/1/1977 
Boinvilliers, Jean Deputy, Chairman of the Parliament- 
ary Delegation for broadcasting and 
member of the Haut Conseil de 1' 
Audiovisuel. 26/1/1977 
R9mont, Francoise Production secretary at France- 
Culture 26/1/1977 
Conte, Arthur Former Pr4sident Directeur Nnera1 28/1/1977 
of the ORTF. and 
19/6/1979 
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Martinet, Gilles National secretary of the Socialist 
party 7/2/1977 
Cole, Gorard Secretary of the Comit4 pour le 7/2/1977 
respect du droit a l'information and 
radio-t l4vis e (Committee set up 7/9/1979 
by the parties of the Union of the 
Left to monitor news programming). 
Barbot, Jacques General secretary of the Syndicat 10/2/1977 
National des Journalistes. 
Leroy, Georges Former director of news at Radio 11/2/1977 
Europe no. 1 and former director and 
of news at A2. 14/2/1977 
Balle, Francis Director of the Institut Francais de 
Presse and writer on the mass media. 17/2/19? 7 
Urbin, Danielle Assistant national secretary, SNRT- 
CGT, FR3.21/2/1977 
Rochet, Jacques Member of the national bureau, 
BURT-CFDT, SFP. 24/2/1977 
Costa, Gilbert Member of the national bureau, 
SURT-CFDT, Radio-France. 28/2/1977 
Favre, Jean Member of the national bureau, 28/2/1977 
SURT-CFDT, A2. and 
17/6/1977 
Si4gel, Maurice Former director-general of Radio 
Europe 1 15/3/1977 
Dubois-Dumee, Jean- Member of the Quality Committee 16/3/1977 
Pierre and director general of Tel 4rama 
C avada, Jean-Marie Former news editor at A2 and 
producer of the current affairs 25/3/1977 
programme C'est-ä-dire. 
Dutoit, Christian Former member of Desgraupes' 
editorial team at the ORTF and 25/L+/1977 
former member of A2's news staff 
(technical editor of news). 
Peyrd, Paul Director of external relations, A2. 27/4/1977 
Orhand, Xavier Commercial Director, RF? -TI1 27/4/1977 
Andre, Mario Representative of the SNRT-CGT, A2 2/5/1977 
Mousset, Jean Commercial director, RFP-A2 2/5/1977 
Furbeyre, Jacqueline Deputy director in charge of 4/5/1977 
personnel, A2 and 
16/6/1977 
Schaeffer, Pierre Author, member of the Qu -ity 4/5/ 1977 Committee and of the Rau Conseil and 
de l'Audiovisuel, and fo ier director 2/7/1979 
of research at the ORTF. 
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Guy, Christian Former member of Desgraupes news 
staff at the ORTF and former news 5/5/1977 
editor at A2 
Arnstam, Pierre-Henri Former member of Desgraupes' news 
staff, journalist at A2, represent- 
ative of the CFDT-journalistes 9/5/1977 and 
A2 17/9/1979 
Islet, Jean-Francois Responsible for control of 
advertising, A2 11/5/1977 
Savelli, Mirette Responsible for programme 
schedules, A2 17/5/1977 
Cublier, Jean-Michel Lecturer at Paris I, engaged on 
research on the content of French 
television news programmes. 17/5/1977 
Someritis, Richard Representative of the SNJ, A2 20/5/1977 
Guibert, Edouard Former general secretary of the ORTF 
section of the Syndicat National des 3V5/1977 
Journalist es 
Billy, Maurice Member of the national bureau, 
SURT-CFDT, TF1 13/6/1977 
Barre, Michel Deputy general secretary of the 
FR3 section, SNJ, and member of 
the national bureau, SNJ. 14/6/1977 
Manier, Stephane Journalist, TF1 representative of 
the CFDT-journalistes, TF1 16/6/1977 
Michaud, Roger General secretary of the news depart- 
ment, FO. Trade union observer 
during the meetings of the Journal- 
ists' Reallocation Committee, 20/6/1977 
autumn 1974. 
Thibau, Jacques Former deputy director of televis- 
ion at the ORTF and writer on the 
French mass media. Author of Une 
t-416vision pour tous les fran ais 
and La t levision, le pouvoir et 
216/1977 1'argent. 
Thierry Guillot- Press officer of the UDF 20/6/1979 
Sestier 
Andre Diligent General secretary of the CDS, former 21/6/1979 
Senator, former rapporteur special 
of the Senate finance committee's 
annual budgetary report on the 
ORTF and ra orteur of the Diligent 
reports, 19 and 1972. 
Bertrand Cousin Director of the chairman's cabinet 
3 29/6/1979 
and 
11/7/1979 
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Barrere, Denise Public relations officer, 
Radio France 7/197; 
M. Durufle Director of the cabinet of 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas 3/7/1979 
Arnaud, Jean-Loup Member of the central management, 3/7/1979 
FR3 and former member of Rossi's and 
cabinet, autumn 1974.13/7/1979 
M. Gasser Deputy director of the Senate 9/7/1979 
cultural affairs committee 
Long, Marceau General secretary to the Prime 10/7/1979 
Minister and former President 
Directeur Ggntral of the ORTF. 
Ralite, Jack Deputy, member of the Parliament- 10/7/1979 
ary Delegation for broadcasting 
and Communist party spokesman on 
broadcasting. 
Pouillard, Denys Assistant to Henri Caillavet, 
Senator, rapporteur of the Senate 
cultural affairs committee's annual 12/7/1979 
budgetary report on broadcasting and 
rapporteur of the Caillavet report, 
1978 
Blin, Bernard Member of the management, TFI 12, /7/1979 
L'Ollivier, Paul Member of the management, Radio 13/7/1979 France. 
Kalaydjian, Albert Service Juridigue et Technique 13/7/1979 
de 1"Information 
Mme. Tourillon Secretary of the Quality Committee 13/7/1979 
M. Cordier Journalist, (television page of 
L'Bumanite) 16/7/1979 
Mme. Mairal-Bernard Public relations officer, SIP 16/7/1979 
Caron, Rene General secretary of the M news 
staff. 18/7/1979 
Fabius, Laurent Socialist Party spokesman 19/7/1979 
Vaurs, Roger Former member of the cabinet 
of Chaban-Dehnas responsible 19/7/1979 
for broadcasting policy (1969-1972). 
v"/ 
Mme. Fourneret Secretary of the Haut Conseil de 20/7/1979 
1'Audiovisuel. 
Borvo, Pierre Service Juridique et Technique 
de 1'Information 20/7/1979 
Copin, Noel- Head of the Politics desk, A2 23/7/1979 
Longuet, Gerard Deputy, member of the board of 
governors, TF1.6/9/1979 
de Tarle, Antoine Administrator, National Assembly 8/9/1979 
Desgraupes, Pierre Journalist, former director of 10/9/1979 
news on channel one at the ORTF 
Favre, Jean Member of the board of governors, 
A2 and representative of the 10/9/1979 
SURT-CFDT. 
Cluzel, Jean Senator, rapporteur special of the 
Senate finance committee's annual 
budgetary report on broadcasting 11/9/1979 
and rapporteur of the Cluzel report, 
1979. 
Suffert, Georges Journalist, Le Point 11/9/1979 
Perier, Jean-Claude Conseiller d'Etat, Vice-chairman 13/9/1979 
of the Staff Reallocation Committee 
and former chairman of the Quality 
Committee 
Rosset, Jean-Loup Secretary to the board of governors, 14/9/1979 
TF1 
M. Mougey Service Juridique et Technique 17/9/1979 
de 1'Information 
Reynaud, Genevibve Member of the management, Radio 18/9/1979 
France 
Carat, Jacques Senator, member of the board of 
18/9/1979 governors, Radio France. 
Jullian, Marcel Former chairman of A2 19/9/1979 
Mme. Stefanaggi Former member of the Liquidation 19/9/1979 
Service of the ORTF 
Esteve, Daniel Journalist, representative of CFDT- 
journalistes, A2 20/9/1979 
de PrLumont, Jean Deputy, ranporteur of the National 
Assembly cultural affairs committee's 
annual budgetary report on broad- 21/9/1979 
casting. 
Marchand, Jean-Pierre TV producer 25/9/1979 
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